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iABSTRACT
The aim of this study is to evaluate the risk-return efficiency of credit policies for
managing portfolio credit risk of banking institutions.  The focus of the empirical
analysis is on a range of possible policy options using a simulation model that represents
an operating environment of lenders servicing the Australian farm sector.  Banking
institutions resort to a range of internal policy instruments to manage potential loss of
income and capital in event of borrower default.  The use of internal policy mechanisms
occurs because well-developed derivative markets for managing credit risks are limited.
Efficacy of credit policy maximises the capacity of banks to absorb loan losses when
they occur and minimises the possibility of bank failure.  By corollary, efficient credit
policy also extends the limits to which banks can make finance available to borrowers,
and to offer lower lending rates in a competitive lending environment.  To this end,
decision-makers in banks have been focusing on applying the portfolio theory concepts
of risk measurement, diversification and pricing for risk to credit policy development.
However, there have been limited empirical applications of portfolio theory to credit
policy formulation in the literature.  In this study, insurance theory principles and agency
relationships between a borrower and a lender are integrated into the portfolio theory
framework.  This framework is used to assess the nature of the relationships between
each type of credit risk and credit policy.
Credit risk is viewed as being comprised of two components: expected loss and
unexpected loss.  Expected loss equals the income and capital loss expected in event of
default weighted by the probability of default.  Unexpected loss is the extent to which
deviations in realised loan losses occur from their expected values.  When many
borrowers are combined to form a portfolio, borrowers may be graded on a common
basis through the expected loss spectrum for default risk and security risk using a
two-dimensional risk classification matrix structure.  The extent to which unexpected
losses on individual loan securities are correlated defines systematic risk while the
remaining portfolio risk constitutes unsystematic risk.  Systematic risk among loan
securities occurs as a result of correlation of loss probabilities between different types of
borrowers.  Since the probability of default of borrowers is directly related to their
income distributions, correlations of loss distributions occurs as a result of a common
ii
set of exogenous factors affecting income distributions of borrowers in different regions
and industries.  Beta risk on loan securities is therefore assessed on the basis of securities
classified for regional and industry segmentations.
Promised interest rates charged on loan securities are comprised of four key
components when priced for credit risk: the risk free rate, the default risk premium, the
security risk premium and the portfolio risk premium.  For a particular borrower, the
default risk premium and the security risk premium are added together to give a
certainty-equivalent risk premium.  This risk premium allows lenders to be compensated
for expected losses on loan securities held by a borrower.  If each credit risk class
includes many region-industry segments with each segment containing a large number of
similar sized borrowers, lenders may force the unsystematic component of portfolio risk
to zero.  A key pre-condition behind risk spreading is independence between the
covariances of loss rates across regions and industries.  If independence is achieved, the
income received through the certainty-equivalent risk premium exactly matches the
expected loss rate on the risk class.  Under these conditions, the expected return on
each risk class in a competitive capital market is the risk free rate of interest.
The portfolio risk premium is a function of the market risk premium for bearing
portfolio risk and beta risk on loan securities in a particular region-industry segment.
Portfolio risk premiums may be formulated using low or high order definitions of
regions and industries depending on the nature of data available to measure beta.  A
portfolio risk premium is added to the certainty-equivalence promised interest rate to
give the promised interest rate charged to a borrower.  This pricing behaviour allows the
expected returns on loan securities to reflect differences in beta risk associated with
different region-industry segments.
Pricing for credit risk is efficient so long as risk concentrations are not excessive and the
default risk of borrowers remains independent of the promised rate of interest.  At the
portfolio level, excessive risk concentrations for most lending institutions may arise as a
result of dissimilar sized borrowers and disproportionate numbers of borrowers in
different low-order definitions of regions and industries.  Maximum portfolio
concentration limits may therefore be defined for different categories of borrowers in
order to limit excessive risk concentrations.  Minimum portfolio limits may be used to
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assure risk spreading across a sufficient number of region-industry segments within a risk
class.  Lenders also manage the impact of unexpected losses on their portfolio returns
through adequate allocations of equity capital on particular portfolio segmentations.
At the borrower level, credit controls may be used to ensure that borrower default risk
remains independent of the promised interest rate being charged over a limited range of
the expected loss spectrum.  A risk pricing limit may be set for different portfolio
segments at the point where promised interest rates begins to affect default risk.  Credit
quality limits may be formulated in terms of a maximum acceptable expected probability
of default and a minimum acceptable expected security coverage.  Loan proposals that
do not satisfy credit quality limits are either rejected or revised in the credit screening
process.  Revision of loan applications may occur in circumstances where default risk is
not independent of pricing or where loans are insufficiently secured.  In these cases,
credit quality may be improved by obtaining more collateral coverage or through
reducing maximum credit limits.  A minimum credit reserve limit may be devised to
permit lenders to price new borrowers for credit risk in the region of acceptable credit
quality in accordance with risk constraints implied by a credit risk classification system.
If borrowers do default, maximum credit limits may be extended or loan repayments
may be rescheduled to improve the dynamic profile of the lender’s risk and returns on
loan securities.
Since the risk-return efficiency of various credit policy parameters involves empirical
investigation, a dynamic portfolio model is outlined to enable the analysis of different
credit policy options.  The decision problem facing a lender in selecting credit policy is
modelled as a choice between portfolio return distribution functions arising from
different credit policy regimes.  Stochastic dominance (SD) efficiency criteria are used to
choose between credit policy alternatives.  The SD criteria considers the total return
distribution and requires only general assumptions to be made about the nature of the
risk-return preferences of decision makers in banks.
The portfolio theory framework is couched in terms of the capital budgeting approach
to generate a portfolio return distribution function for a particular credit policy regime.
Using this framework, borrowers are segmented by credit risk class, region, industry
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and loan maturity to give categories of loan securities with relatively homogeneous
distribution functions for bank returns.  Each credit risk class defines risk constraints
on which a stochastic simulation model of the average borrower in a portfolio segment
may be developed.  The credit risk classification system links a borrower’s financing
decision to their production and investment decisions in line with credit policy.  The
simulation method for credit scoring allows alignment of borrowers with differing
credit quality characteristics to a credit risk classification system, and offers an
alternative technique to existing credit scoring methods in the literature.  In the
dynamic model, the stochastic simulation method is used to generate loan security
returns through time.  Loan return outcomes predicted for a given borrower income
scenario are weighted by the number of borrowers in the segment to give measures of
portfolio performance in absolute dollar terms.
The computable simulation model developed in this study uses farm surveys data to
generate a portfolio environment that is representative of lenders servicing the
Australian farm sector.  This model is used to examine the risk-return efficiency of two
aspects of credit policy: risk pricing limits in loan reviews and a loan restructuring option
versus a ‘no restructuring’ option.  The findings suggest that banks servicing the
Australian farm sector will earn more profit without additional portfolio risk if the
maximum limit to which pricing accounts for default risk in loan reviews is positively
linked to volatility of gross incomes of farm business borrowers.  Importantly, this
finding is contingent on well-defined credit underwriting standards to be applied in loan
originations.  In particular, credit-underwriting standards must be formulated so as to
procure farm business borrowers of high credit quality with loans that are fully secured
using fixed assets.  The credit scoring results indicate that for farm business borrowers in
Australia to achieve acceptable credit quality, they must have high levels of productivity
compared to the region-industry average.  The results of simulations also show that a
flexible rather than a rigid policy approach to problem loan management provides for
large net benefits since such a strategy reduces the sensitivity of non-pricing aspects of
credit policy on the dynamic profile of credit risk of farm business borrowers.
With further research, the simulation model may be used to identify sets of efficient
credit policies in which trade-offs in portfolio risk and bank returns occur.  With this
vinformation, pricing and lending guidelines that embodies the optimal credit policy set
may be formulated for application by line personnel in credit approval and loan review
processes.
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1CHAPTER ONE
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Importance of efficient credit policy
Credit policy is used to manage credit risk - the most significant risk faced by banks and
financial institutions (Gray 1997a).  Credit risk arises from the possibility of customer or
counter-party default and leads to loss of income and capital.  The extent to which banks can
absorb loan losses is limited, due to the nature of banking business where both low profit
margins and low equity capital to asset ratios are common.  For example, the major banks in
Australia experienced loan losses ranging from 0.39% and 1.6% of average assets in the six
years to 1995 (RBA, 1995a). While net interest margins were relatively stable at around 3.1%
of average assets during the period, after including non-interest income and deducting for
operating expenses, the rate of return on assets for the major banks varied between -0.21% and
0.93%.  In the period, the capital ratio for the major banks averaged just over 10%.  Despite
capital ratios being limited on the down-si e by regulatory capital requirements, the potential
for unanticipated loan losses to absorb equity capital is high due to the relatively small capital
buffer when capital ratios are low (Saunders 1994, p 315).  Efficacy of credit policy maximises
the capacity of banks to absorb loan losses when they occur (Boffey and Robson, 1995), and
minimises the possibility of bank failure (Ullmer 1997).  By corollary, efficient credit policy
also extends the limits to which banks can make finance available to borrowers, and to offer
lower lending rates in a competitive lending environment.
1.2 The credit policy formulation challenge
For financial institutions holding large diverse portfolios of loan securities, the formulation of
credit policy, which meets risk-return objectives in an optimal sense, continues to challenge
decision makers.  Well-d veloped derivative markets, such as those available for managing
interest rate and exchange rate risks, are limited for loan securities issued into retail lending
markets (Saunders 1994, p 549).  Decision makers manage credit risk to a significant degree
through internal policy mechanisms.
Prior to the deregulation of the Australian banking system in the 1980s, credit risk was viewed
primarily as an intangible and managed on a loan-by-loan basis by rationing credit to borrowers
(Campbell, Coates, Halkerston, McCrossin, Mallyan and Argy 1981, Gollinger and Morgan
21993).  However, the use of various policy mechanisms changed markedly with deregulation as
competitive pressures in retail credit markets intensified, and financial institutions extended
their lending activities further across the credit risk spectrum (Hawtry 1995, Gray 1997b).
First, the measurement of credit risk became fundamental to risk management (Davis and Harper
1991, p 2).  To this end, banks have progressively been adopting more scientific approaches to
credit risk measurement via structured credit risk classification systems and credit scoring
models (Brice 1992, Gray and Cassidy 1997).  Second, pricing for credit risk became an
imperative in a competitive lending environment (Hawtrey 1995).  Without risk pricing, low
risk borrowers viewed loans priced according to a simple average interest rate on offer as
expensive and sought finance from competing banks.  As low risk borrowers exited the loan
portfolio, high-risk borrowers remaining in the bank’s portfolio are inadequately priced for
credit risk (Miller, Ellinger, Barry and Lagili 1993).  Finally, with the removal of external
controls, banks came under pressure to develop well-d fined internal policy guidelines on their
own lending activities in order to manage credit risk exposure.
The selection of an optimal set of policies requires information on credit risk management
strategies that most efficiently meet the risk-return objectives of decision makers across the risk
spectrum.  To achieve this, banks have been focusing on applying the concepts of diversification
and pricing for risk on tradeable securities as developed in portfolio theory by Markowitz
(1959) and Sharpe (1964).  While the portfolio theory paradigm forced a re-examin tion of the
way in which credit policy may be formulated, portfolios of loan securities do not fully satisfy
the precepts of the efficient market hypothesis on which portfolio theory is based  (Whitelaw
1997).  The limited trading of loan securities result in an absence of market-based info mation
to enable the formulation of efficient credit policy through the use of internal policy
mechanisms.
Decision makers also encounter a range of problems in generating alternative sources of
information for this purpose.  Drawing parallels between a borrower’s performance, portfolio
performance and the volatility of exogenous factors determining business performance to credit
risk is difficult due to the dynamic nature of credit risk.  In pricing borrowers for credit risk,
banks are faced with trade-offs between raising returns and the possibility of exacerbating it’s
level of credit risk exposure.  The coincidence of financial risk of borrowers and credit risk
exposure of banks complicates the measurement of credit risk and compounds the difficulties in
disentangling the impact of credit policy on measures of credit risk.
31.3 Research methods for credit policy development
Subjective approaches aside, the quantitative assessment of credit policy within the context of a
credit risk classification system involves the use of experiments.  One experimental approach is
to directly apply different credit policy settings in the credit market at various time intervals.
Econometric methods may be used to assist in evaluating the impacts of different policy settings
on bank returns and risk that occurred across time periods.  This time series approach would
need to be complemented by cross sectional information on the interaction between borrower,
credit risk outcomes and credit policy.  A disadvantage of the approach is that it disrupts the
normal course of banking business.  To ameliorate this problem, simulation models can be used
to conduct empirical investigations into credit policy development.
The simulation method involves developing a mathematical model of the credit risk management
system itself.  The impact of different credit policies may be evaluated by studying the
behaviour of the model whose cause-and-effect relationships are similar to those of the credit
risk management system in practice (Carmichael and Davis 1991).  There have been few
empirical studies that have analysed credit policy in a portfolio context.  Early simulation
applications of portfolio theory to banking focussed on portfolio management issues relating to
either balance sheet or bond portfolio structures (see Whitelaw (1997) for a review).  Gollinger
and Morgan (1993) took a different approach.  They sought to specifically model the problem of
risky loan selection for a commercial bank loan portfolio.  While Gollinger and Morgan (1993)
recognised the difficulties in applying the standard Markowitz-Sharpe framework to loan
portfolio management issues, their model is limited in it’s scope for prescription to the full
range of issues involved in credit policy formulation.  In particular, little emphasis was placed
on linking feed-back mechanisms between credit policy and borrower performance, and in turn,
loan return distribution functions, and risk classification systems used to measure these
distributions.
1.4 Objectives and structure of thesis
The aim of this study is to evaluate the risk-return efficiency of credit policies for managing
portfolio credit risk of banking institutions.  The focus of empirical analysis is on a range of
possible credit policy options using a simulation model that is representative of an operating
environment of lenders with significant distribution networks servicing the Australian farm
sector.  In the farm sector, the dynamics of credit risk are distinctly different to those operating
in other sectors and lenders face significant challenges in formulating efficient credit policy.
Unlike many non-farm industries, actual farm income may exceed or fall short of planned
4income due to the biological nature of agricultural production.  Time lags can exist between a
decision to produce and realisation of the final output in contrast to the assembly line type
process that typifies much of non-farm production systems.  In addition, the ultimate impact of
these factors on credit risk differs considerably by geographic region and by industry.  As such,
information required for efficient credit policy formulation is substantial.  However, the
diversity of borrower types is likely to have favourable implications for credit risk management
for Australian banks with extensive branch networks.  The spread of farm business borrowers
across Australia for the major banks contrasts to the unit banking system in the United States
with it’s emphasis on regional concentrations.
The thesis is structured into three parts.  Chapter Two through to Chapter Seven presents the
principles for the development and selection of credit policy for the management of credit risk
arising from a portfolio of securities.
· In Chapter Two, the theoretical foundations for measuring and managing risk according to
portfolio theory are reviewed.  Following this, portfolio theory is examined from the
perspective of credit risk in Chapter Three.  Key elements of agency theory and insurance
theory are used to highlight the limitations in applying standard portfolio theory to portfolios
of non-tradeable loan securities.  In Chapter Four, a dynamic portfolio model of illiquid loan
securities is presented in which agency and insurance theory principles are integrated into the
portfolio theory framework.  A key feature of this model is the use of a credit risk
classification system to measure the nature of the loan return distribution function.  This
model is used in Chapter Five to outline the principles for efficient credit risk management
in a portfolio theory framework.  Chapter Six extends the discussion on credit risk
management by considering the credit risk dynamics stemming from loan product structures.
Since a range of credit policy alternatives are presented, Chapter Seven outlines the
stochastic dominance method for evaluating risky portfolio investments as an approach for
choosing between different credit risk management options.
Chapter Eight through to Chapter Ten presents the key elements of the credit risk evaluation
process for delivery of credit policy.
· In Chapter Eight, the operational processes for identifying and evaluating linkages between
the uncertain economic environment and borrower performance via a credit risk classification
system are explained.  Following this in Chapter Nine, a range of credit scoring models used
to quantitatively link measured characteristics of borrowers to measures of credit risk are
reviewed and the stochastic simulation approach for credit scoring is introduced.  The
capacity for these credit scoring models to be linked to a credit risk classification system for
5alignment to measures of portfolio credit risk and therefore to deliver credit policy is
assessed in Chapter Ten.
Chapter Eleven through to Chapter Fifteen presents the details of the empirical analysis.
· In Chapter Eleven, a stochastic simulation model of a bank’s farm loan portfolio is presented
in which key aspects of the economic environment facing the Australian farm sector are
integrated into the modelling framework.  The data used as input into the stochastic
simulation model is outlined in Chapter Twelve.  Following this, the design of the credit
policy experiments is outlined and a range of statistical issues in utilising a stochastic
simulation model is discussed in Chapter Thirteen.  The results of an evaluation of a range of
different credit policy options are presented in Chapter Fourteen.  Chapter Fifteen, the final
chapter, draws conclusions for efficient delivery of credit policy by banks with loan
exposures in the Australian farm sector.
61. INTRODUCTION 1
1.1 Importance of efficient credit policy 1
1.2 The credit policy formulation challenge 1
1.3 Research methods for credit policy development 3
1.4 Objectives and structure of thesis 3
7CHAPTER TWO
2. PRINCIPLES OF PORTFOLIO THEORY
2.0 Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to outline the theoretical foundations for measuring and managing risk
from a portfolio theory perspective.  In the next section, concepts for measuring the probability
distribution function of the returns on a security and portfolios of securities under portfolio
theory are discussed.  In Section 2.3, implications are drawn for efficient selection of
combinations of securities based on their risk-return characteristics as reflected in a portfolio’s
expected return and the variability of that return.  In Section 2.4, the Capital Asset Pricing
Model, an extension of portfolio theory, is discussed to examine i ’s implications for pricing
risky capital assets.  In Section 2.5, the Capital Asset Pricing Model is used to examine the role
played by a firm’s capital structure in influencing it’s risk-return profile.  A summary is
provided in the final section.
2.0 Measurement of risk
In portfolio theory, investors are assumed to make choices between risky securities on the basis
of their risk and return (Markowitz 1952, 1959).  For marketable securities, their returns may be
measured by the holding period rate of return.  The holding period is specified (for example, one
year) and all the benefits received during the year are theoretically reinvested.  For multi-p riod
investments, the holding period rate of return can readily be converted to an equivalent return
per period by compounding the holding period rate of return for each period.  The expected
(mean) return of a security is used as an indicator of it’s nticipated profitability.  In general
terms, the expected value of an investment is simply the possible return outcomes weighted by
their probability of occurrence.  If rij  is the j-th possible outcome for the return on  security i
and if pij  is the probability of the j-th return, the expected return is given by:
(2.1) E r p ri ij ij
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The security’s forecast uncertainty is measured by the variance (or standard deviation) and is
used as an indicator of risk.
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For simplicity, the distribution of returns from a security may be assumed to be normal.
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If an investor holds n ecurities with weights, wi  , equal to it’s percentage value in the
portfolio, the expected return on the portfolio is the weighted average of the expected return of
each security in the portfolio:
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where E rp( ) = expected portfolio return;
2
pd = variance of portfolio returns;
Covr ri j( ) = covariance of returns on security i and security j;
wi = the share of the asset value of the i-th security of the total
asset value of the portfolio; and
i = 1, … , n securities.
2.0 Portfolio theory
Portfolio theory examines the selection of different combinations of securities based on their
risk-return characteristics as reflected in a portfolio’s expected return and the variability of that
return under the assumption of the efficient market hypothesis  (Harrington 1987, p 26).  An
efficient market occurs when security prices fully reflect all available information (Fama 1970).
Key assumptions that underlie the efficient market hypothesis include (Harrington 1987, p 26):
· when investors’ objective is to maximise the utility of terminal wealth;
· investors make choices on the basis of risk and return as outlined in Section 2.2;
· investors have homogeneous expectations of risk and return;
· investors have identical time horizons; and
· information is freely and simultaneously available to investors.
Given these assumptions, a decision rule for evaluating risky alternatives can be based solely on
their expected returns and variance (M rkowitz 1952).  The ‘expected return-varia ce’ or
9‘mean-variance’ (also referred to in the literature as the E-V rule) can be defined as follows.
Security i will be preferred to security j if one of the following two conditions hold.
· Expected return of security i exceeds (or is equal to) the expected return of security j and the
variance of i is less than the variance of j  or
· The expected return of security i exceeds that of security j and the variance of i is less than
(or equal to) that of j.
The E-V rule may be expressed algebraically as follows.  Security i is preferred to security j if
either
(2.6) E r E r Var r Var ri j i j( ) ( ) ( ) ( )³ <   and   
(2.7) E r E r Var r Var ri j i j( ) ( ) ( ) ( )> £   and   .
The E-V rule may also be applied to portfolios of securities to define an efficient portfolio in
terms of an optimal set of portfolio weights for different securities (Markowitz 1959).  An
efficient portfolio is one that provides the maximum return for a given level of risk (as measured
by the variance) or the minimum risk for a given level of return.  By varying the level of return,
and minimising at each of these levels the volatility of returns on the portfolio, a locus of
optimal combinations of individual investments into portfolios may be constructed.  This
analytical tool is called the efficient frontier.  This is the locus of portfolios that minimise risk
for each level of expected return.  To derive the efficient frontier, quadratic programming may
be used to minimise the portfolio variance for differing levels of return.  The objective function
and the constraints for the quadratic programming problem may be specified as follows:
(2.8) Minimise
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Equation (2.8) specifies the objective function of the quadratic-programming problem as
minimise the portfolio variance.  The first constraint (equation (2.9)) assumes all the weights on
each security sum to one.  The second constraint (equation (2.10)) states that the expected return
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on the portfolio is a weighted sum of the expected returns on the securities and this must be at
least equal to the minimum required rate of return *r .  The final restriction (equation (2.11))
precludes the possibility of negative holdings in security . This later restriction means that the
possibility of short sales is excluded.
Given that the investment universe is such that the return and risk of each security is measured
in terms of it’s expected returns and it’s variance in conjunction with it’s ovariances with other
securities, an investor may set differing levels of expected portfolio returns and minimise the
associated portfolio risk.  Using the selection criteria outlined in eq ations (2.6) and (2.7), the
investor can ensure consistency in their selection process in choosing a particular combination
of securities and calculate their respective weightings in the investor’s portfolio.  The output of
the programming problem is therefore a set of optimal weightings of particular securities that
results in the minimum portfolio variance for a given level of expected portfolio returns.
The primary conclusion of portfolio theory is that investment risk can be reduced by
diversification, that is, by spreading the portfolio across different classes and types of assets.
The risk associated with holding any given portfolio of assets consists of two distinct types of
risk: unsystematic risk (USR) and systematic risk (SR).
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Unsystematic risk measures the portion of portfolio risk that is associated with individual asset
returns behaving independently of each other.  As diversification increases, meaning that as
progressively more assets are added to the portfolio with each weighted equally in the portfolio,
the unsystematic risk component is easily diversified away.
Systematic risk involves a different concept.  If covariance is expressed as r d dij i j  where rij
represents the correlation coefficient between the returns on assets i and j , then clearly
systematic risk measures the portion of portfolio risk that is a consequence of returns on
different assets being correlated with one another.  When returns are positively correlated, their
return variabilities do not cancel one another out completely.  That is, as more securities are
added to a portfolio, more c variances are also added, and while the weight of each covariance
for each security gets smaller, their sum converges on the average covariance (see Figure 2.1).
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Figure 2.1   Portfolio diversification and risk reduction
p
number of securities in portfolio
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Thus the investor’s decision-making process on risky aset selection may be modelled as a
problem of choosing an optimal combination of securities (portfolio) out of the subset of
efficient combinations (portfolios).  These efficient securities holdings facing a investor can be
described by the upper half of the envelope curve in the E(rp) and dp space as illustrated in
Figure 2.2.  All interior combinations, and combinations below min)( prE , should not be
chosen.  These combinations of securities represent inefficient portfolio options.  Investors can
always improve their position (increase return with no increase in risk, or reduce risk without sacrifice
of return) by choosing a different combinations of securities that exist only on the efficient frontier.
Figure 2.2    Efficient frontier
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2.0 Capital Asset Pricing Model
Markowitz’s analysis provided a convenient framework for measuring portfolio risk and
portfolio return.  The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) takes this framework a step further
by examining it’s implications for pricing risky capital assets (Sharpe 1964, Linter, 1965,
Mossin, 1966).  The CAPM simplifies the Markowitz framework by establishing a benchmark
index of the market value weighted portfolio of all possible risk investments.
This market-value-weighted portfolio, or index, is called the market portfolio (Harrington 1987,
p 14).  A requirement of the CAPM is the existence of a risk free security which investors can
borrow and lend unlimited amounts.  The risk free security by definition has a zero variance and
zero covariance with any other security and earns a small but positive return as determined by
the time value of money.  There are no taxes, transaction costs, restrictions on selling short, or
other market imperfections.  Total asset quantity is fixed, and all assets are marketable and
divisible (Harrington 1987, p 26).
If an investor has access to risk free securities, an array of efficient portfolios may be
constructed using different combinations of the risk free security and risky securities.  This array
of combinations is described by the capital market line and represents all possible capital
market investments proportionately.  The point of tangency between the capital market line and
the efficient frontier, M in Figure 2.3, shows the expected returns if the average investor held an
all equity portfolio and earns E rm( ) .
13
Figure 2.3    Efficient frontier and the capital market line
capital market line
M
efficient frontier
i
d p
E r( )p 
Er( )m 
Portfolios on the capital market line dominate portfolios on the efficient frontier because an
investor can earn a higher expected portfolio return for a given level of portfolio risk than if they
choose a portfolio on the efficient frontier.  The tangency point, M, is the so called market
portfolio and, in theory, is the theoretically desired optimal portfolio containing all risky
securities in proportions reflecting the minimum variance portfolio.  The equation for the capital
market line is:
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Investors exhibiting less risk aversion than the average investor earn a rate of return on their
portfolios that lie on the capital market line between i and E rm( ) .  These investors hold
proportionately less of M with the remaining proportion invested in risk free securities.  A more
aggressive investor may earn a rate of return beyond E rm( )  by holding negative balances of the
risk free asset.  This debt-supported or leveraged portfolio strategy enables investors to move
further to the right on the capital market line, thus allowing higher expected returns (and higher
risk).  The way in which investors may influence returns and risk on a portfolio through leverage
is discussed in more detail in the next section.
The process of arbitrage ensures that asset prices reflect capital values determined by the
CAPM.  Arbitrage occurs because investors maximise their utility of terminal wealth in a
frictionless investment environment.  The market portfolio, M, is the unique portfolio on the
efficient frontier where unsystematic risk is zero since this portfolio is fully diversified.  If
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investors hold undiversified inefficient combinations of securities, other investors that do
actively pursue a M rkowitz diversification strategy bid up prices of securities to their fair
market value that will reflect the equilibrium expected return at a given level of risk.  Prices of
risky securities and their expected returns are required to compensate for non-diversifiable or
market risk.  Diversifiable risk is not compensated in terms of higher expected returns since
investors can easily account for this risk through diversification strategies.
The CAPM implies that a security market line may be used to measure the extent of
compensation required in the price of the risky security that cannot be eliminated through
diversification.  The security market line measures the contribution of the returns of a risky
security to a measure of systematic risk called beta , b, as shown in equation (2.15):
(2.15) b
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where bi             = beta coefficient on the i-th security;
Covr ri m( )  = covariance between  the return on  the i-th security and the returns
on the market portfolio;
ri m,           = correlation coefficient between the return on the i-th security and
the market portfolio;
d m
2           = variance of market portfolio; and
d di m,           = standard deviation of security i and the market portfolio
respectively.
If returns on a security move exactly in line with returns from the market portfolio, the value of
beta, b i , is equal to one.  A security’s expected returns will equal the market return, rm nd it’s
risk premium equals the difference between the market return and the risk free return.  For
securities that are more volatile than the market portfolio, ie b i > 1, risk premiums are greater
than the market-portfolio risk premium.  For securiti s less volatile than the market portfolio, ie
b  i < 1, risk premiums are less than the market portfolio.  The CAPM equation for estimating
the required rate of return on a security is:
(2.16) E r i E r ii m i( ) { ( ) }= + -   b
where E ri( )    =expected return on security i;
     i      =riskless rate of return; and
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E rm( )    = expected return on the market portfolio.
Since each investor in a perfect market extracts all potential gains from diversification, the only
remaining risk after diversification is systematic risk.  Systematic risk occurs as a result of a
common set of exogenous factors affecting all asset prices.  Because each asset is not be
affected identically by these factors, the covariance of returns on individual assets relative to
standard deviation of returns on the market portfolio will differ.  Accordingly, the size of risk
premiums that are added to the risk free rate reflects the extent of the covariance relationship of
returns on each asset with the covariance of returns on the market portfolio.  Thus beta can
replace the variance as a measure of portfolio risk because investors hold fully diversified
portfolios.  In Figure 2.4, the security market line represents the trade-off between beta and
return for every asset.
Figure 2.4    Security market line
security market line
i
E ri( ) 
E r m ( )
1 b i
2.0 Capital structure
A firm’s risk-return profile is affected by not only it’s selection criteria for particular
investments but also by it’s capital structure.  A firm’s capital structure is described by the mix
of debt and equity securities used to fund it’s asset portfolio.  Under the principle of value
additivity, the value of debt securities,D, and equity securities,E , is equal to the firm’s
holdings of a portfolio of assets, A:
(2.17) A D E= +    
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Modigliani and Miller (1958) (referred to as MM henceforth) provided a rigorous analysis of
the relationship between the value of the firm and it’s capital structure and stated three
propositions.  MM proposition I states that the market value of any firm is independent of it’s
capital structure.  MM proposition II is that the expected rate of return on the equity securities
of a levered firm increases in proportion to the debt-equity ra io ( / )D E , expressed in terms of
market values.  MM proposition III is that the appropriate discount rate for investment
appraisal is independent of how an investment is to be financed.  Key assumptions behind the
MM propositions are:
· individual and firms can borrow or lend at the same market rate of interest;
· there is no risk of bankruptcy; and
· there are no transaction costs or other barriers to the free flow of information in the security
markets.
If the above assumptions are satisfied, then the MM propositions apply to both borrowers and
lenders since both types of firms are assumed to be subject to the same market rate of interest.
The same market rate of interest may apply because arbitrage between firms with either surplus
capital or insufficient capital occurs without transaction costs or other barriers to the free flow
of information.
While MM used the present value of the firm approach in proving their propositions, Haugen
and Pappas (1971) recouched the MM propositions in terms of the CAPM.  Given equation
(2.17), and ignoring taxation implications, the firm’s beta also called asset or portfolio beta,
Ab , can be expressed as the weighted sum of it’s equity and debt betas, enoted as Eb and
Db  respectively:
(2.18) b b bA D ED A E A= +  ( / ) ( / )
A firm’s asset beta is based on the market portfolio and may therefore be viewed as measuring
it’s business risk.  In the context of financing investment, business risk is defined as the
uncertainty or variability associated with the firm’s future operating income.  In the process of
utilising debt finance or leverage, the systematic risk of the levered firm is larger than the
systematic risk of the non-leveraged firm.  As leverage increases, the uncertainty or variability
in the rate of return on securities due to debt financing (otherwise termed financial risk)
increases since the obligations of debt holders are met from earnings from equity holdings in a
period of reduced earnings (Levy and Sarnat 1990, p 334).
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If b D  is positive, that is debt incurs additional systematic risk to the firm, then equation (2.18)
may be rearranged in terms of the debt-to-equity ratio to give:
(2.19) b b b bE A A D D E= + -( ) /  
Equation (2.19) indicates that a firm’s equity beta depends on it’s asset beta (or business risk),
the spread between the asset and debt betas and the firm’s leverage.  If borrowings occur at the
risk free rate, then b D = 0 and equation (2.19) may be rewritten as:
(2.20) b b bE A A D E= +    /
Under either circumstance, equity beta may be expressed as a linear function of the firm’s
leverage.  The effect of financial leverage on equity beta is depicted in Figure 2.5 in the case of
risk free debt.  The key conclusions of the analysis, which ignores tax effects, are that financial
leverage creates financial risk and the beta of the firm’s equity increases as leverage increases.
However, the firm’s asset or portfolio beta remains unaffected and therefore the market value of
the firm is independent of it’s capital structure as given in MM’s proposition I.
MM’s proposition II is based on the law of one price in which arbitrage in a perfect capital
market results in prices of capital assets with perfect substitutability to being the same at a
given point in time.
Figure 2.5    Effect of leverage on equity beta
b
0
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The rate of return required on a portfolio of securities held by a firm may be given by the
weighted average cost of capital when leverage is utilised.  In this case, the expected return on a
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portfolio comprising all of the firm’s securities,Ar , s given by the cost (or expected return) of
debt capital, rD , and the cost (or expected return) of equity capital,rE , mul iplied by their
weights in the portfolio to give the weighted average cost of capital, wacc.
(2.21) wacc r r
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A
r
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   = = +
Since a firm’s equity beta is a linear function of it’s leverage, th  expected rate of return on the
equity securities of a levered firm also increases in proportion to the debt-equity ratio.  By
rearranging equation (2.21), the expected return on equity may be found.
(2.22) r r r r D EE A A D= + -( ) /  
Accordingly, the rate of increase in the equity return depends on the spread between the
expected rate of return on a portfolio of all the firm’s securities Ar  and th  expected return on
the debt, Dr , as shown in Figure 2.6.  Given arbitrage in perfect capital markets, returns on
marketable equity securities are raised to exactly compensate holders of equity securities for the
contribution of financial risk as leverage increases.  According to MM, arbitrage ensures that
that there is no optimal capital structure and the appropriate discount rate for investment
appraisal is simply the expected rate of return on the market portfolio held by a firm.
Figure 2.6    Effect of leverage on the weighted average cost of capital
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Modigliani and Miller (1963) show that optimal capital structure can exist when corporate taxes
are introduced.  The payment of interest on debt, which is deductible for tax purposes, lowers
the weighted average cost of capital through a tax shield.  If the after-tax cost of debt is denoted
by kD , and the marginal tax rate is given by t, the cost of debt can be defined as follows:
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(2.23) k r tD D= -( )1
Under various assumptions, a firm will pursue a capital structure comprising 100% debt since
the wacc line continues to decline with increasing levels of leverage (see Figure 2.7).  On the
other hand, the presence of personal taxes and a dividend imputation system of taxation may
reduce the tax advantage of debt financing (Davis 1990).
Figure 2.7    Effect of leverage on the weighted average cost of capital
                    with corporate taxes
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2.0 Summary
In this chapter, the key elements of portfolio theory were outlined.  An investor can fully nullify
portfolio risk associated with security returns behaving independently of each other
(unsystematic risk) by diversifying across a large number of different types of securities.  If a
large number of securities are included in a portfolio, the remaining portfolio risk, termed
systematic risk, converges to the average covariance of the rates of returns of all securities
included in the portfolio.  An efficient frontier may be defined that consist of optimal
combinations of different securities in terms of their weightings into portfolios that minimise
portfolio risk for each level of expected portfolio returns.
When risk free securities are introduced, the CAPM indicates that there is one unique portfolio
on the efficient frontier that investors may hold called the market portfolio.  Investors may hold
proportions of the market portfolio and risk free securities depending on their preference for
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risk.  Since the process of arbitrage ensures that capital asset prices reflect full diversification
by market participants, the CAPM shows that returns for risky securities are compensated for
market risk only.  The CAPM indicates that there exists a capital market line on which all
efficient portfolios lie.  Further, a security market line may be derived which sets out a linear
relationship between expected returns and risk of individual securities.  From this relationship,
the CAPM measures the size of the risk premium required to be incorporated into the returns of
a risky security through a measure of systematic risk called beta.
A firm’s risk-return profile is also affected by it’s mix of debt and equity securities used to
finance it’s asset portfolio.  Given a particular portfolio of assets, as the proportion of debt used
relative to equity (leverage) increases, the expected return on the equity of the firm increases in
order to offset financial risk.  If debt and equity are perfect substitutes, the process of arbitrage
in capital markets ensures that the market value of any firm is independent of it’s capital
structure.  Further, the expected rate of return on the equity securities of a levered firm increases
in proportion to i ’s debt-equity ratio.  Consequently, the discount rate for evaluating
investments is the weighted average cost of capital and the capital structure of the firm is
irrelevant in investment evaluation.  If corporate taxes are introduced, the optimal capital
structure is augmented to comprise 100% debt due to a tax shield, though if personal taxes and
a dividend imputation system of taxation exist, the tax shield effect is reduced.
A number of simplifying assumptions have been made to present the key elements of portfolio
theory and it’s implications for pricing capital assets and valuing the firm.  In the next chapter,
some of these assumptions are considered within the context of credit risk and implications are
drawn for pricing loan securities and valuing a firm affected by credit risk.
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CHAPTER THREE
3. PORTFOLIO THEORY AND CREDIT RISK
3.1 Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to consider portfolio theory within the context of credit risk.  Credit
risk involves the possibility of default on promised payments on a debt security, and in severe
cases may lead to bankruptcy for a lender.  In the next section, some insurance concepts are
introduced into the Markowitz-Sharpe framework to elucidate issues involved in pricing loan
securities for credit risk.  In Section 3.3, the problem of imperfect information about the nature
of credit risk on loan securities is examined and techniques suggested in the literature for
measuring credit risk are briefly reviewed.  In Section 3.4, agency theory is used to show why
credit markets can be illiquid.  The major implications are drawn for the management of credit
risk when agency problems exist, and for portfolio valuation when loan securities are illiquid.
In Section 3.5, the cost of capital used for valuation purposes is then reviewed within the
context of credit risk.  A summary of the chapter is provided in the final section.
3.2 Expected returns and insurance theory
3.2.1 Credit risk and insurance theory principles
Credit risk involves the possibility of default on promised payments on a loan security.  The
possibility of losses when default occurs means that lenders require compensation for taking on
credit risk.  In contrast, risk on a security in the CAPM framework is only measured by beta.   Th
issue of compensation for expected losses on loan securities is not found in the
Markowitz-Sharpe framework, though it has parallels to the insurance problem.  The insurance
problem involves how to manage the possibility of losses on insurance contracts through risk
spreading.
In standard insurance models, risk spreading involves investors with possibly different risk
attitudes sharing the same risk.  In the case of credit markets, holders of loan contracts or
securities (borrowers) are assumed to be risk averse.  Each borrower faces a particular income
distribution that presents the possibility of default on their loan in some future time period.  The
lender shares the risk of default on loan securities that are issued to borrowers.  To limit the
impact of this risk, the lender seeks to spread this risk across many different types of borrowers.
When risk spreading is applied in the context of credit markets, the lender is assumed to be risk
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neutral.  The lender’s risk neutrality is justified by the argument that market competition will
force the lender to earn zero expected profits (Nelson and Loehman 1987).
On a given loan security, a borrower promises to repay a loan security to the lender at a given
rate of interest.  This rate of interest is the promised return on the loan security to the lender if
default by the borrower does not occur.  If default occurs, the lender incurs a loss through
delayed, missed or partial loan payment.  Borrower performance and default therefore represents
two different states for returns with the lender being confronted with state-contingent returns on
a particular loan security.  Using equation (2.1), the expected return on the loan contract i is the
possible return outcomes weighted by their probability of occurrence.
(3.1) )(.  ').1( iiii
e
i CLEdrdr +-=
where   r e = expected return;
  r' = promised rate of interest;
  d = probability of default; and
)(CLE = expected capital loss in event of default.
The first term of equation (3.1) measures the promised income from the loan contingent on
borrower performance while the second term measures the expected loss in event of default.  The
expected loss is in fact more than the expected capital loss due to the revenue forgone when
default occurs.  Equation (3.1) shows that a lender is confronted with a portfolio of prospects
concerning the expected rate of return depending on where the level of promised interest rate
charged on loan (Gravelle and Rees 1981, p 570). In Figure 3.1, the portfolio of prospects for the
expected rate of return is illustrated for differing levels of the promised interest rate.  In this
Figure, the relationship assumes that the probability of default of the borrower remains
independent of the promised interest rate.  The expected loss in event of default in Figure 3.1 is
represented by the symbol, EL.
Figure 3.1    Relationship between the promised interest rate and bank
 expected rate of return
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Insurance theory suggests that a firm confronted with a portfolio of prospects on an asset is
willing to pay an insurance premium to an insurance firm to avoid adverse outcomes (Hey 1984,
p 447).  The insurance firm undertakes to pay the firm the losses accruing to the insured in the
event of an adverse outcome.  In return, a risk-averse firm is willing to pay more than the
actuarially fair price for the insurance.  In the context of equation (3.1), the maximum risk
premium that may be paid will be at least equal to the expected loss (or equivalently, the
actuarial loss).
(3.2) rp d E CLi i i³ . ( )
Bierman and Hass (1975) argue that lenders will pursue an expected-loss compensation policy.
In a competitive market, lenders will price their loan securities on an expected risk neutral
basis.  This policy rule assumes that rpi  is set equal to the expected loss on a loan security.
The contractual interest rate that is charged to a loan security becomes equal to the
certainty-equivalent promised rate of interest rate shown as r ce in Figure 3.1.  This interest rate
is equivalent to the risk free interest rate, i, plus a certainty-equivalent risk premium, rpce.
This risk premium is commonly referred to as the default risk premium in the literature, and is a
function of the probability of default and the loss expected when default occurs.
(3.3) cei
ce
i rpir +=
3.2.2 Portfolio theory implications of insurance
An insurance firm acts to spread it’s risks by combining numerous insurance contracts into a
portfolio (Nelson and Loehman 1987).  In this way, the insurance firm is compensated for any
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expected losses by the payment of premiums by firms not experiencing adverse outcomes so
long as the loss probabilities between contracts are independent.
The risk spreading principle of insurance in the context of lending may illustrated by defining
risk classes g=1,…, k.  Each risk class indicates different levels of expected losses.  Loan
securities may be classified for similar rates of expected losses.  The assumption is also made
that each loan security is of similar size.  The expected return and variance from a portfolio of
loan securities of a similar size for risk class g may be given by equations (3.4) and (3.5)
respectively.  If a lender holds n loan securities in risk class g with weights, wi , equal to it’s
percentage value in the portfolio, the expected return on the risk class is the weighted average of
the expected return of each loan security:
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where )( grE = expected return for the portfolio of loan securities in risk
class g;
2
gd = variance of returns for the portfolio of loan securities in
risk class g;
)( igrE = expected return for loan security i in risk class g;
2
igd = variance of returns for loan security i in risk class g;
)( kgigrrCov  = covariance of returns on loan security i and loan
security k within risk class g;
igw = the share of the asset value of the i-th loan security of the
total asset value of the loan security portfolio in
risk class g;
g = risk class; and
i = 1, … , n  loan securities.
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When loan securities of similar expected loss rates are segmented using a risk classification
system, the expected returns for each risk class will equal promised returns less the expected
loss.  Since the income earned from the certainty-equivalent risk premium equals the expected
loss under risk spreading, the return earned on the portfolio of loan securities in risk class g is
equal to risk free rate of return.
The variance of returns on a portfolio of loan securities in a risk class occurs in the form of
unexpected deviations in losses from loan securities around their expected levels (Davis 1990,
Wyman 1991, Foss 1992).  This form of variability therefore may also be termed as unexpected credit
risk, or equivalently unexpected losses (denoted as UEL).  If many loan securities are combined to
form a risk class, the extent to which losses on individual loan securities are correlated defines
systematic risk while the remaining portfolio risk constitutes unsystematic risk.
As in portfolio theory, unsystematic risk for the risk class occurs as a consequence of losses on
individual loan securities behaving independently of each other.  If the number of loan securities
in a risk class is very large, then the first term on the right side of equation (3.5) is zero
(Bramma and Batterham 1994).  The risk-spreading principle is therefore the insurance theory
counterpart to Markowitz’s diversification principle.  Since unsystematic risk is effectively
forced to zero under risk spreading, the appropriate rate of return according to the CAPM is the
risk free rate of interest.  Lenders must therefore be expected risk neutral in their pricing
behaviour.  Expected profits on securities must be zero under these conditions in a competitive
capital market.
Systematic risk in each risk class will depend on the extent to which losses on each individual loan
security is correlated with losses on the whole portfolio.  If the same mix of securities (in terms of
types of borrowers that hold loan securities) exist across each risk class, the systematic risk in each
risk class will be equivalent to systematic risk associated with the total loan portfolio.  Since
investors are averse to portfolio risk, they require compensation for bearing unexpected losses that
occur on systematic basis.  Accordingly, the CAPM would suggest that the required compensation for
this risk is equal to the market risk premium.
Systematic risk among loan securities occurs as a result of correlation of loss probabilities between
different types of borrowers (Kao and Kallberg 1994).  Since the probability of default is directly
related to income distributions of borrowers, correlation of loss distributions might be expected to
occur as a result of a common set of exogenous factors affecting income distributions of borrowers in
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different regions and industries.  Hence, the diversification principle of portfolio theory applies not to
individual loan securities but to portfolios of loan securities categorised along regional and industry
lines.
The expected return and variance from a portfolio of loan securities of a similar size for
region-industry segment j may be given by equations (3.6) and 3.7) respectively.  If a lender
holds n loan securities in region-industry segment j with weights, wi , equal to it’s percentage
value in the portfolio, the expected return on the region-industry segment is the weighted
average of the expected return of each loan security:
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where )( jrE = expected return for the portfoli  of loan securities in
region-industry segment j;
2
jd = variance of returns for the portfolio of loan securities in
region-industry segment j;
)( ijrE = expected return for loan security i in region-industry
segment j;
2
ijd = variance of returns for loan security i in egion- industry
segment j;
)( kjijrrCov  =covariance of returns on loan security i and loan security k
within region-industry segment j;
ijw = the share of the asset value of the i-th loan security of the
total asset value of the loan security portfolio in
region-industry segment j;
j = region-industry segment; and
i = 1, … , n  loan securities.
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The expected return and variance from the total portfolio of loan securities, denoted (E(rp)) and
( 2pd ) respectively, may be given by equations (3.8) and 3.9) respectively when the investment
universe comprises m region-industry segments.  The expected return on he portfolio is given
by
(3.8) å
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Again, if the lender is fully diversified across a large number of similar sized region-industry
segments, unsystematic risk is forced to zero.  Since beta is simply the extent to which the returns
from borrowers from a portfolio segment covary with the returns to the total portfolio standardised for
the variance of portfolio returns, beta for portfolio segment j may be calculated using the standard
formula given by equation (2.15) as follows:
(3.10)
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This measure of beta may be used to derive a loan security market line to give the expected
return for all loan securities in a region-industry segment.
(3.11) ( )irEir pjej -+= )( b
The portfolio risk premium (prp) for bearing beta risk is given by
(3.12) pjj  .mrpprp b=
where
(3.13) irEmrp pp -= )(
and mrp = market risk premium.
Therefore the expected return on a loan security may be represented by the following expression
(3.14) j
e
ij prpir += .
The portfolio risk premium, prp, has the following properties.  If b j =1, the portfolio risk premium
for segment j is equal to the market risk premium - bank returns from borrowers in segment j varies
coincidently with portfolio returns.  If b j >1, the portfolio risk premium for segment j is greater than
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the market risk premium - bank returns from borrowers in segment j varies more than coincidently
with portfolio returns.  If b j <1, the portfolio risk premium for segment j is l ss than the market risk
premium - bank returns from borrowers in segment j varies less than coincidently with portfolio
returns.
The formulation of the promised interest rate to give expected returns on a loan security according to
equation (3.14) is discussed in detail in Chapter Five.
Each lender in a perfect capital market is responsible for extracting all potential gains from
diversification through pricing for beta risk.  There are, however, physical limits to which lenders may
be able to diversify.  Some regional and industry categorisations may be sufficiently large so as to
outweigh the variances of returns for smaller industries and regions (Kao and Kallberg 1994).  This
categorisation problem place limits on diversification and may result in the unsystematic
component of portfolio risk being positive rather than zero.  In addition, differences i  the nature
of firm concentration in regions and in industries will result in variations in the weightings of loan
securities within a region-industry segment.  These variations may limit a lender’s capacity to utilise
the ‘law of large numbers’ on which the risk spreading and diversification principles are based on
(Wyman 1991).  Further, if loan securities are of dis-similar size, then the portfolio weights on
the loss probability functions will be d s-proportionately represented by actual loss rates on
these loan securities both within risk classes and within region-industry segments.
Risk concentrations therefore involves not only assessing the nature of correlations of loss
probability functions of loan securities, but also their weighting within a particular portfolio
segmentation (Kao and Kallberg 1994).  While the use of portfolio risk premiums allows
expected returns on loan securities to reflect unexpected credit risk, this form of pricing will not
be as efficient as implied in the Sharpe CAPM framework.  Because of the loan categorisation
problem, portfolio risk premiums are likely to be applied to higher orders of portfolio
categories, for example, by country and by sector, rather than by region and by industry. As a
result, lenders also rely on a range of non-prici g methods to manage credit risk that occurs in the
form of unexpected losses on lower orders of region-industry categories.  These aspects are discussed
further in Chapter Five.
While the single period framework has been used in this section to elucidate issues involved in
pricing for credit risk, there are certain factors that lead to difficulties in the direct application
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of the Markowitz-Sharpe model as outlined above.  In the next section, the issue of measuring
expected losses (alternatively, expected returns) on loan securities is examined.
3.3 Information on loan security returns
The nature of risk and returns for many types of loan securities cannot be directly observed
because trading of loan securities is limited (Kao 1993).  Without direct pricing information,
loan security valuation is difficult (Allen 1997, p 176).  As a result, the extent to which lenders
may extract information about the return on loan securities depends on whether data on the
returns are comparable traded securities exist with adjustments being made for differences in
their returns that may occur to a range of non-credit features.  More generally, Zwick (1980)
notes that non-credit yield premiums for debt securities, such as corporate bonds, over
comparable publicly traded securities may occur as a result of lower liquidity, their flotation
costs relative to public offerings and differences in costs associated with direct contact and
negotiation between issuers and purchasers.
For traded debt securities such as corporate bonds, risk rating agencies such as Moodys, and
Standard and Poors, categorise securities held by utilities, financial institutions and
multinational corporations into several classes according to likelihood of loss.  Different
approaches may be used to evaluate this data and to calculate the size of default premiums.  The
first approach is to examine the spreads between risk-fre  Treasury bonds to bonds held by
corporations of different quality.  This approach gives measures of the perceived credit risk of
corporate bonds from single payments at different times in the future (Fisher 1959, Yawitz
1977, Jonkhart 1979, Litterman and Iben 1991).  Secondly, as an alternative to extracting
expected default rates from the current term structure of interest rates, Altman (1989) suggest
that historic or past default risk experience, the mortality rate, of bonds may be used.  In this
approach, the likelihood of losses is extracted by comparing the historical default rate
experience of bonds in each credit quality class in each year after issue on the bond.  Finally,
options-pricing models may be used to estimate the expected returns from marketable bonds
(Merton 1974, Black and Scholes 1973).  These models simultaneously value the payoffs to
bond issuers and purchasers given possible ayoff contingencies regarding repayment and
default.
The measurement of expected losses on illiquid corporate bonds may be estimated using data on
comparable traded securities.  The matching of comparable corporate bonds to illiquid
involves the utilisation of credit scoring models.  Credit scoring models enable the assignment
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of illiquid bonds to particular risk grades on a similar basis used by risk rating agencies (Kao
1993).  Univariate classification models (Beaver 1966) or multivariate classification models
(Altman 1968 and others) have been proposed in the literature to achieve this purpose.  These
types of credit scoring models are based on the assessment of micro-finance easures of
borrower characteristics using statistical classification techniques (see Chapter Nine).  This
approach also requires equivalent data on traded corporate-bond h lders facing similar
economic conditions to non-traded corporate-bond holders.
For most loan securities issued by financial institutions, however, there exists almost no
published information on their returns and likelihood of loss for a range of industries which
make up a large part of their security portfolios.  These industries are primarily comprised of
small to medium sized firms that rely almost exclusively on financial intermediaries to source
their external funding requirements.  Financial institutions may utilise their own data on risk
classified loan portfolios combined with ancillary data on borrower characteristics to estimate
the likelihood of loss on their loan security portfolio.  In particular, the mortality rate derivation
of credit risk method suggested by Altman (1989) may be used to extract information about
expected losses by risk class.  This approach, however, assumes that there exists sufficient
historical data on which to estimate returns on loan securities by credit risk grade.  It also
assumes that sufficient information on the non-price factors is available in order to standardise
pricing information for analysis.
The focus of the approaches outlined above is on the estimation of expected losses.  These
approaches are limited in scope for measuring unexpected losses.  Perhaps more importantly,
the lack of information on the nature of beta risk for different categories of loan securities means
that pricing for beta risk is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to implement.  These
difficulties further highlight the importance of non-pricing mechanisms for managing
unexpected credit risk.
3.4 Credit market efficiency and agency theory
Credit risk can result in illiquid markets.  Without liquidity, market prices of loan securities
cannot be observed.  Further, purchases and liquidations of loan securities can only be achieved
gradually over time.  Active management of the portfolio mix of illiquid loan securities may be
achieved only through limits on new securities.  Slow adjustments to loan portfolio structures
occur because of the difficulty in cancelling existing loan contracts with borrowers (Gollinger
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and Morgan 1993).  In addition, sizes of loan securities are likely to vary considerably between
region-industry segments as a result of differences in industry structure.
Because of these problems, the capital budgeting approach to valuing illiquid loan securities
must be used rather than the single-period framework suggested by the Markowitz-Sharpe
paradigm (Kao 1993).  Pricing of liquid capital assets may be analysed in a single period
framework proposed by Sharpe because security prices accurately and quickly reflect available
market information.  If structural shifts in expected returns, or beta values, of securities occur,
portfolio managers can buy or sell marketable securities relatively instantaneously in order to
re-align portfolio mix in line with the underlying fair market value of particular securities.  As a
result, the valuation of marketable securities may be easily analysed within a single-period
framework as suggested by the Markowitz-Sharpe framework.
Illiquidity of loan securities arises from large transaction costs and non-monetary factors
involved in conducting trades and this feature of certain credit markets can be explained by
agency theory.  Agency theory seeks to explain economic relationships that develop into
contracting between two parties termed as principals and agents.  Jensen and Meckling (1976)
show that principals - in this case lenders - can assure themselves that the agent (borrower) will
make optimal decisions only if appropriate incentives are given through contracts and the agent
is monitored.  This monitoring function occurs because borrower agents have the opportunity
(through default) to absorb shareholders’ wealth that is used to fund the lender’s activities.
For lenders, agency problems can arise from hidden actions by borrowers in the form of adverse
selection and moral hazard or asymmetries of information between borrowers and lenders
(Miller, Ellinger, Barry and Lajili 1993).  Adverse selection problems arise if borrowers have
the possibility of being riskier than originally assessed by the lender at the time of loan
approval.  Moral hazard problems are incurred if borrowers have the possibility of taking on
greater risks during the loan compared to that originally assessed by the lender.  Asymm tries of
information occurs if borrowers know more about their objectives and financial condition at the
time of credit application and during the period of the credit relationship with the lender.  To
ameliorate agency problems, lenders develop loan contracts, implement systems to administer
these contracts and conduct research (Miller, Ellinger, Barry and Lajili 1993).  Agency costs are
incurred in the process of formulating, enforcing and adapting loan contract to the different
needs of borrowers and in response to actions by borrowers as they occur.
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However, the process of procuring accurate and timely information on credit quality of
borrowers is not costless (Barry, Baker and Sanint 1981).  When agency costs are excessive,
borrowers may be disciplined in a credit market through risk of non-renewals of loans (Stiglitz
and Weiss 1983).  Lenders also contain agency costs by including in their loan contracts
extensive provisions that are intended to forestall, correct or constrain borrowers’ actions that
cause agency problems.  These provisions include pledging of collateral, repayment on demand,
reporting requirements, performance standards, sales restrictions, constraints on added
borrowing, insurance requirements, default penalties and foreclosure conditions (Miller,
Ellinger, Barry and Lajili 1993).
Some agency costs cannot be fully removed.  In this case, lenders utilise fees to recoup
transaction costs with fees structures deployed in loan pricing depending on the nature of agency
problems between a borrower and a lender (Thakor and Udell 1987).  Consequently, the
expected rate of return on a loan security i in region-industry segment j comprises the risk free
rate of return, the portfolio risk premium and an administration cost allowance to cover agency
costs, a, not ameliorated through pricing and non-price methods (Davis 1990).
(3.15) iij
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While primary credit markets are generally not liquid, secondary markets can develop to allow
trades based on portfolios of loan securities to occur.  The incorporation of credit enhancements
(for example, collateralisation) has enabled derivative markets to develop to a limited extent for
certain types of loan securities (Das 1998, p 123).  In most cases, credit enhancements are
insufficient to attract trades.  For many types of loan securities, banks, as originators of loan
securities, may make lending decisions with less than full information because they are
concerned with minimising agency costs (Van Horne 1980, p 290).  As loan sellers, potential
buyers may be concerned about the nature of the information about the credit quality of loan
securities being sold (Lucas and McDonald 1987).  Therefore information asymmetry
contributes to the lack of liquid markets for most types of loan securities issued by banks
(Sinkey 1989, p 516).
Because lenders face illiquid risks, the lender’s capital budgeting and risk management
functions are linked (Froot and Stein 1998).  Since portfolios of il quid loan securities must be
evaluated using the capital budgeting approach, an appropriate discount rate must be selected to
ensure future cash flows earned at least match the cost of capital.  When the capital budgeting
approach is used in the context of lending, the cost of capital is used as a price setting rule.
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Borrowers are willing to pay the promised interest rate derived by reference to the required rate
of return that will provide an expected stream of cash flows to the bank that gives at least a
positive expected net present value (Davis 1990).
3.5 Cost of capital
The Modigliani and Miller (1958, 1963) analysis indicated that the discoun  rate for evaluating
investments is the weighted average cost of capital, wacc.  The wacc is given by the cost of debt
capital and the cost of equity capital, with each cost multiplied by their proportions of total
liabilities.  Without corporate taxes, the capital structure of the firm is irrelevant in investment
evaluation.  If corporate taxes are introduced, the optimal capital structure is augmented to comprise
100% debt due to a tax shield, though if personal taxes and a dividend imputation system of taxation
exist, the tax shield effect is reduced.  The discount rate for portfolio valuation purposes is simply the
cost of debt.
The cost of equity and the debt-equity mix is linked when credit risk is introduced into the
theory of capital structure.  When the possibility of default is introduced, bankruptcy and it’s
associated costs can result in the possibility of optimal debt-equity mix.  Bankruptcy costs leads
to capital assets being liquidated at less than their economic value.  The lower economic value
occurs as a result of bankruptcy costs in the form of a deadweight loss.  Deadweight losses
accrue because investors are unable to diversify these costs.  The deadweight loss leads to a
premium being added to the required rate of return on equity capital (Van Horne 1980, p 275).
The possibility of bankruptcy is usually not a linear function of leverage but increases at an
increasing rate of leverage beyond some threshold (Kraus and Litzenberger 1973).  Accordingly,
the expected cost of bankruptcy also increases non-linearly with the expected rate of return on
equity for the firm rising commensurately (Van Horne 1976, p 275).  Levy and S rnat (1990, p
409) conceptualise the rise in cost of equity as reflecting higher costs of insurance (against
bankruptcy) when leverage is at extreme levels.  As illustrated in Figure 3.2, this effect would
induce a point, defined by D E/ '  at which the wacc begins to rise as it outweighs the impact
of the tax shield.
Agency costs may also influence the optimal debt-equity mix.  In this case, agents incur costs as
a result of monitoring activities by the firm’s stockholders.  Jensen and Meckling (1976) show
that regardless of who incurs the monitoring expenditures, the burden is ultimately borne by
stockholders as a wealth reduction.  As a firm approaches an extreme level of leverage, the
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firm’s stock holders incur higher costs in monitoring the activities of the bank in raising debt
finance, and therefore wacc, as shown in Figure 3.2.
The above analysis assumes that the firm undertakes a particular investment strategy that gives
a single level of systematic risk on it’s assets.  For a banking firm, the possibility of bankruptcy
can arise from different categories of loan securities because, either the definitional structure, or
the nature of firm concentrations of regions and industries do not enable unsystematic risk to be
forced to zero in all region-industry segments.  For similar reasons, differences in sizes of loan
securities within risk classes may also result in unexpected losses varying across risk classes.
Consequently, when risk spreading or diversification is not completely efficient, banks may be
inclined to utilise alternative methods for allocating equity capital.  To address this issue, one
particular concept that has emerged is risk-adjusted return on capital or RAROC (Froot and
Stein 1998).
Figure 3.2    Effect of leverage on the weighted average cost of capital with
corporate taxes, bankruptcy costs and agency costs
r
0 1.0
tax effect
tax and bankruptcy
tax, bankruptcy and
 monitoring costs combined
D/ E'' D/ E' D/ E
The RAROC method effectively assesses a risk premium on an investment, that is proportional
to a measure of an investment’s capital-at-risk, multiplied by a cost-of-capital.  The
capital-at-risk is determined by ascertaining the risk of unexpected losses exceeding a certain
critical level (Davis (1990).  Equity capital reserves can then be allocated to categories of loan
securities with the amount of capital allocation depending on the nature of the investor’s risk
preferences.  Under this approach, capital budgeting decisions are modelled as a firm with
different divisions (Van Horne 1980, p 328).  Once capital- t-risk has been determined for each
division of assets, separate cost-of-equity for each division are measured in terms of the risk of
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that activity.  The cost-of-equity for each division is combined with the cost-of-debt and
weighted by the target debt-equity ratio to give wacc for that division.  In this approach, loan
asset categories associated with higher unexpected losses will have a higher required rate of
return because of a higher cost for equity-capital.
The cost of debt for a lender can be influenced by a number of factors including the nature of
deposit raisings and government restrictions on capital assets required to be held.  First, the cost
of deposit-funds generally cannot just be the average of interest rates because banks often
provide ‘implicit interest’ to customers in the form of services for which charges may not be
levied (Davis 1990).  Second, the relationship between the cost of debt (deposits) and the risk
of default on debt is likely to be positively related at extreme levels of leverage as a result of
deposit insurance – whether or not deposit insurance is implicit or otherwise (Davis, 1990,
Shrieves and Dahl 1992).  Capital adequacy constraints may also affect wacc at extreme levels
of leverage.  Capital adequacy constraints may force banking institutions to achieve lower than
optimal leverage levels. The cost of debt is more than otherwise at less than optimal leverage
levels (Davis 1990).
3.6 Summary
Credit risk involves the possibility of default on promised payments on a debt security, and in
severe cases may lead to bankruptcy for a lender.  In order to ensure that lenders are adequately
compensated for default risk, lenders employ credit scoring models and use credit risk
classification systems to measure expected loss rates on loan securities.  Using measures of
expected losses by risk class, lenders may factor a certainty-equivale  risk premium - that
equals the expected loss - into the promised interest rate charged on loan securities.
If large numbers of loan securities are combined into classes of similar rates of expected losses,
lenders force the unsystematic component of portfolio risk to zero by risk spreading across large
numbers of similar sized loan securities.  A key pre-condition behind risk spreading is the
covariances of losses associated with loan security are independent.  If this occurs, the income
received through the certainty-equivalent risk premium exactly matches the expected loss on the
risk class.  Under these conditions, the expected return on each risk class in a competitive
capital market is the risk free rate of interest.
Systematic risk among loan securities occurs as a result of correlation of loss probabilities between
different types of borrowers.  Since the probability of default is directly related to income distributions
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of borrowers, correlation of loss distributions might be expected to occur as a result of a common set
of exogenous factors affecting income distributions of borrowers in different regions and industries.
Beta risk on loan securities is therefore assessed on the basis of regional and industry segmentations.
However, there are a number of factors that limit the precise application of beta risk pricing as
envisaged under the CAPM approach.  First, the nature of beta on loan securities is difficult to
identify if data on unexpected losses across different types of loan securities are not available.
Second, there are physical limits to which lenders may be able to diversify.  Some regional and
industry categorisations may be large compared to others.  Differences in industry structures may also
result in risk concentrations.  Finally, illiquidity of loan securities means that purchases and
liquidations of loan securities can only be achieved gradually over time because of the difficulty in
cancelling existing loan contracts with borrowers.  To some extent, pricing for beta risk on loan
segments may be applied to higher orders of regional and industry segmentations though at some loss
of pricing efficiency due to aggregation.  As a result of these factors, non-pricing strategies for
managing unexpected losses on a portfolio basis are required.  Non-pricing strategies may include
managing risk concentrations through limits on new securities, and through adequate allocations of
equity capital on particular segmentations.
There is also a range of non-pricing mechanisms that lenders utilise to limit credit r sk that arise
in the form of agency problems.  In the process of engaging an agency relationship, lenders
develop loan contracts with extensive provisions to forestall, correct or constrain borrower’s
actions that cause agency problems.  Because the nature of agency problems varies among
borrowers, returns on loan securities held by borrowers also vary considerably. For this reason,
returns on loan securities are difficult to measure on a consistent basis, particularly without
observable market prices as in the circumstance for traded securities.
Because loan securities are illiquid, the capital budgeting approach must be used to value
illiquid loan securities rather than within a single-period framework as suggested by the
Markowitz-Sharpe paradigm.  Under the capital budgeting approach, the returns from loan
securities are analysed within a multi-period framework in which the security returns are
discounted by the expected rate of return required and are weighted by their absolute dollar
values to measure portfolio performance.  The capital budgeting approach also enables the
evaluation of the impact of disproportionate-sized loan securities on portfolio returns because
absolute dollar values are used to determine their weightings.
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When the capital budgeting approach is used to undertake loan security valuation, the cost of
capital is used as a price setting rule.  Borrowers are willing to pay the promised interest rate
derived by reference to the required rate of return that will provide an expected stream of cash
flows to the bank with at least a positive expected net present value.  The weighted average cost
of capital may be used as the discount rate.  When diversification and risk spreading are not
completely efficient in removing unsystematic variations in portfolio returns, the risk-adjusted
return on capital, or RAROC, may be used as the discount rate.  Since a loan portfolio may be
viewed as being comprised of different segmentations with each segment having it’s own level
of unexpected risk, a different RAROC may be calculated for each segment and be used for
discounting purposes.
In the next chapter, these aspects are integrated into a portfolio model of illiquid l an securities.
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CHAPTER FOUR
4. PORTFOLIO MODEL OF ILLIQUID LOAN SECURITIES
4.1 Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to adapt the portfolio theory framework to portfolios of illiquid loan
securities held by banking institutions.  Sta dard capital budgeting theory for valuing assets is
applied to a portfolio of illiquid loan securities under certainty in the next section.  Following this, the
capital budgeting framework is extended for the possibility of holders of illiquid loan securities facing
uncertain prospects in Section 4.3.  The framework incorporates a model of a borrower to generate a
loan loss probability function, and a risk classification system for measuring expected losses.  A
discount rate is then selected to calculate the net present value of bank returns from the illiquid
loan portfolio.  Some of the key limitations of the model are discussed in Section 4.4.  A summary is
provided in the final section.
4.2 Portfolio model of loan securities with certain repayments
In the process of issuing loan securities, a banking firm holds a maturity profile of securities.  If  a
denotes the number of years that have elapsed since borrowers have commenced a loan, the
maturity profile may be represented by
a = 0, ..., nt where nt is the maturity term of securities in the portfolio.  A portf lio of illiquid
securities may also be segmented according to regional and industry categories.  Under certainty, these
categories give rise to borrowers having similar loan sizes and repayment patterns.  Region-industry
segments are denoted by the subscript j.  In a particular time period, a cert in number of b rrowers
exist in a portfolio segment, denoted by Xjat.  Within portfolio segment j at time t, the number
of borrowers  across the maturity profile may be represented by the vector xjt as follows:
(4.1) [ ]tntjtjtjtjjt XXXXx  1-   2   1   0  ,...,,,=
Under certainty, a borrower fully anticipates their financing requirements and makes an initial loan
drawing of an amount, L , at the commencement of the loan period (in other words, a = 0).  The
returns to a bank from the average borrower in a portfolio segment during a time period with X jat
borrowers are it’s cash flows in the form of interest and principal payments.
(4.2) BR I Pjat jat jat= +
47
where BR = average bank returns (or cash flow) from portfolio segment;
I = interest payment at the promised interest rate;
P = principal payment;
with subscripts denoted as follows
j = 1, ..., m region-industry segments;
a = 1, ..., nt maturity of loan; and
t = 1, …, n time periods.
In a dynamic setting, the number of borrowers in each portfolio segment at the close of each
time period depends on the opening number of borrowers in the portfolio segment plus net flows
of borrowers during the time period.  At loan account time 0 at the b ginning of time period t, a
number of borrowers may enter portfolio segment j during time period t.  The number of
borrower entrants may be represented by NX jt  , which is equivalent to the following under
certainty:
(4.3) NX Xjt j a t= =  0 
The number of  borrowers exiting a portfolio segment during a time period, MX jt , equals the
number of borrowers reaching the end of their maturity term, n .  The nu ber of existing borrowers
which exit the portfolio is therefore equivalent to:
(4.4) MX Xjt j nt t= -   1
Accordingly, at the end of time t, the number of borrowers in a particular region-industry segment j,
X jt ,  under certainty will equal the number of borrowers at the beginning of a time period t plus net
flows of borrowers as follows:
(4.5) X X NX MXjt jt jt jt= + --1
where the initial number of borrowers in a region-industry segment j a  the beginning of each time
period is given by the sum of the number of borrowers in each maturity
(4.6) X Xjt j a t
a
nt
- - -
=
-
= å1 1 1
1
1
   .
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Bank returns from a portfolio segment of a particular stage of maturity is found by multiplying
the average returns from borrowers holding securities of a particular stage of maturity, BRjat  ,
times the average number of borrowers held in the segment in time period t, X ja t- -1 1.
(4.7) BR X BRjat ja t jat= - -1 1.
The returns on the total loan portfolio in time period t, BRpt, is found by summing the bank
returns from each portfolio segment across m number of region-industry segments and nt
different stages of maturity within each j-th segment.
(4.8) BR BRpt jat
a
nt
j
m
=
==
åå
11
Standard capital budgeting techniques may be used to evaluate the returns to a portfolio of loan
securities.  Following Fisher (1930), the value of a loan security portfolio is the present value of cash
flows arising from the portfolio over time.  If cash flows are certain, they may be discounted by the
risk free rate of interest.
(4.9) PV BR
BR
i
p
pt
t
t
n
( )
( )
=
+=
å 11
where PV = present value and
i = risk free rate of interest.
Capital market equilibrium under certainty and competition requires that the net present value
(NPV) of investments equal zero.  NPV is zero because arbitrage will ensure that the rate of
return on investments equal the risk free rate of return given efficient capital markets. NPV of
bank returns from loan securities in portfolio segment j discounted over the life of the loan
maturity term is given by:
(4.10) jotnt
tntj
nt
a
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jat
jt L
i
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+
= å
= )1()1(
)(   
1
Under certainty, loan securities are always fully repaid. The loan balance at the conclusion of
the loan, tntjL   , in equation (4.10), therefore equals zero.  At the time of writing the loan,
pricing of loan securities requires that the rate of interest charged on which bank returns results
in the present value of bank returns to be the same as the initial loan balance, tjL  0 .  The loan
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rate of interest will therefore be equal to the single period risk free rate of interest.  The risk free
rate of interest as the discount rate results in the NPV of bank returns from a loan security to be
equal to zero at the time the loan is written.
In a total portfolio context, the NPV of bank returns for the portfolio over an investment
horizon n can be assessed as follows:
(4.11) NPV BR
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where
(4.12) L L X Lp j
j
m
ja ja
a
nt
j
m
0 0
1
10 10
1
1
1
= =
=
- -
=
-
=
å åå .
(4.13) L L X Lpn jn
j
m
jan jan
a
nt
j
m
= =
= ==
å åå
1 11
.
and
jatL = average loan balance for borrowers in region- ndustry segment j
of maturity a at time period t.
The NPV of bank returns for the portfolio at time period 0 will not be equal to zero as it is in
the case for equation (4.10), for a discount rate equal to the risk free rate.  In equation (4.10),
the value of the second term on the right side, the present value of the ending loan balance given
as nttntj iL )1/(  +  is equal to zero because the loan is fully repaid.  In contrast in equation
(4.11), the present value of loan balances across the portfolio at the end of the investment
horizon, given as npn iL )1/( +  is positive.  The value of 
n
pn iL )1/( +  is positive because there
are loans that have yet to be fully repaid.  The term 0pL  is also positive.  Consquently, NPV of
bank returns determined on a portfolio basis, NPV BRp( ) , is positive under certainty.
4.3 Portfolio model of loan securities with uncertain repayments
4.3.1 Model of a borrower
Under certainty, investors perfectly anticipate future financing requirements, borrow the
required funds at the risk free rate of interest and repay principal and interest over time.  The
introduction of uncertainty surrounding business income of investors leads to unanticipated
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financing requirements and repayment streams.  Gabriel and Baker (1980) present a conceptual
framework for linking production and investment decisions of borrowers without recourse to
liquid debt or equity capital markets, to the financial decision via a risk constraint.  In this
model, decision-makers use reserves of liquid assets in the form of a credit reserve, or
borrowing capacity, to offset cash deficiencies resulting from an adverse outcome in an
uncertain economic environment.
Within this framework, a borrower is assumed to utilise a term loan facility to fund a once-off
anticipated fixed-capital expense. This facility is used jointly with a working capital facility,
such as an overdraft that allows cash deficiencies on an annual basis to be rolled-over.  Th
working capital facility reflects it’s purpose as a credit reserve to fund unanticipated funding
requirements.  The fixed term and overdraft is a common lending system (Lieber and Orgler
1986).  The borrower is assumed to have no other external sources of funds.  In applying the
model to a borrower, no explicit consideration is made concerning resource use constraints and
production functions, and their implications for the business operation.  These factors are implicitly
accounted for through the specification of how a business’s financial flows may vary given certain
credit conditions and variations in internally generated funds through time.
Due to agency problems and since enforceable claims to the future income of borrowers do not
exist, the borrower pledges some proportion, c, f their assets, A, as collateral to back their
financial requirements (Plaut 1985).  For example, the value of c might reflect proportions of
fixed and non-fixed assets.  The pledging of fixed assets as a first mortgage is a common
practice in lending.
(4.14) C c Ajat jat jat= .
The sale of value of A, and therefore C, is uncertain due to variations in returns made on the
asset.  If returns on the asset are sensitive to fluctuations in borrower incomes, then the
proportion of the borrower’s assets that is salvaged upon sale is uncertain and may be
represented by a random variable, s.  Since the quality of assets may vary by portfolio segment,
the mean,E sjt( ) , and a variance, Var sj( )  may vary by portfolio segment (Plaut 1985).  The
expected salvage value of the assets may be applied to find the expected value of collateral, by
substituting the expected salvage value for each time period into equation (4.15) as follows.
(4.15) E C E s c Ajat jt jat jat( ) ( ). .=
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In this framework, banks make their own expectations about the salvage value of collateral.
This expectation may vary from the market value determined in asset markets.  Differences in
expectations may occur because the lender is required to make judgements about the sensitivity
of collateral values to borrower incomes and about when borrowers may default.  Based on the
expected value of the borrower’s collateral, the bank appraises the maximum permissible credit
available to a borrower, L jat
m .  This relationship may be expressed as the maximum credit limit, cl ,
times the expected value of collateral.
(4.16) L cl E Cjat
m
jat jat= . ( )
The size of credit reserves is equal to the difference between the maximum permissible credit
available to the borrower as determined by the bank and the opening value of the borrower’s
liabilities.
(4.17) CR L Ljat jat
m
ja t= - - -1 1
In the first year of borrowings, the bank and the borrower jointly agree on a positive amount of credit
reserve set as a proportion of maximum liabilities.
(4.18) CR crm Lj t j a t j a t
m
  a=   =1     1 1= =.
where crm = minimum credit reserve limit.
In the final year of borrowings, the bank imposes the requirement that all outstanding loans must be
repaid in the final period.  Thus the maximum credit limit at the close of the final year of borrowings
is zero.
The borrower is assumed to begin with an overdraft balance at time a = 0 , LOj a t   = -0 1 , of
zero.
(4.19) LOj a t   = - =0 1 0
The maximum permissible size of term loan, LTj a   t-1=0 , is therefore given as:
(4.20) LT L CRj a t j a t
m
j a t   -      == = =-0 1 1 1
In the following years, the balance of all loans outstanding held by the borrower is given by the
sum of the term loan principal and the absolute value of the negative balance on the overdraft
facility.
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(4.21) L LT LO a LOjat jat jat jat= + > <      for    and   1 0
The borrower makes repayments on the term loan facility at a rate of PI ineach  year according
to an agreed amortisation formula at a promised interest rate, rt' , with  maturity term of nt.  If
the promised interest rate is a random variable, then the value of PI is also a random variable.
(4.22) PI f LT rt ntjat j a t t jat= = -( , ' , )   0 1
Term loan interest payments, IT, term loan principal payments, P and the closing balance of the
term loan facility under this arrangement are determined as follows:
(4.23) IT rt LTjat t j a t= - -' .     1 1
(4.24) P PI ITjat jat jat= -
(4.25) LT LT Pjat j a t jat= -- -    1 1
The  interest payable on the overdraft is calculated on the absolute value of negative overdraft
balances as follows:
(4.26) IO ro LO LOjat t j a t j a t= <- - - -' .            for  1 1 1 1 0
so that total interest payments, I,  in year t equals the following:
(4.27) I IT IOjat jat jat= +  .
Under the loan contract, the fixed debt servicing requirement, FDR, of the borrower is the
amount that must be paid regardless of operating conditions.  These include the principal
repayments on the term loan facility, the total interest payments, and fees and charges payable
on both facilities, LFC .  Banks use fees and charges to recover transaction costs arising from
agency problems.
(4.28) FDR PI IO LFCjat jat jat jat= + +
The bank agrees to allow the borrower to make drawings and repayments on the overdraft
facility as income conditions permit.  The borrower’s business faces uncertain prospects
regarding it’s gross operating surplus that is solely internally generated from it’s business
assets.  Accordingly, the business’s gross operating surplus may be described by the random
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variable, GOS.  The gross operating surplus is defined as gross income, GI  et of the firm’s
expenses, FC and tax payments, TAX.
(4.29) GOS GI FC TAXjat jat jat jat= - -
Borrowers are assumed to meet their minimum personal expense requirements,PE  in each time
period from the business.  In addition, it is assumed that personal expense requirements are
constant through time.
(4.30) PE PEjat jat=
If the borrower incurs surplus liquidity during time t, surplus funds are either retained in the
overdraft facility or consumed.  However, if adverse operating conditions are encountered, the
borrower is permitted to make drawings on the overdraft up to the prearranged maximum credit
reserve limit less the outstanding loan balance at the beginning of the period.  Thus given a
borrower’s particular cash inflows and outflows in each time period t,  the change in the
overdraft balance in a particular year, DLO , will be bounded on the downside by the size of the
borrower’s credit reserve with the outcome for each time period, if the borrower does not
default, equal to the following:
(4.31) DLO GOS FDR PEjat jat jat jat= - -
with the consequent closing balance for the overdraft facility
(4.32) LO LO LOjat j a t jat= +- -    1 1 D .
The cash surplus including credit reserves, CSR, in each time period is equal to the following
(4.33) CSR GOS CR FDR PEjat jat jat jat jat= + - -
Since GOS and FDR are random variables, so is CSR.  Total risk of a business is defined by
Gabriel and Baker (1980) as the probability, d, that the business is unable to generate a
minimum level of gross operating surplus to meet the outgoing funding requirements of the
business including debt servicing and funds required for personal expenditure.  This
relationship may be expressed as:
(4.34) ( )P CSR djat jat£ £0
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In a dynamic framework, the value of d will vary over the maturity period of the term loan.
Given that GOS and FDR are random variables, and with PE fixed, the value of CR will vary
within limits imposed by credit policy as given in equation (4.17).  If CR varies, so will d.
Therefore if expectations of equation (4.34) are taken,
(4.35) jatjatjatjatjat PEFDRECRGOSECSRE --+= )()()(
and if the variance of the probability function CSR is known, a value for the probability of
default ‘expected’ in time  ay be found.  In graphical terms, the shaded area marked d in
Figure 4.1 gives the expected probability of default of a borrower in a particular time period.
Figure 4.1   CSR distribution and the expected probability of default
CSR
probability
0
d
When a large number of borrowers are combined to form a portfolio under uncertainty, a lender
is faced with an array of widely differing borrower income distributions, and therefore loan
return distribution functions.  The lender is assumed to be able to define low-order
region-industry segmentations that give relatively homogeneous business asset structures and
borrower income distributions.  Within each given region-industry segment, non-h mogeneous
risk-return preference functio s among borrowers result in differences in the propensity of
borrowers to leverage and to provide security coverage on their loan securities.  In this
framework, the model of the borrower outlined in this section is used to reflect the average
borrower in a region- ndustry segment.
The role of djat is therefore two-fold; first as a risk constraint on borrowers, and second, as an
input to measuring the expected losses on borrowers associated with a particular segment.
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Through the risk constraint, the potential for deviation in promised bank returns on loan
securities in the event of borrower default is explicitly accounted for.  The credit risk
classification system for measuring expected losses is discussed in the next section.
4.3.2 Bank portfolio segment returns
Credit risk classification
With uncertain borrower incomes, credit risk gives rise to deviations from the promised bank
returns from a portfolio of borrowers.  The upside of bank returns from the average borrower in
a portfolio segment during any particular time period is limited to promised interest and
principal payments and loan drawings.  A financial institution usually does not benefit if
borrowers improve their performance.  On the downside, the bank’s returns is limited in simple
terms to the extent that it retains collateral to cover the borrower’s outstanding loan in event of
borrower default.  Abstracting from transaction costs, the expected returns from the average
borrower in a portfolio segment of a particular maturity, E BRjat( ) , is therefore the sum of the
promised return and the expected capital loss weighted by their probability of occurrence:
(4.36) ( ) ( )E BR d I P LO d E CLjat jat jat jat jat jat jat( ) . . ( )= - + + +1 D
where
(4.37) E CL
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A limitation of expressing returns in absolute dollar values, as is the case in equation (4.36), is
that bank returns are not standardised for a number of factors to enable classification of
individual borrowers according to their impact on the bank’s expected rate of return.  These
factors include the stage of maturity, the variations in cash flows from the overdraft facility and
differences in loan and collateral sizes of borrowers within a region-indust y p rtfolio segment.
Standardisation may be achieved by, first, expressing the return to loan securities given in equations
(4.36) and (4.37), in terms of a one year term loan product with no loss of generality,
(4.38) ( ) ( ) ( )E BR d I L d E C Ljt jt jt jt jt jt jt( ) . . ( )= - + + -- -1 1 1
and second, dividing equation (4.38) through by the size of the loan, L, to give the expected rate of
return to a bank from a borrower:
(4.39) ( ) ( ).( ' ) .( )1 1 1 1+ = - + + -r d r d scrjt
e
jt jt jt jt
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where    re  = expected rate of interest (or equivalently, expected
bank returns per unit of loan);
     r'   = promised rate of interest; and
     scr = expected security cover ratio (ratio of expected collateral value to the
loan)
The second term on the right side of equation (4.39) is the expected loss in region-in ustry j.  As
discussed in the previous chapter, the lender employs a risk classification system reflecting different
levels of expected losses denoted as
g=1, …, k.  Equation (4.39) also shows that the expected loss is the product of the expected
probability of default and the expected security cover ratio.  A two-dimensional credit risk
classification system may therefore be constructed to classify borrowers into discrete classes of similar
levels of expected credit risk.  In the default risk dimension, the possible range of the expected
probability of default lies between zero and one.  Default risk grades, denoted by the symbol, q, ma
be defined by discrete intervals for the default probability between these global limits as follows:
(4.40) q  =  
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where dq  = limit for expected probability of default for q-grade.
In the security risk dimension, increasing expected credit risk are indicated by decreasing values for
the expected security cover ratio, scr.  The upper bound of scr is a very large number.  The lower
bound of scr is zero when the borrower pledges no collateral.  Values for the security cover ratio
greater than one indicate that no capital loss is expected, however, promised interest income is
foregone.  Security risk grades, denoted by the symbol, , may e defined in terms of discrete
intervals for the ratio within these global limits as follows:
(4.41) h  =  
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and +¥ > > > > >= = = -s s sh h h hncr cr   .... cr1 2 1 0
where scrh  = limit for expected security cover ratio for h-grade.
Expected loss in the portfolio context is measured by a credit risk classification system, which gives
dimensions, q and h, to form a matrix of risk classes.  Figure 4.2 illustrates a credit risk classification
system in the case of a 4x4 matrix system.  The use and application of a credit risk classification
system in credit policy development and delivery is discussed in more detail in later chapters.
Figure 4.2  Credit risk classification system in a 4x4 matrix form
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When a credit risk classification system is used, the expected returns from the average borrower in
a portfolio segment of a particular maturity as given in equation (4.36) may be re-written s:
(4.42) ( ) ( )E BR d I P LO d E CLjqhat jqhat jqhat jqhat jqhat jqhat jqhat( ) . . ( )= - + +1 D +
The absolute value of expected bank returns is also a function of the number of borrowers.  In
this respect, the bank retains borrowers in a portfolio segment into the next time period if
default does not occur.  However, if default occurs, borrowers are written off, as denoted by
WXjqhat , and exit the portfolio during time period  t. Accordingly, the expected number of
borrowers in a portfolio segment at the end of a time period is the sum of the number of
borrowers which have survived and the number of borrower losses weighted by their probability
of occurrence which may be expressed as:
(4.43) ( ) ( ) ( )E X d X d WXjqhat jqhat jqhat jqhat jqhat( ) . .= - +1
where X jqhat and WXjqhat equal X jqha t- -1 1 depending on the circumstance.
58
Portfolio segment returns by credit risk class
The expected bank returns in a risk class g is found by summing across all regions, industries
and loan maturities as follows:
(4.44) åå
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Since actual outcomes for the probability of default and security cover may deviate from their
expected levels, realised bank returns in risk class g in time period t will equal:
(4.45) åå
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Portfolio segment returns by region-industry segment
The expected bank returns in particular portfolio segment j is found by summing across all risk
classes and loan maturities as follows:
(4.46) E BR E BR E Xjt jqhat jqha t
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Since actual outcomes for the probability of default and security cover may deviate from their
expected levels, realised bank returns in portfolio segment j in time period t will equal:
(4.47) BR BR Xjt jqhat jqha t
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Given the existence of writeoffs during any time period, the realised number of borrowers
remaining in a portfolio segment j at time t will equal equation (4.48) (note that the number of
new borrowers entering a portfolio segment, NX, is also a random variable; however, in this
case, it is assumed to be fixed through time):
(4.48) X X NX MX WXjt jt jt jt jt= + - --1
where
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4.3.3 Valuation model of portfolio
Across the total portfolio, the expected returns to the bank from a portfolio of  region-industry
segments in time period t is given by the sum of the expected returns from the average borrower
in segment j weighted by the number of borrowers in the segment:
(4.50) E BR E BRpt jt
j
m
( ) ( )=
=
å
1
In a dynamic context, the valuation of the bank’s loan security portfolio in a market equilibrium
framework may be viewed in conceptual terms by the capital asset pricing model.  Banks are
concerned only with systematic risk if diversification and risk spreading are efficient.  If these
conditions are met, then the discount rate used to measure NPV of bank returns from a portfolio
of loan securities may be determined by the capital market line as described in Chapter Two:
(4.51) NPV BR
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with the discount rate equal to
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where the standard deviation of returns on the market portfolio is denoted by  md  and th
standard deviation of bank returns on the portfolio  pd  represents the level of systematic risk the
bank wishes to bear.  E rp( )  is the associated expected portfolio returns determined by the
capital market line.  Consequently, the NPV of expected bank returns from a portfolio of loan
securities may be found by discounting expected returns using discount rate r:
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with the variance of the NPV of portfolio returns given by:
(4.54) { } ( ){ }[ ]Var NPV BR E NPV BR E NPV E BRp p p( ) ( ) ( )= - 2
If lenders are unable to achieve efficient risk spreading or diversification, the RAROC method
may be used to determine the discount rate.
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4.4 Limitations of multi-period portfolio model
The portfolio model presented in this chapter is limited to the analysis of bank business risk.
The financing decision for the loan security portfolio has not been integrated into the model.
Accordingly, further extensions to the balance sheet model would be required for the analysis of
bank financial risk.  The asset-liability model would need to link the mix of debt and equity
securities across different portfolio segments according to their relative contributions to
unexpected losses.  The divisional cost of capital approach as outlined in Section 3.5 would be
required.  A major consideration in a dynamic portfolio model of bank liabilities is the linkage
between short term and long term funding requirements.  In theory, the long term funding
requirements are determined by the bank’s optimal capital structure; and the linkage between
costs of funding and loan pricing in this context is discussed in Chapter Eleven.  In the short
term, expansions and contractions in the size of the bank’s capital base may occur due to
variations in capital losses that arise from credit risk and therefore retained earnings in a given
time period.
In a multi-period model, these short-te m changes in capital structure need to be related to the
bank’s optimal capital structure.  The dynamic linkages between retained earnings and funding
requirements could be provided by a rule similar to the ‘sustainable asset growth rate’.  This
rule defines the capital needs of banking institutions in terms of the retained earnings from the
security portfolio and borrowings given a constant debt-equi y ratio through time (Shanmugum
and Turton 1992, p 224).  Some alterations to this rule would be required so that deviations in
the short-term debt-equity ratio from the long run optimal ratio are possible.  Regulatory
constraints such as capital adequacy requirements imposed on banking institutions would also
need to be considered (Davis 1990).
4.5 Summary
The standard capital budgeting approach was applied to a portfolio of of illiquid loan securities.
Loan securities are categorised by loan maturity, region and industry.  These categories give
portfolio classifications comprising of borrowers with similar income distributions, loan sizes
and repayment patterns.  In this framework, the maturity profile of an illiquid loan security
portfolio necessitates a dynamic model specification.  The model outlined in this chapter differs
from models in the literature in that loan loss distribution functions are generated by directly
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modelling the borrower, and includes key agency relationships between borrowers and lenders.
The production and investment decisions of borrowers are directly linked to the financing
decision via a risk constraint as specified by credit policy of the lender.  Through the risk
constraint, deviations from promised bank returns on loan securities are explicitly accounted for.
When borrowers are combined to form a portfolio, banks face an array of expected loss
outcomes.  Default by borrowers may lead to capital losses being incurred by banks.  The size of
loss expected when default occurs depends on loan contract specifications with respect to the
amount of collateral pledged relative to the size of the loan.  Since loan contract specifications
vary widely among borrowers in a portfolio segment, a credit risk classification system may be
constructed using a two-dimensional matrix structure so as to compare the expected loss of
individual borrowers on a common basis through the expected loss spectrum.  In this system,
borrowers are classified into categories defining similar levels of default risk as measured by
their expected probability of default and similar levels of security risk as measured by their
expected security coverage ratio.
In a dynamic framework, the expected rate of return in portfolio theory is replaced by the
expected NPV of returns while portfolio risk is indicated by the nature of the NPV distribution.
Under uncertainty, the NPV of returns from a portfolio may be discounted by the required rate
of return as determined by either the CAPM or the RAROC method.  The choice of CAPM over
RAROC for determining the discount rate requires that both the size of borrowers and size of
region-industry segments do not impact significantly on the distribution of total portfolio
returns.  A limitation of the modelling approach is that asset-liability i sues are not analysed;
the focus is on the impact of credit risk on bank returns earned on a portfolio of loan securities.
In this chapter, the promised interest rate charged and contract terms on loan securities across
different portfolio segments were not examined.  In the next chapter, pricing and the formulation
of contract terms on loan securities with uncertain repayment streams are developed in line with
the principles outlined by insurance theory and portfolio theory.
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CHAPTER FIVE
5. PORTFOLIO APPROACH TO CREDIT RISK MANAGEMENT
5.1 Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to prescribe credit policy rules for managing credit risk within the
context of the principles of insurance and portfolio theory outlined in Chapter Three.  The
foundation for policy prescription is the credit risk classification system as described in Chapter
Four.  The focus of policy prescription in Section 5.2 is on rules for formulating promised
interest rates to be charged to borrowers that are consistent with expected returns required on
certain categories of loan securities.  The focus of policy prescription switches in Section 5.3 to
formulating a range of non-pricing related rules that may be used to achieve credit risk control.
A summary of the chapter is provided in the final section.
5.2 Credit risk pricing
5.2.1 Promised interest rate and unsystematic risk
This section aims to derive a promised rate of interest that is consistent with expected loss rates
defined for different classes in a credit risk classification system.  A credit risk classification
system provides information about the expected probability of default of borrowers and security
cover pledged by borrowers.  This information may be used in conjunction with equation (4.39)
to give a promised interest rate to be charged to borrowers that results in an expected return
equal to the risk free rate of interest.  Equation (4.39) expresses the expected rate of return as a
function of the expected probability of default, the expected security cover ratio and the
promised rate of interest for a one-year maturity security.
To isolate the impact of default risk on expected bank returns, collateral is initially assumed to
cover the loan in event of default.  In this case, the return to the bank is zero in event of default,
and the second term on the right side of equation (4.39) may be suppressed.  Under the
assumption that the expected probability of default is independent of the interest rate charged to
the borrower, the risk free rate of interest may be set equal to the certainty-equivalen  promised
bank return, r ce , times the probability of survival.
(5.1) ( ) ( )( )1 1 1+ = + -i r djqht
ce
jqht
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By rearranging equation (5.1), the promised interest rate charged to a borrower on a
certainty-equivalence basis may be calculated as
(5.2) ( )
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In the case of no chance of default (ie, d = 0), i  and r ce are equal.  In contrast, when a
borrower is certain to default, (ie, d = 1), the certainty-equivalent rate of interest is undefined
and the bank cannot be compensated for the risk of receiving no interest income.  The size of the
certainty-equivalent default risk premium, drpce for a borrower is calculated as the difference
between the certainty-equivalent promised interest rate and the risk-free interest rate as shown in
equation (5.3).  The default risk premium depends on the size of the probability of default as
illustrated in Figure 5.1.
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In portfolio segments where borrowers do not fully secure their loans, banks are subject to an
expected capital loss if they are forced to recall loans on default.  Saunders (1994, p 175)
suggest that a security risk premium may be used to compensate lenders for expected losses of
loan principal that accrue when the security cover ratio is less than one.  Setting equation (4.39)
to the risk free rate of return gives:
(5.4) ( ) ( ).( ) .( )1 1 1 1+ = - + + -i d r d scrjqht jqht
ce
jqht jqht
By rearranging equation (5.4), the certainty- quivalent promised interest rat  is determined by
equation (5.5).
Figure 5.1  Relationship between the default risk premium and the
                  expected probability of default
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Since values for the security cover ratio less than or equal to one are relevant, equation (5.5)
may be re-written as follows for ease of application:
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The required size of the certainty-equivalent security risk premium, srpce, is given by the
second term on the right side of equation (5.6).
(5.7) srp
d
d
scrjqht
ce jqht
jqht
jqht= -
-
( )
.( )
1
1
The certainty-equivalent risk premium, rpce, for expected security cover ratios less than one is
therefore equal to
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The relationship between rpceand the expected probability of default is illustrated in Figure 5.2
for the different levels of the expected security cover ratio.  Given scr' .= 10 and scr'' .< 10,
the impact of a lower expected security cover ratio is to raise the certainty- quival nce risk
premium for all levels of the expected probability of default except in the case where d=0.
Figure 5.2   Relationship  between the risk premium, the expected
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                   probability of default and the expected security cover ratio
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5.2.2 Promised interest rate and systematic risk
The aims of this section are two-fold: first, to outline a method for estimating beta risk on loan
securities; and second, to derive a promised interest rate that is consistent with the expected
return required on certain types of loan securities so that lenders are compensated for bearing
systematic risk.  When loan securities are illiquid, the capital budgeting approach outlined in
Chapter Four may be used to measure portfolio risk.  If risk spreading in conjunction with
certainty-equivalence pricing for expected losses for borrowers in each risk grade effectively
forces unsystematic portfolio risk to zero, the remaining source of volatility of returns from loan
securities is beta risk.
Beta risk from loan securities occurs in the form of covariations in bank returns from borrowers
held across different regions and industries.  Categorisation of regions and industries may
involve either low or high order definitions depending on the nature of the data available.  The
following procedure may be used to obtain a measure of beta risk on loan securities.  Holding
period returns for each portfolio segment, and across the total portfolio, may be calculated by
estimating the following:
(5.9) r
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where rj = holding period return on portfolio segment j;
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PV j
ce = certainty-equivalent present value of portfolio segment j;
L j 0 = initial value of loans in portfolio segment j;
rp = holding period return on total portfolio;
PVp
ce = certainty-equivalent present value of total portfolio;
Lp 0 = initial value of loans in total portfolio; and
n = investment horizon.
Bank returns and bank loan balances in each portfolio segment and the total portfolio in future
periods are discounted by the risk free rate.
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Bank returns in portfolio segment j in time period t are found by summing the bank returns from
all loan securities within the segment.
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Loan balances in portfolio segment j at the end of the investment horizon, n, is found by
summing the loan balances from all loan securities within the segment.
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Bank returns from the jqha-th portfolio segment are assessed at the certainty-equivalent
promised rate of interest for a multi-period lending product as follows
(5.15) r i drp srpjqhat
ce
jqhat
ce
jqhat
ce= + +  .
Importantly, the certainty-equivalent rate of interest must be independent of the borrower’s
expected probability of default.
Equation (3.10) may be used to calculate beta for borrowers in portfolio segment j using
measures of holding period returns given in equations (5.9) and (5.10).  If the market risk
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premium, mrpp, is known, beta may be used to calculate a portfolio risk premium for borrowers
holding loan securities in region-industry segment j (see equations (3.12) and (3.13)).  The
portfolio risk premium, prpj, defined in equation (3.13) was given as:
(5. 16) prp mrpj j p= b  .  
The incorporation of the portfolio risk premium into the promised interest rate structure in a
multi-period context is achieved by adding the value of the portfolio risk premium to the risk
free rate, i, the default risk premium, drpce, and the security risk premium, srpce, as shown
below:
(5.17) r i drp srp prpjqhat jqhat
ce
jqhat
ce
j' = + + +
That is, jqhatr'  is the promised interest rate charged to each individual borrower in
region-industry segment j, default risk class q, security risk class h, of loan maturity a in time
period t.  Figure 5.3 shows the relationship between the promised interest rate and expected
bank returns with and without a portfolio risk premium.  The one-period model used to derive
the risk premium structure may be further refined by exploring the implications for the term
structure of credit risk as discussed by Jonkhart (1979).
Figure 5.3    Relationship between the promised interest rate, bank
         expected rate of return and the risk premium
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5.2.3 Pricing limits
There are limits to which banks may price for credit risk.  The prescriptions for promised rates
of interest according to different types of credit risk in the previous section have been made on
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the basis that the probability of default is independent of the promised interest rate charged.  If
the independence condition is violated, then the expected returns earned from borrowers in
certain portfolio segmentations will be at variance to the expected return on which the promised
interest rate was based.
The level of independence between the risk of default and the promised rate of interest depends
on the degree to which borrowers can substitute business risk for financial risk, or reduce their
total risk.  Business risk is defined as variations in borrower income accruing from fluctuations
in both output and input prices (including interest rates).  Financial risk stems from variations
in cash flows that arise from increasing leverage.  Gabriel and Baker (1980) show that
borrowers will balance their business risk and financial risk when maximising their net returns
to their operations subject to the constraint that total risk does not exceed a specified limit.  In
this context, the total risk of a borrower is defined by a particular targeted expected probability
of default.
In this framework, when higher promised interest rates are charged to borrowers, business risk
is raised, which accentuates the impact of any financial risk that accrues through leverage.
Borrowers adjust their mode of operation to reduce business risk in order to accommodate any
additional financial risk.  This balancing of risks ensures that total risk is held constant and the
targeted expected probability of default remains unchanged.  While the proportion of financing
costs relative to the borrowers operating expenses remain small, these operational adjustments
result in little overall change in their mode of operation.  To the extent that these adjustments
can occur, the expected probability of default will be independent of the promised interest rate.
If adjustments are required, borrowers are likely to rank investment options by the present
discounted value of each investment’s income stream.  Borrowers would reduce investment
levels in response to higher level of interest rates (Branson 1979, p 215).  This relationship, of
course, defines the interest rate elasticity of demand.
However, for borrowers already burdened with debt, adjustments to their mode of operation are
generally difficult.  Agency theory models suggest that adverse incentives and moral hazards can
lead to higher-risk borrowers responding to higher interest rates through undertaking riskier
investments (Saunders 1994, p 164).  As promised interest rates are increased further, a point
exists at which significant changes in a borrower’s mode of operation are required.  This point
is attained when business risk exposure of borrowers cannot be further reduced for a given
expected net return from their operation.  As financing costs increase relative to operating
expenses, higher financing costs provide incentives to borrowers to invest in activities with
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higher expected net returns (Saunders 1994, p 164).  Given the expected return-risk trade-off,
higher expected returns can only be achieved through riskier investments and thus increasing the
probability of default more than proportionately to an increase in the promised interest rate.
Therefore, for a given level of leverage, there can exist a range over which promised interest
rates results in negligible impacts on borrowers' expected probability of default.  Beyond a
particular point, rpl, higher risk premiums lead to sufficiently high promised interest rates such
that they lower expected returns to the bank (see Figure 5.4).  To circumvent pricing impacting
on expected returns, banks may use a risk pricing limit on borrowers.  The risk pricing limit
depends on the values for the expected probability of default and the expected security cover
ratio of the borrower and beta risk for the portfolio segment.  A risk pricing limit rule on the
promised rate of interest on portfolio entrants and existing borrowers through the course of their
loan period may be defined for a region-industry segment j as follows:
(5.18)
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The use of a risk pricing limit in a multi-period context is discussed further in Chapter Eight.
Figure 5.4  Relationship between the promised interest rate and the expected interest rate with
dependency between the expected default probability and the promised interest
rate
0
rpl
r
r'
e
74
5.3 Credit risk control
5.3.1 Credit quality limits
The risk pricing limit rule implicitly defines credit quality limits for acceptable portfolio
entrants.  Credit quality limits may be expressed in terms of the expected probability of default
and the expected security cover ratio where these may be denoted by dn and scrn respectively.
Given that rpl defines the limit for the promised rate of interest charged on loan securities that
ensures both certainty-equivalence and appropriate pricing for beta risk, regions for required
credit quality may be defined for acceptable portfolio entrants in terms of dn a d scrn. In other
words, if rpl for portfolio segment j is known, then equation (5.18) may be viewed as
combinations of dnand scrn as follows:
(5.19) rpl i drpdn srpdn scrn prpj j j j j= + + +( ) ( , )
By solving (5.19) in terms of dn across particular ranges set for crn, credit quality limits may
be derived in terms of the risk pricing limit.
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If a bank sets the pre-condition that entrants must be fully secured, the maximum acceptable
default-probability is positively related to the ratio of the margin between the risk-pricing-limit
and the risk-free-rate to the total-return from the loan at the risk-pricing-limit.  The unshaded
region in Figure 5.5 shows the combinations of d and cr for acceptable portfolio entrants
according to this rule.
In circumstances where a bank may permit portfolio entrants without full security coverage, the
setting of credit quality limits that satisfies the risk pricing limit is less straightforward.  The
dark shaded area in Figure 5.5 gives the region for potentially acceptable portfolio entrants
according to this rule.
However, there are several reasons why some decision-maker  may not find this region
comprising acceptable risk.  First, collateral plays an important role in providing incentives to
borrowers to repay their loans since claims on future income streams of borrowers are not
enforceable (Plaut 1985).  Second, d and scr both jointly determined the values of the
75
security-risk-premium.  At the margin, the default probability may not be independent of the
security cover ratio because there is a direct relationship between cr and lev rage, as discussed
later in Section 5.3.3.  This direct relationship is accentuated at low levels of scr, though the
possibility does arise for scrnvalues to be greater than one.  On the other hand, if the size of
loan is sufficiently small relative to borrower equity then lower security cover ratios may in fact
have a negligible impact on leverage.  The relationship defined in equation (5.20) may also be
useful in circumstances where banks are able to secure claims over income streams through
non-collateralised means.
Figure 5.5  Relationship between credit quality limits and
the risk pricing limit
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Credit quality limits may be directly applied within the framework of a credit risk classification
system.  In the security risk dimension, acceptable borrower entrants are graded into categories
that define ranges for the security cover ratio.  Borrower entrants associated with scr values
more than scrn are deemed acceptable.  Acceptable borrower entrants may be classified in the
three-grade case as follows:
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where scrh  = limit for expected security cover ratio for h-grade; and
scrn = minimum acceptable expected security cover ratio for loan applicants.
In the default risk dimension, grades for acceptable borrower entrants may also be defined using
ranges for the expected probability of default.  Borrower entrants associated with d values less
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than dn are deemed acceptable.  Acceptable borrower entrants may be classified in the
three-grade case as follows:
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where dq  = limit for expected probability of default for q-grade; and
dn = maximum acceptable expected probability of default for loan applicants.
When equations (5.21) and (5.22) are combined, a 3x3 credit risk classification system is
formed.  The 3x3 credit risk classification system is illustrated in Figure 5.6 where scr is given
on the x-axis and on the y-axis.
Figure 5.6   Credit risk classification matrix system with credit quality limits for
borrower entrants
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The shaded area give d and scr combinations for unacceptable portfolio entrants.  In Chapter
Eight, the credit risk classification system framework is extended further to explain a
classification system for all loan maturities.  In this respect, central bank guidelines suggest that
a credit risk classification system should cover both performing and impaired securities, and
include at least 8 grades covering exposures with the lowest risk to those where losses are
certain (RBA 1995b, p 12).
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5.3.2 Risk concentration limits
The role of risk concentration limits in credit risk management was discussed in Chapter Three.
Lenders have good information about numbers of borrowers and their loan balances classified
according to credit risk and low-order definitions of regions and industries.  In conceptual terms,
minimum concentration limits may be utilised to ensure that the ‘law of large numbers’ on low-l vel
definitions of regions and industries is satisfied.  If the ‘law of large numbers’ is satisfied and
individual region-industry segments are of relatively equal size, then diversification and risk
spreading are efficient.  The use of minimum concentration limits, however, presupposes that there
are sufficient numbers of borrowers of acceptable credit quality for lenders to pursue in loan
originations.
Maximum concentration limits may be utilised to ensure that excessive concentrations of loan types
for which returns covary significantly do not occur.  In the case where risk pricing limits impose
upper limits on promised returns, and therefore insufficient pricing of beta risk, maximum
concentration limits are an alternative means of circumventing potential adverse impacts of beta risk
on portfolio returns.  On the other hand, lower risk pricing limits provide for a higher degree of credit
quality required of borrower entrants, thus reducing the potential contribution of systematic variations
in portfolio returns.
In the case where there are significant differences in the size of individual borrowers, or in the
structure of regions and industries in an economy, the possibility of insufficient risk spreading
and diversification arises.  In this case, Morgan (1989) indicates that sufficient loan vol me data
are published to enable decision-makers in banks to construct single-index portfolio models to
gauge risk concentrations.  Using such data, market benchmarks may be established. Individual
financial intermediaries may use these benchmarks to compare their own internal allocations of
loans across different sectors (Saunders 1994, p 180).  The development of risk concentration
limits, in a practical sense, therefore depends principally on categorisation systems for defining
regions and industries.  Once regions and industry definitions are established, risk concentration
limits may be formulated.  Risk concentration limits then would depend on a large number of
factors including the structure of the loan market, the specialisation of a particular lender, the
lender’s existing portfolio mix, each lender’s pricing and lending policy and the nature of data
available.
5.3.3 Collateral and the maximum credit limit
At the borrower level, collateral and the maximum credit limit can both act as direct substitutes
for pricing for credit risk on loan applicants over a certain range of expected loss rates
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(Saunders, 1994, p 176).  At the margin, more collateral may be obtained from borrowers in
place of charging a higher contractual rate of interest as indicated by the security risk premium.
The expected security cover ratio may be defined by using equation (4.15) for the expected
collateral value, and dividing through by the maximum permissible liabilities to give the
following:
(5.23) scr
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Substituting equation (5.23) into equation (5.7) gives a relationship between the security risk
premium and the proportion pledged as collateral that ensures certainty-equival nce for a single
period term loan.  The distribution of the security risk premium in terms of cj  is given in
equation (5.24).  The nature of the trade-off between the security risk premium and the expected
value of collateral for a given particular maximum permissible loan size is illustrated in Figure 5.7.
Of importance, the sensitivity of this trade-off is positively related to the expected probability of
default.
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Figure 5.7 Relationship between the security risk premium and proportion of assets
pledged as collateral given certainty equivalence
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On the other hand, there is also direct substitutability between the security risk premium and the
maximum permissible size of loan.  If the proportion of assets pledged as collateral by borrowers is
held constant, then in the event of default, a bank may limit the potential size of loan losses by
relating the credit limit to the amount of collateral pledged by the borrower as shown in equation
(4.14).
Equation (4.16) may be rearranged to give the relationship between the security cover ratio and
the maximum credit limit for a single-period term loan.
(5.25) scr cljqht jqht= 1/
This relationship applies for all scr values greater than zero including loans that are fully
secured.
Hence, by substituting equation (5.25) into equation (5.7), and cancelling like terms, a
relationship between the security risk premium and the credit limit that ensures
certainty-equivalence may be formed.  The scp-cl relationship is illustrated in Figure 5.8 and is
formally defined as follows:
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Figure 5.8    Relationship between the security risk premium and the
    credit limit given certainty equivalence
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Since higher credit limits also imply higher levels of leverage, the relationship described in Figure 5.8
is also referred to as the leverage structure of interest rates (Plaut 1985). The security risk premium is
zero if the credit limit is equal to one.  The size of the loan in event of default is be fully covered by
the expected value of collateral.  As the credit limit becomes larger, the size of the security risk
premium required to give certainty-equivalence tends to d/(1-d).  The sensitivity of the relationship
is positively related to the expected probability of default.
While the relationship between pricing and the credit limit has been examined in the context of
the security risk premium for ease of exposition, there may be circumstances where the risk
pricing limit rule shown in equation (5.19) is limiting, even when the security risk premium is
zero.
5.4 Summary
Promised interest rates are comprised of four key components when pricing for credit risk: the
risk free rate, the default risk premium, the security risk premium and the portfolio risk
premium.  A default risk premium and a security risk premium are added to the risk-fre  interest
rate.  This gives a certainty-equivalence promised interest rate on loan securities.  These two
risk premiums allow lenders to be compensated for expected losses on loan securities.  The
portfolio risk premium is then added to the certainty-equivalence promised interest rate.  The
portfolio risk premium varies in size according to the size of beta risk for a particular
region-industry segment.
Credit controls are a necessary adjunct to pricing in the portfolio approach to credit risk
management.  Over a certain range of the expected loss spectrum, various credit controls may be
used to ensure that borrower default risk remains independent of the promised interest rate being
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charged.  A limit may be set on the promised rate of interest that is charged to borrowers to
ensure that risk premiums factored into interest rate structures do not affect default risk.  In
particular, risk pricing limits allow promised interest rates to be consistent with the underlying
expected returns required on loan securities.  In addition, loan proposals that do not satisfy
credit quality limits can be rejected.  There are two forms of credit quality limits; first, a
maximum acceptable expected probability of default, and second, a minimum acceptable
expected security cover ratio.  These credit quality limits can be determined in terms of the risk
pricing limit so as to ensure efficient pricing.  Within these limits, the collateral required and/or
the maximum permissible credit limit allowable on borrowers may be substituted for the risk
premium under certain circumstances.  A key assumption behind the policy prescriptions
outlined above is that risk concentrations in a loan security portfolio are not excessive.
For most lending institutions, the size of borrowers may vary considerably with definitions of
regions and industries being predetermined by the underlying structure of an economy.  As a
result, the use of risk premiums and credit controls at the borrower level may not be completely
efficient.  Portfolio concentration limits may be defined for different categories of borrowers in
order to both improve the efficiency of pricing and to manage unexpected losses.  Minimum
portfolio limits may be used to assure sufficient risk spreading within a risk class or to ensure
adequate diversification across different region-industry segments.  Maximum portfolio limits
may be used to limit risk concentrations.  One method for assessing risk concentrations is to
compare an individual lender’s portfolio structure with a benchmark portfolio.  Given a
high-order region-i dustry category, a benchmark portfolio structure may be constructed that
reflects the average structure of loan balances in each low-order region-i dustry segment for all
lenders.  The individual lender would then formulate risk concentration limits to reflect the
market-based benchmark portfolio.  There are, however, some conceptual problems with the
approach despite it’s relative ease of application.
In the next chapter, a number of additional credit controls are canvassed.  These credit controls
arise from the structure of loan products within a dynamic context.
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CHAPTER SIX
6. LOAN PRODUCT DYNAMICS AND CREDIT RISK MANAGEMENT
6.1 Introduction
The aims of this chapter is to examine credit risk arising from loan product structures in a dynamic
setting, and to outline the options available to banks for controlling this source of risk.  The focus is
on the circumstance where business borrowers jointly use term loan and overdraft products.  While
loan products are constructed in the first instance to meet the financing requirements of borrowers,
their terms and conditions must also be considered against the risk-return objectives of credit policy
makers.  In Section 6.2, impacts of loan construction on credit risk are outlined, and then credit policy
options for minimising these impacts are considered.  Following this, options for loan product
reconstruction to deal with defaulting exposures is examined in Section 6.3.  A summary of the
chapter is provided in the final section.
6.2 Loan product construction
6.2.1 Term loan product types
Term loan products may be classified according to the nature of interest rate charging or the
structure of repayment. The interest rate charged may be fixed for the duration of the term or be
charged on either a variable or an adjustable basis (Pederson, Duffy, Boehlje and Craven 1991).
A variable interest rate loan security allows interest rates to fluctuate with current rates of
interest associated with funding the loan security.  Interest rate settings on variable rate loans
can change frequently (for example, quarterly or monthly), and are often contractually tied to an
index.  This pricing arrangement allows banks to pass interest rate risk through to borrowers in
the event of an unexpected rate increase while enabling borrowers to avoid locking into a high
interest rate if rates should fall.  An adjustable rate mortgage is priced so that interest rates
change at predetermined intervals usually according to an index such as Treasury securities.  In
some cases, adjustable rate loan securities and variable rate loan securities have interest rate
caps that limit the increase in the interest rate for each repricing period and over the life of the
loan.
From a default risk perspective, the expected probability of default associated with a fixed
interest loan is generally lower than that for a variable or an adjustable interest rate product
when nominal interest rates are stable.  The lower default risk arises for fixed interest loans
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because there is certainty over future interest rate movements.  Pederson (1992) shows that the
variable rate loans transfers interest rate risk associated with lender’s cost-of-funds t  the
borrower, and therefore default risk is raised.  However, Pederson (1992) also shows that this
disadvantage of variable interest loans must be counterbalanced against their risk efficiency in
managing interest rate volatility on lenders’ cost-of-funds.
Inflation trends, of course, affect both nominal interest rate and borrower income movements.
When inflation is not steady over the term of the loan, nominal income movements as a result of
rising/falling inflation can increase/reduce the capacity of borrowers to meet loan instalment
payments.  For example, borrowers may borrow at a high fixed rate because they expect a high
rate of inflation.  With the passage of time, growth in their nominal income will increase their
capacity to pay fixed loan instalments.  On the other hand, if inflation falls, fixed rate borrowers
may experience a reduction in their capacity to repay fixed loan instalments.  Variable rate
borrowers would generally have their instalments reduced as inflation fell.
Repayment structures on the term lending facility can vary widely with the choice of repayment
structure depending on the preferences of both the bank and the borrower.  The standard term
lending product is the straight-line amortisation mortgage product.  Under this arrangement, a
borrower’s principal and interest payments in each time period up to the maturity term of the
loan, nt,  are determined by the amortisation factor, am, times the initial term loan drawing
(6.1) PI am LTjqhat jqhat jqha t= = -    . 0 1
where the amortisation factor is determined by the following
(6.2) am
rt rt
rt
jqhat
jqhat jqhat
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jqhat
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jqhat
jqhat
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+ -
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1 1
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With a fixed-interest amortised term loan, equation (6.1) ensures that at the end of the maturity
term, term loan principal outstanding is zero.  In contrast, under a variable interest rate regime,
the time path of the interest rate affects the size of principal repayments made through the term
with the possibility of a non-zero term loan balance at the conclusion of the maturity term.  If
interest rates generally fall over the term, the ending term loan balance is positive with the
borrower required to make a balloon payment to the bank at the end of the maturity term. On the
other hand, if interest rates generally rise over the term, the ending term loan balance is negative
with the bank required to reimburse funds to the borrower.  In any event, conditions attached to
the variable rate loan contract will determine whether instalments and principal payments both
alter, or whether one remains the same, under interest rate changes.
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Credit repayment variants to the straight-line amortisation repayment formula include flexible
repayment, graduated payment or adjustable-term financing (Pederson, Duffy, Boehlje and
Craven 1991).  Flexible repayment mortgages allow borrowers to increase or reduce the amount
of loan payments, within certain limits, in response to fluctuating repayment ability.  Graduated
payment mortgages structure loan payments in a manner which allow initial payments to be less
than under straight amortisation with subsequent payment sizes gradually increasing over the
life of the loan.  This type of arrangement allow borrowers larger credit reserves at early stages
of the term loan if the time path of the maximum credit limit is held constant (Lee 1979).
Adjustable-term financing has been suggested by Bo hlje and Pederson (1988).   Under this
financing arrangement, banks are able to pass interest rate changes through to borrowers by
adjusting the term of the loan in such a way that the repayment level required by borrowers is
not increased.  Given this, the size of the credit reserve is held constant other things held equal.
This consequently reduces the risk of default compared to other financing arrangements.
6.2.2 Minimum credit reserve limit and initial leverage
The minimum credit reserve limit directly influences a borrower’s expected probability of
default through it’s impact on their initial actual leverage.  Because of this, the minimum credit
reserve limit is a critical parameter in the control of default risk.  By definition, the minimum
credit reserve limit determines the relative proportions of the initial sizes of the credit reserve
and the term loan drawings once the maximum permissible liabilities of successful loan
applicants have been set.  From equation (4.18), the credit reserve and the initial term loan
drawing are equal to the following:
(6.3) CR crm Lj qh t jqh t jqh t
m
 1 1 1= .
(6.4) LT L CRjqh t jqh t
m
jqh t0 1 1 1- = -
Substituting equation (6.3) into equation (6.4) gives
(6.5) LT L crm Ljqh t jqh t
m
jqh t jqh t
m
 0 1 1 1 1- = - .
and simplifying gives
(6.6) LT crm Ljqh t jqh t jqh t
m
  0 1 1 11- = -( ).
The credit reserve and the initial term loan drawing may be expressed as proportions of the
maximum permissible liabilities by dividing equations (6.3) and (6.6) through by L jqh t
m
1
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(6.7)
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Since the expected collateral value is a fixed proportion of business assets, equation (6.8) is
directly related to actual leverage.
In order to examine the relationship between crm and d , assume that the term loan product is
a fixed interest product.  With personal expenses fixed, business risk will simply reflect the
variance of earnings before interest and tax.  Accordingly, given a fixed variance, the impact of
actual leverage on d  is reflected in shifts in the expected value of cash surpluses including
credit reserves, E CSR( ) , relative to the size of the maximum permissible liabilities.
Substituting equations (4.28) and (4.29) into equation (4.33), taking expectations and dividing
through by Lm gives the following expression (with subscripts removed for ease of exposition).
(6.9)
E CSR
L
E FDR
L
E TAX
L
CR
Lm m
d
m m
( ) ( ) ( )
= - - +a
where a =
- - -E GI E FC PE E TAX
L
nd
m
( ) ( ) ( )
and
E TAXd( )  =  expected tax paid as a result of debt and
E TAXnd( )  =  expected tax paid independent of debt.
The value of E FDR( )  given in equation (6.9), is a function of the amortisation factor, the
average loan fee rate and the size of initial term loan drawing.  Since the size of initial term loan
drawings determines actual leverage, the ratio of expected fixed-debt servicing requirements to
maximum permissible liabilities may be expressed as a function of actual leverage as follows:
(6.10)
E FDR
L
am crm lfr crm
m
( )
.( ) .( )= - + -1 1
= + -( ).( )am lfr crm1
where am= amortisation factor and
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afr = average loan fees and charges paid.
Increases in actual leverage leads to additions to credit reserves as a result of the taxation
deductibility of interest and loan servicing charges.  If a linear relationship is assumed, then this
relationship may expressed as follows:
(6.11)
E TAX
L
atr r lfr crm
d
m
( )
.( ' ).( )= - + -1
where atr = average taxation rate.
Substitution of equations (6.10) and (6.11) into equation (6.9) gives
(6.12)
E CSR
L
am lfr crm atr r lfr crm crm
m
( )
( )( ) .( ' )( )= - + - + + - +a 1 1
 =a - + + + - +( .( ' )).( )am lfr atr r lfr crm crm1
If q  is defined as m lfr atr r lfr+ - +.( ' ) , then equation (6.12) simplifies to
(6.13)  
E CSR
L
crm crm
m
( )
.( )= - - +a q 1
Equation (6.13) may be used to define the liquidity impact of actual leverage on the ratio of
expected value of cash surpluses including credit reserves to maximum permissible liabilities.
If g  is defined as the liquidity impact of crm n E CSR Lm( ) / , then, taking the final two
components of equation (6.13),which are dependent on the level of crm, gives the following:
(6.14)   =  g q- - +.( )1 crm crm
 =    - + +q q( ) .1 crm
Equation (6.14) gives the size of g  as a linear function of crm as shown in Figure 6.1 with the
slope of the line given by 1+ q .
Figure 6.1    Relationship between liquidity and the minimum
credit reserve limit
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Importantly, solving for g  equal to zero gives a crmvalue where actual leverage on expected
cash flows can be nullified as follows.
(6.15) *  =
1+
crm
q
q
Alternatively stated, the positive contribution to liquidity for credit reserves set at the level of
crm*  is exactly offset by the negative impact on cash flows from actual leverage stemming
from ( *)1- crm .  At crm* , the E CSR Lm( ) /  ratio is equal to a , the ratio of non-debt specific
net-cash-flows to maximum permissible debt indicated by credit policy.
This relationship may be used to define an efficient combination of credit reserves and actual
leverage of a borrower consistent with the risk constraint imposed by a lender.  If the shape of
the underlying probability distribution function of cash surpluses including credit reserves is
normally distributed (by way of example), then the shape of the relationship between crm and
d  will reflect the cumulative probability distribution function for CSR for values of
CSR£ 0.  The most efficient value for crm to both a borrower and a lender is given by
crm*  where the point of inflection occurs in the crm - d  relationship as illustrated in Figure
6.2.
Figure 6.2    Relationship between the minimum credit reserve limit and the expected
probability of default
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At crm* , the expected probability of default is equal to da , which reflects purely the business
risk of the borrower given the lender’s risk constraint.  For crm values less than crm* , the
probability of default asymptotically converges to 1.0.  The size of the credit reserve, in the
event of all other terms and conditions of the loan contract remaining unchanged, tends to zero,
and the capacity of borrowers to fund their fixed loan obligations is diminished.  For crm
values greater than crm* , the probability of default asymptotically converges towards d' since
actual leverage is zero at crm= 1.
Since the above analysis is specified in terms of proportions of Lm, equation (6.15) may be used to
determine the required level of crmto give an actual leverage ratio that leaves the underlying
probability of default of borrowers before debt unchanged following taking on leverage.  Key
assumptions behind the rule defined in equation (6.15), when applied in this context, include:
· borrowers are similar in production and business asset structures in a region-industry
segment;
· linearity exists between actual leverage and the loan fees and charges paid; and
· linearity exists between actual leverage and average tax rate of the borrower.
If these assumptions are satisfied, the expected probability of default of borrowers may be
measured solely in terms of the business risk relative to their maximum permissible liabilities.
This measure of default risk holds regardless of which security risk class successful loan
applicants are placed into.  This feature means that the leverage impact on income variability is
nullified.  As a result, greater credit risk control is achieved using the rule given in equation
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(6.15) because the rule ensures that the influence of loan products and loan pricing on borrower
default risk is minimised.
6.2.3 Maximum credit limit dynamics
The maximum credit limit determines the maximum permissible leverage of a borrower.  This
limit may be determined independently of a borrower’s cash flow distribution since it is the
control parameter for the size of expected losses in the event of default.  For expected security
cover ratios above the minimum security cover ratio scrn, the maximum credit limit is given by
rearranging equation (5.25):
(6.16) cl
scrjh jh
=
1
.
For new loans, the maximum possible size of overdraft drawing permitted is given by the credit
reserve - the difference between the maximum permissible liabilities and the size of the initial
term loan drawing.  Beyond the first year of the term loan, the maximum credit limit is the
control parameter for overdraft drawings.  Actual leverage will depend on the repayment
patterns on the term loan facility, and the extent to which unanticipated adverse conditions lead
to drawings on the overdraft facility.  However, in an ex ante sense, if a fixed maximum credit
limit for the maturity term is used, the repayment of term loan principal through the duration of
the loan results in expansions in the projected size of the credit reserve.  The rise in credit
reserves means that the underlying expected probability of default of the borrower falls as term
loan principal repayments are made.
Accordingly, the time path of the maximum credit limit may be alternatively formulated so that
it falls at a rate at which the term loan principal expressed as a percentage of the expected value
of collateral draws down through the duration of the loan term.  The expected size of the credit
reserve through to the final year would be held constant, leaving the underlying expected
probability of default unaffected by the maximum credit limit.  Under certain conditions, a
borrower’s credit limit may also be augmented during a term of the loan if a borrower seeks
further additions to their credit reserve in order to reduce the possibility of falling into a state of
default.
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6.3 Loan product reconstruction
6.3.1  Problem loan resolution policy options
Given the model of a borrower as outlined in Chapter Four, a borrower reaches default status
when cash flows are insufficient to cover business, personal and fixed debt servicing
requirements after exhausting the maximum available credit reserve during any particular time
period.  Expressed another way, default status is reached when CSRjqhat < 0.
In the event of default, the business is overdrawn by amount equal to CSR on the overdraft
facility, and the previously agreed maximum credit limit is violated.  The control of credit risk in
this circumstance may be achieved through increases in credit reserves.  There are three primary ways
through which borrower’s credit reserves may be increased (Lawrence and Arshadi 1995).  First,
since repayment options on the overdraft are flexible, the only option available in terms of changes to
conditions on the overdraft is to extend the maximum credit limit.  Credit limit extension allows
borrowers to draw sufficient funds to meet their financial obligations.  Second, alterations to prior
agreed terms of term loan contracts can provide borrowers additional time and better match
principal payments to periodic net cash income of the borrower (Pede s n, Boehlje, Doye and
Jolly 1987).  Finally, additional liquidity may be provided to a borrower through a temporary
reduction in the rate of interest charged on debt facilities.
Other considerations in the development of problem loan resolution policy options include the
number of times restructuring options are offered to a borrower, whether to make the
restructuring options contingent on the prior credit risk class migratory pattern of the borrower
and their taxation implications.  While the impact of these issues on a bank’s risk-return profile
are clearly empirical issues, in principle, if a borrower does enter default, credit quality is
impaired and restructuring options are offered only once or are applied without recognition of
the borrower’s previous credit risk classification history.  Taxation implications depend on the
time path of taxable income under each different restructuring strategy.  When provisionings for
losses are taken, taxable income in the current period is reduced, and therefore the tax burden
falls.  If provisions for losses are written back in future years, both taxable income and tax
burden are increased in these years.  If restructuring options only involve changes to bank asset
levels, no taxable income reductions are generally involved.  For this reason, restructuring
options that involve augmenting taxable income, so as to reduce taxation burden, may be
favoured.
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There are four major options that may be used by banks in restructuring problem loans.  These
are rescheduling the loan contract, rescheduling the loan contract with credit extension, recall
the loan or begin liquidation proceedings (Webb 1982, Shanmugun 1990).  The option of
interest rate reductions to sub-commercial levels in event of default is not considered in this
study.  The measurement of bank returns and loan balances under different problem loan
resolution policy options are subject to central bank guidelines that define circumstances where
income may not be accrued ahead of it’s receipt (RBA 1993, 1995b).  While interpretation of
these guidelines differ between banks, the methodology used for measuring bank returns and
loan balances under these various options described below are defined to be consistent with
these guidelines.
6.3.2 No restructuring
If the bank offers no debt restructuring options to a borrower in event of default, the bank
forecloses on the business and sells the collateral pledged to recover the loan.  If the salvage
value of collateral is more than the amount of loan outstanding, the bank is not subject to a
capital loss.  However, if the salvage value of collateral is insufficient to fully cover the loan,
the bank writes off the difference between the collateral value and the loan in the form of a
provisioning for bad and doubtful debt.  The general form for measuring bank returns in event
of default abstracting from resource costs is as follows:
(6.17) BR RL CLjqhat jqhat jqhat= -
where RL = revenue from loan and
CL = capital loss.
In the circumstance where no restructuring policy is pursued, then in simple terms, RL  is equal
to zero.  If outstanding credit is not fully secured, CL  is qual to the writeoff not been
previously provided for as a bad and doubtful debt.  I  the loan is fully secured, full loan
repayment occurs and no capital loss is incurred.
6.3.3 Reschedule through lengthening the maturity term
A bank may provide further liquidity to a borrower by simply rescheduling a shorter term loan
into a longer term loan.  Given the standard amortisation formula, the size of the amortised
principal and interest repayments falls, albeit at a decreasing rate, as the maturity term of the
loan is extended.  Under this arrangement, the bank does not incur any additional costs from the
viewpoint of higher potential loan losses.  Loan restructuring is successful in the first instance if
the longer maturity term provides a borrower with sufficient liquidity in the current period.  This
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is achieved if the reduction in the value of the amortised principal and interest repayment is
sufficient to cover the required funding deficit.  In the second instance, the loan restructuring is
successful if the prior agreed credit limit of the borrower is not violated.
If the loan facility was successfully restructured, the impact on bank returns is as follows.  The
bank earns lower total interest income in the time period than under the original terms.  If a
capital loss can be expected, then under central bank guidelines, banks are required to make a
provisioning in the form of a new specific provision for bad and doubtful debt.  Accordingly,
bank returns equal the following if the restructuring is successful.
(6.18) ( )BR RL E CLjqhat jqhat jqhat= -
On the other hand, no provisioning for a bad and doubtful debt is required if the loan is fully
secured.  If the restructuring is unsuccessful, bank returns are measured according to equation
(6.17) with a writeoff not previously provided for as a provisioning being incurred.
If in the period following loan restructuring, the borrower performs, it is assumed for the
purpose of this study that the loan is restored to performing status.  A writeb ck of the specific
provisioning is made if the loan was not fully secured in the previous period.  However, if the
borrower defaults, the loan balance is repaid to the extent to which collateral covers the loan.  In
addition, if the provisioning was more than adequate, the bank makes a writeback of the
difference between the actual sale value of collateral and the expected value of collateral on
which the provisioning was based, and bank returns in the current period are increased by this
amount.
(6.19) ( )BR RL E CLjqhat jqhat jqhat= +
If the provisioning was inadequate to cover the actual capital loss, a writeoff that was not
specifically provided for is incurred and is deducted from bank returns.
(6.20) ( )BR E CL CLjqhat jqhat jqhat= -
6.3.4 Deferral of term loan interest and principal payments
An amortised term loan repayment may be broken into it’s comp nents: interest payment and
principal repayment.  Through the term of the loan, interest payments are at their highest level at
the early stages of the loan.  Consequently, the benefits to borrower liquidity from interest
payment deferral compared to interest payment deferral are at their greatest.  However, the
liquidity benefits of interest payment deferral must be counterbalanced against the taxation
benefits of interest payment deductibility for income taxation purposes.
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Under the, principal payment deferral option, interest payment are made.  If restructure is
successful, the borrower is allowed to defer the principal payment and the term loan principal
outstanding remains constant from the current period to the next.  If the loan is fully secured and
therefore no capital loss may be expected, interest income is deemed to be earned in the current
period, though receipt in cash terms is expected to occur in later years, and no provisioning is
required.   If the loan is not fully secured on the basis of the expected salvage collateral value,
the bank also earns no interest on the term loan facility in the current period with this interest
income held in reserve pending on continued borrower performance.  In addition, a new specific
provisioning is required to be made, and bank returns in the current period are measured
according to equation (6.18).
If, on the other hand, the restructure is unsuccessful, a writeo f not previously provided for as a
provisioning is incurred if the outstanding credit is not fully secured.  If in the period following
interest forgiveness the borrower performs, the bank restructures the term loan repayment to
ensure that the full amount of the new outstanding balance of term loan principal is fully repaid
at the conclusion of the loan.  At this juncture, restructuring may take several forms.  One
option is to retain the original maturity term and the outstanding term loan balance is amortised to
give a new but higher repayment rate for principal and interest.  Alternatively, restructuring may take
the form of lengthening the maturity term so as to lower the amortised term loan repayments
compared to the previous option.
Once restructured, bank revenue equals interest income received on the new loan balance.  If the
exposure was not fully secured in the previous year, bank revenue also includes the interest held
in reserve from the previous period.  As described in the previous section, bank returns are
increased by the amount of writeback of provisionings if the borrower performs while the
treatment of provisionings and writeoffs in event of default by a borrower depend on the realised
outcome for the salvage value of the borrower’s collateral.
An alternative to deferral of term loan principal payment is deferral of the interest payment.  If a
borrower is able to meet the principal repayment but can only partially pay the interest
component, the bank in this case may defer this latter payment for a given time period, say one
year.  If the restructure is successful, the borrower is allowed to capitalise the interest into the
term loan principal.  If the loan is fully secured and therefore no capital loss may be expected,
interest income may be accrued and no provisioning is required.  If the loan is not fully secured
on the basis of the expected salvage collateral value, the bank earns no interest on the term loan
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facility in the current period with this interest income held in reserve pending on continued
borrower performance.  Further, a new specific provisioning is required to be made, and bank
returns in the current period are measured according to equation (6.18).  If, on the other hand,
the restructure is unsuccessful, a writeoff not previously provided for as a provisioning is
incurred if the outstanding credit is not
fully secured.
If in the period following interest forgiveness the borrower performs, the bank restructures the
term loan repayment using the options described above.  Similarly, once restructured, bank
returns are measured in the same way as in the case where term loan interest is deferred.
The bank may also defer payment of the full amount of the amortised principal and interest
payment for a given time period.  The borrower capitalises the repayment into the outstanding
term loan principal.  The outcome for bank returns is similar to that outlined above with the
exception that the inclusion of principal repayments increases the size of the provisioning if the
loan is not fully secured.
6.3.5 Restructuring with credit extension
Under more adverse circumstances confronting a borrower, the deferral of term loan repayments
may provide insufficient credit reserves to a borrower and an extension of the borrower’s
prearranged credit limit may be required.  The xtent to which the credit limit may be extended
depends on the policy stance of a bank.  The extension could be set at the minimum amount sufficient
to just cover the exposure's unpaid term loan repayment.  Alternatively, the credit limit may be
extended by the minimum amount required to meet the borrower’s credit requirement plus a set
proportion to give the borrower a credit reserve.  Further, the period over which the credit extension
rule applies may be restricted to a set number of periods rather than the remainder of the maturity
term.  Since a credit limit extension implies an increase in the size of expected loss in event of
borrower insolvency, the size of provisionings is also increased if the borrower is not fully secured.
6.3.6 Impact on portfolio risk
The impact on the dispersion of bank returns from different restructuring options in net present value
terms is generally not easily determined and depends on a number of factors.  These factors include
the size of liquidity requirements of borrowers, the sensitivity of default risk to additional credit
reserves following restructuring, the distribution of the salvage value of collateral pledged by
borrowers and taxation implications of different restructuring strategies.  The impact on the
dispersion of bank returns in terms of default risk and security risk is discussed below.
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For a given dispersion of borrower incomes, the likelihood of restructuring being successful in
reducing default risk depends on the extent to which systematic serial correlation in borrower incomes
exists.  If borrower incomes are positively serially correlated through time, the probability of
consecutive low incomes is increased, and the likelihood of successful restructuring will be less.
Conversely, if serial correlation in borrower incomes is negative, this likelihood is higher.
The impact of unsuccessful restructuring on bank returns depends on the distribution of capital losses
in event of default, and therefore the distribution of the salvage value of collateral.  In this respect, the
relationship between borrower incomes and collateral asset prices is important.  If prices of collateral
assets are positively related to borrower incomes, the likelihood of a larger capital loss in event of
default will be higher than in the case where borrower incomes are negatively related.
Positive serial correlation in borrower incomes combined with a direct relationship between borrower
incomes and collateral values therefore gives an indication of conditions under which restructuring
options are likely to be relatively risk-return inefficient.  The lower the extent of positive serial
correlation in borrower incomes and the less directly related collateral values are to borrower incomes,
the greater the risk-return efficiency of restructuring options are likely to be compared to no
restructuring in event of borrower default.  Further, the impact of loan restructuring options on
systematic portfolio risk depends on the extent to which distributions of borrower incomes and
collateral asset values are correlated, both at a point in time and over time, across regions and
industries
6.4 Summary
Banks have various options in controlling credit risk through the initial construction of loan
products or through reconstruction of loan products if borrowers fall into default.  In either case,
the degree of impact of loan product structure on credit risk depends on it’s influence on the
time path of the credit reserves available to the borrower, and therefore the dynamic profile of
default risk through the maturity term.  Fixed interest rate loans generally reduce credit risk
relative to variable interest rate products, though inflation trends can strongly influence credit
risk associated with variable- nterest and fixed-interest loan products.  More flexible principal
repayment conditions may provide a means for minimising the influence of loan product on
credit risk.  The minimum credit reserve limit of portfolio entrants may also be formulated so
that the effect of leverage on borrower’s default probability is nullified.  If the leverage effect on
the default probability is nullified, independence between pricing and default risk is assured
within certain limits.
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In event of default, there is a range of options open to a bank to restructure loan products.
Under certain circumstances, these options may provide for increased returns and a reduced
dispersion of returns to the bank in a net present value context.  The risk-return efficiency of
these options depends on several factors.  These factors include: first, the distribution of
borrower incomes and salvage values of collateral pledged by borrowers in a given time period
and across consecutive periods; second, the size of liquidity requirements of borrowers on the
sensitivity of additional credit reserves following restructuring to default risk; and finally, the
time path of the tax burden.  Further, the way in which the first two factors covary across
regions and industries will impact on the bank’s systematic portfolio risk.
Since policy makers are confronted with a number of competing policy options for efficient
credit risk management, a method is outlined in the next chapter as to how might the most
desirable credit policy set be chosen.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
7. CREDIT POLICY EVALUATION
7.1 Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to outline a method for choosing the most desirable credit policy regime
from a number of alternative credit policy regimes.  Decision making under uncertainty may be
viewed as choices between alternative probability distributions of returns, and a decision maker
chooses between them in accordance to a consistent set of preferences (Bawa 1975).  In Section 7.2,
the decision problem facing banks in selecting a credit policy regime is framed in the context of
choosing between portfolio return distribution functions arising from different credit policy regimes.
In the following three sections, efficiency criteria based on first-, second- and third-order stochastic
dominance are outlined.  These criteria establish the selection of efficient sets of credit policy regimes
from the feasible set of credit policy regimes according to general properties about risk-return
preferences that are likely to reflect those of decision makers in banks.  In Section 7.6, key limitations
of the evaluation method are highlighted and a range of options proposed in the literature for reducing
these problems is discussed.  A summary of the chapter is provided in the final section.
7.2 Decision problem
The decision problem under analysis is to choose between different credit policy regimes that
decision-makers in banks may wish to apply.  A credit policy regime i may be defined as a
composition of the following policy rules.
(7.1) i =
é
ë
ê
ê
ê
ê
ê
ê
ê
ê
pricing rules
credit quality limits rules
collateral quantity and quality rules
credit limits rules
loan product rules
problem loan resolution policy rules
Each credit policy regime gives rise to pay-offs in terms of loan security returns to the bank subject to
a range of constraints that decision-makers cannot control.  These constraints include the initial size
and structure of the loan security portfolio at the beginning of the evaluation period and the prior
history of borrowers in the portfolio.  In the provision of credit, other exogenous factors include the
economic environment facing borrowers and the size of loan security inflows by portfolio segment in
each time period over the evaluation horizon.  The uncertain nature of the economic environment and
borrower inflows may be described by distribution functions that describe their likelihood of
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occurrence in future periods.  The bank is also assumed to employ a particular credit risk evaluation
method via a credit risk classification system and credit scoring models in order to measure the impact
of the economic environment on the credit risk of borrowers and to deliver credit policy.  Therefore
given k number of credit policy regimes, the pay-off from the i-th credit policy regime may be given
by the probability density function of the net present value of bank portfolio returns, ( )NPV BRip ,
over the investment horizon, n, shown by equation (7.2)
(7.2) ( )f NPV BRip( )
where the measure of the net present value of bank returns is measured by
(7.3) ( )NPV BR BR
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given the following constraints:
· uncertain economic environment;
· uncertain new borrower in-flows by portfolio segment;
· credit risk evaluation method;
· initial portfolio loan asset structure; and
· borrower financial structures and production characteristics
where subscripts are denoted by
p = portfolio;
t  =  1, …., n time periods; and
i  =  1, …., k credit policy regimes.
The choice between k number of credit policy regimes may be achieved through the use of an
efficiency criterion (Levy and Sarnat 1990, p 178).  An efficiency criterion is a decision rule for
categorising all potential policy regimes into two mutually exclusive categories: an efficient
category and an inefficient category.  The former category contains all of the desirable policy
alternatives.  The final choice of policy from the efficient category ultimately depends on the
risk-return pref rences of a decision-maker.
There is a range of efficiency criteria that have been proposed in the literature.  The efficien
selection between alternative credit policy regimes cannot be based simply in terms of expected
value and variance of security returns in view of the possibility of non-normality of bank returns (see
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Chapter Four).  Arrow (1971) and Hicks (1962) have also pointed out that a quadratic utility function
in security selection is assumed by the mean-variance rule.  They suggest that such  utility function is
highly implausible since it implies increasing absolute risk aversion.  Alternative selection criteria
have been proposed including the use of semi-variance as opposed to the variance and stochastic
dominance.  Semi-variance has been proposed by Mao (1970) and by Markowitz (1959) as a measure
of risk on grounds that semi-variance concentrates on reducing losses.  In contrast, the variance
considers extreme gains, as well as extreme losses, as undesirable.  In a similar vein, the Mean-Gini
coefficient approach proposed by Yitzhaki (1982) represents a further subset of measures of risk
consistent with the expected utility paradigm.
Hadar and Russell (1969), Hanoch and Levy (1969), Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970) and
Whitmore (1970) suggest ordering uncertain prospects using stochastic dominance (SD)
criteria.  Key advantages of the SD approach include that the form of the decision maker’s
utility function does not need to be specified, and no assumptions about the functional form of
probability distributions of bank returns from the portfolio are required.  The SD approach can
be used to define efficient sets of credit policy regimes under alternative (progressively more
stringent) conditions regarding the return-risk preferences of decision-makers.  In this approach,
the general characteristics of the investor’s utility function are defined in terms of first-order,
second-order and third-order stochastic dominance.
7.3 First-order stochastic dominance
First-order stochastic dominance (FSD) is based on the behavioural assumption that if x is e
unscaled measure of pay-off such as wealth, or alternatively, net present value of portfolio
returns, decision makers always prefer more to less of x.  Where the return-risk preferences of
decision-makers are represented formally by a utility function U x( ) , FSD assumes a
monotonically increasing utility function such that the first derivative is strictly positive.
Expressed another way, U x1 0( ) .>
FSD as an efficiency criterion may be defined in terms of cumulative probability functions.  The
first derivatives of risk prospects, F and G, can be formally related to their probability
distribution functions, f(x) and g(x) respectively.  The pair of continuous cumulative
probability functions F1 and G1 may be then defined over the range [a, b]  as follows:
(7.4) F R f x dx
a
R
1( ) ( )= ò
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(7.5) G R g x dx
a
R
1( ) ( )= ò
F is said to dominate G in the sense of FSD if F R G R1 1( ) ( )£  for all possible R in the range
[a, b] with at least one strong inequality.  That is, for at least one value of R, the cumulative
probability under for prospect F must be less than the cumulative probability for prospect G.  A
key property of this efficiency criterion is that it is transitive.  Transitivity implies that if F
dominates G and G dominates H, F must dominate H.
As illustrated in Figure 7.1, the FSD rule requires that a cumulative distribution curve which is
first-order stochastically dominant to lie nowhere to the left of a cumulative probability
distribution curve which is dominated.  Distributions that are dominated according to FSD are
termed as stochastically inefficient.  Further, a pair of distributions that intersect are termed as
stochastically efficient of first degree (FSE).  As Anderson, Dillon and Hardaker (1977) point
out, inefficient distributions under FSD would never be selected by B noullian utility
maximisers when presented with a set of FSD efficient distributions.  Given a first-degre
stochastic efficient set, the selection of a single most preferred distribution requires further
information about the decision-maker’s risk preferences.
Figure 7.1  First-order stochastic dominance
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7.4 Second-order stochastic dominance
Second-order stochastic dominance (SSD) is an additional efficiency criterion for elimination of
probability distributions from the FSE set.  The rule for identifying efficient distributions in the
sense of SSD requires an additional behavioural assumption regarding the decision-maker’s
aversion to risk in addition to preferring more to less.  Strict second-order SD assumes that the
decision-maker is risk averse.  Thus in terms of a decision-maker’s utility function, the
assumption is made that the function is not only monotonically increasing but also strictly
concave over the range, [a, b] of possible pay-offs.  This condition may be alternatively
expressed in terms of the decision-maker’s utility function where it’s properties reflect both
U x1 0( ) >  and U x2 0( ) < , where U x2( )  is the second derivative of an investor’s utility
function with respect to an uncertain prospect x.
The decision rule for SSD may be expressed in terms of cumulative probability functions.
Given a pair-wise comparison of two cumulative probability distribution functions, a
distribution function F1 dominates G1 if it lies more to the right in terms of differences in area
between the two cumulative distribution curves cumulated from the lower values of the
uncertain quantity.  This is illustrated by Figure 7.2 where the area designated as A exceeds the
area designated as B, and therefore F dominates G under second-order SD.
In algebraic terms, SSD is defined as the sum of the cumulative probabilities over the range of
the uncertain quantity for a distribution F1  and a distribution G1 as follows:
(7.6) F R F x dx
a
R
2 1( ) ( )= ò
(7.7) G R G x dx
a
R
2 1( ) ( )= ò
Applying these expressions in a pair-wise comparison of distributions, the distribution F
dominates G in the sense of SSD if F R G R2 2( ) ( )£  for all possible R with at least one strong
inequality.  Therefore in any number of successive pair-wise comparisons of distributions,
dominated distributions are revealed as inefficient in the sense that they would never be
preferred by risk averse, utility maximising decision makers.  Any un-dominated distributions
constitute the second-degree stochastic dominant efficient set.  When uncertain prospects are
normally distributed, the only set of prospects that is not dominated, using SSD, is the
mean-variance efficient set (Bawa 1975).  However, when prospects are non-no mal, the
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selection of a particular probability distribution requires further information regarding the risk
preferences of decision-makers beyond the assumption of a simple aversion to risk.
Figure 7.2    Second-order stochastic dominance where cumulative probability
distribution functions cross twice
(area A > area B)
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7.5 Third-order stochastic dominance
Whitmore (1970) extended on second-order stochastic dominance by suggesting a particular type
of risk aversion might typify decision making under uncertainty.  The concept of third-order
stochastic dominance (TSD) assumes that decision-makers exhibit decreasing bsolute risk
aversion.  Under this assumption, the utility function of decision-mak rs under uncertainty
reflects a positive third derivative, U x3 0( ) > .  This particular property implies that
decision-makers become decreasingly averse to risk as they become wealthier.   In algebraic
terms, TSD is defined in terms of the integral of cumulative probabilities over the range of the
uncertainty quantity for distribution F2  and G2 respectively:
(7.8) F R F x dx
a
R
3 2( ) ( )= ò
(7.9) G R G x dx
a
R
3 2( ) ( )= ò
Expressed another way, TSD may be defined as the area under the second-order SD cumulative
function.  Under the TSD rule, the distribution F is said to dominate G if )()( 33 RGRF £  for
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all possible R with at least one strong inequality.  Further, the mean of distribution F must be
greater than the mean of distribution G.  This condition is given by )()( xExE GF ³ .  Again,
successive pair-wise comparisons of a number of different distributions under TSD will result in
a third-degree stochastically efficient set.  This set cannot be larger than the second-degr e
stochastically efficient set.
7.6 Limitations of evaluation approach
The stochastic dominance approach as an efficiency criterion has two key limitations.  First, the
approach requires pair-wise comparisons of distributions, which may be time consuming.
Second, a stochastic dominant efficient set of a particular order may contain a significant
number of risk prospects relative to the feasible set.  Porter, Wart and Ferguson (1973)
improved on the algorithm for first- and second-order SD provided by Levy and H och (1970)
by suggesting some pre-conditions for SD to increase the speed of calculation.  Vickson (1977)
presents an algorithm for the decreasing absolute risk aversion criteria.  Levy (1992)
summarises a range of pre-conditions that may be used to quickly arrive at an efficient set of
distributions using SD.  These include:
· a distribution dominates only if it has an equal or greater mean;
· if two distributions have the same mean, then the distribution with the larger variance cannot
dominate;
· a distribution cannot dominate if it has the lowest observation;
· dominance by FSD implies dominance by SSD, and dominance by SSD implies dominance
by TSD; and
· if a distribution is dominated, this distribution can be excluded from the efficient set and
there is no further need for comparisons with all other distributions (in a pair-wise sense).
The problem of large efficient sets of distributions relative to the feasible set using stochastic
dominance remains a key issue in the literature.  Several studies propose that SD of higher
orders could be used.  For example, Anderson (1974) suggests a rule for fourth-o der SD while
Hammond (1974) explores higher order dominances based on cumulative probability
distribution functions that intersect a specified number of times.  Indeed, Whitmore (1989)
shows that the SD rules may be extended for all degrees of a class of completely monotonic
utility functions.  However, Levy (1992) points out that SD beyond the third- rder ave educed
economic meaning in the context of risk preferences that may be representative of investors.
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Alternative approaches to using higher order stochastic dominance have been suggested in the
literature to provide for greater discriminatory power within the stochastic dominance
framework.  This occurs though at a cost of requiring more information on the risk preferences
of investors (Drynan 1986).  Meyer (1977a) suggests using certain types of utility functions to
describe limits within which investors display absolute risk aversion in an approach called
stochastic dominance with respect to a function (SDRF).  Recall that absolute risk aversion is
the extent to which investors increase their holdings in riskier assets as their wealth increases,
then for an uncertain prospect, x, absolute risk aversion is defined as:
(7.10) A x U x U x( ) ( ) / ( )= - 2 1 .
The SDRF approach considers a class of utility functions in which the absolute risk aversion
function of investors lies between specified lower and upper bounds given by the parameters
a x1( )  and a x2( )  respectively.  Meyer (1977b) shows that SDRF requires the identification of
a utility function U x( ) , which minimises
(7.11) [ ]F G x F x u x dx( ) ( ) ( )-
-¥
¥
ò 1
subject to the constraint
(7.12) a x A x x1( ) ( )£ £  a (x)    for all values of 2 .
Equation (7.11) gives the difference between the expected utilities of the pair of distributions F
and G for all possible x.  For a given class of investors, if the minimum of this difference is
positive, then F dominates G, and the expected utility of F is always more than that of G.
Conversely, if the minimum is zero, an individual may be indifferent between the two
alternatives, and the distributions cannot be ordered.  However, if the minimum of equation
(7.11) is negative, F is not preferred to G,.  In this situation, the following expression
(7.13) [ ]F F x G x u x dx( ) ( ) ( )-
-¥
¥
ò 1
must be minimised subject to equation (7.12) to determine whether G domina es F. SDRF
gives smaller efficient sets than SD because SDRF places greater restrictions on the risk
preferences of investors.  In particular, for all values of x, FSD under SDRF is given by the
parameters a x1( ) = -¥  and a x2( ) = ¥  while SSD under SDRF is given by the case where
a x1 0( ) =  and a x2( ) = ¥ .
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An alternative approach to reducing the size of an efficient set is suggested by Levy and Kroll
(1978), in which they introduced riskless borrowing and lending into the SD framework,
otherwise denoted as SDR.  The SDR framework may be viewed as the SD equivalent to the
Capital Asset Pricing Model paradigm in which a riskless asset is introduced into the
mean-variance selection framework.  If x and y denote two risky assets, then { }xa  and
{ }yb may be defined as subsets encompassing all linear combinations of the riskles asset and
the risky asset as follows:
(7.13) x x ia a a= + -. ( ) .1   
and
(7.14) y y ib b b= + -. ( ) .1   
where  i  =  rate of return on the riskless asset
and proportions  a b,  >0.
Under SDR, Levy and Kroll (1978) show that x dominates y, if and only if, for every element in
{ }yb  there is at least one element in the subset { }xa which dominates it in the stochastic
dominance framework.  Given this, the corresponding FSD, SSD and TSD rules with a riskless
asset may be denoted by FSDR, SSDR and TSDR respectively.  Levy and Kroll (1978) provide
proof that SDR efficient sets are no larger - and in most cases, significantly smaller - than SD
efficient sets.  Levy (1992) gives an example for the case where two uncertain prospects F and
G intersect, and therefore FSD does not exist.  If F is combined with a riskless asset, a new
distribution Fa  corresponding to xa is formed.  The distribution Fa  rotates about the line
x i= .  If a distribution Fa  can be identified which is completely to the right of the
distribution G, Fa  is FSD over G.  This will occur if a  is positive.  If a  exists, then for any
selected b , one can find g abº  such that Fg  dominates Gb , and hence F dominates G by
FSDR.  Since F may dominate G with a riskless asset, despite dominance does not occur
without a riskless asset, SDR efficient sets are in general much smaller than SD efficient sets.
The same reasoning may be applied in comparisons of SSD and SSDR, and TSD and TSDR.
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7.7 Summary
Credit policy evaluation is a decision problem involving risk.  A number of steps must be
realised so that evaluation of credit policy can proceed.  The first step is to establish a range of
credit policy regimes that a bank might implement.  The second step is to define different states
or possible future values of return outcomes that may occur, but not known with certainty.
These return outcomes should reflect the consequences for each credit policy regime contingent
on factors exogenous to the decision-making environment.  The third step is to determine the
probabilities associated with factors that make up the economic environment of relevance to the
decision problem.  The final step is to select an efficiency criterion that allows a choice to be
made between different credit policy regimes.
There are a number of different efficiency criteria that may be used.  In this study, first-order,
second-order and third-order stochastic dominance criteria are used to compare distributions of the net
present value of bank returns.  The SD criteria require only general assumptions to be made about the
nature of the risk-return preferences of decision-makers in banks.  Without more specific information
about risk preferences of decision-makers, the SDRF cannot be applied.  The SDR approach was also
rejected.  The SDR criteria require returns on risky assets to be measured using holding period
returns.  The portfolio model of illiquid loan securities presented in Chapter Four measures returns
using the capital budgeting approach.  While holding-peri d returns can be calculated from present
value measures, bank returns measured by the model cannot be compared to the return on a riskless
asset.  The measure of bank returns in the model accounts for only loan revenues and provisionings
for loan losses.  The measure of bank returns therefore excludes resource costs associated with
undertaking lending operations.
In the SD approach, repeated pair-wise comparisons of return distributions resulting from
different credit policy regimes are made to determine whether credit policy regimes are not
dominated by others.  The SD method can identify credit policy regimes of increasing levels of
efficiency that reflect progressively more stringent conditions regarding the risk-retur
preferences of decision makers.  A credit policy regime within a given efficient set does not
dominate any member of that set.   Ideally, when comparing numerous credit policy regimes, the
SD criteria would be effective in reducing the number of credit policy regimes within each set.
Key disadvantages of the SD approach include that the efficient set can be as large as the
feasible set, and the considerable computing time involved in making pair-wise compar sons of
many distributions.
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Once credit policy has been formulated, the delivery of a credit policy regime is achieved
through the credit risk evaluation process.  In the next chapter, the credit risk evaluation process
is described.  Credit risk evaluation allows links to be made between characteristics of
borrowers to measures of credit risk so that credit policy may be applied.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
8. CREDIT RISK EVALUATION
8.1 Introduction
The aim of this chapter is detail operational processes utilised in commercial lending for identifying
and evaluating the linkages between an uncertain economic environment, borrower performance and
credit policy.  The focus of the chapter is to show how the policy prescriptions outlined in Chapter
Five apply in a dynamic framework.  A number of studies outline components of these credit
processes, but only some explicitly integrate the role played by a credit risk classification system in
the credit risk evaluation process.  In studies that do integrate risk classification concepts into credit
evaluation, they fail to recognise the different policy-related roles played by a risk classification
system in the credit evaluation process for credit originations compared with those involving on-going
portfolio maintenance.  The credit evaluation process applied to credit originations, also termed credit
screening, is discussed in the next section while the loan review process for on-going portf li
maintenance is outlined in Section 8.3.  The final section concludes with a commentary on credit
evaluation concepts that are integrated into the credit policy framework presented in subsequent
chapters.
8.2 Credit screening process
The screening of credit originations within the commercial lending process is conceptualised as a
series of steps as illustrated in Figure 8.1.  Credit originations involves the bank soliciting potential
customers with these customers having a perceived need to initiate or add to their external debt
financing.  The potential customer makes judgements about their financial requirements using a
variety of methods including capital expenditure plans and flow-of-funds analysis.
Figure 8.1    Credit screening process
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At the time of loan application, the bank ascertains the financial position of the borrower’s firm and
evaluates their security risk and default risk.  The value of a borrower’s assets may be based on
accounting records or through formal valuations of the assets.  The accuracy of the security cover ratio
as a measure of the anticipated recovery of loan balance when default occurs therefore depends on the
estimation of the salvage value of collateral.  Generally this value is based on historical experience of
a bank for various asset types in particular regions and industries and is applied in the security
valuation process through the use of lending margins.  In this approach, lending officers apply lending
margins to adjust current valuations of assets to sale values likely to be realised in a period in which a
borrower may default.
The evaluation of the default risk or the credit worthiness of loan applicants is more complex than for
security risk analysis.  There are a range of quantitative techniques that can be used to draw
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relationships between borrower characteristics and default risk to give a default risk credit score (see
Chapter Nine).  The default risk credit score may be either a direct measure or a proxy measure of a
borrower’s expected probability of default.  According to Barry and Ellinger (1989), key aspects
included in the bank’s appraisal of the default risk credit score are the customer’s location, industry,
size, tenure position and structure of assets, liabilities and equity capital and a range of performance
measures reflecting the outcome of previous operations.
On the basis of the credit scores estimated for the loan applicant, a lending officer evaluates a loan
application for it’s portfolio suitability against the bank’s credit underwriting standards.  The lending
officer compares the security risk credit score to the credit-quality parameter sc n to gauge whether a
loan applicant represents an acceptable or unacceptable security risk.  The lending officer then
compares the default risk credit score to the credit-quality parameter dn to gauge whether a loan
applicant represents an acceptable or unacceptable default risk.  Both risk classification system
parameters reflect the risk-pricing limit for borrowers.  The risk pricing spread between the highest
quality loan and the lowest quality loan can be relatively low.  This implies that for fully secured
loans the expected default probabilities are also at the extreme end of the default probability
spectrum.  For banks in the United States, Casey (1990) suggests that the expected loss spread is
commonly around 1 percentage point.  Anecdotal evidence for Australian banks indicates that the risk
pricing spread may be somewhat higher (CBA 1997, personal communication).
Once the lending officer is satisfied that the loan application satisfies the bank’s underwriting
standards, pricing and lending decisions are made to reach a final credit granting decision.  The
lending officer grades the successful loan application into security risk grades defined by h=1, ...,
hn, and into default risk grades defined by q=1, ..., qn.
Once a borrower is risk graded, the security risk credit score may be used to assist in the
determination of a borrower’s maximum permissible credit limit.  At the margin (that is beyond the
risk-pricing limit), the security risk credit score may also be used to identify tradeoffs that can be
made in negotiation with the borrower.  Such tradeoffs include the borrower’s risk pricing, the
borrower’s maximum permissible credit limit or the proportion of the borrower’s assets pledged as
collateral.  Given the terms of the loan contract, the borrower’s minimum credit reserve limit is also
ascertained with the determination of the risk premium assessed on the basis of the borrower’s default
and security risk grades.
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In Figure 8.2, the structure of a credit risk classification system used in the credit screening process is
illustrated with the shaded region again defining unsuitable portfolio applicants defined by the credit
underwriting standards.  The unshaded region gives risk categories defined for differing levels of
default and security risk that are used for pricing successful loan applications.
Once pricing and lending decisions have been reached, the borrower then implements his or her
business plans, and realises a particular performance for the firm.  The ending financial position is the
outcome of the borrower beginning position, business plans, credit terms and subsequent outcomes.
The ending position becomes the beginning position for the next period.
Figure 8.2  Structure of credit risk classification system in the credit screening
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8.3 Loan review process
The loan review process involves credit evaluation at periodic intervals following the credit
originations stage and is a key monitoring device for ensuring the bank’s risk and return objectives
are being met (Udell 1989).  The review of loans within the commercial lending process is
conceptualised as a series of steps shown in Figure 8.3.
Barry and Ellinger (1989) show that the loan review process may be modelled in a recursive
framework in which the lender’s credit decisions regarding a borrower’s financing terms for the
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expected economic environment are based on the firm’s current financial position which is turn is
dependent by past performance.  At the start of the period, the financial position of the borrower’s
firms is described with the borrower formulating business plans for the coming year with this
business plan encompassing intended decisions on production, marketing, investment and financing
activities for the coming year.  The bank reviews the business plans and previous financial
performance and evaluates the creditworthiness of the firm using a credit scoring technique.  At this
point, the loan review allows new information about the borrower’s financial situation to be
accounted for in credit decisions.
Figure 8.3    Loan review process
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The evaluation of the borrower’s progress is assisted through a loan review model for credit scoring
which aims to re-appraise the creditworthiness of the borrower’s firm.  In loan reviews, the
application of the security risk credit score is relatively simple.  The lender simply reviews the
expected value of collateral and checks if adjustments have been made to the borrower’s credit limit.
Based on the borrower’s expected security cover ratio, the borrower is graded according to the
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security risk classification system.  In the default risk dimension, the default risk credit score is used
to grade borrowers into default risk categories defined by
q=1, ..., qn  for loan pricing purposes, and if required, higher default risk categories that define
impaired asset qualities.  The lower limit for the expected probability of default for impaired asset
qualities is defined by the corresponding default probability for the risk-pricing limit.  Different levels
for the expected security cover ratio and the default probability may define different grades of
impaired asset quality.  An illustration of the credit risk classification system that may be utilised in
the loan review process is shown in Figure 8.4.  In this Figure, the configuration of the risk
classification system is described for scrn = 1.0 and default risk grade limits for security cover ratios
less than one consistent with the principles given in equation (5.20).
Figure 8.4 Structure of credit risk classification system in the loan review process
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If the credit scores of an individual borrower have changed since credit screening or previous loan
review, a range of credit decisions may follow.  These decisions include modification of the
borrower’s loan facilities for the borrower’s changed credit requirements and appropriate adjustments
to the risk pricing of the borrower.  Adjustments to promised interest rates are also compared to the
risk pricing limit that apply in loan reviews.  The borrower then implements their business plans, and
realises a particular firm performance.  The ending financial position is the outcome of the borrower’s
beginning position, business plans, credit terms and subsequent outcomes.  The ending position
becomes the beginning position for the next period.
123
In the loan review process, the credit risk classification system also facilitates portfolio maintenance
decisions.  When numbers of borrowers or loan balances of borrowers are aggregated by security risk
grade and/or default risk grade, bank decision makers have information about the extent to which
portfolio credit quality has either improved or deteriorated through the period.  An important indicator
is the extent of risk migration of borrowers from acceptable risk grades to risk grades that define
impaired asset quality.  For planning purposes, decision-mak rs may compare actual portfolio
performance to that expected at the beginning of the period.  If portfolio performance is likely to be
below that expected, then the bank may enact a series of remedial action arrangements to ensure
adequate resources are allocated to the management of impaired loan security assets.  Remedial
actions may include a reassessment of the underlying economic environment; and in light of this
assessment, a re-formulation of pricing limits and credit controls.
8.4 Summary
This chapter highlights the different roles played by the credit risk classification system to deliver
credit policy in the credit risk evaluation process.  At the credit-originations stage, the
credit-screening process assists the application of the bank’s credit-underwriting standards.  The
maximum acceptable probability of default and the minimum acceptable security cover ratio for loan
applicants define credit-underwriting standards.  Credit scoring models may be used to facilitate the
measurement process.  Once loan applications have been appraised, suitable portfolio entrants may be
used to graded using credit scoring models so as to determine their risk pricing and other terms and
conditions of the loan contract.  The loan review process involves periodic reappraisal of a borrower’s
credit quality.  A loan review model for credit scoring can assist in the process of quantitative credit
quality assessment.  The results of credit scoring provide a basis for assessing whether a change in the
credit risk grade has occurred from the previous period.  If the credit risk grade of a borrower change,
the credit risk classification system provides a basis for the realignment of the borrower’s loan pricing
and loan terms.
Since credit screening and loan reviews are distinct phases, a dynamic model specification rather than
a static representation of a credit risk management system can only capture the range of decisions
required to effect risk- eturn objectives of decision makers in banks.  Loan reviews are conducted at
the end of each time period in the normal course of lending and are based on information obtained
about previous time periods.  The recursive nature of loan reviews provides for an intrinsic dynamic
structure for the simulation model that is presented in Chapter Eleven.
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Credit scoring models are a critical component of the credit evaluation process.  A range of credit
scoring models for measuring default risk that have been proposed in the literature are reviewed in the
next chapter.  In Chapter Ten, the discussion on credit scoring models is extended to an assessment of
the contribution these models make in aligning measures of credit risk to the credit risk classification
system.
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CHAPTER NINE
9. CREDIT SCORING MODELS
9.1 Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to outline quantitative approaches to credit risk evaluation.  These credit-
scoring models provide a systematic basis for assessing a borrower’s financial data to reach an
assessment of a borrower’s credit quality. Credit scoring models generally link ex-post data on
borrower repayment performance to their production and financial characteristics.  In Section 9.2 and
Section 9.3, key parametric and non-parametric approaches to credit scoring in the literature are
reviewed.  The basic premise underlying these approaches is that credit quality prediction can be
achieved through models estimated using historical data.  In Section 9.4, a framework for credit
scoring is presented using an alternative means via the simulation method.  In contrast to most
approaches proposed in the literature, this method seeks to predict credit quality subject to a credit
policy using an ex-ante framework of analysis.  The ex-ante framework is achieved by incorporating
probability distributions for key factors that affect future loan repayment into a financial model of a
borrower so as to derive a distribution function of borrower liquidity.  Key limitations of credit
scoring models are discussed in Section 9.5.  A summary of the chapter is presented in the final
section.
9.2 Parametric statistical approaches
9.2.1 Overview
Parametric statistical approaches to credit scoring involve the use of discriminant or regression
analysis using data on borrowers generally from two population types: ‘good’ loans and ‘bad’ loans.
Definitions of the two populations depend on the purpose to which the model is put.  Credit scoring
models may be used for credit screening purposes or for loan review purposes (Miller and La Due
1989).
Credit-screening models aim to assess the likelihood of loan applicants being successful or
unsuccessful in repaying their loans.  Data used for empirical estimation is therefore based on initial
loan applications, and the two populations are defined as accepted and rejected applications (Joy and
Tollefson 1975).  While credit-screening models estimated using such data shed little light on the
probability of default of borrowers, they do give an indication about default quality limits.
Credit-screening models attemp to provide information on the maximum acceptable default
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probability that has been historically applied by lending personnel.  The purpose of loan review
models, on the other hand, is to enable periodic reappraisal of the expected probability of default of a
borrower.  Data used for analysis includes recent financial information from existing borrowers in a
bank’s portfolio.  The two populations are defined as performing borrowers and defaulting exposures
(Miller and La Due 1989).  In either case, the dependent variable in the estimating equation is
represented by the dichotomous variable, Z: good loans incur Z=1, and bad loans incur Z=0.  The
general form of model for estimation may be presented as:
(9.1) ( ) iiji uXfZ +=
where  Zi = 0, 1;
)( ijXf = credit score for borrower i; and
Xij  = j th characteristic of borrower i; and
iu  = disturbance term.
Common parametric-statistical approaches to credit scoring include the multiple discriminant model,
linear probability model, logit model and probit model (Turvey 1991).  These approaches are
simultaneous classification models since they attempt to derive customer groups given a certain
criterion by simultaneously considering all customer attributes for which data are available to derive a
credit score (Srinivasan and Kim 1988).  A range of financial indicators of borrower performance is
used as independent variables in these credit-scoring models (Altman 1983, p 106-108).  Key
financial risk indicators include gearing, liquidity, profitability and working capital ratios.  Other
common indicators used are debt servicing capacity indicators such as interest cover and cash flow
cover.
9.2.2 Multiple discriminant analysis
The aim of multiple discriminant analysis is to define a classification rule that minimises the expected
cost of misclassification of data on borrowers into ‘good’ and ‘bad’ loans.  Under this formulation,
the characteristics of two population groups, as defined by the Z score, are solved by identifying a
function called the discriminant function.  The set of coefficients or weights is chosen to make the two
groups as different from each other as possible.  Where the group dispersion matrices are equal
(alternately, the number of observations in the two groups are the same), the linear discriminant
method may be used.  In the case where the prior probabilities between the two groups are not equal,
the quadratic structure is proposed (Altman 1983, p 135).  The output of multiple discriminant
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analysis is a proxy measure of the expected probability of default.  The estimating form of equation is
as follows:
(9.2) Z V Xi j ij
j
n
=
=
å
1
The discriminant function of the form shown in equation (9.2) transforms the individual variable
values using the discriminant coefficients, Vj , to a single discriminant score, or Zi  value, which is
then used to classify a borrower.  In the linear discriminant approach, the analysis-of-variance
statistical procedure enables the vector V to be chosen so that the ratio of the ‘between group’
variance to the ‘within group’ variance is maximised.  This objective function is given in equation
(9.3):
(9.3)
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V
V X X
V SVMax  f
=
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0 1
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X 0  and X1  represent the vectors of expected values for the explanatory variables for each of the
subgroups, V is the vector of coefficients and S is the covariance matrix, which is assumed to be of
equal size for each subgroup.
Since Fisher (1936), discriminant analysis has been used widely as a statistical technique in analysing
classification problems including credit scoring.
In particular, linear discriminant analysis has been applied to corporate loans by Altman (1968),
Altman and Izan (1984), Pantalone and Platt (1987a, 1987b), Betts and Belhoul (1987), Altman,
Haldeman and Narayanan (1977) and Houghton and Smith (1991), to consumer loans by Galitz
(1983) and to agricultural loans by Turvey (1991).
A key criticism of linear discriminant analysis models is that they require restrictive assumptions of
distributional form.  In particular, the assumption of multi-variate normal populations with the same
variance/covariance structure is made.  This assumption is frequently violated in credit scoring
analyses given that financial ratios normally used as explanatory variables rarely result in errors that
are normally distributed (Ohlson 1980).  The problem of non-normal errors result from the fact that
financial ratios are bounded by certain limits.  Linear discriminant analysis models also assume
misclassification costs are the same for all groups.  In the credit-screening process, the cost of turning
down a good loan (type 1 error) and the cost of accepting a bad loan (type 2 error) are assumed to be
the same (Ziari, Leatham and Turvey 1995).  Similarly in the loan review process, the cost of
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incorrectly classifying a loan as an impaired loan asset is the same as the cost of incorrectly
classifying a loan as an non-impaired performing asset.
9.2.3 Linear probability model
The linear probability model uses ordinary least squares or weighted least squares to regress Xij   on
to  Zi  to find the parameters b j  which gives the estimated importance of the j th variable in
explaining past repayment experiences (Turvey 1991).  The estimating form of equation is as follows:
(9.4) å
=
+=
n
j
iijji uXZ
1
b
The estimated model may then be used in a forecasting context.  Measured values of borrower’s
characteristics are inserted into the estimated equation.  The prediction made for iZ  indicates the
probability of default; that is, E Z di i( ) = .  However, a major weakness of the linear probability
model is that the estimated probabilities of default predicted by the estimated model can often lie
outside the interval zero to one.  The logit and probit models overcome this weakness by restricting
the estimated range of default probabilities to lie between these boundaries.
9.2.4 Logit probability model
The logit model constrains the cumulative probability of default on a borrower to lie between zero and
one by assuming the probability of default to be logistically distributed according to the following
functional form:
(9.5) F Z
ei Zi
( ) =
+ -
1
1
where     e = exponential and
F Zi( )   = cumulative probability of default on the loan.
Given the non-li earity inherent in the logistic functon, the logit probability model is estimated by
maximum likelihood techniques (Madalla 1987).  The forecast value forZi  for a borrower is derived
in similar way as the linear probability model.  The Z-value for the borrower is then transformed by
the logistic function to produce a value for F Zi( ) .  This value is interpreted as the expected
cumulative probability of default of the borrower as illustrated in Figure 9.1.
Figure 9.1   Logit probability model
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The logit probability model has been applied to corporate loans by Ohlson (1980), Zavgren (1983),
Platt and Platt (1990), and Platt and Platt (1991); to housing loans by Schafer and Ladd (1981); and
Lawrence, Smith and Rhoades (1992), to consumer loans by Chesser (1974); and to agricultural loans
by Mortensen, Watt and Leistriz (1988) and Miller and LaDue (1989).  The major weakness of the
logit probability model is the assumption that the cumulative probability of default takes on a
particular functional form that reflects a logistic function.  The use of the probit function has been
posed as an alternative.
9.2.5 Probit probability model
The probit model also constrains the projected probability of default to lie between zero and one but
differs from the logit model by assuming that the probability of default has a (cumulative) normal
distribution rather than the logistic function (Zmijewski 1984).  Again given the non-linearity of the
dependent variable, the probit model is estimated by maximum likelihood.  The probit model has
been applied to corporate loans by Boyes, Hoffman and Low (1989), Gablowsky and Talley (1981);
and to agricultural loans by Lufburrow, Barry and Dixon (1984) and Turvey (1991).
9.3 Parametric non-statistical and non-parametric approaches
9.3.1 Overview
Parametric-statistical credit-scoring models are subject to restrictive assumptions about distributions
of the disturbance term.  In addition, assumptions are made about functional forms among the
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explanatory variables in the linear discriminant and linear regression models.  A linear relationship is
assumed between dependent variables and the independent variable in linear statistical models (Ziari,
Leatham and Turvey 1995).  Financial ratios often included as explanatory variables only range
between zero and one.  A linear relationship cannot apply outside this range.  Further, other types of
industry and environment variables that contribute to the business risk exposure of borrowers may not
amenable to parametric analysis.  These types of variables include competitive pressures, barriers to
entry, customer and labour relations, the market power or competitive advantage of client and the
impact of technological change. These factors may induce non-linear r lationships for financial ratios
included as explanatory variables.
In most parametric statistical studies in credit scoring, these aspects have been considered either
though data standardisation or normalisation techniques.  Standardisation involves classifying data
for environmental features including regional and industry differences.  The estimating form of
equation is applied to segmented data, or alternatively, dummy variables are included for
distinguishing features that lead to structural differences among coefficients (Johnston 1984,
p 225).  As an alternative to the dummy variable approach, Altman and Izan (1984) suggest
normalisation of explanatory variables by using industry relative ratios.  In this approach, financial
ratio data of a firm are related to industry averages.  Firm to industry financial ratios (industry relative
ratios) allow control of industry variations within sample data across several industries so that data
need not be segmented on an industry basis.  Platt and Platt (1990) justify this approach noting that,
first, industry relative ratios measure all firms on the same scale regardless of industry within a time
period, and second, industry relative ratios should be stable across time periods.  The same
normalisation approach may be used to account for regional differences within a particular industry.
Some researchers have suggested alternatives to parametric statistical methods. Parametric
non-statistical methods are able to deal more effectively with different classification objectives than
statistical approaches (Ziari, Leatham and Turvey 1995).  Non-parametric methods are able to more
effectively incorporate dis-continuities in relationships between explanatory variables within a fully
segmented data set (Srinivasan and Kim 1988).  Parametric non-statis ical a d non-parametric
methods may be categorised into two groups: simultaneous and sequential methods.  A simultaneous
classification method commonly used is goal programming.  Sequential partitioning methods
repeatedly partition customer attribute data in order to achieve separation of data into good and bad
loans.  These methods include the recursive partitioning algorithm and neural networks. A further
approach is the Quinlan algorithm (Quinlan 1983).  The Quinlan approach to two-group
classification has many similarities to the recursive partitioning algorithm.
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9.3.2   Goal programming
Freed and Glover (1981) proposed that a discriminant problem can be formulated in a linear
goal-programming framework.  In this framework, a discriminant function (or a separating
hyperplane) is constructed to classify data into a prespecified group.  The process of ‘fitting’ models
to historical data differs in an important way.  In goal or mathematical programming, the average
error is minimised in cases where observations may be erroneously classified.  The minimisation
procedure differs from the linear probability and linear discriminant models.  In these models, the
‘fitting’ process minimises the average squared error in all cases.
In the credit-scoring context, the goal programming technique aims to determine a relationship
between weights associated with explanatory variables and a scalar that define a cut-off point between
good loans and bad loans.  The cut-off point, given by , is defined so as to assign as correctly as
possible loan data of good loans to one side of the separating hyper-plane and bad loans to the other
side.  In algebraic terms, the objective of goal programming is to find the coefficient b   and a
non-zero vector X satisfying:
(9.6) A X i G1 1³ Îb,         
    and
(9.7) 12          , GiXA Î< b
where  Ag =  matrix of n jg x observations on borrowers;
  i = 1, 2, ..., N ; and
 N = total number of borrowers (N n n= +1 2 ).
The separating hyper-plane given by AX=  gives the boundary between the two groups.
The linear goal-programming approach may be further extended to deal with more complex problems,
including multi-group classifications (Chhikara 1989).  In the event that the two groups are not
linearly separable, an objective function may be specified to separate the group classification.  Ziari,
Leatham and Turvey (1995) formulate the objective function in terms of deviations that measure the
degree to which individual loans violate the two-group b undary.  In particular, a deviation is said to
be external/internal if it’s associated observation is incorrectly/correctly classified (that is, falls on the
wrong/right side of the separating hyperplane).  External/internal deviations represent the extent to
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which a deviation is incorrectly/correctly classified.  Thus external deviations are undesirable while
internal deviations are desirable.  By setting the objective function of the programming model as the
minimisation of external deviations, a set of weights can be calculated for each explanatory variable.
In the credit-scoring context, these measures are then used to weight the financial ratios of borrowers
to derive a particular credit score.  The computed credit score is then compared to the optimal value
for the credit score derived from the programming model.  Ziari, Leatham and Turvey (1995) outline
several choices of criterion functions for the mathematical programming model applied to
classification problems and provide remedies for a range of unacceptable solutions to such models.
9.3.3 Recursive partitioning algorithm
The recursive partitioning algorithm estimates a classification rule as a sequence of two group
partitions of explanatory variables that are being used as determinants to an independent variable
(Frydman, Altman and Kao 1985).  The recursive partitioning algorithm has also been applied to
corporate loans by Srinivasan and Kim (1987).
In the credit scoring context, the aim of recursive partitioning algorithm is to develop a sequence of
questions or rules with either accept/reject notions to grade loans data into ‘good’ loans and ‘bad’
loans.  A particular sequence is defined by a set of nodes called binary classification trees, as
illustrated in Figure 9.2.  Each node defines a particular rule or question regarding the values of the
determinants of default risk.  A tree is formed through repeated splits of data according to the ‘best’
cut-off value for a particular explanatory variable (or combinations of explanatory variables) under
consideration at a particular node.  In Figure 9.2, the explanatory variable represented by X1  is split
into two levels, shown by X11and X12, to achieve groupings from a particular node.  The variable
X2  is assumed to be a single level parameter.
Figure 9.2   Hypothetical tree for two-group classification under the recursive partitioning
algorithm
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The recursive partitioning algorithm seeks to define cut-off values for default risk determinants.  In
the recursive partitioning algorithm, the ‘best’ splitting rule is defined as one that enables the
achievement of descendent subsets of a sequence of nodes that are ‘purer’ than the sequence in the
present subset.  From a statistical viewpoint, purity in the recursive partitioning algorithm is
interpreted as the expected cost of misclassification when data in a particular node are being randomly
assigned to two groups.  The recursive partitioning algorithm is completed when terminal nodes are
assigned to all possible default risk determinants and all loans data is finally classified.  The outcome
of the recursive partitioning algorithm is set of terminal nodes representing the minimisation of the
observed expected cost of misclassification of each assignment.  The final step of the recursive
partitioning algorithm procedure is to select the correct complexity of tree structure using
cross-validation tests (Chhikara 1988).
The Quinlan algorithm is similar to the recursive partitioning algorithm.  As in the recursive
partitioning algorithm, the Quinlan (1983) method aims to classify data on various attributes using
the decision tree approach.  A key difference between the two approaches is the way in which decision
trees are formed in the Quinlan algorithm.  Decision trees are formed using attributes that may be
described using discrete forms.  The major explanatory variables used in credit scoring are financial
ratios.  Financial ratios are generally continuous rather than discrete.  As a result,  the Quinlan
algorithm has been little used in the credit scoring literature.
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9.3.4 Neural network approach
The neural network has been proposed as a relatively new approach to the recursive partitioning
algorithm for developing links or correlations between X variables to improve on Z classifications.
The neural network approach has been applied to credit scoring models for corporate loans by Jensen
(1992), Salchenberger, Cinar and Lash (1992) and Tam and Kiang (1992).  Conceptually, neural
networks consist of layers of interconnected neurons.  The structure of a simple neural network may
be viewed as being comprised of three layers of neurons: input, hidden and output.  Applicant
characteristics are described as input neurons receiving values for certain default risk determinants.
The performing and default status of applicants is used as the network’s output neurons.  Hidden
layers serve as transfer functions to define how to process inputs into outputs.  The neural network
system develops transfer functions by analysing a proportion of a data set and comparing the results
from this analysis to predictions made on the remaining unanalysed data set.  In a succession of
comparisons, the connections between layers are strengthened.  In particular, the network is
constructed so that it is capable of learning and storing associations.
9.4 A simulation approach
Barry and Ellinger (1989) suggest that the dynamics of credit policy, the credit scoring function and
borrower performance can be modelled in a recursive framework using a simulation approach.  When
lenders base their credit evaluations on projections, mostly they reflect anticipated outcomes for a
single year or constant levels of borrower performance and interest rates over a longer period of time
(Barry and Ellinger 1989).  While Barry and Ellinger (1989) use a qualitatively estimated parametric
credit-scoring model to illustrate these aspects, their approach may be extended to directly estimate
the expected probability of default.  Since projected performance is subject to uncertainty, the
stochastic framework may be used in which probability distributions for uncertain parameters
affecting borrower performance are modelled.
When simulated using a mathematical model, the time path of a borrower’s expected probability of
default may be estimated to define the key relationships between these uncertain economic factors and
the economic and financial structure of a borrower for a particular set of credit policies.  This is
achieved by generating the probability distribution function for a borrower’s cash surplus including
their credit reserves, f CSR( )  , for a particular time period through a series of trials.  Each trial
represents a sample of values from the probability distributions for the uncertain economic factors and
the simulation model is used to measure a sample value for CSR.  Since a negative CSR value
indicates default and CSRvalues greater than or equal to zero indicates performance, each trial
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results in one of two outcomes.  The dichotomous variable, Z, m y e used to represent these
outcomes for borrower i in time period t as follows:
(9.8)
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If the Z-outcomes are independent from trial to trial, and if c denotes the number of times Z equals
one in m number of trials, then by sampling repeatedly for m numbe of trials, the binomial
distribution may be used as the probability distribution of c (Hoel 1954).  The probability associated
with each possible value of c, denoted by  )(cf is given by the following:
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, called the binomial coefficient, is computed using the following formula
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where m!=(m-1)(m-2)....(2)(1) for m ³ 1 and m! = 1 for m=0.  The term
 cd  gives the probability of defaults in z trials, the term cmd -)-1(  gives the probability of m-c
non-defaults in m-c trials and they are multiplied together because the trials are independent.  The
population mean and population variance for the binomial distribution are given by the following:
(9.11) m =md
(9.12) d 2 =md d( )1-
Following Mead, Curnow and Hasted (1993, p 293), if the probability d is unknown, the sample
estimate of the probability of default from a simulation experiment from m number of trials is given
by the sample proportion
(9.13)
m
c
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with the sample variance of the estimate given by
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(9.14) Var d d d m( $) $( $) /= 1- .
9.5 Limitations of credit scoring models
Each credit scoring approach varies in terms of it’s statistical properties and predictive accuracy.
Predictive accuracy of each approach will vary according to the respective sample sizes, periods
covered, variables examined and technique employed (Saini and Bates 1984).  The extent to which
data meets underlying statistical properties required for estimation will also influence result outcomes
(Srinivasan and Kim 1987, Turvey 1991 and Ziari, Leatham and Turvey 1995).  While credit scoring
models can considerably aid prediction of default by using an objective approach, there are a number
of wider concerns that can limit their usefulness.
Extensive data are required to estimate credit scoring models with each specific approach having it’s
own particular data requirements.  Given the absence of data, some banks may choose to apply
subjectively determined weightings, on explanatory variables in their credit scoring models (Barry and
Ellinger 1989).  In cases where data are available, a number of interpretation-rela d issues may
concern the nature of estimation results.  First, definition of default and timing of default implied by
credit scoring models may be too simplistic for application (Houghton and Smith 1991).  Secondly,
data on which models are estimated are generally based on portfolio averages, and their prediction
made by these models may not be valid for portfolio segments with diverse business structures.  If
time series data are utilised for model estimation, structural shifts in relationships between the
dependent variable and independent variables may occur over time (Saini and Bates 1984).  For
example, structural shifts in the form of changes in credit policy will influence relationships between
the Z-score and explanatory variables.  Thirdly, credit quality may be affected by a number of
intangibles relating to a borrower’s management ability.  These types of variables are difficult to
incorporate into quantitatively-based credit-scoring models (Turvey 1991).  Fourthly, credit scoring
models are based on ex-post sample classification.  The underlying premise of such an approach is
that history is a good guide to the future (Houghton and Smith 1991).  Finally, as Fisher and Moore
(1986) point out, predictions made for the default probability by a credit scoring model must be able
to be related to the credit risk classification system.
9.6 Summary
A number of commonly used credit-scoring approaches were presented in this chapter.  In the
literature, key parametric statistical approaches include discriminant and regression methods while
other methods included goal programming, the recursive partitioning algorithm and neural networks.
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The simulation method was presented as an alternative approach that could be used to directly
estimate the expected probability of default of borrowers contingent on a particular credit policy.  The
next chapter examines the extent to which each credit scoring approach may be related to a credit risk
classification system.
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CHAPTER TEN
10.CREDIT SCORING AND DEFAULT RISK CLASSIFICATION
10.1 Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to examine the contribution the major credit scoring approaches are able to
offer in terms of aligning the measured credit risk of a borrower to the parameters of the default risk
classification system.  There is a paucity of studies in the literature that assess the degree to which
statistical credit scoring techniques can be linked to default risk classification systems.  The major
factors affecting the degree of contribution depends on the statistical basis of a credit scoring
technique and nature of the data available.  The focus of this chapter is on the circumstance where no
prior information about the default risk grade of firms is contained in the data available for
estimation.  Parametric approaches to credit scoring are examined in Section 10.2 while
non-parametric approaches are investigated in Section 10.3.  The simulation approach to credit
scoring for default risk classification is then outlined within a parametric framework in Section 10.4.
A summary is provided in the final section.
10.2 Parametric approaches
Parametric approaches to credit scoring vary in their ability to be directly linked to a default risk
classification system.  The regression approaches directly estimate the expected probability of default
for default risk classification (Boyes, Hoffman and Low 1989).  Once data on borrowers is imputed
into credit scoring models estimated by regression techniques (using either the linear model, the logit
model or the probit model), the estimate of the default probability is compared directly against the
default-probability limits defined for each default risk grade (Turvey 1991).  By way of illustration,
the relationship between the Z-value predicted by the logit probability model and the default risk
classification system with a configuration as presented in Figure 8.4 is shown in Figure 10.1.
Figure 10.1   Logit probability model and the default risk classification system
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In contrast to the regression approaches, the relationship between the probability of default and the
predicted value of the Z-score in the multiple discriminant analysis approach is less straightforward.
In the linear discriminant model, the estimated linear discriminant function maps points that
represents observations in two different groups in a m-dime sional attribute space into a
one-dimensional space in such a way that the distributions of points from the two-groups are
maximally separated.
If the prior probability of membership in group  is qi, the cost of mis-classifying an observation as
belonging to group j when it actually belongs to group i may be defined as cij.  Given the objective is
to minimise the expected total cost of mis-classification, Anderson (1958) suggests that the critical
value of Z, denoted by Z*, may be given as:
(10.1)
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The appropriate value of Z* depends on both the prior probability of group membership and the ratio
of costs of mis-classification.  Altman (1983) suggest that the prior probability of default may be
substituted for qi if two populations (good and bad loans) are normally distributed with equal
covariance matrices.  An optimal cut-off score that minimises the probability of misclassification may
be defined as follows:
(10.2)
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where  Z* = optimal cut-off score;
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pd  = prior probability of default;
C1 = cost of Type 1 error; and
C2  = cost of Type 2 error.
In most studies, the sample proportion (the share of bad loans in the total sample population) is used
to infer the prior probability of default (Joy and Tollefson 1975, Frydman, Altman and Kao 1985).
When the sample proportion is substituted for the prior probability, the cut-off score calculated is
asymptotically optimal in these circumstances - that is, as the size of the sample increases, the rule
approaches optimality (Rencher 1995, p 330).
The critical cut-off score therefore represents a single point in the (Z, d) space for a particular
population.  For different populations with different prior probabilities of default, information may be
obtained about the various combinations of measured characteristics of borrowers that are associated
with various levels of probability of default.  A series of linear discriminant models may be used to
define a number of (Z*, d 
p 
) points.  This set of points, and their associated discriminant functions,
may define attributes of borrowers that fall within ranges of the various cut-off levels for default
probabilities in a default risk classification system.  However, a key assumption behind such an
approach is that there are large populations for estimating each different linear discriminant function.
Alternatively, different critical values for the Z-score based on a single discriminant function may be
used to define the various cut-off limits for the default probability required by a default risk
classification system (Izan 1984).  To do this, the assumption is made that the relationship
established between Z a d d
 
 estimated by the original discriminant function apply across the default
risk spectrum.  If Z 
c
 denotes different values for Z for various levels of d as implied by equation
(10.2), then higher Z 
c
-scores are associated with higher default probabilities provided that the cost of
a Type 1 error is held constant relative to the cost of a Type 2 error.  In Figure 10.2, the relationship
between Z
c
 as calculated by equation (10.2) and the probability of default is illustrated for a
C C1 2/  ratio of 30:1.
Figure 10.2   Relationship between the optimal discriminant cut-off score, the expected
probability of default and the default risk classification system
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A key assumption behind defining Z-score cut-off limits for a default risk classification system in this
way is the existence of linear relationships between measured characteristics of borrowers and the
probability of default through the default risk spectrum.  The relationship between Z 
c
 and d is lik ly
to become less robust as measures of the Z-score move away from Z* and  d 
p
.  Predictions made by
the linear discriminant model become based on out-of-sample values for borrower attributes.
The size of the C C1 2/  ratio depends on a number of factors.  The opportunity cost of Type 1 error
is expected to exceed the opportunity cost of a Type 2 error since when lending to high risk loans, the
loss of principal, interest income and additional administrative, collection and legal costs, may be
expected to exceed revenue foregone (Turvey 1991).  Frydman, Altman and Kao (1985) suggest that
the cost of a Type 1 error in commercial lending can typically exceed the cost of a Type 2 error by up
to 70:1.  In their base case, they suggest using 30:1, a ratio estimated by Altman (1983, p 190).
The C C1 2/  ratio is unlikely to be constant across the population with the size of the ratio likely to
depend on the amount of security cover pledged by borrowers. Altman (1983, p 179) shows that the
opportunity cost of classifying a bad loan as a good loan is equal to the expected loss in event of
default.  The expected loss in event of default is equivalent to 1- scr.  As scr tends to zero, the
cost of a Type 1 error also increases, and raises the ratio of the cost of a Type 1 error relative to the
cost of a Type 2 error.  Conversely, as scr tends to one, the expected capital loss tends to zero with
the opportunity cost of mis-clas ifying a bad loan as a good loan converging to revenue foregone.  For
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scr values close to one, the cost of a Type 1 error becomes equivalent to the cost of classifying a
good loan as a bad loan, a Type 2 error, and consequently the relative costs are equalised.
Since security risk is measured differently to default risk, sample data for a particular region-indus ry
segment may be collated by security risk grade.  The graded data may then be used to generate a
family of linear discriminant functions with separate individual discriminant functions estimated for
each different security risk grade within a region-industry segment.  Equation (10.2) could then be
applied to define Z 
c
 values for each default probability limit defined for the default risk classification
system. Given a unique ratio of the costs of a Type 1 and Type 2 errors for each security risk grade,
the predicted Z-score of a borrower can be compared to relevant cut-off scores related to particular
limits for the expected probability of default defined for a default risk classification system.
The prior probability of default in the goal programming approach for a two-group c edit-scoring
discriminant problem is ascertained in a similar way as for the linear discriminant model.  The
separating hyper- lane given by AX = b , as shown by equations (8.6) and (8.7), gives a boundary
between good and bad loan groupings.  An estimation of the probability of group membership can be
approximated by the relative frequencies of the groups in each of the two half planes (Srinivasan and
Kim 1987).  Therefore the probability of default associated with the boundary is given by the relative
frequency of bad loans for large samples.
10.3 Non-parametric approaches
Non-parametric approaches to credit scoring display less direct relationships between cut-off scor s
for classification and the full spectrum of the default probability required for default risk classification
compared to parametric approaches.  In the goal programming approach for a multi-group
credit-scoring discriminant problem, the separating hyper-plane given by AX = b  , as shown by
equations (8.6) and (8.7), no longer gives a boundary between good and bad loan groupings.
Conditional probability functions must be used to establish the probability of default of a particular
group.
In the Recursive Partitioning Algorithm approach to credit scoring, classification trees can partition
the variable space into several good loan and bad loan regions (Frydman, Altman and Kao 1985).
With each region, there is a probability of default given by a conditional probability function for a
particular node.  The size of the default probability for a region depends on the resulting sample
proportions for both former and ending nodes in a particular classification tree.  The precise formula
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for the conditional probability function of a particular classification tree is given in the Appendix of
Frydman, Altman and Kao (1985).
A key problem of both non-parametric approaches in terms of their alignment to a default risk
classification system is that the default probabilities are pre-determined by the nature of the data set
used for estimation and the final model selected for credit scoring.  In nearly all circumstances,
relationships cannot be easily formed between the classification rule and the expected probability of
default limits defined for a default risk classification system.  Non-para etric approaches lead to the
need for conditional probability statements in order to infer the default probability of a borrower.
10.4 Simulation approach
Under the simulation approach, the expected probability of default of a borrower is directly
estimated using the framework outlined in Section 8.4.  However, the structure of this modelling
framework assumes that lenders have information about a borrower’s default risk grade and/or
their initial production and financial structures in order to conduct simulation experiments.
While the framework suffices for loan review purposes, a credit screening model is developed in
this section based on the model of a borrower outlined in Section 4.3.1.  The data used for
analysis is assumed to be sample data drawn from populations of firms in specific industries
within certain regions and has been collated to give average per firm statistics.  The industry
relative ratio approach is used to derive internally consistent relationships between the initial
financial characteristics of the average borrower in a region-industry portfolio segment and the
default risk classification system.  In this framework, the security risk classification system is
used to derive internally consistent relationships between the initial liability structures of
borrowers given the average asset structure of firms within a region- ndustry segment.
For exposition purposes, the configuration of the credit risk classification system for screening
loan applicants is assumed throughout this chapter to comprise a 3x3 matrix.  The average value
of assets of firms in a region-industry segment j is given by Ajt .   The average proportion of
assets pledged as collateral by loan applicants is denoted by cjt .  The lender is assumed to
know the probability distribution of the salvage value of collateral, sjt .  A l nder then
ascertains the expected value of collateral pledged by the average borrower in event of default as
follows:
(10.3) E C E s c Ajt jt jt jt( ) ( ). .=
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The maximum permissible credit available, L jha t
m
  =1   to applicants in acceptable security risk grades
may be determined by:
(10.4) L cl E Cjha t
m
jh a t jt     = ==1 1 . ( )
where the maximum credit limit, cljha t  =1 , is assumed to be determined by the cut-off limits for the
expected security cover ratios defined by the security risk grading system:
(10.5) cl scr h hnjh a t h          for = = =1 1 1/ ,....,
For simplicity, assume that the average borrower has a zero initial overdraft balance and the bank
provides the average borrower with a certain amount of credit reserve, which for exposition purposes
in this analysis, is assumed to be independent of the average borrower’s credit risk grades.
(10.6) LOj h t  a=  0 1 0- =
(10.7) CR CR CR Lj a t j a t j a t jh a t
m
 =1  =     =1   =    with  = <1 1
Accordingly, the amount of initial term loan drawing LTjh a   t-1=0 , is determined as follows:
(10.8) LT L CRj h a jh a
m
j  a=  t-1  t =  t=0 1 1= -
If the term loan facility is an amortised variable interest rate product, the fixed debt servicing
requirement, FDRjha t  =1 , for the average borrower may be specified as a random variable,
given in equation (10.9), through the amortised principal and interest payment, PI jha t  =1 .  The
stochastic nature of PI jha t  =1  depends on the probability distribution function specified for the
term loan i terest rate, i rtht( ) , with the ultimate level of FDRjha t  =1  determined by the size of
the individual term loan drawing, the average maturity term of loan applicants, nt,  and loan
fees and charges, LFC jha t  =1 .  Further, lets assume at this point that no certainty equivalent
default risk premium is factored into the term loan interest rate structure; though a certainty
equivalent security risk premium is factored in if scrjha t  = - <0 1 1.  The distribution of the fixed
debt servicing requirement under these assumptions is given by the function:
(10.9) a h( ) ( ( ); , , )FDR FDR rt LT nt LFCjha t jht jh jha t    a=0 t-1   = ==1 1
where
(10.10)h l( ) ( ) ( )rt rb rp scrjh a t
ce
jh a= == +1 1 t  t
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and l( )rbt  defines the probability distribution for the benchmark promised rate of term loan
interest in time period t.  The expected value of rbt  may be defined in terms of the risk free rate
of return plus a portfolio risk premium.
Assume that the average firm in region-industry j also has cash outgoings in the form of
non-debt firm specific costs, FC jt , and personal expenses, PE jt , both of which are fixed and
that firms are not subject to taxation with no loss of generality.  The capacity of firms to
internally generate funds is given by a random variable, denoted by y ( )GI jt .  Given the above
assumptions, the probability distribution function of cash surpluses including credit reserves,
denoted byf CSRjha t( )  =1 , for the average borrower in each security risk grade in the first loan
year in region-i dustry segment j may be represented by the following:
(10.11)f CSR GI FC CR FDR PEjha t jt jt jha t jha t jt( ) ( ) ( )      = = == - + - -1 1 1y a
In the simulation approach, the expected probability of default is directly estimated through
repeated sampling from the probability distributions defined for GI jt  an rbt  to give the
expected probability of default of borrower, djha t  =1 , as follows:
(10.12) ( )P CSR dijha t ijha t =    1 10£ £ =
Because there are several security risk grades, lower security-cover ratios lead to higher debt.
To the extent to which lower scr values result in larger initial term loan drawings and therefore
higher levels for E FDRjh a t( )  =  1  and Var FDRjha t( )  =1 , a family of probability distribution
functions for CSRjh a=1 t  may be generated as shown in Figure 10.3 with the following
properties resulting for the expected probability of default.
(10.13)d d dj  h j h =  a=  t j h =  a=1 t =  a=  t1 1 2 3 1< <
Figure 10.3  Family of probability distribution functions for CSR by security risk grade
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The modelling framework presented above ignores the possibility of, first, default risk pricing by the
lender, and second, the fact that typically, for a given level of debt, the expected probability of default
for loan applicants within a region-industry segment will vary due to differences in their underlying
productivity level.  If default risk pricing is introduced, equation (10.10) may be rewritten as:
(10.14)h l( ) ( ) ( , )rt rb rp d scrjqh a t
ce
jqh a jh a= = == +1 1 1 t  t  t
with the FDR  probability distribution function rewritten as:
(10.15)a h( ) ( ( ); , , )FDR FDR rt LT nt LFCjqha t jqha t jh jha t      a=0 t-1     = = ==1 1 1 .
Productivity may be viewed as the capacity of firms to internally generate funds given their resource
base.  A productivity relative ratio is defined so as to normalise the average productivity level of
borrowers in a particular credit risk grade as defined by a default risk-security risk matrix to the
productivity level of the average firm for a region-industry segment.  Given this, the productivity
relative ratio may be defined as the ratio of the average gross income level for a particular q,h
segment for borrowers to the average gross income level for the j-th segment once the resource base of
borrowers have been standardised as follows:
(10.16)prr
GI
GIBjqhat
jqhat
jt
=
where
GIijqhat = average gross income for borrowers in s gment jqh in time period t;
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prrjqhat = productivity relative ratio for borrowers in segment jqh in time
period t; and
GIBjt = ‘base’ gross income for firms in the segment j  in time period t.
By rearranging equation (10.16), a linear relationship between GI and GIB  may be formed:
(10.17)GI prr GIBjqhat jqhat jt= .
Thus if prr= 1, then the gross income of borrowers in q,h credit risk segment of the j-th
region-industry associated with a particular credit policy set is equal to that of the average firm in the
region-industry segment.  Alternatively, higher/lower levels of prr than one indicates that borrowers
have higher/lower capacity to internally generate funds from their firm than the average.
Under this formulation, the probability distribution of GI  takes the following properties.  The value
of E GI( )  will be linearly related to E GIB( )  through prr.  The relationship between prr and
the variance of GI  is less straightforward.  There is the possibility that loan applicants with higher
underlying levels of productivity are also more adept at reducing the volatility of gross incomes
through risk management strategies.  In addition, loan applicants may also trade off higher levels of
productivity (or alternatively, higher expected returns) for lower levels of business risk.
Notwithstanding these aspects, it is assumed that the variance of GI  of loan applicants in a
region-industry segment does not vary with their productivity levels in this model.  Subst tuting
equations (10.15) and (10.17) into equation (10.11) gives:
(10.18)f CSR prr GIB FC CR FDR PEjqha t jqha t jt jt jha t jqha t jt( ) . ( ) ( )       = = = == - + - -1 1 1 1y a
Equation (10.18) represents a parametric simulation model with the value of the expected probability
of default for a particular portfolio segment dependent on the value given for the productivity relative
ratio.
The relationship between prr and the probability distribution function of CSR depend on a number
of additional conditions.  If leverage is held constant for different levels of prr, the variance of
FDR  will also be constant.  The variance of CSR will therefore be a function of the variances of
GI  and FDR  and will remain unchanged for all values of prr. However, higher/lower values of
prr increases/decreases E CSR( ) , and lead to higher/lower values of the expected probability of
default.  In Figure 10.4, the cumulative probability density functions for CSR in a particular
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region-industry segment for a given level of leverage is drawn for two different values of prr.
Given that prr''>prr' , F CSR( )  associated with prr''  is to the right of G CSR( )  associated
with prr' and therefore dG > dF  .  The hatched area gives  dF   while the lined area including the
hatched area gives dG .
The relationship between prr and leverage depends on the size of the positive contributions of the
credit reserve relative to the size of the negative contributions arising from the fixed debt servicing
requirement.  If the value for credit reserves of borrowers,CR, is h ld constant for higher levels of
initial term loan drawings, the expected value of FDR  increases and the variance of FDR  expands
both indicating increased financial risk.  Thus as leverage increases, the value of prr must be
increased sufficiently in order to offset increased financial risk so as to hold the expected probability
of default constant.
Figure 10.4 Relationship between the productivity relative ratio and the expected
probability of default
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In Figure 10.5, a series of curves are drawn that illustrate the relationship between prr and scr for
given levels of d .  These curves may be termed iso-probability curves.  The x-axis defines differing
levels of leverage given by the inverse of scr.  This measure is equivalent to leverage since A and
CR are held constant (see equations (10.3) to 10.8)).  The prr parameter is shown on the y-axis.
Three iso-probability curves, denoted by d1 , d2  and dn reflect the cut-off values for the expected
probability of default defined by the 3x3 credit risk classification system.  In this framework, regions
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may be found which give values for prr and scr consistent with a particular default risk grade,
given by q, for acceptable loan applicants for a given credit policy setting.
Since security cover provided by borrowers is assumed to be independent of their productivity,
regions may also be found for prr and leverage for pairings of default risk grades and security risk
grades required in a 3x3 credit risk classification system.  These regions are illustrated in Figure 10.6.
In this Figure, the shaded region represents values for prr, scr and d  for which loan applicants
are rejected.
Figure 10.5 Relationship between the productivity relative ratio, expected security
cover ratio, the expected probability of default and default risk class
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Figure 10.6 Definition of default risk-security risk class regions for the productivity
relative ratio, probability of default and expected security cover ratio for
region-industry j
154
prr
1/ scr
dn
1
2
d
d
q = 1
h = 1
1/ scrn1/ scr 21
q = 3
h = 1
q = 3
h = 2
q = 2
h = 2
q = 1
h = 2
q = 2
h = 1
q = 1
h = 3
q = 2
h = 3
q = 3
h = 3
1/ scr
The above analysis has assumed that CR is constant across security risk grades.  The
implication for relaxing this constraint for the iso-probability relationships depend on the size
of the change in CR with respect to a unit change in 1/ scr relative to a change in E FDR( )
also with respect to a unit change in 1/ scr.  Defining a unit change in a variable by the
symbol, D  - then for a fixed interest term lending facility, if D DCR scr/ ( / )1  is greater than
D DE FDR scr( / ( / )1 , the iso-probability line is downward sloping.  If D DCR scr/ ( / )1  is
equal to D DE FDR scr( / ( / )1  - as implied by a crm value given by equation (6.15) - the
iso-probability line is a straight line that is horizontal to the x- xis.
Conversely, the iso-probability line is upward sloping if
D D D DCR scr E FDR scr/ ( / ) ( / ( / )1 1< .  For a variable interest term lending facility, the
above relationships are augmented by the extent to which prr is required to be increased for
additional contributions to Var FDR( )  as 1/ scr is increased.
In a portfolio context, the average prr for all successful loan applicants in a particular credit
risk grade may be ascertained and be used to reflect the average productivity relative ratio for a
borrower in a portfolio segment for simulation purposes.  The process of estimating prr for
given cut-off values of d  as defined by the credit risk classification system is essentially an
experimental one.  Since d  is unknown for a particularprr value and scrh  value, in first instance, a
value for prr, say at prr' , must be predetermined for a particular security risk grade and the
resulting sample value for d may be estimated.  Under certain circumstances, once the initial value
of the prr for a risk grade is established, the loan review process involves the re-estimation of d
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and scr at the end of each period at this prr level while borrowers remain in the portfolio.
Further discussion on the dynamics of the productivity relative ratio and its implications for
model construction is found in the next chapter.
10.5 Summary
There have been few attempts in the literature to explicitly relate credit scoring models to default risk
classification systems.  In this chapter, the major credit scoring models were reviewed in relation to a
default risk classification system.  A key advantage of parametric statistical methods for credit scoring
over parametric non-statistical and non-parametric methods is their ability to allow for borrower
classification according to cut- ff levels defined in a default risk classification system.  However, this
advantage must be viewed within the context of their statistical properties as outlined in the previous
chapter, and the validity of any relationships drawn between an estimated model and the parameters of
a default risk classification system.  In contrast to parametric statistical methods, cut-off ev ls for
predicted credit scores estimated using other methods are essentially pre-d termined by the sample
proportions in classifications of bad and good loans.  These cut-off levels may bear little relation to
those specified for a default risk classification system.
A simulation model for credit screening purposes was developed within a parametric framework in
order to evaluate credit policy impacts on borrower default risk.  This framework draws on the
industry relative ratio approach by defining a productivity relative ratio.  This ratio measures the
capacity of loan applicants to generate internal funds relative to the average firm in a region-industry
segment.  The productivity relative ratio may be used to develop relationships between the parameters
of a credit risk classification system and productivity levels and leverage of borrowers on a portfolio
basis.  Using the simulation method, financial relationships can be estimated for a particular credit
policy set consistent with the range of exogenous credit risk determinants for a region-indu try
segment.  When credit policy is endogenous to the credit scoring process, it was shown that credit
policy significantly impacts on the attributes of borrowers required to meet certain cut-off limits in a
default risk classification system.  Any evaluation of different credit policies must contain a
framework of analysis in which credit policy is modelled as being endogenous to the credit system.
In the next chapter, the stochastic and deterministic elements of the simulation model are specified to
reflect the operating conditions of borrowers in the Australian farm sector.
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CHAPTER ELEVEN
11. SIMULATION MODEL
11.1 Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to describe an annual simulation model of a bank’s farm loan
portfolio that produces measures of portfolio returns and loan security balances.  A key focus of
modelling framework is to enable the simulation of an economic environment similar to that
faced by banks lending to the Australian farm sector.  The formulation of the simulation model
builds on the modelling constructs described in Chapters Four, Nine and Ten.  In Section 11.2,
a broad overview of the structure of the simulation model is presented.  In Section 11.3, the
economic environment of the farm model and the modules for simulating the sources and uses of
funds of farm borrowers are described.  In Section 11.4, the economic environment of the bank
model is discussed within a portfolio context and measures of bank returns and loan balances
are outlined for different credit policy regimes at the portfolio segment level and then at the
portfolio level.
11.1 Structure of simulation model
The simulation model may be represented by sets of inputs and outputs as shown in Figure 11.1.  The
key inputs of the model at the start of each period are the credit risk management system, the uncertain
economic environment, the portfolio structure of farm loan securities and expected new loan security
flows.  The final outputs of the simulation model at the end of each time period are measures of loan
returns and bank loan assets.  The impacts of a particular credit policy set, the economic environment
and the portfolio structure of farm loan securities on bank returns are measured by a series of farm
models and an associated set of portfolio weights in an integrated model of a bank's farm loan security
portfolio.
Figure 11.1  Schematic diagram of simulation model
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A model of the number of new loans entering each particular portfolio segment in a simulation year
defines the initial values for portfolio weights.  Against these weights, a farm model is constructed
with financial and production structures representative of the portfolio segment.  Each farm model
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contains a cash flow statement, a taxation statement and a balance sheet statement.  The initial
financial structures of each new farm model is made consistent with the bank’s credit risk
classification system through the use of a credit screening model via the stochastic simulation method.
Given information about the prior financial and production history of borrowers in the portfolio
segment, the farm model may be used to ascertain the loan repayment outcome and the collateral
coverage status regarding loan securities given the scenario for the economic environment.  From this,
the implications for bank returns and changes in net loan balances can be measured.  At the end of
each time period, a loan review model is applied to assess the ending value of each farm model’s
credit scores.  These credit scores are utilised in the next period for loan pricing purposes.  In
addition, the closing values for stock variables in the farm and bank models provide the opening
values for the stock variables in these models in the next time period.  The recursive quality provides
for an intrinsic dynamic structure for the simulation model.
The intrinsic dynamics of the simulation model are embodied in the loan maturity profile of the loan
security portfolio.  Since the prior financial history of borrowers across the maturity profile must be
known in order to project the future performance of a loan security portfolio, the simulation model
must be comprised of two separate modules: a historical module and a projection module.  This
feature is illustrated in Figure 11.2.  The historical module generates starting conditions for a full
synthetic profile of a bank’s loan security portfolio for input into the projection module.  Because a
bank’s portfolio of loans is the sum of it’s c mponent parts, each component part must have it’s own
set of starting conditions.
Figure 11.2  Schematic diagram of the historical and projection modules of the
simulation model
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Accordingly, each farm model must have a history regarding it’s cash flow, taxation and balance sheet
statements consistent with the recent historical economic environment and a credit risk management
system.  For example, the liability structure of each farm model at a given point in time reflects prior
repayment and borrowing patterns.  Due to this, the historical model is required in order to give data
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on the recent past that will allow the projection model to commence.  The portfolio weights attached
to each farm model will also reflect these factors in which the number of farms in each portfolio
segment at any given time period is determined by actual loan performance, default rates and
terminations arising from full loan repayment.
While the historical module is subjected to the historical economic environment, the projection model
relies on scenario forecasts extracted from probability distribution functions defined for stochastic
variables comprising the uncertain economic environment.  The input of scenarios for the economic
environment in each time period gives estimates for values of loan returns and assets for a given set of
credit policies.  By simulating the projection module through the investment horizon, the NPV of
bank returns for a particular scenario may be calculated.  Different sample values of the NPV of bank
returns are estimated by repeating the above process several times.  These sample values are then used
to identify the distribution of NPV of bank returns for a particular credit policy set.
11.2 Farm model
11.2.1 Economic environment
Risky returns occur in the context of crop and livestock production in a particular year because either
enterprise yields or commodity prices, or both, involve unsystematic variations in their values which
results in uncertainty (Dillon
1977, p 104).  The time paths of commodity prices and enterprise yields on an annual basis may be
viewed as being comprised of a number of systematic components and an unsystematic component.
Systematic variations in commodity prices and enterprise yields are those components which may be
expected to occur and include their underlying trend, cyclical behaviour and covariability with other
prices and yields.
Commodity prices in real terms have in general displayed a downward trend since 1945 (Roberts,
Doyle, Stayner, Mues and Gray 1996).  Farmers have offset this adverse trend by productivity gains
over long time periods (Knopke, Strappazzon and Mullen 1995).  In general, these productivity gains
have been reflected in a positive trend in enterprise yields.  Systematic cycles or positive serial
correlation also have been observed in some commodity prices due to lags in the agricultural
production process (Shepherd 1963).  Covariations between different commodity prices for a
particular farm business may occur due to jointness in supply with other commodities and therefore
market conditions in one determine the returns received in another (Tomek and Robinson 1972, p 71).
Covariations in enterprise yields within regions may also be expected to occur, as a result of climatic
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effects such as drought or rainfall.  Further, covariation between enterprise yields and commodity
prices may be expected, due to supply-related price variations or to commodity quality-yield linkages.
The impact of commodity prices and enterprise yield trends and volatility on the distribution of farm
income also depends on the possibility of specialisation and diversification in particular agricultural
activities.  For farms in regions where resource endowments permit only limited diversification, the
distribution of farm income may reflect greater risk than for farms in regions where enterprise
switching and/or diversification is possible.
11.2.2 Gross farm income module
Gross farm income measures internally generated funds of the farm business.  Gross farm income may
be modelled directly by assuming a particular distribution with a mean and a variance.  Alternatively,
gross farm income may be measured indirectly, by modelling the distributions for both commodity
prices and enterprise yields.  These distributions may be combined with information about enterprise
structures for farms within a particular region-industry segment. While the later approach provides a
more effective approach in modelling the key determinants of credit risk facing a farm business,
information and computing resource requirements are considerable, and this approach could not be
pursued.
Under the direct approach, gross farm income was modelled as comprising of two components.  The
first component is a distribution function for the average farm in a region-industry segment (the base
model), as given in equation (11.1).  The second component is a distribution function for the average
farm in a credit risk class relative to the base model (as given in equation (10.16)).  The possibility of
serial correlation in gross farm income was ignored.  Since non-negative values must be precluded,
the distribution of gross farm income for the base model was assumed to be log normally distributed
with a mean and variance as follows:
(11.1) GIB N E GIB Var GIBjt jt jt= log ( ( ), ( )
where GIB = gross income for the base farm model;
The log-normal distribution function retai s the tractable nature of the normal distribution function
since a positive random variable, xt , is log normally distributed with two parameters  E x( )and
Var(x) if  y xt t= ln   is normally distributed with mean E y( )  and variance Var y( ) (Crow and
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Shimizu 1988, p 2).  If sd(x) is the standard deviation of x, then the log-normal distribution for x is
defined as:
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11.2.3 Farm costs module
The farm costs module incorporates three key elements.  First, farm cost structures in a particular year
is assumed to be the same for all farms in a particular region- ndust y segment.  This assumption
could be made given that the productivity relative ratio accounts for different levels of productivity by
credit risk class within a particular region-industry segment (see Section 10.4).  That is, farm costs for
the farm model in the ijqha segment are equal to the farm costs for the base model in the j-th
region-industry segment.
(11.3) FC FCijqhat jt=
where FC = farm costs.
Second, expected farm costs for the base model is assumed to be constant through time.  This
assumption is discussed further in Section 11.3.7.
(11.4) )()( jjt FCEFCE =       for all t.
Third, farm costs in a particular year may be viewed as being comprised of two components: variable
costs and fixed costs.  Variable costs are expenditures that vary with the size of operation.  Farm fixed
costs, on the other hand, occur irrespective of size of operation.  However, from a data measurement
viewpoint, some variable costs may not be fully disentangled from fixed costs due to aggregation by
accountants in the process of compiling financial accounts.
Expected farm fixed costs are modelled as a given proportion of the expected farm costs during a
particular year in equation (11.5) with expected variable costs given by the difference between total
costs and fixed costs (equation (11.6):
(11.5) E FFC efcE FCjt jt( ) . ( )=
(11.6) E FVC E FC E FFCjt jt jt( ) ( ) ( )= -
167
where FFC = farm fixed costs;
efc = expected fixed cost factor where expected fixed costs are expressed as a
proportion ofexpected total farm costs; and
FVC = farm variable costs.
The scenario value of farm costs in a particular year depends on the extent to which short term
variations in production levels leads to changes in required expenditures to support a particular
production level.  To model this relationship, gross farm income for the base model in a
region-industry segment may be used as a proxy for a farm’s production level in a particular time
period.  Both farm variable and fixed costs are therefore modelled to vary according to a certain
proportion of the difference between GIB  and E GIB( ) in region-industry j plus their expected
values (equations (11.7) and (11.8) respectively).  If the difference is negative, the scenario value of
farm costs is below their expected value.  Conversely, if the difference is positive, the scenario value
of farm costs is above their expected value.  Farm costs are given in equation (11.9).
(11.7) ( )FVC E FVC fvc GIB E GIBjt jt j jt jt= + -( ) . ( )  
(11.8) ( )FFC E FFC ffc GIB E GIBjt jt j jt jt= + -( ) . ( )
(11.9) FC FFC FVCjt jt jt= +
where fvc = variable cost factor and
ffc = fixed cost factor.
11.2.4 Loan fees and charges module
Borrowers are subject to a number of loan fees and charges.  These include bank fees, bank charges,
and non-bank fees and charges on loan facilities.
(11.10) LFC BF BC NBFCijqhat ijqhat ijqhat ijqhat= + +
where BF = bank fees;
BC = bank charges; and
NBFC = non-bank fees and charges.
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There are a wide variety of types and structures for fees and charges levied on borrowers.  In this
study, only the major loan fees and charges were included (for a discussion of the types of fees and
charges, see ABA and MOFAC Consultants (1988)).  The payment of loan fees and charges is
assumed to be made regardless of farm income conditions, except in the case of full default.  The
nature of loan fees and charges charged to a farm on debt finance depends on whether the farm model
is in it’s first year of loan repayment, a = 1, or whether the farm model has progressed beyond it’s
first year, a> 1.  While key features of fees and charges payment structures assumed in this study are
presented below, fee and charges schedules are outlined in detail in Appendix A.
Bank fees chosen comprise the following: overdraft transaction fee, overdraft line fee, line service fee
payment and establishment fee.  The overdraft transaction fee payment is a function of the number of
deposits and withdrawals made on the overdraft facility during a particular time period.  In turn, the
number of deposits BTNDand withdrawals BTNC were assumed to be a function of the number
and type of enterprises in a particular region-industry segment.
(11.11) BTNC BTND fijqhat ijqhat and enterprise mix, enterprise type)= (
The overdraft line service fee payment is a function of the outstanding balance on the overdraft facility
at the beginning of the time period.  Since initial overdraft balances for portfolio entrants is assumed
to be zero, the overdraft line service fee payable by portfolio entrants is also zero.  The line service fee
payment is a function of the outstanding balance on the term loan facility at the beginning of the time
period.  The establishment fee is levied on new borrowers and is a function of the size of the initial
term loan drawing made at the commencement of the loan.
Bank charges are levied on new borrowers to cover legal costs incurred by the bank for registering
and lodging security documents.  State government also levy fees and charges on borrowers
undertaking borrowings in their first year.  The nature of these fees and charges vary by State.  These
include State government stamp duties, State government loan security duties and loan
security registration fees.  State government stamp duty is a function of the maximum permissible
borrowings drawn under the loan contract.  State-governm nt loan security duty is a function of the
maximum permissible borrowings drawn under the loan contract.  The State government loan security
registration fee payment is comprised of a number of fees relating to the registration of security
pledged against loans.  The payment made depends on the type of security being pledged (for
example, landed mortgage, stock mortgage, crop lien or bill of sale).
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11.2.5 Taxation payments module
The utilisation of debt influence taxation payments since interest costs and loan fees and charges are
tax deductable.  A number of assumptions are made regarding the farm business structure in order to
estimate annual taxation payments.  Moon, Peterson, Kokic and Douglas (1995) report that in
Australia around 85% of broadacre family farm operators and spouses were using income averaging
and 93% of broadacre farms were unincorporated in 1993-94.  In this model, income splitting
between two partners was assumed since over 50% of farms use this business structure (Males and
Davidson 1990).  Taxable income averaging provisions were assumed to be over 5 years in the
historical model and over 7 years in the projection model, reflecting changes in this provision during
the early 1990s.  Capital gains tax and livestock reconciliation taxation implications were not
modelled.
Given information about the prior taxable income history of borrowers, taxable income in the current
year may be calculated as follows assuming income tax averaging provisions over tn number of y ars:
(11.12) TTFI TFIijqhat ijqhat
t t tn
t
=
= - +
å
1
where TTFI = taxable farm income after income splitting and n ye rs
tax-averaging and
TFI = taxable farm income after income splitting.
The value of taxable income in the current year depends on the problem loan resolution policy of the
bank.  This occurs because if forgiveness of interest payments occurs, taxation payments following
restructuring may differ from tax payments assessed prior to restructuring due to non-payment of
interest.  For borrowers with term loans less than tn years of duration, the assumption is made that
taxable income in periods prior to entry in the bank portfolio is assessed on the basis of no debt.
While the assumption of no debt was made for simplicity, levels of existing debt prior to taking new
debt facilities are likely to vary widely.  Debt usage varies according to the willingness of farm
businesses to utilise external sources of funds, investment plans and financial conditions in previous
years.  Generally, at least 30% of Australian farms have 100% equity, 40% of farms have 85%-95%
equity-asset ratios with the remainder having equity-ass t ratios less than 85% (Madden and Malcolm
1996).  The impact of the ‘no debt prior to entry’ assumption depends on the extent to which
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increased tax payments arising from higher taxable incomes compare to the reduction of taxable
income that accrues from tax-deductability of debt costs.
The calculation of taxable income in a particular year given p number of partners may be defined as
follows:
(11.13) TFI
p GI FC LFC I a
p GIB FC a
ijqhat
ijqhat jt ijqhat ijqhat
jt jt
=
- - - ³
- <
é
ë
ê
ê
ê
ê
1 1
1 1
.     for 
.                               for 
( )
( )
where I = total interest payments.
Taxation payments are equal to p times the product of the average tax rate and the value of taxable
income in the current period.  The taxation schedule used to calculate the average tax rate is shown in
Appendix B.
(11.14) TAX p atr TTFIijqhat ijqhat ijqhat=        . .
where atr = average tax rate.
11.2.6 Use of surplus funds module
The farm model generates surplus funds if successive years of high incomes occur.  These surplus
funds may be used for consumption or investment purposes.  In this model, surplus funds ar  a sumed
to be fully consumed only if cumulative surpluses appear to be permanent rather than transitory.
To model this consumption behaviour, minimum personal-ex nses is fixed at PE  through time.
However, successive years of internally generated surpluses are drawn down as follows.  If borrowers
experience a succession of positive balances on the overdraft over several years, borrowers are
assumed to consume the cumulated cash surplus.  In this model, the closing value of the overdraft
balance at the end of a time period depends on the number of periods the borrower has remained in
the portfolio.  For borrowers in the first two years of the term loan, the closing balance of the
overdraft is determined as follows:
(11.15) LO
CS a
LO CS a
ijqhat
ijqhat
ijqha t ijqhat
=
=
=
é
ë
ê
ê
ê
- -
                       if 
 
+       if 
1
21 1
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where
(11.16) CS GI FC LFC IO PI TAX PEijqhat ijqhat jt ijqhat ijqhat ijqhat ijqhat jt= - - - - - -
For borrowers in the years following the first two years of the term loan, the closing balance of the
overdraft is determined as follows:
(11.17) LO
LO LO LO
LO CS
ijqhat
ijqhat ijqha t ijqha t
ijqha t ijqhat
=
³é
ë
ê
ê
ê
- - - -
- -
0                           if    and  0 
  
+        otherwise
, 1 1 2 2
1 1
11.2.7 Productivity relative ratio dynamics
The productivity relative ratio measures the capacity of borrowers to internally generate funds from
the business relative to the average farm in a region-i dustry segment.  In the credit-screening model,
the value of the productivity relative ratio, denoted by prr, allows farm models within a
region-industry segment to be aligned to the credit risk classification system (see Section 10.4).  Once
values for prr are estimated in the first year of the loan for a particular simulation year (given by
t a- + 1), these levels were assumed to be held constant through time.
(11.18)prr prr a ntijqhat ijqha t a i= < £= - +        for 11 1
In conceptual terms, this assumption can be made if and only if:
· expected values of gross farm income, farm costs, collateral and personal expenses are fixed;
· structural aspects such as credit policy, taxation and loan fees and charges schedules are held
constant; and
· the underlying variances of gross farm income and interest rates remain unchanged through
time.
If these conditions are met, then the following additional assumption may be made.
(11.19)prr prr tijqha t ijqha t          for all = = ==1 1 1
Equation (11.19) says that the once a matrix of values of prr is estimated in the first
simulation time period, the same matrix may be used for all incoming farm models in
future periods.  This condition is distinct from equation (11.18) since the focus of
equation (11.19) is on the initial characteristics of borrower entrants in different time periods.  The
dynamics of equation (11.19) is examined below.
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Any shifts over time in the expected values of CSR for the base model augments the required value
of prr compared to the original estimate of prr calculated.  The reasons for this are as follows.  If
the underlying variances of the stochastic variables are assumed to be constant through time, a
particular value for E CSR( )  at time t  is found for the base model given a particular level of
debt and the following associated parameters are defined giving rise to prr p r= *  with
d d= * .  For simplicity, let us express E CSR( )  for the base model in security risk class h=1
as follows:
(11.20)E CSR prr E GIB E FC E NCjha t jha t jt jt jha t( ) * ( ( ) ( )= = == +1 1 1. ) -
where  E NC( ) = the expected value of all other cash flows (ie, net of farm costs
and the gross farm income of the base model).
For given values of E GIB E FC E NC( ( ) ( )),   and  in time period t, then solving for a critical
value of prr gives
(11.21) prr
E FC E NC
E GIBjha t
jt jha t
jt
*
( ) ( )
(=
==
-
1
1
)
When the variances of GIB  and interest rates are constant, then equation (11.21) in difference
equation form is given by
(11.22) D
D D
D
 
  
 )
prr
E FC E NC
E GIBjha t
jt jha t
jt
*
( ) ( )
(=
==
-
1
1
Denote djha t=1 *  as the underlying probability of default for the base model in a security risk class h
in time period t.  For djha t=1 *  to remain unchanged from one period to the next, D prr jha t* =1  must
be given by equation (11.22).  Since D D DE GIB E FC E NCjt jt jha t( ( ) ( )),   and =1  were all
assumed to be zero in this model, equation (11.19) for farm models relating to a = 1 could be used
for setting the productivity relative ratio through time.
11.3 Bank model
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11.3.1 Economic environment
11.3.1.1 Interest rates and discount rate
The time path of lending rates in the retail market may vary due to volatility in financial markets (see
Gruen (1995) for discussion on financial market volatility and Lowe (1995) for discussion on
linkages between bank funding and retail lending rates).  The annual structure of the farm model
requires adjustments to interest rates charged on the overdraft facility and the flexible interest rate
term lending facility in response to changes in funding rates to be made at yearly intervals.  Expected
nominal rates of interest on each facility were assumed to be constant through time in both the
historical and projection models.  For the projection model, a separate loan pricing model was
developed based on a ‘cost of funds plus profit margin’ approach so as to be consistent with the fixed
discount rate used in the NPV calculations.  While a full derivation of the model is provided in
Appendix C, key components of the pricing model are discussed below.  In presenting the model, the
assumption is made that the bank has full knowledge of it’s lon  run optimal capital structure
associated with funding it’s agricultural loan security portfolio in the Australian region.
The bank distinguishes between overdraft and term loan products as being comprised of short term
and long term assets.  Consequently, these assets may be funded by short term and long term
liabilities respectively in order to immunise the repercussions stemming from interest rate risk under
certain circumstances (Saunders 1994, p 94).  If expected cost of funds differs between short and long
term liability maturities, then the expected rates of interest on the overdraft and term loan facilities
may also differ if profit margins on both facilities are the same.  The expected rates of interest on the
overdraft and term loan facilities may be written as follows:
(11.23) E ro E c er nlbm mST( ) ( ).( ).= - +1 p
(11.24) E rb E c er nlbm mLT( ) ( ).( ).= - +1 p
where E ro( ) = expected rate of interest on the overdraft facility;
E rb( ) = expected rate of interest on the term loan facility for prime rate borrowers
(associated with zero expected losses);
E cST( ) = expected cost of funds on short term liabilities;
E cLT( ) = expected cost of funds on long term liabilities;
er = bank equity-asset ratio;
nlbm = net lending balances multiplier; and
pm = profit margin.
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The profit margin is set equal to the target net interest margin (interest income less interest expenses
expressed as a ratio of bank assets) times the net lending balances multiplier.
(11.25) pm nim nlbm=   .
where nim = net interest margin.
The net interest margin is given by the target return on assets before tax, plus the non-interest expense
ratio less the non-interest income ratio.
(11.26) nim r nier niirA
bt= + -
where rA
bt = target return on assets before tax;
nier = non-interest expense ratio; and
niir = non-interest income ratio.
The target return on assets before tax is given by
(11.27) r
r er
ctrA
bt E=
-
  .
1
where rE = target return on equity;
er = bank equity-asset ratio; and
ctr = company tax rate.
The net-lending-balances multiplier is the ratio of bank assets to net lending balances.  Since banks
hold other assets (buildings, plant and equipment, etc) to support it’s lending operations and financial
assets for capital adequacy purposes (non-callable deposits and prime assets) (Shanmugam d
Turton 1992, p 130), a net lending balances multiplier may be given by:
(11.28) nlbm
A
BLN
ncdr par
oasr ncdr par
= =
+ +
- + +
1
1 1( )
where   A = bank average assets;
BLN  = net lending balances;
oasr = other asset support ratio;
ncdr = non-callable deposits ratio; and
par = prime assets ratio.
The distribution of interest rates associated with short term lending facilities such as overdrafts and
longer term lending facilities such as term loans were assumed to be log-normally distributed with a
175
mean and a variance as given in equation (11.2).  Further, since interest rates of different maturities
are linked through the term structure of interest rates relationship, the overdraft and the term loan
interest rates covary with each other through time.  The distributions of the nominal rates of interest
on the overdraft and the term loan may be represented by:
(11.29) rbt  ~ ( )ln ( ), ( ), ( , )N E rb Var rb Covro rbt t
(11.30) rot  ~ ( )ln ( ), ( ), ( , )N E ro Var ro Covro rbt t
The discount rate was set using the weighted-averag-cost-of-capital approach as given below.
(11.31) dr wacc r ctr er r erD E= = - - +   ( )( ) .1 1
The variable rD  is interpreted as expected interest expenses expressed as a ratio of bank assets.  In
applying equation (11.31), the target return on equity was assumed to embody a portfolio risk
premium required by decision makers for beta risk and/or unexpected losses associated with equity
capital allocated to the agricultural loan security portfolio with the regional definition encompassing
all regions within Australia.  Expected interest-exp ns s is modelled as a weighted average of the cost
of short- erm funds and the cost of long-term funds as follows.
(11.32) r c bodr c btlr erD ST LT= + -( . . )( )    1
where   rD = cost of funds;
  cST = cost of short term funds;
  cLT = cost of long term funds;
bodr = ratio of net overdraft lending balances to total net lending balances; and
btlr = ratio of net term lending balances to total net lending balances.
11.3.1.2 Covariation in gross farm income
If farm loan securities are combined to form a portfolio, bank performance is likely to be subject to
credit risk influences arising from systematic covariations in gross farm income across different
region-industry segments over time. The major underlying exogenous influences affecting the
distribution of gross farm income are sourced from variations in commodity prices and enterprise
yields.  These covariations may occur for a number of reasons.  In particular, the law of one p ice
dictates that prices of a particular commodity across different regions should be strongly correlated
(Marshall 1989, p 234).  As mentioned in Section 11.3.1, covariation between different commodity
prices across regions and industries and covariation between enterprise yields and commodity prices
may also occur due to jointness in supply.  Enterprise yields across different regions may be
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systematically related to the extent to which climatic events occur simultaneously across different
regions rather than in isolated areas.  In this study, the net impact of co-volatility patterns in
commodity price and enterprise yield are assumed to be reflected in the covariances of gross farm
income.  The upper triangle of the variance matrix for gross farm income for the base model for m
number of region- ndustry segments may be represented by:
(11.33) å gfib   =
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where  å gfib = variance matrix for gross farm income for the base model for m number of
region-industry segments  and
d  ij = covariance for gross farm income for the base model in region-indust y i and
region-industry j.
11.3.1.3 Farm asset salvage values
When lending to the Australian farm sector, a common practice of banks is to require their loan
applicants to pledge their fixed assets as collateral.  In this study, the value of business assets pledged
as collateral is assumed to equal the full estimated market value of land and buildings associated with
the farm business.
(11.34) C LBjt jt=
where LBjt = value of land and buildings.
In Chapter Four, the salvage value of collateral pledged as security realised upon sale is modelled in
the form of the parameter s; the proportion recovered from the current market value of collateral (and
in this case, farm land and associated fixed structures).  The key modelling framework of farm-land
valuation models, as reviewed by Madden and Malcolm (1996), is the income capitalisation method
outlined by Boehlje and Eidman (1988).  This method indicates that the salvage value of farm ass ts
is positively related to farm income levels and inversely related to interest rates.  Further, systematic
variations in farm asset salvage values across portfolio segments may occur due to covariability of
farm incomes across regions and industries through time.
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Given the above, a simple model of salvage value of farm assets is proposed.  The salvage value is
expressed as a function of current gross income.  Since constant expected interest rates are assum d,
the impact of interest rates on farm asset values was ignored.  In addition, other factors found to be
important by Just and Miranowski (1993), such as inflation rates and changes in real returns on
alternative uses of capital, are not modelled.  In this model, the extent to which the salvage value of
farm assets across the portfolio will display a certain level of covariability depend on the covariance
assumptions for gross farm income.
The expected level of the farm asset salvage value in percentage terms was assumed to be constant
through time (equation (11.35)).  The time path for the salvage value was modelled as a function of
gross farm income for the base region-industry segment around their expected levels  (equation
(11.36)).
(11.35) )()( jjt sEsE =      for all t
(11.36) s E s svf
GIB
E GIBjt j j
jt
jt
= +
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where    s = salvage value of farm assets and
svf = salvage value factor.
11.3.1.4 New loan account numbers
The number of new entrants in a portfolio segment in a particular year is likely to be a function of a
range of economic factors including credit policy and competitive behaviour between lending
institutions.  Key economic factors include the population of farms in a region-industry segment and
the expected return and risk of agricultural investment.  The credit quality limits, qnand scrn ,
determine the default risk and security risk required for portfolio entrants.  If concentration limits are
applied, these limits can constrain the number of farms entering the portfolio.  Due to the complexity
of the relationships between these factors, a simple model of new loan account numbers was
developed.
At the farm sector level, the number of farms has tended to fall through time, though this trend can
differ by region and by industry depending on historical and expected economic circumstances.  For
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projection purposes, the population of farms in a region- dustry segment is expressed as a function
of the logarithm of time.
(11.37) POPN POPN POPN tjt j j= +0 D   . log()
where POPN = population of farm in a region-industry segment.
In each time period, a fixed proportion of farms in a region-industry segment is assumed to
successfully obtain finance from the bank.
(11.38) XS bs POPNjt jt=    .
where XS = number of portfolio entrants by region-industry segment and
bs = share of farm population which obtain finance from the bank in a region-i dustry
segment.
Variations in default risk within a region-industry segment are explained by productivity differences
because farm business assets are assumed to be homogeneous.  The proportion of farms in a
region-industry that fall into particular default risk grades q qn= 1 2, ,..,  may be defined by the
parameter, shq.  This parameter is expressed as a function of the distribution of productivity:
(11.39) shq f productivitydistributionq j= ( ) 
The parameter, shq, is applied in the new loan account numbers model as follows
(11.40) X shq Xijqa t jq jt= - =0 1   S.
where X = number of borrowers in a portfolio segment.
Information on the distribution of the willingness to leverage by farm businesses by different
region-industry segments is unavailable.  In the absence of this information, the number of farms in
each default risk class in a region-industry segment are allocated in equal proportions to each security
risk class as follows:
(11.41) X X hnijqha t ijha t= - = -=0 1 0 1 /
11.3.1.5 Existing loan account numbers
Once the initial value of new farm numbers for a particular portfolio segment is established using
equation (11.41), this value was fixed through the duration of the maturity term.  If the maturity term
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is reached, all borrowers remaining in the portfolio segment exit the portfolio.  Borrowers may also
exit prior to maturity term.  In this model, the possibility of early exit from the portfolio due to
accelarated repayment is ignored, with emphasis being placed on well-defined rules for loan
repayment.  In this approach, when the farm model predicts default, the number of borrower exits
depend on whether loan restructuring is successful in providing defaulting borrowers temporary
liquidity reprieve by the bank as follows:
No restructuring policy
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X CSR
CSR
ijqhat
ijqha t ijqhat
ijqhat
=
³
<
é
ë
ê
ê
ê
- -1 1 0
0 0
                if  
                          if         
Restructuring policy
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where CSRpr = cash surplus including credit reserves prior to restructuring and
CSRfr = cash surplus including credit reserves following restructuring.
11.3.2 Portfolio segment module
The initial value of net lending balances for a particular portfolio segment is set by the value of loan
balances of incoming borrowers in the first year of the term loan.  At loan account time 0, the net
lending balances in portfolio segment ijqh  i  time period t is given by the product of the number of
new loan accounts and the value of the average net loan balances in the portfolio segment (for
relationships between BLN  and the farm model, see Appendix D).
(11.44) BLN X BLNijqha t ijqha t ijqha t= - = - = -=0 1 0 1 0 1.
where BLN = net lending balances for portfolio segment and
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BLN = average net lending balances for portfolio segment.
The closing portfolio value of net lending balances for credit policy set i in each por folio segment is
equal to the opening value of net loan balances plus the change in net lending balances during the
year.
(11.45) BLN BLN BLNijqhat ijqha t ijqhat= +- -1 1 D
where DBLN = change in net lending balances during a simulation year;
A change in the portfolio value of net lending balances occurs as a result of capital gains (interest
capitalisation and interest held in reserve), capital losses (as a result of provisionings and write-offs)
and through loan drawings and repayments by the customer base in the portfolio segment (see
Appendix D).  In summary, two accounting identities may be outlined under which loans in default
during a particular period are treated differently.  The identities depend on whether defaulting loans
are rendered insolvent immediately by the bank, and on whether defaulting loans granted temporary
liquidity reprieve are expected to be fully secured in the event of insolvency.
No loan restructuring and restructuring allowed for loans fully secured only
(11.46) DBLN IC LD RPT WNSPijqhat ijqhat ijqhat ijqhat ijqhat= + - -
Restructuring allowed for loans not fully secured
(11.47) DBLN IR SPN WBSijqhat ijqhat ijqhat ijqhat= - +  equation (11.46)+
where IC = interest capitalisation;
LD = loan drawings;
RPT = loan repayments;
WNSP= write-off of provisions for bad and doubtful debts not previously provided for;
IR = interest held in reserve;
SPN = new specific provisions for bad and doubtful debts; and
WBS = writeback of specific provisions for bad and doubtful debts.
Loan revenue for the portfolio segment is equal to interest income plus bank fees and charges income.
Interest income and bank fees and charges income for a portfolio segment is equal to the product of
the opening number of loan accounts in the portfolio segment and the average interest income and
bank fees and charges income earnt on the portfolio segment respectively.  Provisionings for bad and
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doubtful debts measured for a particular portfolio segment is given by new specific provisionings less
the writeback of specific provisionings plus write-offs of loan assets not specifically provided for in
the portfolio segment less write-offs previously specifically provided for.  The measurement of loan
revenue and provisionings depends on the choice of problem loan resolution policy as follows:
No loan restructuring and restructuring allowed for loans fully secured only
(11.48) RL II BFCijqhat ijqhat ijqhat= +
(11.49) PB WNSPijqhat ijqhat=
Restructuring allowed for loans not fully secured
(11.50) RL IRijqhat ijqhat=   equation (11.48)+  
(11.51) PB SPN WBSijqhat ijqhat ijqhat= + -equation (11.49)
where RL = loan revenue;
II = interest income;
BFC = bank fees and charges income; and
PB = provisionings for bad and doubtful debts.
11.3.3 Portfolio module
The portfolio value of bank loan assets at time t for a given credit policy set i i  measured as the
value of lending balances net of provisions for bad and doubtful debts.  Thus the measure of
bank loan assets excludes reserve deposits and other asset support.  The portfolio value of net
lending balances is found by summing the net lending balances within each portfolio segment
and is given by:
(11.52) BLN BLNipt ijqhat
a
nt
h
hn
q
qn
j
m
=
=
-
===
åååå
1
1
111
Bank returns on the loan security portfolio are measured as the value of loan revenue net of
provisions.  Bank portfolio returns for credit policy set i in tim  period t are given by the
following:
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where R = bank returns.
Since bank costs are assumed to be exogenous to credit risk, bank costs may be excluded from the
calculation of bank returns in equation (11.53).  To the extent that bank costs do vary with credit risk,
bias is introduced when the simulation model is used to analyse alternative credit policies.
In the next chapter, data used to underpin the simulation model for empirical analysis is presented.
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CHAPTER TWELVE
12. DATA
12.1 Region and industry specifications
Farm level data was sourced from farm surveys compiled by the Australian Bureau of Agricultural
and Resources Economics (ABARE) in their Australian agricultural and grazing industries surveys
(AAGIS) and Australian dairy industry survey (ADIS).  The coverage of ABARE farm surveys
includes five broadacre industry segments and a dairy industry across Australia.  The industries are
defined according to the Australian and New Zealand Standard Industrial Classification (ANZSIC)
system (see Table 12.1).  The sample size in the surveys has varied from year to year with around
1,600 farms surveyed in 1995-96 (the latest year for which survey data was used).  Each sample farm
has a designated survey weight and the sum of these weights is equal to the population for the
particular region or industry.  A discussion of survey design and the way in which the sample is
selected can be found in ABARE (1997a and previous issues).
Table 12.1  Industry definitions
___________________________________________________________________________
Industry ANZSIC      Definition
   class
Wheat and other crops   0121 Farms engaged mainly in growing cereal grains, coarse grains,  oilseeds or
grain legumes
Mixed livestock-crops   0122 Farms engaged mainly in running sheep or beef cattle and growing cereal
grains, coarse grains, oilseeds or grain legumes
Sheep-beef   0123 Farms engaged mainly in running both sheep and beef cattle
Sheep   0124 Farms engaged mainly in running sheep
Beef   0125 Farms engaged mainly in running beef cattle
Dairy   0130 Farms engaged mainly in dairying
___________________________________________________________________________
Regional coverage for empirical analysis included all States plus the Northern Territory.  Regional
definitions for broadacre industry data within each State are based primarily on the predominant
broadacre landuse, which varies according to climate and topography.  In total, the data provided
average farm statistics across 27 regions and resulted in 42 region-industry classifications (see Table
12.2 and Figure 12.1).  Information on Local Statistical Areas (LSAs) within regions outlined in
Table 12.2 is available from the author on request.
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Particular specifications for the farm level data on a variable-by-variable basis are discussed below.
All variables measured in monetary terms are deflated by the Australian consumer price index to
express time series in 1995-96 dollars.
12.2 Gross farm income
Gross farm income includes total enterprise receipts plus other receipts earned from other activities.
In the historical simulation model, scenario values for gross farm income comprised the historical
series for the 18-year period to 1995- 6.  Gross farm income distributions are estimated from time
series that were deflated and log transformed.  Expected values in the projection simulation model are
proxied by the exponent of sample means of historical log-transformed time series.  The
log-transformed time series comprised gross farm income across the 18-period for each
region-industry segment.  The expected values of gross income are also used in the credit screening
and loan review modules of both the historical and projection simulation models.  Variance and
covariance measures are calculated using sample value formulas on log-transformed deflated income
data.  Covariances for gross farm income between different region-indus ry segments associated with
correlation coefficients between -0.5 and +0.5 are set to zero.  A subjective judgement was made that
correlation coefficients in this range were sufficiently small to warrant the impact of these parameters
to be excluded from the credit policy analysis.  Data values and parameters of the gross income model
are shown in Appendix E.1.
Table 12.2  Region-industry specifications and codes
Region
industry
code
ABARE
description
code
Region description Industry description
1 1113 NSW - pastoral zone Sheep-beef
2 1212 New South Wales - wheat-sheep zone 1 Mixed livestock-crops
3 1222 New South Wales  - wheat-sheep zone 2 Mixed livestock-crops
4 1232 New South Wales  - wheat-sheep zone 3 Mixed livestock-crops
5 1236 New South Wales  - wheat-sheep zone 3 Dairy
6 1315 New South Wales  - high rainfall zone 1 Sheep
7 1324 New South Wales  - high rainfall zone 2 Beef
8 1326 New South Wales  - high rainfall zone 2 Dairy
9 2211 Victoria - wheat-sheep zone 1 Wheat and other crops
10 2221 Victoria - wheat-sheep zone 2 Wheat and other crops
11 2232 Victoria - wheat-sheep zone 3 Mixed livestock-crops
12 2236 Victoria - wheat-sheep zone 3 Dairy
13 2313 Victoria - high rainfall zone Sheep-beef
14 2314 Victoria - high rainfall zone Beef
15 2315 Victoria - high rainfall zone Sheep
16 2316 Victoria - high rainfall zone Dairy
17 3114 Queensland - pastoral zone 1 Beef
18 3124 Queensland - pastoral zone 2 Beef
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19 3134 Queensland - pastoral zone 3 Beef
20 3145 Queensland - pastoral zone 4 Sheep
21 3211 Queensland - wheat-sheep zone 1 Wheat and other crops
22 3216 Queensland - wheat-sheep zone 1 Dairy
23 3222 Queensland - wheat-sheep zone 2 Mixed livestock-crops
24 3224 Queensland - wheat-sheep zone 2 Beef
25 3314 Queensland - high rainfall zone 1 Beef
26 3324 Queensland - high rainfall zone 2 Beef
27 4115 South Australia - pastoral zone Sheep
28 4211 South Australia - wheat-sheep zone 1 Wheat and other crops
29 4222 South Australia - wheat-sheep zone 2 Mixed livestock-crops
30 4315 South Australia - high rainfall zone Sheep
31 4316 South Australia - high rainfall zone Dairy
32 5125 Western Australia - pastoral zone Sheep
33 5212 Western Australia - wheat-sheep zone Mixed livestock-crops
34 5221 Western Australia - wheat-sheep zone Wheat and other crops
35 5314 Western Australia - high rainfall zone Beef
36 5315 Western Australia - high rainfall zone Sheep
37 5316 Western Australia - high rainfall zone Dairy
38 6313 Tasmania - high rainfall zone Sheep-beef
39 6315 Tasmania - high rainfall zone Sheep
40 6316 Tasmania - high rainfall zone Dairy
41 7114 Northern Territory - pastoral zone South Beef
42 7154 Northern Territory - pastoral zone Nth Beef
Figure 12.1  Map of Australia with region-industry codes
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For key to region-industry codes in map, see Table 12.2
12.3 Farm costs
Farm surveys data on farm costs are split into their fixed and variable components.  Fixed cost items
included administration expenses (accountancy, travel and entertainment, subscriptions, telephone
etc.), insurance, leasing charges (plant and machinery), depreciation, motor vehicle expenses, local
government rates, land rent and repairs and maintenance.  All farm costs not included in fixed costs
are classified as variable cost items.
As for the gross farm income variable, scenario values for farm costs in the historical simulation
model comprised the time series for the 18-year period to 1995- 6.  The simple average of farm costs
in this period was used as the expected value in both the historical and projection simulation models.
The estimate of the fixed costs to total costs ratio is based on the simple average for the 10-year
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period to 1995- 6.  A shorter period is chosen because the ratio exhibits a distinct downward trend on
average across the 42 region-industry segments in the earlier 8-year period.
Measures of variable cost factors and the fixed cost factors were estimated for the 42 region-industry
segments using regression analysis on data comprising farm costs and gross farm income for the
18-year period to 1995- 6.  Regression estimates of the parameters in the farm cost model and a
measure of the model’s predictive power by region-industry segment are given in Appendix E.2.
12.4 Personal expenses
Personal expenses are proxied by ABARE’s operator estimates of the labour input of operators,
partners and their families imputed at the relevant Federal Pastoral Award rates.  Given a definitional
break in the series and lack of distinct time trends, the estimate of personal expenses used in both the
historical and projection simulation models were the simple average in each region-industry segment
for the 8-year period to 1995- 6.  Data values used for personal expenses are shown in Appendix E.3.
12.5 Land and buildings
The value of land and fixed improvements comprised fixed assets used by the farm business estimated
by ABARE farm surveys.  These estimates excluded land share-farmed off sample farms but included
the value of the operator’s home.  On average, the value of land and buildings in real terms exhibited
a distinct upward trend in the first half of the 18-year period to 1995- 6 but was stable during the
second half.  Accordingly, the expected value of land and buildings by region-industr  segment used
in both the historical and projection simulation models are defined to be the simple average for the ten
year period to 1995- 6.  Data values used in the simulations are shown in Appendix E.4.
12.6 Salvage value of farm assets
The expected value of the salvage ratio (defined as the percentage of the market value of farm assets)
was assumed to be 70%.  Depressed values of farm assets are likely when borrowers experience
financial difficulty, or when default occurs on loans, as a result of economic factors.  For the scenario
salvage value of farm assets, measures of the sensitivity of landed asset values to gross farm income
by region-industry segment were estimated using regression analysis.  This analysis was performed on
deflated time series data for the relevant transformed variables for the 18-year pe iod to 1995- 6.
Regression results and parameters of the salvage value of farm asset model are presented in Appendix
E.4.
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12.7 Farm population
Time series data on farm population by region-industry segment were supplied by ABARE.  This data
is derived from census surveys conducted by the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS).  Coverage of
farms excludes hobby farms and sub-commercial properties due to a lower limit set for the Estimated
Value of Agricultural Operations (EVAO).  As at 1995-96, the lower limit for the EVAO was
$25,000.
In the historical simulation model, scenario values for farm population comprised the historical series
for the 18-year period to 1995- 6.  For the projection simulation model, regression analysis was
performed on the historical time series using the natural logarithm of the following sequence  t=1, 2,
...,18.  In circumstances where the historical average rate of change in farm population over the
projection period was considered too severe, the size of the regression parameter, DPOPN , was
qualitatively adjusted to provide a better-behav d projection scenario.  The bank’s share of farm
population to enter the portfolio at time t was assumed to be 2% for all region-industry segments.  In
circumstances where 2% of farm population was less than 10, alternative values were substituted to
give a spread of new borrowers in each credit risk class of a 3x3 classification system as given in
Appendix E.5.
Time series for distributional data by farm population numbers was collected to proxy the likely
productivity of farms, and therefore the share of farm population by default risk class of acceptable
credit quality.  Within each region-industry, ABARE farm survey data was split into four categories
defining equal shares of total gross farm income for the segment.  The share of farm population
producing the top 25% of gross farm income was assumed to be the share of farms entering the lowest
default risk class; the second quartile of farms into the next default risk category and the third quartile
into the highest default risk category.  Under this formulation, farms in the lowest quartile were
deemed to be unacceptable credit quality.  In both the historical and projection simulation models, the
share reflected the 5-y ar average for the quartile percentage to the year 1995-96.  The data values
and parameters used in the farm population module are shown in Appendix E.5.
12.8 Number of overdraft transactions
The number of deposits and cheques drawn by the average farm by region-industry was assumed to be
a function of enterprise mix and type.  ABARE farm surveys data was used to identify the enterprise
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activities for the average farm by region-industry segment.  Each region-industry was screened for
positive receipts in either wool, livestock, cropping and milk enterprises for the 10-year period to
1995-96.  The 10-year period was chosen to indicate year-in- r-out measures of enterprise mix
since enterprise switching can occur due to changes in economic conditions.  Table 12.3 gives the
assumptions used for the number of overdraft transactions made per enterprise while Appendix E.7
provides the data assumptions for the number of drawings and deposits made by region-industry
segment.  These assumptions were used in both the historical and projection simulation model.
Table 12.3  Overdraft transaction numbers assumptions 1
BTNC per enterprise BTND per enterprise
Wool 20 2
Livestock 30 55
Cropping 50 2
Milk 30 12
1 In region-industry segments where multiple cropping and livestock enterprises were indicated, the number of cheques
drawn by the average farm were reduced since purchases of individual input items for multiple enterprise farms may be consolidated.  Where two
cropping enterprises were indicated, cheques drawn were assumed to total 100.  For region-industries with more than 2 enterprises, the total derived
number of cheques drawn per enterprise were reduced to a third.  Where more than one livestock enterprise was indicated, the total number of cheques
drawn were assumed
to be to 45.
12.9 Interest rates and discount rate
The overdraft and term loan interest rates data were sourced from ABARE (1997b) and are provided
in Appendix E.6.  The overdraft rate series refers to nominal mid-point rates charged on overdrafts
less than $100,000 applying to the lowest risk borrowers for the major banks in Australia.  The
nominal term loan rate of interest series refers to the variable rate charged by the Commonwealth
Development Bank over the period.  The term loan interest rate series used requires careful
interpretation.  This series represents the only published series available on term loan rates charged to
rural borrowers in long time series format.  However, this interest rate series may not represent the
rate charged to lowest risk borrowers since the Commonwealth Development Bank played the role as
a lender of last resort over most of period under analysis (Powell and Milham 1990).  However, the
series will reflect the average interest rate charged by commercial banking entities to the extent to
which special assistance was given to the Commonwealth Development Bank.  Special assistance
was provided in the form of non-payment of corporate taxes and dividends and receipt of income and
equity subsidies.  In any event, risk premiums are not applied to the interest rate structure in the
historical simulation model.
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In the historical simulation model, scenario values for interest rates comprised the data used to
estimate interest rate distributions.  In the credit screening and loan review models, the expected
values and variances utilised were the sample means and sample variances of the overdraft and term
loan interest rate time series also calculated over the 18-year period to 1995- 6.  In addition, the
correlation coefficient between the overdraft rate and the term loan rate was assumed to equal one
assuming a normal distribution.  The parameters of the interest rate distributions used in the
simulations are summarised in Table 12.4.
Table 12.4   Interest rate assumptions
Variable (mnemonic) Expected value
Historical    Projection
Variance Correlation
coefficient
Overdraft interest rate (o) 13.94% 10% 0.1371% 1.0
Term loan prime interest rate (rb) 14.68% 12% 0.0625%
Discount rate 5.4%
In the projection simulation model, the sample variances of the overdraft and term loan interest rates
used were the same values calculated for the historical model.  Data assumptions for the loan pricing
model and discount rate calculation are provided in Table 12.5.  Expected interest rates on the lending
facililies once calculated according to these assumptions are rounded up to two decimal places give
the interest rates used in simulations as specified in Table 12.4.
Table 12.5 Loan pricing model and discount rate parameters
Variable Mnemonic Value Comment
Cost of short term funds cST 5.5% 180 day bank bill rate - average 1993-94(RBA, 1997)
Cost of long term funds cLT 9.4% 10 year Treasury bonds - average 1993-94(RBA, 1997)
Non-callable deposits ratio ncdr 1.5% Minimum 1%
Prime assets ratio par 5% Minimum 4%
Other asset support ratio oasr 8% Estimate
Non-interest expenses ratio nier 3.1% Lowe (1995) 1993- 4 value
Non-interest income ratio niir 1% Estimate
Overdraft balances ratio bodr 20% Estimate
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Term loan balances ratio btlr 80% Estimate
Return on equity rE 15% Estimate
Company tax  rate ctr 33% Actual rate in 1995-96
Equity-asset ratio er 10% Estimate
Cost of debt rD 6.2% Internally derived
Net lending balances multiplier nlbm 1.08784 Internally derived
Net interest margin nim 4.3% Internally derived
Profit margin pm 4.68% Internally derived
Data on the long run structure of the bank for pricing purposes over the investment horizon were
determined, in some cases, using known average bank statistics, and in others, using an element of
conservatism relative to the minimum capital adequacy requirements.  As at July 1993, Australian
banking institutions were required to set a minimum Tier 2 capital (equity and second tier forms of
capital) at 8% of risk weighted assets.  In this model, risk weighted assets include farm loans and
other asset support, both of which are weighted 100%.  Accordingly the assumption was made that
the bank sets the long run equity asset ratio at 10%, which gave rise to a buffer of just under 2%
above the required minimum.  The return on equity was set at 15%.
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CHAPTER THIRTEEN
13. EXPERIMENTAL AND STATISTICAL DESIGN
13.1 Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to discuss experimental and statistical design issues in conducting credit
policy evaluations with a discrete event computable stochastic simulation model.  The major design
issues involve balancing the trade-offs b tween, first, the computing resources required and
simulation time, and second, the statistical accuracy of simulation results.  Section 13.2 outlines the
design of the credit policy experiments.  Following this in Section 13.3, the broad structure of the
computer programs used is explained.  In Section 13.4, statistical issues including sampling designs
and stopping rules to effect the stochastic components of the simulation model are discussed.  In the
final section, the performance of key components of the simulation model are validated, and a
commentry is made on how might the credit risk management system modelled in this study be more
extensively validated in the future.
13.2 Experimental design
13.2.1 Factors and levels
The response variable in the credit policy experiments is the net present value of bank returns.  The
objective of the credit policy experiments is to estimate the nature of the response surface for a range
of credit policy decision variables (or factors).  In Chapter Seven, the factors under consideration were
presented as comprising a set of credit policy rules which included pricing rules, credit quality limit
rules, collateral quantity and quality rules, credit limit rules, loan product rules and problem loan
resolution policy rules.  The way in which these credit policy rules are delivered, and consequently the
response variable, are also subject to the credit risk evaluation method used, and therefore the
configuration rules for the credit risk classification system.  The particular rules or levels assigned to
each of these factors are discussed below.
Credit risk classification system configuration rules
In the loan review process, direct estimates of the expected probability of default are provided under
the simulation approach.  A credit risk classification system is therefore not required to effect risk
pricing in loan reviews.  However, the credit risk classification system is required in the credit
screening process to enable the definition of initial portfolio characteristics of acceptable loan
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applicants.  Using a 3x3 matrix structure, cut-off limits for classifications of default risk and security
risk used are given in Table 13.1.  The values in this Table are formulated on the following basis.
· In the security risk dimension, each new farm model was set according to the maximum
permissible farm liabilities consistent with the three values given for the expected security cover
ratio shown in Table 13.1.  These ratios were derived so as to imply average farm equity-asset
ratios in event of default on an equal-w ighted portfolio basis of around 90%, 80% and 70% for
the security risk
grades 1, 2 and 3 respectively.  This follows since the expected security cover ratio is a function of
the minimum permissible equity-asset ratio, denoted as earmin, and the fixed assets to total assets
ratio, denoted as lbar:
(13.1) scr
ear
lbarh
h
=
-
1
1 min
.
 The lbar value used to calculate equation (13.1) was 77.2%, the simple average of the lbar
value across the 42 region-industry segments for the 5 year period to 1995-96.  A key implication
of this assumption is that for region-industry segments with higher lbar values than 77.2%, the
resulting permissible leverage in event of default is lower than for region-industry segments with
lbar values below the average.
· In the default risk dimension, initial values for the productivity relative ratios assigned to
incoming farm models in the credit screening process were set to be consistent with the range
shown for the expected probability of default defined for the credit risk rating system, also given in
Table 13.1.
Table 13.1   Credit risk rating system configuration
Risk grade
dimension Parameter
Level for q or h
1                              2                             3
Security risk scr-level 7.72 2.57 1.54
Default risk d-range 0% 2%£ £d 2% 4%< £d 4% 6%< £d
Pricing rules
Pricing for credit risk was assumed to account for default risk only as defined by equation (5.3).  The
possibility of positive security risk premiums was precluded due to: first, all incoming farm models
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were required to be fully secured, and second, restructuring was not permitted for loan balances that
were less than fully secured.
The portfolio risk premium was assumed to be factored into the bank rate of return required on equity
capital allocated to the Australian farm sector as a whole.  In other words, beta risk is assumed to be
assessed at the sector level, for example farm versus manufacturing, and Australia versus overseas
countries.  This approach was taken since there are a number of unresolved issues relating to the
distribution of returns from a benchmark portfolio in order to calculate beta risk in particular regions
and industries.  As a consequence, beta (or portfolio) risk across different portfolio segments was not
estimated.  While the risk pricing limit in credit screenings was set at 5%, the risk pricing limit in
loan reviews was subject to empirical investigation.   Three levels were chosen for the isk prici g
limit in loan reviews.  These were set at 2.5%, 5% and 7.5%.
Credit quality limit rules
The configuration of the security risk classification system used in the analysis implied that the
minimum acceptable security cover ratio was set to 1.54 times the permissible loan value.  In the
default risk dimension, the maximum acceptable expected probability of default for loan applicants
was set at 6%.  This setting reflected the presumption that the resulting certainty equivalent default
risk premium (just under 6%) was the maximum risk premium that a competitive market for new farm
loans would bear.
Collateral quantity and quality rules
The collateral pledged by loan applicants was set equal to the estimated market value of fixed assets.
While fixed asset collateral is appropriate for broadacre agricultural lending, security pled ed against
dairy-industry loans are influenced by regulatory structures in a certain regions.  For example,
tradeable milk quotas are generally required as collateral in New South Wales.  Insufficient data was
available to effect this rule.  Accordingly, all industries were assumed to provide as collateral 100%
of the estimated market value of land and buildings associated with the business as specified in
equation (11.34).
Credit limit rules
The maximum credit limit for acceptable loan applicants was specified as the inverse of the expected
security cover ratio as given in equation (10.5).  In Table 13.2, these limits are specified using the
three values for the scr levels set for each security risk class given in Table 13.1.  Accordingly, the
percentages are expressed as a share of the estimated value of land and buildings associated with the
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farm business.  The maximum credit limit once set was as umed to be fixed for the maturity term
except in the final year in which the limit was forced to zero.  The zero setting for the maximum credit
limit ensured that any prior drawings on the overdraft facility are fully repaid at the conclusion of the
maturity term.
Table 13.2   Credit limits expressed as a percentage of fixed assets
Security risk class Maximum credit
limit
Minimum credit limit
Historical               Projection
1 12.95 1.97 1.84
2 38.91 5.92 5.51
3 64.93 9.87 9.20
The credit reserves for acceptable loan applicants was set according to equation (6.15).  This equation
defines the limit to be a certain proportion of the maximum permissible liabilities.  The following
assumptions were made for the amortisation factor, the average loan fee rate, the average tax rate and
the expected rate of interest in order to apply the equation as a universal rule in the historical and
projection simulation models.
· The amortisation factor was calculated assuming a 10 year maturity term and the expected rate of
interest on the term loan facility applying in the period;
· The average loan fee factor was calculated assuming an average term loan size for new loans of
$200,000.  Since the simple average of the value of fixed assets pledged as collateral across the 42
region-industry segments was $950,344, the application of the minimum credit limit implied an
initial term loan drawing for the average farm of around $200,000.  Further, the loan fee factor
includes the loan service fee plus the establishment fee and assumes a zero overdraft balance.
· The average taxation rate was calculated assuming an average earnings before interest and tax
(EBIT) of $50,000 - the simple average of EBIT across the 42 region-industry segments - and the
application of the income taxation schedules given in Appendix B.
· The expected rate of interest applied is the term loan rate given in Table 12.4.
The application of the values of the minimum credit reserve limit, given in Table 13.3 , are
summarised in Table 13.2 in which the ratio is expressed as a percentage of fixed assets.
Table 13.3   Minimum credit reserve limit assumptions
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Item Mnemonic Level
Historical              Projection
Amortisation factor 1 am 0.1968 0.1770
Average loan fee rate lfr 0.0125 0.011
Average taxation rate atr 0.188 0.175
Expected rate of interest E rb( ) 0.1468 0.12
Minimum credit reserve limit crm 0.1521 0.1417
1  Amortisation factor is calculated using the expected rate of interest shown in the Table given a 10
    year maturity term.
Loan product rules
The overdraft facility was assumed to be a variable interest rate product and not subject to risk
pricing.  The term loan facility was defined as a variable interest rate-straight line amortised product.
Pricing accounted for credit risk and the maturity term was fixed at 10 years for all farm models.
Both loan products are subject to pre-determined bank fee structures as outlined in Appendix A.
Problem loan resolution policy rules
Two levels were set for the problem loan resolution policy: the option of ‘no restructuring’ offered to
defaulting loans was contrasted to an ‘interest-only with credit extension’ resolution policy as
outlined in Table 13.4.
Credit policy experimental design
Table 13.5 summarises the complete factorial design of the credit policy experiments under analysis
(excluding the single level assumptions for credit policy rules outlined above).  In total, six credit
policy sets are examined given three levels chosen for the risk pricing limit on existing borrowers, and
two levels chosen for the problem loan resolution policy.
Table 13.4    ‘Interest only with credit extension’ resolution policy assumptions
_________________________________________________________________________________
Pre-conditions for restructuring
· Loans in their first year and loans in their final three years of the maturity term are not offered
restructuring
· Maximum permissible farm liabilities must be fully secured if restructuring is to proceed
· Restructuring option is only offered once during the term of the loan
Form of restructuring in event of default
· Interest only on the term loan facility with term loan principal payment compulsory
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· If forgiveness of term loan principal payment is not sufficient to stave off default, then the
maximum credit limit is extended to meet the required amount of liquidity provided that the loan is
fully secured
· Bank fees and overdraft interest payment compulsory
Form of restructuring following year of default
· If farm model performs in the period following reversion to interest only or credit extension, the
term loan facility is restructured with no change in the maturity date and the new amortised term
loan repayment amount calculated on the basis of the new term loan balance
__________________________________________________________________________________
Table 13.5   Credit policy experimental design
Credit policy
identifier
Risk pricing
limit
Problem loan resolution
policy
1 5.0% no
2 5.0% yes
3 2.5% no
4 2.5% yes
5 7.5% no
6 7.5% yes
13.2.2 Experiment size
The experiment size for the portfolio model is a function of the number of credit policy sets under
evaluation, the number of region-industry groupings, loan maturity structure and the credit risk rating
system configuration for new loans. Table 13.6 shows that 3,780 farm models were potentially
developed for analysis.  These models were subjected to the six credit policy sets shown in Table 13.5
in a given simulation year.   The 3,780 farm models compare to 70,658 broadacre and dairy
establishments in Australia as at 31 March 1996 (ABARE 1997a).
Table 13.6  Farm models for a particular credit policy set
_________________________________________________
Portfolio dimension Parameter Number
Region-industry segments     m    42
Initial default risk grades    qn     3
Initial security risk grades    hn     3
Loan maturity term    nt    10
Total number of farm models 3,780
_________________________________________________
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The actual number of active farm models in a simulation period was dependent on whether the new
loan numbers module provided for a positive number of borrowers in a particular portfolio segment
and whether full default occurred during the maturity term.  Since the number of farm models
developed is potentially large, the framework of analysis is limited to an examination of the response
surface for credit policy rules which apply to existing borrowers as given in Table 13.5.
13.3 Computer program
The computer programming language used was FORTRAN 77.  Four computer programs were
utilised in the empirical analysis.  These were INIT, EVAL, ADDBR and STOCHASTIC.  The first
three programs comprised commands to generate the distribution of the response variable and were
developed by the author with assistance.  The relationship between these programs are summarised in
Table 13.7 and discussed in further detail below.  The program STOCHASTIC is used to compare
probability distribution functions of a response variable on the basis of stochastic dominance tests.
This program was sourced from Anderson, Dillon and Hardaker 1977, p 313).
Table 13.7  Outline of computer programs
Program Feature Output
INIT Simulation model
Deterministic economic environment
based on the 1978-79 to 1995-96 period
Region-industry data only
Starting conditions for each farm model and the
bank model for EVAL for each region-industry
EVAL Simulation model
Stochastic economic environment
Region-industry data only
Estimation of n number of observations of the
response variable for 6 credit policy sets for each
region-industry
ADDBR Data transformation program
Input files sourced from EVAL Adds n x 42 number of region-industry response
observations estimated by EVAL to give n
number of response observations on a portfolio
basis
STOCHASTIC Data analysis program
Input files sourced from ADDBR Conducts stochastic dominance tests on n
number of response observations for m number
of different response functions
Program INIT
The program INIT was written to conduct the historical model simulations.  The program INIT
utilised a deterministic economic environment as described by historical data for key variables in the
farm model.  The running of program INIT was conducted in two stages to allow simulations to be
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achieved on a 486 DX2/100 personal computer with 16 megabytes of RAM and 850 megabytes of
hard disk space.  Stage one utilised data sets for region-indust y segments 1 to 21 while stage 2
utilised data sets for region-industry segments 22 to 42.  The STACK memory requirement requested
by the LAHEY FORTRAN 77 compiler was 1.2 megabytes.  Simulation time for the program INIT
was approximately 60 minutes per stage.
Program EVAL
The program EVAL was written to conduct the projection model simulations with the final output of
the program being n number of observations of the response variable for six credit policy regimes.
The running of the program EVAL was conducted on 42 separate occasions; each occasion utilising
input data for a specified region-industry segment.  This formulation reduced the required STACK
memory to 87 kilobytes for one region-industry segment, a maturity term of ten years, a credit risk
configuration rule defining nine credit risk classes and six credit policy sets.  The simulation time for
program EVAL ranged from between one hour and 11 hours per region-industry data set with an
average running time of around 8 hours per run.  Computer hardware specifications used were
PENTIUM 120 megahertz, one gigabyte hard drive with reliance on Local Area Network RAM.
The program EVAL was constructed so that the economic environment generated by the projection
model in the 42 separate runs was consistent with the underlying portfolio environment.  This
consistency was achieved by utilising the following processes.  First, the random number generator
was initialised with the same seed in the first time period of the first iteration in the generation of the
response variable in each of the 42 runs.  Second, scenario values for gross farm income in each time
period were generated from their multi-variate log normal distributions based on a 42 x 1 vector for
expected values and a full 42 x 42 covariance matrix.  Once the full set of sample values for gross
farm income across the 42 region-industry segments was generated, the sample value for gross farm
income for a particular region-industry segment was selected for input into the projection model.  This
sampling consistency problem was not the case for the interest rates variables since the sample
scenario values for interest rates generated from a bi-variate log normal distribution in each time
period were required to be the same across all region-industy segments.  Third, the program EVAL
was constructed so that the calls to the random number generator when generating the scenario values
for gross farm income and interest rates was the same at each equivalent stage in each of the 42
separate runs.
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The program EVAL used a random number generator, called DRAND, for the generation of
stochastic processes in three separate models.  These were the scenario model, the redit screening
model and the loan review model.  Accordingly, two separate random number generators were defined
through the use of different names.  For example, the function DRANDA was used for scenario values
while the function DRANDZ was used for credit scoring.  In the case of the credit scoring processes,
independence of samples between each successive use of the random number generator was the only
pre-condition required to ensure statistical consistency.
Program ADDBR
The program ADDBR utilises the portfolio principle that NPV of portfolio returns are simply the
addition of NPV of returns from each portfolio segment.  Input data into ADDBR are n sample
values of the response variable for the 6 c edit policy sets for 42 different region-industries.  The
program ADDBR was developed as a data transformation program to add equivalent observations of
the response to generate a portfolio based estimate of the response variable.  The output of program
ADDBR incorporates a matrix of n observations of the response variable for 6 credit policy sets.
This matrix set provided the required data for comparison of stochastic efficiency of credit policies
relating to a portfolio comprising loans across 42 region-industry segments.
13.4 Statistical design
13.4.1 Sampling design
Generation of random variates
In this section, the sampling design used in the generation of the random variates from their specified
distributions is outlined.  There are two random variates in the simulation model, gross farm income
and interest rates, and both were assumed to be log-normally distributed.  To draw a sample vector
from a log-normal distribution, the direct relationship between a log-normal distribution and a normal
distribution may be used.  Regardless of whether a random variable x is a scal r or a vector,  if
),(~ 2x xNx dm then  y e
x=   is distributed log normally, since  ln( )y  equals x and x is normally
distributed.  Following Kleijnen and van Groenendaal (1992, p 47), a sample vector  y  can b
generated from a multi-variate log-normal distribution by utilising the following three steps:
· generate the distribution )1,0(~NZ  using a random number generator;
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· define a vector x in terms of Z to give a sample from the multi-variate normal distribution
x Zx x= +m d  ; and
· conduct a logarithmic transformation of the multi-variate normal vector, y x= exp() , to give the
required sample vector from a multi-variate log-normal distribution.
A comprehensive treatment regarding the generation of pseudo-ra dom n mbers using a probability
distribution function of a Z-distribution is given in Naylor, Balinfy, Burdick and Chu (1966).  The
particular method utilised by FORTRAN 77 to generate the pseudo-random numbers in DRAND is
sourced from Knuth (1969).  The ‘square root method’ was used as an efficient procedure for
generating sample vectors from a multi-variate normal distribution (see Scheuer and Stoller (1962)
and Graybill (1969, p 298)).  Johnston (1987) presents an extensive treatment of sampling from
multi-variate normal distributions while a discussion of the relationship between the multi-variate
normal distribution and multi-variate log-normal distribution is found in Crow and Shimizu (1988).
The sampling design for the stochastic variables depended on the environment under examination.  In
the generation of scenario values for gross farm income for time periods t n= 1 2, ,... ,   in the
projection model during a particular simulation run, a multi-variate log normal distribution was
assessed using the full 42 x 42 covariance matrix.  In the construction of empirical distributions for
cash surpluses including credit reserves in the credit screening and loan review models,  uni-variate
log normal distribution was used.  In the later environmental context, covariances of gross farm
income between different region-industry segments are not required.
The term loan and overdraft interest rates are also assumed to be perfectly correlated for a bi-variate
normal distribution.  If a normal distribution, x,  is log transformed to give y, th  correlation
coefficients of the corresponding log normal distribution must be checked to ensure conformity with
certain statistical bounds.  The upper bound for the correlation coefficient in the bi-variate normal
case can be defined as follows (the lower bound is ignored since it was not applicable):
(13.2) rY1 1  Y2 £ +
where rY1  Y2   =  correlation coefficient on the bi-variate normal distribution.
The bounds on the correlation coefficient on the bi-variate log normal distribution is given by
the inequality
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If rY1  Y2  is set to one, then r X1  X2  must satisfy the bound given by
equation (13.3).
Construction of the response distribution
The empirical distribution of the response variable,  NPV(BR), for a credit policy set can be
generated through using either a discrete probability function, or by using the inverse transformation
method to pass a continuous curve through a discrete cumulative distribution (Anderson, Dillon and
Hardaker 1976,
p 313-318).  Anderson, Dillon and Hardaker (1976) suggest that discrete distributions are the
simplest for assessing stochastic efficiency and outline the following steps to construct a discrete
probability distribution for application of the stochastic efficiency criteria.
With data on the response variable, n adjacent sub-intervals are constructed (that is, j=1, 2, ...., n).
Each sub-interval is represented as a rectangle whose upper and lower interval bounds may be
denoted by NPV(BR)U  and NPV(BR)L  respectively.  The height of each sub-interval j, given by fj ,
represents the probability that the value of NPV(BR) for a random event for a credit policy set will
fall into the j-th sub-interval, that is NPV(BR)L < NPV(BR)j < NPV(BR)U.  In the empirical
investigation,  was set to 15.  With this information, stochastic dominance tests may be conducted
by constructing all the combined discrete values of the response variable for pairs of probability mass
functions ))(( iBRNPVf  and ))(( jBRNPVg  and arranging them into ascending order such that
if i j<  then NPV BR NPV BRi j( ) ( )< .  If two or more NPV(BR) observations have the same
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numerical value, each is considered to be distinct and the rank allocated to equal values is lowest for
those associated with the potentially dominated distribution.
Credit screening model
The credit screening model required a sampling design to effect a series of experiments in the
estimation of the productivity relative ratio.  The estimation process for discovering a matrix of values
for this ratio consistent with a configuration assumed for the credit risk classification system is
particularly computing time intensive.  The discovery process was aided through the use of an an
algebraic solution to the model.
An important property of the credit screening model is that the value of prr associated with an
expected probability of default equal to 50% may be found without prior knowledge of the variance of
CSR.  This solution is achieved by utilising equation (11.20), setting E CSR( )  to zero and solving
for a unique value of prr.  The critical value of prr for a particular security risk grade h given a
selected credit policy regime i wh n d=50%, denoted by prr*  is derived in Appendix F and is
summarised below:
(13.4) prr
E FC E NC
E GIB
E CSRijha t
jt ijha t
jt
ijha t*
( ) ( )
( )=
==
+
1
1
1 0    for ( ) ==
Once the value for prr ijha t* =1  is found, the value of prr was increased in increments of  0.1.  If
overshooting of the required estimate of the default probability occurred, the experiment resumed at
the previous level of prr with increments set at 0.02.  At the new level of prr, the value of d was
re-estimated and compared to the required range specified for d for th  default risk class under
examination.
Loan review model
In contrast to the cr dit screening model, the initial conditions for the loan review model are fully
known in each time period.  Where the closing value of the expected probability of default on a prior
basis was known to be large, the loan review model was not activated.  These circumstances included
when either loan restructuring had occurred, or when values of E CSR( )  were less than or equal to
zero.  For these situations, the expected probability of default is known to be at least 50%, and
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therefore out of the default probability range for which the risk pricing limits given in Table 13.5
apply.
13.4.2 Stopping rules
Response variable
The construction of an empirical distribution of the net present value of bank returns involves two
stopping rules.  The first stopping rule defines the number of time periods in the investment horizon
over which an individual sample record of the response is taken.  The second stopping rule determines
when a sufficient number of individual sample records of the response have been taken.
The main issue in setting the investment horizon is the trade-off between simulation time and the
extent to which the distribution of the response will reflect the true variance of default rates within the
simulation model.  The credit policy experiments involve low default probabilities.  In this context,
the length of the investment horizon must be considered against the lowest risk pricing limi under
examination.  At a risk pricing limit of 2.5%, or approximately one expected default every 40 years,
the investment horizon should probably be set at a multiple of 40.  There are two counterbalances to
this proposition.  First, the variance of the estimate of the expected probability of default narrows as d
tends to zero (as discussed in the next section).  Second, as the investment horizon is lengthened,
discounted values of bank returns in periods towards the conclusion of investment horizons fall to
negligible values other things held constant.  Therefore the marginal contribution to improvements in
the accuracy of estimates of net present value of bank returns in a simulation run tends to a small
value as the investment horizon is increased.  In light of these considerations, the stopping rule used
for the investment horizon was set to 50 years.
An appropriate stopping rule for the number of sample records of the response variable for each credit
policy set is less easy to define.  If a distribution is normal and the variance is known, the required
size of sample is proportional to the variance of the true distribution and inversely proportional to the
accuracy required (Lewis and Smith 1979, p 195).  In the case where the variance is unknown, a
sequential sampling rule may be utilised.  Under this approach, a running estimate of the variance of
the response through the simulation may be taken.  Once a minimum level of confidence about the
estimate of the mean of the response has been reached, the simulation is terminated and empirical
analysis may be performed (Lewis and Smith 1979, p 195).  These stopping rules assist in ensuring
the accuracy of estimates of the means of a distribution, but not on the nature of the whole
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distribution.  As a result, these techniques provide statistical rules for testing first-order stochastic
dominance but provide little guidance on precise rules for testing second-order and thir-order
stochastic dominance (Levy 1992).  The main reason for the difficulty in establishing stopping rules
for testing higher order stochastic dominance is the statistical complexities for dealing with extreme
left tail of the distribution (Levy 1992).
The following principles were assessed to be important in the absence of clear guidelines from the
literature.    If too few samples of the response were taken, observations of the response variable
would be concentrated in the upper spectrum of the likely distribution.  This would occur since the
upside of bank returns is determined by the promised interest rate.  As such, this would leave
insufficient information about the nature of the downside risk for a particular credit policy experiment.
In addition, if insufficient samples are taken, a sunk cost is involved in re-running the simulations in
order to achieve the same seed used to initialise the random number generators across the 42 runs of
the program EVAL.  On the other hand, the number of required samples of the response multiplies the
number of times which simulations must be run, which leads to substantial increases in simulation
time.
In any event, the stopping rule for the number of observations of the response was set to 200.  This
size of sample was assessed prior to computer runs to be adequate to give a reasonable estimate of the
mean and therefore to perform first-orde  stochastic dominance tests.  However, care would need to be
exercised in interpreting higher-orders of stochastic dominance.  It was recogni ed that 200 samples
are probably insufficient to construct discrete probability distribution functions comprised of 15
sub-intervals.  The standard errors associated with means calculated for extreme sub-intervals ar
likely to be relatively large given the number of runs used to conduct the policy simulations.
The results of the simulations indicate that at least the first-order stochastic dominance tests are
robust.  If fact, t-statistics measured for the empirical distributions of net present value of bank
returns ranged between 74.5 and 166.6 for the six credit policy sets on a portfolio basis.  T-statistics
associated with distributions of net present value of bank returns estimated for six credit policy sets
across 42 region- ndustry segments ranged between 0.85 and 191.2.  With the exception of one
region-industry segment, the sample means measured either on a portfolio basis, or on a
region-industry basis, are significant at the 1% level.
Loan review and credit screening models
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Sequential and fixed stopping rules were jointly used in the loan review and credit screening models
to derive sample estimates of the expected probability of default.  In these models, the size of
variances could be pre-det rmined in order to construct stopping rules with we l-defined degrees of
statistical accuracy.  The fixed sample size rule defines a global stopping rule for the number of
observations of CSRto construct an empirical distribution.  Recall that a dichotomous variable z
was defined as follows:
(13.5) z
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where the subscript i=1, ..., m denotes the number of samples of CSR.  Suppose
independent observations zi  are taken as a Bernoulli process and the parameter ci  denotes the
number of defaults which occurred during the process:
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While the random variable c is binomially distributed, the central limit theorem permits the
assumption that the distribution of c is approximately normal if the c-outcomes are independent from
trial to trial and are identically distributed (Naylor 1971, p 292).  Since these assumptions are
satisfied in the credit scoring applications, then if the probability d is unknown, the sample value of
the expected probability of default from a simulation experiment from m number f trials is given by
the sample proportion
(13.7) $d
c
m
i=
with the sample variance of the estimate given by
(13.8) Var d
d d
m
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When the variance, d 2 of the normal distribution is known then the ( )1- a  per cent confidence
interval for the population mean, given by d, is d Z± a d/2   where Za /2  is the percentile of the
normal distribution which leaves a / 2 per cent probability in each tail.  Therefore the ( )1- a  per
cent confidence interval for the probability,d , is required to be found:
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(13.9) c m d d mi / ( )/± - Za 2 1
If m is large, then the substitution for the value of d  required to be found in the variance by an
estimate of d will have very little effect of the width on the confidence interval.  This occurs since d
is small and the variance of mi /  will be reduced by a factor of 1
2/ m  (Mead, Curnow and Hasted
1993, p 292).
If  the half- ength of the confidence interval, denoted by D , is defined as follows,
(13.10) mddZ )1(2/ -=D a
the distribution of the sample value of the expected probability of default, $d , is giv n by $d ± D  as
illustrated in Figure 13.1.
Given equations (13.9) and (13.10), and if d d( )1- is known and a  is specified, then the sequence
z z z1 2 3, , ... may be observed with sampling stopped when
(13.11) m M Z d d= = -a / ( )2
2 21 D .
In the loan review model, the level of confidence about the estimate defined by a  was set at 5%
giving a 95% confidence interval.  The value of d  us d to estimate d d( )1-  was approximated by
the risk pricing limit, rpl.  The parameter rpl defines the maximum size of the default risk premium
to be effected in a credit policy experiment.  When d  is small, the size of the default risk premium
may approximated by  itself.  Further, when d  is small, the standard error of the estimate is
approximated by d m for a fixed number of samples (Wetherill 1966, p 118).  Accordingly, the
value of d d( )1- , when approximated by rpl rpl( )1- , represents the maximum size of variance
of the estimate required to determine the size of the fixed sample.
Figure 13.1   Probability of default distribution
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The most critical parameter determining the size of the fixed sample is the value of D .  This occ rs
since m increases by a factor of 1 2D .  In the loan review model, D  was set to 3%.  This was the
upper limit on the size of D  imposed by the sequential sampling rules used to minimise the cost of
simulation experiments in terms of time.  These concepts are discussed below.
Sequential stopping rules define two sampling options; a sample space in a region in which further
observations are taken, and a sample space in which sampling is terminated.  Under sequential
sampling, m is considered as a random variable rather than c (Wetherill 1966, p 118).  The random
variable m is considered to be dependent on the outcome of the first m- 1 r plications.  The cost of
a simulation experiment is therefore minimised by generating only enough observations to achieve the
required results with pre-det rmined accuracy.  A particular sequential sampling rule useful for
estimating distributions involving low probabilities is known as the inverse binomial sampling
procedure (Wetherill 1966).  This procedure provides for more sample observations to be taken for
smaller values of d  than for d  nearer to 50%.  This allows the estimate of d  to be calculated so
that the standard error is approximately proportional to d  (Wetherill 1966, p 118).
Under the inverse binomial sampling rule, the sequence z is sampled until a fixed number, c, of
positive results has been observed and the expected value of the estimate d  is giv n by
(13.12) $d
c
mi
=
-
-
1
1
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where mi  is the total number of sample values taken once c has be n reached.  To effect the
sequential sampling rule, equation (13.11) is used to determine the fixed sample size, m.  The local
stopping rule, as measured by c, is determined by rearranging equation (13.7) as follows:
(13.13) c d= $.  m
where $d  is proxied by the risk pricing limit, rpl, for reasons outlined earlier.  Table 13.8
summarises the values set for c andm given the three levels set for the factor rpl.
The upper limit on the size of D imposed by the sequential sampling rule was 3%.  The minimum
number of sample records of the local sample rule given by equation (13.12) is c=2.  Given th
number of sample records, m is equal to 104 samples when the smallest default probability required
is approximated by rpl=2.5%.  If a =5%, then substitution of rpl=2.5% for d, and m=104 into
equation (13.10) gives the upper limit of D to allow the sequential sampling rule to be used.  If D  i
larger than 3%, c must be less than 2, rendering the sequential stopping rule to be inoperable.
Alternatively, D may be smaller to give more concise estimates of d but this comes at a cost of a
larger c, and therefore a longer time taken for simulations.
Table 13.8   Stopping rule values in the loan review model
rpl c m D a
2.5% 2 104 3% 5%
5.0% 10 202 3% 5%
7.5% 22 296 3% 5%
In the credit screening model, the level of confidence about the estimate was also set at 5%.  The
value of d used to estimate d d( )1-  was given by the mid-point of the range of default probabilities
defined for a particular default risk class.  Since the starting value for the productivity relative ratio
for the credit screening experiments is initially for high values of d, and there ore in the region of
default risk class q=3 or greater, stopping rules were based on $d = 5%.  Once a value for the
productivity relative ratio was found for q=3, the aim of the experiment switched to estimating the
value for the productivity relative ratio for q=2 and therefore $d = 3%.  A similar iterative process
was used to estimate the productivity relative ratio for default risk class q=1.  The h lf-length of the
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confidence interval, D , employed in the credit screening model varied with default risk grade.  In
Table 13.9, the values for c and m given three levels set for dq  are determined according to the
maximum value for D  permitted to effect sequential sampling rules.
Table 13.9   Stopping rule values in the credit screening model
q dq c m D a
1 1% 2 202 1.37% 5%
2 3% 3 103 3.29% 5%
3 5% 5 100 4.27% 5%
13.5 Verification and validation
13.5.1 Verification of computer progam
Verification involves a logical proof of the correctness of a computer program as a model (Lewis and
Smith 1979, p 173).  The complexity of the computer programs INIT and EVAL was high due to the
considerable use of IF-THEN-ELSE and DO LOOP statements.  The extensive use of these
statements ensured that unneccessary calculations were kept to a minimum.  In addition, the number
of questions required to be asked prior to a particular action being taken were often numerous.  By
way of example, there are at least 8 IF-THEN-ELSE type questions asked in the flow chart in Figure
D.3 for scenarios for calculating bank returns and loan assets under the possibility of loan
restructuring in event of default.  Because of program complexity, a number of methods were used so
that incorrect calculations did not arise.  Key methods employed to verify the computer program
included:
· desk checking in which computer code through program development was reviewed in hard copy
format for possible errors;
· checking conditions in which logical proof or internal consistency of formulas and identities were
re-assessed by back substitution at different stages of the program; and
· stopping conditions for implausible values for parameters and variables during program runs.
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13.5.2 Validation of simulation model
Validation involves the process of ensuring that the output produced by a computer program is a
reasonable predictor of events or outcomes (Lewis and Smith 1979,
p 189).  Validation of a computer program generally requires a comparison of simulated behaviour of
the computer program to data on actual behaviour.  Gottfried (1984, p 180) suggests that the
performance characteristics of a system may be compared through either the use of hand calculations,
with historical data or by theoretical predictions.  Hand calculations were employed extensively
throughout the period of the study.  The substitution of expected values into the stochastic
components of the model provided for steady state estimates of outputs.  These hand and spreadsheet
calculations enabled validatations of predictions made by various models.
Historical data was unavailable to validate the output of the policy simulation model and the credit
evaluation models.  In principle, output produced by the historical component of the policy simulation
model (see Figure 12.2) could be compared to actual data on bank profits and bank assets during the
1985-86 to 1995-96 period.  In this ten-y ar period, the historical simulation model includes a
complete set of loan maturities on which to make an assessment against actual events.  That is, actual
time series of bank revenues and loan asset balances by region-industry segment over the decade
could be compared to bank financial data predicted by the simulation model that has been subjected to
historical economic data.
However, validation of the results of the historical policy simulation model could not be pursued for
several reasons.  Published financial statements of banks do not break down revenues and loan assets
into the regional and industry classifications used in this study.  It may be possible for banks to
re-construct unpublished data on loan assets to allow sensible comparisons to be made.  Under this
approach, decision makers would need to consider the significant changes in the design of credit
policy over the ten year period to 1995-96 that occured in response to deregulation of the banking
system during the 1980s.  The historical policy simulation model assumes only one particular credit
policy regime during the period.
The credit scoring models estimated using the simulation approach could also be validated against the
results of credit scoring models based on alternative approaches.  However, credit-scoring models
published in the literature do not relate to regions and industries employed in this study.  Published
credit scoring models relate either to non-farm businesses or to farm businesses in the United States.
Unpublished data on farm business borrowers held by the major rural sector lenders in Australia
could be used to validate the credit scoring approach developed in this study.  Again, a properly
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constructed database would need to be developed.  This data base would need to contain information
about key characteristics of farm business borrowers classified according to a 3x3 credit risk
classification system using equivalent cut-off scores for default risk and security risk outlined in
Section 13.2.  An alternative approach is to re-estimat  productivity relative ratios with cut-off scores
used in credit evaluation in practice by participating banks.
Without historical data available to validate simulation output, a systematic approach towards
modelling inputs and transfer functions between inputs and outputs was relied on for simulation
model validation.  This approach provides assurance that theoretical predictions made by the
simulation model are robust.  For example, the farm model is comprised of a number of modules that
reflect operating conditions for most farms.  The key sources of credit risk in the farm sector -
volatility in farm incomes, salvage values of farm assets and interest rates - are directly modelled and
are supported empircally through the use of data.  Some of the assumptions made regarding the nature
of variations in these variables are validated later in this section.  In addition, the common practice of
income splitting and income tax averaging by farm businesses is utilised in the taxation module.
These assumptions were made despite their relative complexity and the extensive requirement for
computer memory that these provisions entail in a computer model.  Finally, the productivity relative
ratio approach, combined with the assumptions used in configuring the credit risk classification
system, gives a set of well-defined underwriting standards.  With these standards, credit policy
decision-makers are able to gauge the context in which the credit policy simulation results in loan
reviews are made.
One criticism might be that the credit risk dynamics of the simulation model assume that borrowers
behave as if moral hazard and adverse incentives are absent.  For example, a higher interest rate as a
result of risk premiums are assumed to not give incentives to borrowers to take on higher risks during
the term of the loan than originally assessed by the lender if adverse economic conditions arise.
However, responses by lenders to these behavourial responses by borrowers are accommodated by the
credit risk management system modelled in this study.  Loan contracts are established with
well-defined terms and conditions to stem moral hazards and adverse incentives.  The requirement
that farm loans must be fully secured, either in credit screening experiments, and as a pre-co ditio  as
to whether a ‘restructuring’ option would proceed, are well established predictions of theory, if not in
practice by agribusiness lenders in Australia.  Such a policy ensures that lenders are adequately
compensated for capital losses in event of borrower default when lending to a volatile sector that
comprises borrowers with extensive fixed assets.
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However, there are limits to using theoretical predictions to validate a model, either because
information was absent, or complex modelling of certain behaviours would make the simulation
unwieldily.  For example, in configuring the credit risk classification system, borrowers are assumed
to be willing to take-up debt finance up to approximately 30% of their fixed assets in all regions and
industries.  Another example is that the price response to higher interest rates charged as a result of
risk pricing was assumed to be zero.
The results of the credit scoring and policy simulation experiments are critically dependent on the
distribution of the output variable, FCSR.  The distribution of FCSR dictates predictions made for
the probability of default.  While historical data on FCSR is unavailable, historical data for certain
input variables is available for validation purposes.  These variables include gross income and farm
costs.  The policy simulations are also likely to be sensitive to the distribution of the input variable,
salvage value of farm assets.  The salvage value of farm assets determines the size of actual loss in
event of default.  The validity of assumptions made in describing distributions of gross income, farm
costs and the salvage value of farm assets are discussed below.
Gross income
The time path for simulated values for gross income in each region-industry segment was assumed to
be log-normally distributed with a mean that is independent of time and a constant covariance.  The
sample mean and sample covariances were estimated directly from ABARE farm survey data for the
18 year period to 1995- 6 for the 42 region-industry segments under analysis.  A key assumption
behind the use of sample means and sample covariances in the projection model is that history is a
good indicator of the distribution of gross income in the future.  This assumption can only be
validated with the passage of time.  However, the assumption that gross income for a particular
region-industry segment is not serially correlated may be tested.  In the econometric theory of serial
correlation, autoregressive integrated moving average (ARIMA) models may be used to represent an
uni-variate time series with desirable properties (Box and Jenkins 1976).  These properties include a
stationary covariance and a finite and time-i var ant mean and variance; the same assumptions used
to describe the gross income distribution.
However, the Box-Jenkins approach assumes long runs of observations so that the underlying
economic structure of the time series is stable for a length of time.  Johnston (1984, p 377) suggests
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that the number of observations on which ARIMA models are estimated should preferably be in
excess of 100.  With only 18 observations of annual time series to indicate the nature of serial
correlation, the ARIMA approach was rejected for estimating and testing for serial correlation.
Further, regular patterns of higher orders of serial correlation in gross income are possible, but are
unlikely to occur as a result of fundamental economic factors.
An alternative, and relatively simple, approach was employed to test for first-order serial correlation,
also termed autocorrelation (AR(1)), in the gross income time series using the Durbin-Watson
statistic (Durbin and Watson 1950).  To calculate the Durbin-Watson statistic, denoted as DW, the
following procedure was used.  Gross income is expressed as a function of time so as to detrend the
time series as follows.
(13.14) tt utGI ++= .10 bb
If the disturbance term is suspected to follow an AR(1) scheme, that is
(13.15) ttt uu ef += -1.
The null hypothesis of zero serial correlation is formulated as:
0:0 =fH
and the alternative hypothesis as
0:1 ¹fH .
Since u is unobservable, the DW-statistic is calculated from the vector of OLS residuals
).ˆˆ( 10 tGIe bb +-=  (for precise formulation of the Durbin-Watson statistic, see Johnston 1984, p
315).  The range of DW is from 0 to 4.  If DW is equal to 2 then the residuals, as denoted by ,
exhibit zero serial correlation.  If DWis close to 4, the residuals exhibit negative first-ord r serial
correlation.  If DW is close to zero, the residuals exhibit positive first-order serial correlation.  The
Durbin-Watson statistic is compared to upper (DWU) and lower (DWL) bounds for the critical values
in order to conduct significance tests.  The testing procedure is as follows.
· If DW < DWL reject the hypothesis of no serial correlation in the favour of positive first-order
autocorrelation.
· If DW > DWU do not reject the null hypothesis.
· If DWL < DW < DWU , the test is inconclusive.
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If sample values of DW are less than 2, then the value of DW is used in the above testing process.  If
sample values of DW are more than 2, then the test statistic computed is 4-DW.  Th measure is
applied using the same testing process outlined above with the first condition (DW < DWL)
indicating that the hypothesis of no serial correlation be rejected in the favour of negative first- rder
autocorrelation.
The results imply that the assumption of zero serial correlation is generally applicable in the
broadacre sector using data for gross income in the 18-year period to 1995- 6.  In contrast, the dairy
industry exhibits positive first-order serial correlation in all regions with the exception of regions in
Victoria (see summary of results in Table 13.10 with DW-statistics calculated for each
region-industry segment included in Table E.1).
The DW-statistic is less than two for 30 region-industry segments.  At the 5% significance level, 7
region-industry segments are found to exhibit positive first-order serial correlation.  Of these 7
segments, 6 segments are associated with the dairy industry.  The remaining one observation that
exhibits significant first-o der serial correlation is the sheep-beef industry of the pastoral zone NSW.
The results are inconclusive for the 17 remaining region-industry segments while t e null hypothesis
of zero serial correlation was accepted for six segments.  The high number of region-industry
segments exhibiting inconclusive results is not supprising.  If positive serial correlation does indeed
exist in the broadacre sector, then it is likely to be of unsystematic form rather than in the form of
regular cycles.  Systematic variations in broadacre farm incomes may occur as a result of lags in
breeding programs in the livestock system.  However, unsystematic variations in broadacre farm
incomes are likely to outweigh these systematic variations in most cyclical phases.  For example,
commodity prices are affected by both demand and supply factors.  Further, seasonal conditions play a
major role in determining yield outcomes for broadacre enterprises.
With the exception of regions located in Victoria, the dairy industry involves livestock systems with a
focus on the domestic market.  Market or liquid milk pricing is highly regulated providing for stable
market milk prices in the period.  Systematic variations in farm incomes therefore occur from
fluctuations in milk production, and in turn lagged decisions regarding milking herd sizes.  In
contrast, the dairy industry in Victoria is dominated by manufacturing milk production.  Prices for
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manufacturing milk are more volatile than market milk prices because they are determined on export
markets.
The DW-statistic was more than two for 12 region-industry segments, indicating possible negative
serial correlation.  However, the null hypothesis of significant negative first-order serial correlation
was rejected for 11 of 12 region-industry segments, while for the remaining observation, the
significance test was inconclusive.  This finding accords with the apriori reasoning that only positive
serial correlation of gross income is likely.
Table 13.10 Summary of Durbin-Watson tests for first-order serial
correlation of gross income1
H1
First-order serial
correlation
H0
Reject null hypothesis Inconclusive Total
Postive first-order serial
corrrelation
7 6 17 30
Negative first-order serial
corrrelation
0 11 1 12
Total 7 17 18 42
1   Number of region- ndustry segments for a given classification for the Durbin-Watson test at the 5% level of significance.
Farm costs
The scenario value of farm costs in a particular time period is generated by a model described by
equations (11.3) to (11.9).  The time path of farm costs is modelled as a function of current gross
income with variables in the model taking the form of deviations from their means.  The r2 statistic
may be used for validation purposes (Johnston 1984, p 25).  The r2 statistic measures the
proportion of the variations in the total sum of squares of the actual series, FC, explained
by the predicted series generated by the equation
FC=(1-efc).E(FC)+fvc.(GIB-E(GIB))+efc.E(FC)+ffc.(GIB-E(GIB)).
The predictive power of the farm cost model is generally high for data applying to the 18-year period
to 1995-96 (see Table E.3).  The simple average for the r2 statistic was 41%.  However, high 2
statistics were recorded for the majority of region-industry segments.  Twenty-eight segments recorded
r2 statistics over 70%.  As a group, these segments comprised 71% of the farm population in
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1995-96.  No distinct pattern emerged among the broadacre sect r regarding high or low predictive
power for the farm cost equation with all broadacre industries being represented in either category.
High predictive power of the farm cost model is found in all regions for the dairy industry.
The relative high explanatory power for the farm cost equation for most region-industry s ments
accords with apriori reasoning.  Higher expenditures are required to support higher farm output.  In
the dairy industry, milk prices in most regions are stable.  Therefore variations in farm expenditures
are principally driven by changes in milk output.  In the broadacre sector, the relationship between
farm costs and farm income is more complex.  Because both prices and output are volatile,
interactions between between these two factors on farm costs can occur.  If farm prices are high,
broadacre farmers are likely to utilise more nputs to achieve higher output.  Further, if output is high
because of good seasonal conditions, expenditure on inputs is likely to be higher.  Higher expenditure
on inputs might be expected because of seasonal impacts on pests and disease.  Conversely, if farm
prices are low or if output is low due to adverse seasonal conditions, broadacre farmers are likely to
spend less on inputs in order to save costs and to raise profits.
Salvage asset values
The scenario value of the salvage value of farm assets pledged as collateral (land and buildings) in a
region-industry segment is generated by equations (11.35) to (11.36). The r2 statistic may also be
used to establish the predictive power of the salvage value of farm asset model.  The r2 statistic was
used to measure the proportion of the variation in the total sum of squares of the actual
series, (LB / E(LB)-1) for the region-industry, explained by the predicted series
generated by
(LB / E(LB)-1) =svf.((GIB-E(GIB))-1  for a region-industry.  The r2 statistics
calculated for each region-industry segment are shown in Table E.5.
The predictive power of the model of salvage value for farm assets is low for data applying to the
18-year period to 1995- 6.  The simple average of r2 statistics across the 42 region-industry segments
was 0.8%.  The highest value was 92%, though only 4 region-industry segments displayed r2
statistics over 50%.  Three of these region-industry segments are associated with the dairy industry.
Twenty-one region-i dustry segments show r2 statistics less than 11%.  No distinct pattern emerged
among the different regions and industries for those recording low 2 statistics.
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The low predictive power of the salvage value of farm assets module is not supprising.  As discussed
in Section 11.4.1.3, farm asset values are determined by a range of factors with the sensitivity of farm
asset values likely to differ widely between different region-industry segments.  For regions close to
urban centres, non-farm income trends may be dominant in determining farm asset values.  For
regions not in close proximity to urban centres, more fundamental influences are likely to affect farm
asset values such as profits from production expected in future periods.  Other factors that may be
important include expected interest rates, inflation rates and changes in real returns on alternative uses
of capital.
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CHAPTER FOURTEEN
14. RESULTS
14.1 Introduction
The aims of this chapter are to present the results of credit policy and credit screening simulations and
to evaluate the stochastic efficiency of six credit policy regimes.  In Section 14.2, estimation results
for the distribution of net present value (NPV) of bank returns for the total loan portfolio are
presented for the six credit policy regimes.  In Section 14.3, NPV of bank return distributions for each
credit policy set is evaluated using stochastic efficiency criteria.  Stochastic efficiency analysis is
performed initially using NPV of bank returns distributions for a loan portfolio that includes all
region-industry segments.  This analysis is then followed by an application of stochastic efficiency
criteria to distributions of NPV of bank returns estimated for loan assets in each individual
region-industry segment.  In Section 14.4, the major factors determining the results of the stochastic
efficiency analysis are discussed.  In Section 14.5, the results of the credit screening simulations are
presented.  Key experimental design and statistical design issues arising from the analysis of the
simulation results are then canvassed in Section 14.6 and Section 14.7.  A number of guidelines are
suggested for future credit policy simulations in the final section.
14.2 Credit policy simulation results
In presenting the results, the measurement unit for the response variable, NPV of portfolio bank
returns, is expressed in A$million and in 1995-96 dollar terms.  The estimation results for the six
credit policy sets are presented using histograms (see Figures 14.1 to 14.6).  The histograms show the
number of observations of the response variable falling between ranges specified for NPV of bank
returns.
Summary statistics describing the NPV of bank returns distributions estimated for the total bank
portfolio are shown in Table 14.1.  Summary statistics for NPV of bank return distributions by
region-industry segment are presented in Appendix G.  In these Tables, the first row depicts a credit
policy set identifier.  The second row shows the restructuring policy option employed while levels for
the risk pricing limit in loan reviews is shown in the third row.  The remaining rows show mean,
minimum, maximum and standard deviation of the response variable estimated for each credit policy
set.
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The values of NPV of bank returns for each credit option are large and positive.  The measure of bank
returns does not account for resource costs associated with the banking business, and net present
values of loan balances at the end of the simulation period are both large and positive.  The
t-statistics on all but one credit policy set for one region-industry segment were significant at the 1%
level.  The large t-statistics indicate that credipolicy evaluations involving the first-order dominance
criterion are robust.
Table 14.1 Summary of policy estimation results
Credit policy identifier 1 2 3 4 5 6
Restructuring option no yes no yes no yes
Risk pricing limit (rpl) 5% 5% 2.5% 2.5% 7.5% 7.5%
Mean 1797 2305 2000 2428 1603 2118
Minimum 1730 2255 1970 2391 1573 2084
Maximum 1853 2341 2038 2479 1650 2167
Standard deviation 24.17 15.84 12.00 15.68 13.60 14.00
Figure 14.1 Histogram for credit policy with rpl=5% and ‘no restructuring’ option
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Figure 14.2 Histogram for credit policy with rpl=5% and ‘restructuring’ option
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Figure 14.3  Histogram for credit policy with rpl=2.5% and ‘no restructuring’ option
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Figure 14.4 Histogram for credit policy with rpl=2.5% and ‘restructuring’ option
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Figure 14.5 Histogram for credit policy with rpl=7.5% and ‘no restructuring’ option
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Figure 14.6 Histogram for credit policy with rpl=7.5% and ‘restructuring’ option
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14.3 Stochastic efficiency analysis
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In Figure 14.7, the results of the credit policy simulations for the total bank portfolio are displayed as
cumulative probability distribution functions.  One simple form of dominance is immediately
apparent.  Each of the six credit policies may be ranked solely in terms of first degree stochastic
dominance (FSD).  In particular, credit policy set 4 (rpl=2.5% with ‘restructuring’ option) is
stochastically dominant in the first degree over the five alternative credit policy sets considered in the
investigation.
Figure 14.7  Cumulative frequency functions for credit policy sets 1 to 6
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Under all possible outcomes for the economic enviroment, the NPV of bank returns for a credit policy
regime comprising a risk pricing limit of 2.5% in loan reviews, with restructuring permitted for
defaulting exposures, are greater than those estimated for other credit policy alternatives.
In terms of the factors, the ‘restructuring’ option is dominant for all levels of the risk pricing limit
under examination over the ‘no restructuring’ option.  A risk pricing limit of 2.5% dominates a risk
pricing limit of 5% which in turn dominates a risk pricing limit of 7.5%.  Further, the pattern of
dominance for the risk pricing limit in loan reviews is the same regardless of the restructuring option.
In relative terms, the extent of dominance increases as the level of the risk pricing limit is reduced.  If
expected return outcomes are ignored, portfolio risk (as indicated by the standard deviation of
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portfolio returns) was found to be higher for a risk pricing limit of 5%, compared to the smaller and
larger alternatives, though the impact was muted under the ‘restructuring’ option.  The standard
deviation (or variance) may be used to indicate size of portfolio risk since the distributions estimated
for the response variable were found to be relatively close to normal.  The measure of portfolio risk
encompasses both unsystematic and systematic risk components.
Systematic risk in the simulation model occurs in the form of covariations in bank returns across
different region-industry segments relative to total bank returns earned on the agricultural portfolio in
the Australian region.  Covariation in bank returns across the 42 region-industry segments is driven
by assumptions made regarding covariances in gross income.  Since credit policy simulations were
not conducted with zero covariances for gross income, no conclusion can be reached regarding the
contribution made by different credit policy regimes to this form of systematic risk.
The results of the stochastic efficiency analysis for the six credit policy regimes by region-industry
segment are presented in Tables 14.2 to 14.5.  In these Tables, a number of possible sensitivities that
may influence stochastic dominance outcomes are displayed on a region-in ustry s ment basis.
Columns 1, 2 and 3 define regions and industries.  Columns 4 and 5 show farm profit ratios.
Column 6 gives farm fixed assets-total assets ratios.  Column 7 shows a measure of variability of
farm income.  Column 8 gives the salvage value factor, which indicates sensivity of farm asset values
to current gross income.  Column 9 shows the share of farm population.  Column 10 shows the
change in farm population numbers assumed to occur through time.  The final six columns indicate
relative contributions each region-industry makes to total NPV of bank portfolio returns for particular
credit policy sets.  These contributions are assessed at the means for the NPV of bank returns
associated with each credit policy set.
Credit policy set 4 is not the most efficient regime for all region-industry segments.  In fact, 21 of the
42 region-industry segments do not show credit policy set 4 as the most efficient credit policy regime.
However, region-industry segments that exhibit FSD for credit policy 4 as a group accounted for 47%
of the total farm population in 1995-96 and 43% of the expected NPV of bank returns estimated for
the total bank loan portfolio (see Table 14.2).
The second most common credit policy option assessed to be most efficient was credit policy set 6
(rpl=7.5% with ‘restructuring’ option).  Credit policy 6 is FSD for 11 region-indust y segments.  As
a group, these region-industry segments accounted for 19% of the total farm population in 1995-96
(see Table 14.3).
237
The third most common credit policy option found to be most efficient was credit policy set 2
(rpl=5% with ‘restructuring’ option).  Credit policy 6 is FSD for 4 region-industry segments.  These
region-industry segments accounted for 17% of the total farm population in 1995-96 (see Table
14.4).
Some region-i dustry segments exhibit a range over which the risk pricing limit may be efficient in
terms of stochastic dominance with a unique choice between the 6 credit policy sets not obtained
using either first-order, second-order or third-order stochastic dominance criteria.
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As a group, these region-industry segments accounted for 8% of the total farm population in 1995-96
(see Table 14.5).  Two region-industry segments exhibited third-orde  stochastic dominance (TSD)
between risk pricing limits of 2.5% and 5%.  Under both pricing strategies, the ‘restructuring’ option
was dominant.  Similarly, two other region-industry segments exhibited TSD between risk pricing
limits of 5% and 7.5%.  Again the restructuring option was the favoured option.
Finally, two region-industry segments exhibited TSD between credit policy sets 5 and 6 (‘no
restructuring’ option and rpl=7.5% versus ‘restructuring’ option and rpl=7.5%).  However, these
two region-industry segments as a group only acc unt for 0.6% of the total farm population.
14.4 Factors determining stochastic efficiency outcomes
The reasons for the dominance of the ‘ restructuring’ option over the ‘no restructuring’ option are
straightforward.  The benefits of restructuring on bank returns are discussed in detail in Section 6.3.
In brief, loan restructuring to an ‘interest only’ basis with possible credit limit extension - when
default occurs - provides farm businesses greater capacity to better manage cash flow fluctuations
arising from volatile farm incomes.  However, the finding that restructuring is stochastically efficient
has one caveat - bank costs were assumed to be exogenous to credit risk.  Loan restructuring can incur
significant legal and administrative costs compared to the ‘no restructuring’ option.
Another key factor that may affect the results is the assumption that farm incomes exhibit zero serial
correlation.  Tests in the previous chapter indicate positive serial correlation in the dairy industry but
not in the broadacre sector.  A st aightforward conclusion regarding stochastic efficiency of the
‘restructuring’ option versus ‘no restructuring’ option for the dairy industry may not be found with
further analysis.  However, as discussed below, the volatility of dairy farm income is low, which
would partially negate the impact of positive serial correlation on dairy farm cash flows.
The major contributing factor determining the stochastic efficiency of the risk pricing limit in loan
reviews appears to be variability of gross income.  In Tables 14.2 to 14.4, variability of gross income
is measured using the coefficient of variation (CV) of gross income.  For region-industry segments
where FSD was indicated, averages of CV of gross income associated with risk pricing limits of
2.5%, 5% and 7.5% were 21.2%, 25.7% and 28.2% respectively.  However, the range of CV of gross
income in each of the three groups is wide.  In Figure 14.8a, the scatter plot gives CV of gross income
on the y-axis against different risk pricing limits on the x-axis.  The data in Figure 14.8 relates to
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stochastic dominance results for all broadacre industry segments (all industries under analysis with
the exception of the dairy industry).
Across the six individual broadacre industry classifications, a positive relationship between the level
of risk pricing limit found to be stochastically efficient and CV of gross income is broadly observed.
An exception is the sheep industry.  However, sample sizes on which to make robust observations on
relationships are insufficient.  A slightly different pattern emerges for the dairy industry.  The dairy
industry exhibits low CV of gross income relative to the broadacre sector (see Figure 14.9a).  A risk
pricing limit of 2.5% was assessed to be FSD across all regions in which the dairy industry occurs.
Within the broadacre sector, regional impacts on the relationship between risk pricing limits and
volatility of gross income were mixed.  A strong positive relationship was found for the wheat-sheep
zone (see Figure 14.10a).  However, the relationship for the broadacre sector in either the pastoral
zone or the high rainfall zone does not appear to be as strong as the relationship found for the
wheat-sheep zone (see Figures 14.11a and 14.12a respectively).
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Figure 14.8   Scatter plot of credit policy evaluation results against key
                    sensitivities for the broadacre sector
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Figure 14.9 Scatter plot of credit policy evaluation results against key
                   sensitivities for the dairy industry
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Figure 14.10   Scatter plot of credit policy evaluation results against key
                      sensitivities for broadacre sector in the wheat-sheep zone
a Volatility of gross income
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Figure 14.11   Scatter plot of credit policy evaluation results against key
                      sensitivities for broadacre sector in the pastoral zone
a Volatility of gross income
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Figure 14.12   Scatter plot of credit policy evaluation results against key
                      sensitivities for broadacre sector in the high rainfall zone
a Volatility of gross income      b Profitability
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A reason for this finding may be because farm business structures in the wheat-sheep zone are
relatively more homogeneous despite their diversified enterprise mix than those found in either the
pastoral zone or the high-rainfall zone.
The underlying reason for the positive relationship between volatility of gross income and efficient
level of the risk pricing limits in loan reviews appears to be linked to the range over which credit
reserves of borrowers may vary over time.  While less volatile gross income may indicate more certain
outcomes, low income-volatility also means that once depletion of credit reserve occurs, borrowers are
faced with a low probability of a very high income in a future period that may replenish their credit
reserves.  Conversely, high volatility of gross income may indicate less certain outcomes but it also
means that a wide range of incomes is possible.  High income-volat lity ans that if depletion of
credit reserves occur, borrowers are faced with the possibility of a very high income in a future period,
which may replenish their credit reserves.
The results found regarding the sensitivity of volatility of gross income and the stochastic efficiency of
risk pricing limits may be affected by two key modelling assumptions.  Firstly, successive cash
surpluses generated by farm businesses are a sumed to be consumed with positive overdraft balances
reduced to zero after two years (see Section 11.3.6).  If a longer period over which cash surpluses are
held was assumed, a stronger relationship may have been found between income volatility and the risk
pricing limits.  Secondly, the simulations assume zero serial correlation in gross incomes.  Since
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serial correlation for gross income was indicated for the dairy industry, a negative relationship may be
found between volatility of gross income and efficient levels of risk pricing limits in the spectrum that
risk pricing limits may apply.
Profitability does not appear to be a major factor determining the stochastic efficiency of a particular
level of risk pricing limit.  In Figures 14.8b to 14.12b, profitability is measured using the ratio of
expected earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) to total farm assets.  In contrast to other
region-industry segmentations, the scatter plot for the broadacre sector in the high rainfall zone shows
a marginally positive relationship between profit ratios and the efficient level of risk pricing limit (see
Figure 14.12b).  The profit ratio in the high rainfall zone averaged 2.2%, 2.7% and 3.2% for risk
pricing limits of 2.5%, 5% and 7.5% respectively.  Further, profitability in the high rainfall zone is
low compared to the other two zones.  Despite these observations, a strong relationship between
profitability of farms and stochastic efficiency of risk pricing limits should be unlikely due to the use
of productivity relative ratios in credit screening simulations.  This issue is discussed in the next
section.
Finally, the relative importance of fixed assets in farm business asset structures across different
region-industry segments could contribute to differences in the efficiency of various risk pricing
limits.  Credit policy is assumed to require borrowers to pledge their fixed assets as collateral.
Fixed-to-total asset ratios affect the permissible size of borrowings due to the design of the security
risk classification system.  Cut-off values for the security cover ratios are defined using a
fixed-to-total asset ratio equal to 77.2%.  This value was used to establish equity-asset ratios of 90%,
80% and 70% for security risk grades 1, 2 and 3 respectively on a portfolio basis (see equation (13.1)
in Section 13.2.1).  In particular, region-industry segments with fixed-to-total asset ratios above
77.2%, the resulting permissible leverage in event of default is lower than for region-industry
segments with fixed-to-total asset ratios below 77.2%.  Average fixed-to-total ass t ratios, shown as
LB/FA, in Tables 14.2, 14.3, 14.4 and 14.5, do not appear to be a determinant of FSD outcomes for
different risk pricing limits.
Other key region-industry characteristics of farms do not appear to play a role in determining the
results of the stochastic dominance analysis.  Region- ndustry segments that exhibit strong downward
trends in farm population do not appear to influence stochastic efficiency outcomes.  While the
contribution of these region-industry segments in the total portfolio diminishes over the simulation
period, they are sufficiently spread across all levels of the risk pricing limit found to be stochastically
efficient.  In addition, sensitivity of salvage values of farm assets to current gross income also appears
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to be a minor factor.  While a high average salvage value factor is found for rpl=2.5%, the impact of
high sensitivity of asset values to income is nullified by low income-volatility.
Other factors that may affect stochastic efficiency outcomes relate more generally to the design of the
simulation experiments.  These are, first, values estimated for the productivity relative ratio that
aligns region-i dustry data on new farm business borrowers to the credit risk classification system,
and second, the experimental and statistical design used in the credit screening, loan review and
policy simulation experiments.  These aspects are discussed below.
14.5 Credit screening simulation results
A full coverage of the estimation results for the 3x3 credit risk classification matrix of productivity
relative ratios for both the historical and the projection models across the 42 region-industry segments
are given in Appendix H.  In Table 14.6, a summary of the results is provided in which the
productivity relative ratios estimated for a particular risk class across the 42 region-industry segme ts
are weighted by their population share in 1995-96.
Table 14.6   Summary of productivity relative ratio estimation results
Credit risk class (q given by next row with h the following row)
Default risk grade 1 1 1 2 2 2 3 3 3
Security risk grade 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3
Historical model 1.164 1.102 1.102 1.122 1.102 1.102 1.084 1.099 1.109
Projection model 1.210 1.140 1.149 1.158 1.140 1.149 1.113 1.138 1.154
The results indicate that the productivity of new farm business borrowers is generally required to be
somewhat higher than the average farm to be in the acceptable credit quality spectrum.  On a
population-weighted basis, the average value of the prr across the nine credit risk classes was 1.11
for the historical model and 1.16 for the projection model.  Recall that the prr for e av rage farm
business in a region-industry segment is equal to one.  Therefore these results indicate that farm
businesses with an internal revenue generation capacity relative to their financial outgoings of less
than 1.11 times to 1.16 times that of the average farm do not achieve acceptable credit quality status
on a portfolio basis.
The estimation results differ by region-industry segment with prr ranging from 0.903 to 1.571 in the
historical model and from 0.916 to 1.954 in the projection model.  The productivity relative ratios
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estimated for the historical model are lower than those estimated for the projection model in
equivalent portfolio segments.  This means that the net impact of environmental changes, and the use
of risk pricing for default probabilities up to 6% in credit screening experiments for the projection
model, resulted in more stringent productivity requirements of farm businesses to attain acceptable
credit quality.
The stochastic efficiency of different risk pricing limits in loan reviews has implications for setting
credit quality limits in credit screening.  The credit screening experiments involved a rpl=5%.  A
rpl=5% in loan reviews was FSD for only 4 region-industry segments in the policy simulations.  With
21 region-industry segments indicating FSD for rpl=2.5% in loan reviews, more stringent control of
credit quality at the credit screening stage would appear to be required for nearly one half of the
portfolio.  Equation (5.25) shows that the maximum acceptable probability of default for portfolio
entrants is positively related to the risk pricing limit.  There also appears to be a case for more relaxed
controls on initial credit quality of borrowers in region-industry segments found to favour rpl=7.5%
in loan reviews.
These conclusions assume that zero serial correlation of farm incomes is representative of the pattern
of farm incomes through time.  Positive serial correlation of income found in the dairy industry may in
fact reverse this conclusion.  Positive serial correlation of income would reduce credit quality by
increasing the probability of default other things held equal.  In any event, any reduction in credit
quality is likely to be limited since dairy farms exhibit low income-v latility.
14.6 Impact of experimental design
The design of the credit policy experiments on which the results are based was influenced by two
problems.  First, many of the credit policy parameters are contingent on another giving rise to more
unknown values than known values to formulate credit policy in the experiments.  For example, in
defining the credit quality limits for default risk at 6% and for security risk at 1.57 times, information
about appropriate risk pricing limits in credit screenings and loan reviews was absent.  Second, the
number of credit policies for analysis was necessarily restricted to six regimes because of program
development time requirements, computer memory limits and simulation time constraints.
Both aspects led to the use of simple portfolio based policy rules rather than policy regimes directed
at specific region-industry segments.  For example, portfolio rules such as the configuration of the
security risk classification system and the minimum credit reserve limit rules for new borrowers were
devised for simplicity on data relating to simple averages across the 42 region-industry segments.  In
250
addition, the focus of policy analysis concentrated on regimes affecting existing loan exposures only,
with single level assumptions being made for policy parameters involving the credit screening model.
The impact of the approach used on the credit screening results may perhaps be more clearly
illustrated by presenting the results given in Table 14.6 for the projection model in graphical form.  In
Figure 14.13, the iso-pr bability curve estimated for default risk class q=1 displays an inconsistent
relationship for  prr across different security risk classes.  In contrast, the iso-probability curve
estimated for default risk class q=2 is relatively flat while the iso-probability curve for default risk
class q=3 is positively sloped.
In the first instance, these results suggest the use of inefficient rules for setting the parameters of the
minimum credit reserve limit, particularly at low levels of leverage.  If equation (6.15) for the optimal
minimum credit reserve limit is implemented effectively, then the iso-probability curve estimated for
each default risk class should be horizontal to the x- xis in Figure 14.13.  The minimum credit
reserve limit must be set so as to accommodate the differences in financial structures of farm
businesses across region-industry segments.  In the simulation model,  the minimum credit reserve
limit was formulated using assumptions about the average farm financial structure across the total
portfolio.  This issue is taken up in Section 14.8.
Figure 14.13  Credit screening results for the projection model
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Second, the positive relationship estimated for the productivity relative ratio and security risk between
h=2 and h=3 for all default risk classes signal the possibility of the default probability of borrowers
being dependent on pricing at higher levels of leverage.  If so, the positive relationship implies that
the appropriate value for the security risk limit, scrn, ay be more than 1.57 times on a simple
average portfolio weighted basis.  The precise reasons for the narrow gaps between the three
iso-probability curves in the vicinity of h=2and h=3 are less easily determined because of the
statistical design used.
14.7 Impact of statistical design
The sampling design utilised in the credit screening experiments and the loan review model involved
wide confidence intervals in generating the outputs from these processes.  In the credit screening
experiments, the confidence interval associated with the iso-probability curve for q=3 in Figure 14.13
is over three times wider than the confidence interval associated with iso-probability curve for q=1.
Consequently, the confidence intervals around the iso-probability curves overlap to varying degrees.
Accordingly, caution must be used in interpreting the credit screening results.
The same caution also applies in relation to the credit policy simulation results.  In the loan review
model, the confidence intervals employed imply that the estimated value of the expected probability of
default used in loan pricing are ±3% of the true value of dwith 95% degree of accuracy.  A key
source of variation in CV of gross income and profit ratios displayed in the scatter plots at different
risk pricing limits (see Figures 14.8 to 14.12) may be the wide confidence intervals used to estimate
the probability of default in loan reviews.  Other sources of variation, of course, are factors intrinsic to
the farm surveys data utilised in the simulation analysis, and the low number of samples runs (200
runs) utilised to estimate the distribution of NPV of bank returns in the credit policy simulations.
14.8 Future credit policy simulations
Given the above analysis, the following guidelines may be employed in the formulation of future
credit policy experiments using the simulation model developed in this study.  In broad terms,
preliminary simulation experiments should be directed towards selecting a credit policy regime for the
efficient management of unsystematic risk.  This should then be followed by investigations into credit
policy regimes for managing systematic risk.
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Under this approach, the focus of preliminary investigation is on credit policy development for each
individual region-industry segment with exclusion of the covariance relationships across these
region-industry segments defined for the economic environment.  Initially, the objective should be
directed towards achieving adequate confidence in the efficiency and accuracy of credit underwriting
standards.  These experiments involve only the credit screening simulation model and the
experimental design should embody the following strategies:
· increasing the degree of confidence about the estimates of the relationships between the
productivity relative ratio, the expected probability of default and the expected security cover ratio;
· using small increments of the productivity relative ratio in the spectrum where acceptable credit
quality appears in the estimation process;
· setting the minimum credit reserve limit according to sample data for fixed-to-to l asset ratios
and expected earnings before interest and tax measured for individual region-i ustry segments;
· estimating the risk pricing limit in credit screening appropriate for the region-industry s ment
with this information used to define default risk and security risk limits; and
· configuring the credit risk classification system in line with these credit quality limits on a
region-industry basis.
The credit screening simulation outputs form the basis of a range of single level assumptions for
credit policy regimes in the analysis of unsystematic credit risk dynamics with the historical and
projection models.  As shown in this study, this involves using stochastic dominance tests on
response functions estimated for different credit policy regimes involving various risk pricing limits in
loan reviews and problem loan resolution policy rules.  While t-statistics on the means of NPV of
bank returns estimated in this study are high, a much longer run (possibly around 1000 runs) is
probably required to ensure the robustness of stochastic dominance tests beyond the first-order.  O ce
an efficient credit policy set for managing unsystematic risk for each region-industry s ment has been
identified, the focus of analysis can then be re-orient d towards credit policy regimes for managing
systematic risk.
The portfolio approach to credit policy investigation involves combining the various credit policy sets
for efficiently managing unsystematic credit risk for each specific region-industry s ment into one
comprehensive credit policy regime.  This credit policy regime may then applied to the simulation
model on a full portfolio basis including an economic environment describing covariance
relationships between farm incomes across different region-industry segments.  The model may then
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be used to initially analyse the impact of systematic risk on the stochastic efficiency of different
problem loan resolution policies, and then to measure the size of beta risk by region-industry with the
efficient credit policy set.  Once beta risk relationships have been ascertained, credit policy analysis
can then be oriented towards the efficient use of beta risk pricing, and possibly definition of
appropriate risk concentration limits, for managing portfolio risk.
The final remaining issue concerns the treatment of loan product structures used in the credit policy
evaluations.  Loan product structure dimensions include fixed versus variable interest products,
maximum credit limit dynamics, loan repayment patterns, term maturities and fee structures.  These
dimensions can be treated in simulations through two different ways.  A simple approach is to utilise
the strategy employed in this study by selecting one particular loan product regime for analysis.  A
more sophisticated approach involves using measures of the propensities of borrowers to utilise
different loan products.  Portfolio segment weights may then reflect these propensities, with each farm
model associated with the portfolio segment embodying the loan product structure utilised.  Under
either approach, the robustness of the efficient credit policy regime may be analysed by testing the
sensitivity of stochastic efficiency at different levels set for each loan product dimension.
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Table 14.2 Region-i dustry segments exhibiting first-order stochastic dominance for credit policy set 4 with key sensitivities
Farm model Bank model Share of total portfolio NPV(BR) at expected values
Region-
industry
identifier
Region
     1
Industry
1
E(EBIT)-
FA ratio
2
E(EBIT)-
LB ratio
3
LB-FA
ratio
4
Coefficient
of variation
of GIB  5
salvage
value
factor  6
popn
share
7
Äpopn
8
Credit
policy
 1
Credit
policy
2
Credit
policy
3
Credit
policy
4
Credit
policy
5
Credit
policy
6
% % % % svf % of
total
% %
of total
%
of total
%
of total
%
of total
%
 of total
%
of total
Credit policy 4 -   Risk pricing limit = 2.5% and restructuring option
2 NSW - W/S 1 MLC 4.7 5.8 80.3 19.4 0.23 3.7 0 2.74 3.90 5.84 6.55 2.64 3.99
4 NSW - W/S 3 MLC 5.7 7.0 81.3 19.8 0.45 0.4 -695 2.04 3.58 2.78 4.67 2.33 3.89
5 NSW - W/S 3 Dairy 7.3 9.8 74.1 16.7 1.08 5.0 -9 0.14 0.19 0.18 0.25 0.14 0.19
6 NSW - HR 1 Sheep 2.8 3.2 86.7 27.1 0.15 2.9 -448 6.61 6.05 6.94 6.05 7.46 6.64
7 NSW - HR 2 Beef 0.6 0.7 84.6 18.5 0.00 2.5 -50 2.27 2.78 2.09 2.74 2.34 2.84
8 NSW - HR 2 Dairy 3.7 4.3 85.5 15.8 1.28 1.9 0 0.86 1.10 1.40 2.01 0.86 1.08
11 VIC - W/S 3 MLC 3.5 4.0 85.9 21.5 0.07 3.7 0 1.52 1.80 1.89 2.03 1.66 1.97
12 VIC - W/S 3 Dairy 6.9 9.6 72.0 21.5 0.70 3.5 -406 -0.11 0.39 -0.01 0.59 -0.18 0.27
15 VIC - HR Sheep 2.7 3.3 83.4 30.1 0.38 7.6 -286 2.81 2.66 3.09 2.74 2.73 2.71
16 VIC - HR Dairy 4.6 5.7 80.5 23.3 1.03 0.2 -777 1.41 2.77 1.37 3.09 1.22 2.60
18 QLD - PAS 4 Beef 6.3 9.8 64.3 25.1 0.44 0.9 -20 1.35 1.31 1.22 1.36 1.56 1.45
20 QLD - PAS 3 Sheep 4.3 5.6 75.9 24.8 0.22 1.8 -43 1.83 1.64 1.92 1.71 1.97 1.72
22 QLD - W/S 2 Dairy 4.6 5.9 78.8 17.0 0.52 2.1 -163 0.40 0.54 0.61 0.91 0.38 0.50
23 QLD - W/S 2 MLC 4.1 5.2 78.4 26.3 0.72 3.8 -216 1.02 1.37 2.42 2.32 0.98 1.31
31 SA -HR Dairy 4.8 6.3 75.6 14.4 0.07 0.5 -68 0.11 0.15 0.24 0.35 0.11 0.15
33 WA -W/S MLC 6.0 7.4 80.8 14.9 1.20 2.9 -994 -0.33 1.00 0.53 1.33 -0.45 0.89
34 WA -W/S WOC 8.4 11.4 74.2 23.4 0.43 1.4 -380 0.08 0.27 0.28 0.47 0.15 0.42
36 WA -HR Sheep 3.0 3.6 84.7 25.2 0.22 0.7 -64 1.56 1.42 1.52 1.46 1.75 1.56
37 WA -HR Dairy 3.9 4.6 84.3 15.7 1.91 0.7 -22 0.41 0.60 0.41 0.65 0.46 0.65
38 TAS - HR S/B 2.6 3.0 87.7 20.3 0.00 1.3 -47 1.77 1.53 1.74 1.53 1.87 1.59
40 TAS - HR Dairy 5.8 7.8 74.7 23.6 0.60 0.1 -78 0.14 0.32 0.19 0.35 0.15 0.33
Average 4.6 5.9 79.7 21.2 0.6 - - - - - - - -
Total - - - - - 47.3 -4766 28.64 35.38 36.66 43.17 30.14 36.76
For footnotes to 1 to 8, see Table 14.4
Table 14.3  Region-i dustry segments exhibiting first-order stochastic dominance for credit policy set 6 with key sensitivities
Farm model Bank model Share of total portfolio NPV(BR) at expected values
Region-
industry
identifier
Region
     1
Industry
1
E(EBIT)-
FA ratio
2
E(EBIT)-
LB ratio
3
LB-FA
ratio
4
Coefficient
of variation
of GIB  5
salvage
value
factor  6
popn
share
7
Äpopn
8
Credit
policy
 1
Credit
policy
2
Credit
policy
3
Credit
policy
4
Credit
policy
5
Credit
policy
6
% % % % svf % of
total
% %
of total
%
of total
%
of total
%
of total
%
 of total
%
of total
Credit policy 6 -   Risk pricing limit = 7.5% and restructuring option
1 NSW -PAS S/B 4.4 5.7 77.1 25.8 0.66 1.2 -124 1.09 0.91 0.90 0.80 1.29 1.03
3 NSW - W/S 2 MLC 5.1 6.4 79.2 27.6 0.65 3.7 0 5.47 4.52 4.11 3.56 6.42 5.25
9 VIC - W/S 1 WOC 6.3 8.0 79.3 37.1 0.43 1.9 0 1.27 1.03 0.98 0.84 1.49 1.17
10 VIC - W/S 2 WOC 6.2 7.5 82.8 27.4 0.02 3.1 -398 0.69 0.59 0.48 0.44 0.80 0.66
13 VIC - HR S/B 3.7 4.3 86.3 31.0 0.42 3.5 367 10.66 8.52 8.79 7.40 12.25 9.54
17 QLD - PAS 1 Beef 6.4 15.9 40.5 32.1 0.00 0.2 2.95 0.10 0.08 0.09 0.07 0.11 0.08
21 QLD -W/S 1 WOC 4.0 4.8 83.6 19.1 0.73 1.8 -161 1.45 1.38 1.29 1.28 1.62 1.57
26 QLD -HR 2 Beef 3.0 4.2 72.5 36.6 0.03 0.6 -62.5 1.23 1.00 1.06 0.91 1.38 1.10
28 SA - W?S 1 WOC 7.3 9.6 76.5 28.4 0.73 1.9 -93.5 0.77 0.61 0.59 0.50 0.87 0.68
39 TAS - HR Sheep 2.8 3.5 80.9 20.3 0 1.3 -96 0.62 0.81 0.57 0.76 0.71 0.89
42 NT - PAS Nth Beef 0.5 1.1 42.9 24.8 0 0.2 -9.5 0.17 0.14 0.15 0.13 0.20 0.15
Average 4.5 6.4 72.9 28.2 0.3 - - - - - - - -
Total - - - - - 19.3 -574.6 23.53 19.59 19.01 16.68 27.14 22.12
For footnotes to 1 to 8, see Table 14.4.
Table 14.4  Region-i dustry segments exhibiting first-order stochastic dominance for credit policy set 2 with key sensitivities
Farm model Bank model Share of total portfolio NPV(BR) at expected values
Region-
industry
identifier
Region
     1
Industry
1
E(EBIT)-
FA ratio
2
E(EBIT)-
LB ratio
3
LB-FA
ratio
4
Coefficient
of variation
of GIB  5
salvage
value
factor  6
popn
share
7
Äpopn
8
Credit
policy
 1
Credit
policy
2
Credit
policy
3
Credit
policy
4
Credit
policy
5
Credit
policy
6
% % % % svf % of
total
% %
of total
%
of total
%
of total
%
of total
%
 of total
%
of total
Credit policy 2 -   Risk pricing limit = 5% and restructuring option
14 VIC - HR Beef 2.5 2.9 84.3 38.1 0.00 5.9 400 17.08 15.69 16.35 13.95 14.82 13.52
25 QLD -HR 1 Beef 2.1 2.6 80.6 24.3 0.21 3.7 -625 1.97 2.27 1.68 2.06 2.24 2.46
29 SA - W/S 2 MLC 5.2 6.2 84.2 24.6 0.22 4.8 -250 7.23 6.57 6.49 5.65 6.19 5.92
30 SA - HR Sheep 3.4 4.1 83.0 15.9 0.29 2.5 -124 2.46 2.77 2.17 2.31 1.95 2.43
Average 3.3 4.0 83.0 25.7 0.2 - - - - - - - -
Total - - - - - 16.9 -599 28.74 27.31 26.68 23.97 25.19 24.34
1. Definitions of abbreviations for regions and industries are given in Table 12.2, p 189.
2. Profit ratio where E(EBIT) is defined as expected gross income, E(GIB) less expected farm costs, E(FC).  FA is defined as total value of farm assets.
3. Profit ratio where LB is defined as the value of land and buildings. See also footnote 2.
4. Fixed-to-total asset ratio where the value of fixed assets (LB) is expressed as a percentage share of total value of farm assets (FA).
5. Coefficient of variation of GIB is defined as the ratio of the standard error and the mean of gross income.
6. Salvage value factor is the contribution to the deviation from the mean of salvage value for a unit deviation from the mean of gross income.  For more detail, see Section 11.4.1.3 and Section 12.6.
7. Population share is defined as the number of farms in the region-i dustry segment expressed as a percentage share of total number of farms in 1995-96.  For more detail, see Section 12.7.
8. Äpopn is the assumed change in the number of farms through time.  For more detail, see Section 11.4.14 and Section 12.7.
Table 14.5  Region-i dustry segments exhibiting third-order stocha ic dominance with key sensitivities
Farm model Bank model Share of total portfolio NPV(BR) at expected values
Region-
industry
identifier
Region
     1
Industry
1
E(EBIT)-
FA ratio
2
E(EBIT)-
LB ratio
3
LB-FA
ratio
4
Coefficient
of variation
of GIB  5
salvage
value
factor  6
popn
share
7
Äpopn
8
Credit
policy
 1
Credit
policy
2
Credit
policy
3
Credit
policy
4
Credit
policy
5
Credit
policy
6
% % % % svf % of
total
% %
of total
%
of total
%
of total
%
of total
%
 of total
%
of total
Credit policy sets 4 and 2
                         Risk pricing limits = 2.5% and 5% respectively with restructuring option
24 QLD - W/S 2 Beef 3.4 4.7 72.9 22.9 0.00 3.8 528 15.24 14.48 14.22 13.20 13.43 13.40
35 WA - HR Beef 1.6   1.9 80.5 29.4 0.29 1.4 -215 0.98 0.92 0.98 0.89 0.90 0.85
Credit policy sets 2 and 6
                         Risk pricing limits = 5% and 7.5% respectively with restructuring option
19 QLD - PAS 3 Beef 4.0 4.8 63.3 33.7 0.00 1.8 -18 2.24 1.80 1.93 1.64 2.50 1.95
27 SA - PAS Sheep 6.3 8.3 76.0 36.6 0.00 0.4 -2.5 0.48 0.40 0.38 0.34 0.52 0.43
Credit policy sets 5 and 6
                         No restructuring option and ‘restructuring’ option respectively with risk pricing limit of 7.5%
32 WA - PAS Sheep 1.2 2.6 48.4 17.9 0.81 0.5 -38 0.13 0.10 0.12 0.10 0.15 0.11
41 NT – PAS Sth Beef 3.9 7.6 50.4 40.1 0.00 0.1 6 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.02
For footnotes to 1 to 8, see Table 14.4.
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CHAPTER FIFTEEN
15. CONCLUSIONS
15.1 Conclusions
Portfolio theory provides the foundations for the principles of efficient security
selection and for pricing securities in perfect capital markets.  Financial institutions face
difficulties in applying these principles to loan security selection since they generally
supply the external funding requirements of small and medium sized businesses with
illiquid debt securities.  Without liquid markets, well-developed derivative markets
generally do not form, and in their absence, financial institutions rely on a range of
internally based credit policy mechanisms for managing credit risk.  Decision-makers in
financial institutions face many challenges in formulating credit policy in line with their
portfolio risk-return objectives, because the risk and returns of different credit policy
options are difficult to measure without observable market prices.  This property of
credit markets has also restricted the use of portfolio theory in empirical applications for
credit policy development in the literature.
The principles of risk measurement outlined in portfolio theory can be applied to illiquid
loan securities.  However, some insurance theory principles and agency relationships that
develop between a borrower and a lender must be integrated into the portfolio theory
framework.  Credit risk occurs when lenders face the prospect of a loss on promised
returns from a loan security because of the possibility of default by borrowers.  Credit
risk is therefore comprised of two components: expected loss and unexpected loss.
Expected loss equals the size of the loan loss expected in event of default weighted by
the probability of default.  The size of loan loss expected in event of default is measured
as the difference between the expected value of collateral assets pledged and the loan
value.  Borrowers are required to pledge some proportion of their assets as collateral
against the loan because enforceable claims to future incomes of borrowers generally do
not exist.  The actual size of loan loss is a function of the probability distribution
function for collateral asset values, the size of loan and stage of loan maturity.
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Loan loss distribution functions may therefore be generated by directly modelling
agency relationships between the borrower and the lender.  Borrowers operating in
illiquid credit markets under uncertainty are assumed to rely on two types of loan
securities - one as a credit reserve for funding unanticipated funding requirements - the
other for anticipated fixed investment purposes.  In this context, the loss outcomes on
each individual loan security used by the same borrower must be appraised together
because the distribution of loss on both securities is contingent on the borrower’s
probability of default.  In turn, the expected probability of default is dependent on the
borrower’s income distribution.  Because small and medium sized business borrowers
generally display specialisation in production, borrower income distributions may be
standardised by categorising borrowers by region and by industry.  Within a
region-industry portfolio segment, expected losses among borrowers may vary as a result
of differences in productivity and non-homogeneity of risk-return preferences.  These
factors in turn lead to variations in propensities to leverage and to provide security
coverage.
As a consequence, lenders face an array of outcomes for expected loss when many
borrowers are combined to form a portfolio.  A credit risk classification system may be
constructed using a two-dimensional matrix structure so as to compare the expected loss
of an individual borrower on a common basis to other borrowers through the expected
loss spectrum.  In this system, borrowers are graded into classes defining similar levels of
default risk as measured by their expected probability of default, and similar levels of
security risk as measured by their expected security coverage ratio.  The production and
investment decisions of borrowers can be directly linked to the financing decision via a
risk constraint as specified by credit policy of the lender.  The risk constraint in this case
is the expected loss rate as specified for a particular credit risk class in the credit risk
classification system.
Unexpected loss is the extent to which deviations in realised loan losses occur from their
expected values.  When many loan securities are combined to form a portfolio, the
extent to which unexpected losses of individual loan securities are correlated defines
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systematic risk while the remaining portfolio risk constitutes unsystematic risk.
Systematic risk among loan securities occurs as a result of correlation of loss
probabilities between different types of borrowers.  Since the probability of default of
borrowers is directly related to their income distributions, correlations of loss
distributions occurs as a result of a common set of exogenous factors affecting income
distributions of borrowers in different regions and industries.  Beta risk on loan
securities is therefore assessed on the basis of securities classified for regional and
industry segmentations rather than among individual securities themselves as in the
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM).
Promised interest rates charged on loan securities are comprised of four key
components when priced for credit risk: the risk free rate, the default risk premium, the
security risk premium and the portfolio risk premium.  A default risk premium and a
security risk premium are added to the risk-free interest rate.  This gives a
certainty-equivalence promised interest rate on loan securities.  These two risk premiums
allow lenders to be compensated for expected losses on loan securities.  The portfolio
risk premium is then added to the certainty-equivalence promised interest rate.  The
portfolio risk premium varies in size according to the size of beta risk on a particular
region-industry segment.
For each credit risk class, lenders force the unsystematic component of portfolio risk to
zero by risk spreading across many region-industry segments with each segment
comprising a large number of similar sized loan securities.  A key pre-condition behind
risk spreading is independence between the covariances of losses associated with loan
securities.  If independence is achieved, the income received through the
certainty-equivalent risk premium (the default risk premium plus the security risk
premium) exactly matches the expected loss on the risk class.  Under these conditions,
the expected return on each risk class in a competitive capital market is the risk free rate
of interest.  The portfolio risk premium is added to the certainty-equivalence risk
premium.  In doing so, expected returns on loan securities will reflect variations in beta
risk associated with different region-industry segments.   Pricing for credit risk is
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efficient so long as risk concentrations are not excessive and the default risk of
borrowers remains independent of the promised rate of interest.
For most lending institutions, excessive risk concentrations may arise as a result of
dis-similar sized borrowers and dis-proportionate numbers of borrowers in different
regions and industries.  Portfolio concentration limits may be defined for different
categories of borrowers in order to manage risk concentrations.  Minimum portfolio
limits may be used to assure risk spreading across sufficient region-industry segments
within a risk class.  Maximum portfolio limits may be used to limit risk concentrations.
One method for assessing risk concentrations is to compare an individual lender’s
portfolio structure with a benchmark portfolio.  Given a high-order region-industry
category, a benchmark portfolio structure may be constructed that reflects the average
structure of loan balances in each low-order region-industry segment for all lenders.  An
individual lender would then formulate risk concentration limits to reflect the
market-based benchmark portfolio.  Lenders also manage the impact of unexpected
losses on their portfolio returns through adequate allocations of equity capital on
particular portfolio segmentations.
Credit controls at the borrower level are a necessary adjunct to pricing in the portfolio
approach to credit risk management.  Over a certain range of expected losses, credit
controls may be used to ensure that borrower default risk remains independent of the
promised interest rate being charged.  A risk pricing limit in loan originations may be set
for different portfolio segments at the point where promised interest rates begin to
affect default risk.  Credit quality limits may be formulated in terms of a maximum
acceptable expected probability of default and a minimum acceptable expected security
coverage.  Loan proposals that do not satisfy credit quality limits are either rejected or
revised in the credit screening process.  Revision of loan applications may occur in
circumstances where default risk is not independent of pricing or where loans are
insufficiently secured.  In these cases, credit quality may be improved by obtaining more
collateral coverage or through reducing credit limits.
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Lenders can also utilise policy rules regarding loan product construction to negate its
impact on credit risk.  If borrowers jointly use two loan securities - one as a credit
reserve, the other for fixed investment purposes - then credit limits embodied in loan
products may be formulated so as to minimise the influence of actual leverage on the
financial risk of a borrower.  A minimum credit reserve limit may be devised so as to set
the relative proportions of credit reserves and initial term loan drawings of successful
loan applicants are such that the underlying default risk is unaffected by higher
maximum credit limits.  This rule permits lenders to price borrowers for credit risk in
the region of acceptable credit quality in accordance with risk constraints implied by a
credit risk classification system.
During the term of the loan, there are a number of options lenders may pursue for
managing credit risk that arise in a dynamic context.  Risk pricing limits in loan reviews
may be applied to ensure that default risk is not affected by promised interest rates
charged.  The maximum credit limit for an exposure in default can be extended to
possibly improve credit quality in future periods provided that there is sufficient security
coverage.  Alternatively, the rescheduling of loan contracts by altering the prior agreed
repayment conditions could also improve the dynamic profile of risk and returns on
loan securities held by a borrower.  In this respect, the lower the extent of positive serial
correlation in borrower incomes, and the less directly related collateral values are to
borrower incomes, the greater the risk-return efficiency of restructuring options are
likely to be compared to the use of a ‘no restructuring’ option in event of default.
Further, the impact of loan restructuring options on systematic portfolio risk depends
on the extent to which distributions of borrower incomes and collateral values are
correlated, both at a point in time and over time, across regions and industries.
The selection and delivery of credit policy in credit screening and loan review processes
involve a number of empirical issues.  The key decision problem under analysis involves
a choice between portfolio return distribution functions arising from different credit
policy regimes.  The stochastic dominance (SD) efficiency criteria may be used to
choose between credit policy alternatives.  The SD criteria allow the comparison of the
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total distribution of bank returns for different credit policy regimes.  Further, the SD
criteria require only general assumptions to be made about the nature of the risk-return
preferences of decision-makers in banks.
To generate a portfolio return distribution function for a particular credit policy regime,
the portfolio theory paradigm is couched in terms of the capital budgeting approach.
This approach is used since loan securities involve lumpy investments (borrowers)
without the possibility of sales and purchases in liquid markets.  In a dynamic
framework, the expected rate of return in portfolio theory is replaced by the
expected NPV of returns while portfolio risk is indicated by the nature of the NPV
distribution.  In this framework, bank returns from portfolio segments are measured
according to a model of a borrower that is representative of each segment.  The
stochastic simulation method is used to generate distributions of borrower incomes and
associated loan loss distribution functions.  The capital budgeting approach also enables
the evaluation of the impact of disproportionate sized loan securities on portfolio
returns.  It does this because absolute dollar values are used to determine their
weightings.  In the model used in this study, the number of borrowers in a segment
weight the outcome for bank returns predicted for the average borrower in a particular
segment.
In the capital budgeting approach, bank returns from a loan security portfolio in each
time period may be discounted by the required rate of return as determined by
either the CAPM or the Risk-Adjusted Return-On-Capital (RAROC) method.  The
CAPM may be used to give the discount rate when risk spreading and diversification
by lenders is efficient.  When risk concentrations are excessive, the RAROC method
may be used to determine the discount rate.  In either case, the discount rate is used
as a price setting rule.  That is, borrowers are willing to pay the promised interest rate
derived by reference to the required rate of return that will provide an expected stream
of cash flows to a lender over the term of the loan with at least a positive expected net
present value.
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The delivery of credit policy involves the use of credit scoring models to measure credit
quality in credit originations and in loan reviews.  A number of different credit-scoring
models exist in the literature to measure default risk.  However, each model varies in
their capacity to be directly linked to a credit risk classification system.  The simulation
approach to credit scoring gives a direct estimate of a borrower’s expected probability of
default to enable loan pricing in loan reviews.  Given data on the average financial
characteristics of borrowers in a region-industry segment, the simulation method for
credit scoring may be extended using a parametric approach to align the
productivity of new borrowers to a credit risk classification system.  A key advantage
of the simulation approach over existing credit scoring methods in the literature is
that credit policy is endogenous to credit risk.  This feature allows the assessment of
different credit policy regimes on portfolio performance outcomes.
A computable simulation model was developed in this study to generate a portfolio
environment that is representative of lenders servicing the Australian farm sector.  The
structure of the simulation model allows the analysis of the risk to bank returns
stemming from the possibility of default.  However, asset-liability issues can not be
examined because bank costs are assumed to be exogenous to credit risk.  The
simulation model is used to examine the risk-return efficiency of two aspects of credit
policy.  These were a restructuring option versus ‘no restructuring’ option and three
different levels of risk pricing limits that may apply in loan reviews.
The restructuring option under evaluation places defaulting exposures on an
interest-only basis with the possibility of credit limit extension.  The results of the policy
simulations indicate that the restructuring option is stochastically efficient in the first
degree over the ‘no restructuring’ option in 40 of 42 region-industry segments.  In the
two remaining region-industry segments, a choice could not be made using SD criteria.
However, these region-industry segments as a group account for less than one per cent
of the farm population.
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A credit policy regime that includes the restructuring option and a risk pricing limit of
2.5% in loan reviews is stochastically efficient in the first degree when compared to
higher risk pricing limits in 21 of 42 region-industry segments.  As a group, these
segments account for nearly half of the farm population.  A risk pricing limit of 7.5% is
found to be efficient compared to alternative policy settings for 11 region-industry
segments (19% of the farm population).  A risk pricing limit of 5% is found to be
efficient compared to alternative policy settings for 4 region-industry segments (17% of
the farm population).  A choice for a risk pricing limit could not be achieved using SD
criteria for limits between 2.5% and 5% for 2 region-industry segments, and between 5%
and 7.5% for another 2 region-industry segments.  These 4 region-industry segments
account for 7% of the farm population.
The simulation results indicate that there is a positive relationship between volatility of
gross farm incomes and the stochastic efficiency of different levels of risk pricing limits.
The key underlying reason for the positive relationship appears to be linked to the range
over which gross incomes, and therefore credit reserves, of borrowers could vary in
future years.  While low income-volatility may indicate more certain outcomes, low
income-volatility also means that once depletion of credit reserves occurs, borrowers are
faced with a low probability of a very high income in a future period that may replenish
their credit reserves.  Conversely, high volatility of gross income may indicate less certain
outcomes but it also means that a wide range of incomes is possible.  High
income-volatility means that if depletion of credit reserves occur, borrowers are faced
with the possibility of a very high income in a future period, which may replenish their
credit reserves.
The findings suggest that banks servicing the Australian farm sector will earn more profit
without additional portfolio risk if the maximum limit to which pricing accounts for default risk in
loan reviews is positively linked to volatility of gross incomes of farm business borrowers.
Importantly, this finding is contingent on well-defined credit underwriting standards to
be applied in loan originations.  Credit-underwriting standards must be formulated so as to
procure farm business borrowers of high credit quality with loans that are fully secured using fixed
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assets.  The credit scoring results indicate that for farm business borrowers in Australia
to achieve acceptable credit quality, they must have high levels of productivity compared
to the region-industry average.  Further, a flexible rather than a rigid policy approach to
impaired loan asset management provides for large net benefits since such a strategy
reduces the sensitivity of non-pricing aspects of credit policy on the dynamic profile of
credit risk of farm business borrowers
15.2 Issues for further research
The simulation model developed in this study enables the evaluation of a range of
possible credit policy options in an operating environment that represents lenders with
wide distribution networks servicing the Australian farm sector.  In the context of the
simulation model, there are a number of areas that could be improved to enhance the
simulation properties of the farm model.  First, more research is required on the nature
of serial correlation of gross incomes.  In this respect, validation tests on the nature of
serial correlation of gross incomes in the broadacre sector were largely inconclusive.
Despite low income-volatility in the dairy industry, further research is required to
ascertain the impact of positive serial correlation of dairy farm incomes on the efficient
level of the risk-pricing limit.  Second, better prediction of salvage values of farm assets
by region-industry segments may be achieved through more sophisticated modelling.
Finally, the farm model could also embody differences in enterprise and asset structures
of farm businesses, in contrast to the assumption of homogenous business structures in
different region-industry segments used in this study.  In this respect, a possible future
direction is the application of programming models of farm businesses.  In this
approach, the production and financing decision would be determined in a risk-return
optimising framework in which profit or income is maximised subject to credit limits
and default risk constraints.
The bank model could also be improved in several ways.  First, the bank model could be
also extended to provide a measure of bank returns that also accounts for resource costs
in conducting lending activities.  To do this, further research is required on the
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relationship between non-interest expenses and credit risk.  In addition, the bank model
could be extended to incorporate both assets and liabilities in order to explore
implications for optimal capital structure.  Finally, a stochastic model rather than a
deterministic model of borrower inflows could provide for a more realistic
environmental setting.  In this respect, an important contribution can be made by
introducing concepts such as the interest rate elasticity of demand, the possibility of
early repayment and non-price aspects of marketing strategies used by competing
financial institutions.
Other research issues involve principles of credit risk management.  The pricing rules
derived in this study are based on a one period maturity.  An obvious extension of the
model is to examine the risk-return efficiency of loan pricing for term structure of credit
risk since multi-period maturities are involved.  Further, there are unresolved problems
in constructing a benchmark portfolio on which beta risk relationships can be measured.
Without this information, the formulation of risk concentration limits is also difficult.
For credit policy makers, the major task remains to identify sets of efficient credit
policies in which trade-offs in risk and returns occur.  The strength of the simulation
approach for credit policy evaluation is the systematic approach to modelling a range of
complex factors that influence credit risk in the Australian agri-lending environment.
This strength must be counterbalanced against the cost in terms of time taken to model
key linkages between inputs and outputs for different credit policy regimes, and the
significant computing memory and simulation time to conduct credit policy simulations.
A number of steps are identified in Chapter Fourteen that provide the way forward in
future credit policy experiments with the simulation model.  In brief, further analysis
should initially focus on the selection of a credit policy for each region-industry segment
that efficiently manages unsystematic risk.  Key policy parameters include risk pricing
limits in loan reviews and credit screenings, credit underwriting standards, credit limits
and problem loan resolution policies.
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Once an efficient credit policy set is established for each region-industry segment, these
credit policy sets may be combined to form a comprehensive credit policy regime.  By
varying the levels of different credit policy parameters in this regime, the risk-return
efficiency of various credit policy parameters that may be used to manage systematic risk
can then evaluated to identify the stochastically dominant credit policy set.  Further
analysis could also be conducted to evaluate the sensitivity of stochastically dominant
credit policy regimes to different environmental settings including expected gross
incomes, expected salvage values on farm assets and expected nominal interest rates.
Sensitivity analysis could also focus on different modelling assumptions regarding either
farm business or lender behaviour.  The final research challenge is the formulation of
pricing and lending guidelines that embody the optimal credit policy set for application
by line personnel in credit approval and loan review processes.
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APPENDIX A
LOAN FEES AND CHARGES SCHEDULES
A.1 Introduction
This Appendix outlines schedules used to calculate loan fees and charges payable.  The
schedules were sourced through personal communication with the Commonwealth
Development Bank and computerised internally based credit manuals in the
Commonwealth Bank.  Schedules collected applied to charging regimes in July 1994 and
in October 1997.
A.2 Bank fees
A.2.1 Overdraft facility
The farm model is charged two separate bank fees; overdraft line service fee and the overdraft
transaction fee.  The overdraft line service fee payment (OLF ) is levied on the outstanding deficit on
the overdraft facility at the beginning of the time period (BB) with the size of payment made
depending on the schedule outlined in equation (A.1).  This schedule was used in both the historical
and projection simulation models.  The superscripts H  and P  denote historical and projection
models respectively.
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where subscripts are denoted by
i = credit policy set;
j = region-industry segment;
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q = initial default risk grade;
h = initial security risk grade;
a = years since entrance into portfolio; and
t = simulation year.
The overdraft transaction fee payment (OTF) is comprised of fees payable on deposits  (OTFD) and
withdrawals  (OTFC)  made on the overdraft facility during a particular time period (equations (A.2)
and (A.3) for the projection and historical models respectively).  The size of fees payable in dollar
terms on cheques drawn and deposits made for the historical model are given in equations (A.4) and
(A.5) respectively.  The fee payments used for the historical and projection models relate to schedules
applied by the Commonwealth Bank in July 1994 and in October 1997 respectively.
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A.2.2 Term loan facility
The farm is charged two separate term loan fees: establishment fee and loan service fee.  The
establishment fee is an up-front once-off payment made at the commencement of the term loan.  The
size of establishment fee payable (EF ) depends on the amount of term loan principal drawn (LP )
as outlined in equations (A.6) and (A.7) for the projection and historical models respectively.  The
establishment schedule for the historical model was applied by the Commonwealth Development
Bank in 1994, while that for the projection model was applied by the Commonwealth Bank in 1997.
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The line service fee (LSF) is based on the outstanding balance on the term loan facility at the
beginning of the time period (LP) and the schedule applied in both the historical and projection
simulation models is given in equation (A.8).
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A.3 Bank charges
Bank charges are levied on new borrowers to cover legal costs incurred by the bank for registering
and lodging security documents.  Schedules of bank charges used in the model were levied by the
Commonwealth Development Bank in July 1994.  Bank charges levied on all new borrowers were
given by
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(A.9) BC RLF SLF SFijqhat
H P  and = + +
where RLF =  registration lodgement fee payment;
SLF =  security lodgement fee payment; and
SF = settlement fee payment.
Data values in both the historical and projection models for RLF , SLF  and SF  used were $80.00,
$90.00 and $80.00 respectively.
A.4 Non-bank fees and charges
The schedules for the various fees and charges levied by the State governments of Australia on
borrowers undertaking borrowings in their first year are outlined in this section.  Non-bank fees and
charges (NBFC) include State government stamp duties (SGSD), loan security duty (SGLSD)
and loan security registration fee (LSRF).  State government stamp duty is levied on the value of the
maximum permissible farm liabilities (FLm) agreed to under a loan contract.  The schedules used in
the historical and projection models varied depending on whether changes occurred during the
mid-1990s.
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In the state of Queensland, borrowers are required to pay a loan security duty to the State government.
The duty payable is based on the amount of maximum farm liabilities.  This duty was applied to
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Queensland borrowers that were identified through the j-subscript in both the historical and
projection models.
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The State government loan security registration fee payment is comprised of a number of fees relating
to the registration of security pledged against loans (equation A.22).  The mortgage registration
payment (MRF ) made depends on the type of security being pledged, in this case fixed assets.  The
production fee (PF ) is based on the assumption that three titles of land are registered with fee per
title varying by State.  The transfer registration fee (TRF ) is based on the value of land and
buildings offered as security.  The values of fees used in the historical and projection models are
shown in Table A.1.
(A.22) LSRF MRF PF TRFijqhat
H P
j j j
 and = + +
Table A.1  Loan security registration fees schedule
Mnemonic State for application of loan security registration fees
NSW VIC QLD SA WA   TAS    NT
MRF 50.00 59.00 59.00 65.00 62.00 80.00 90.00
PF 37.50 80.00 0.00 0.00 43.00 22.00 0.00
TRF 50.00 85.00 87.00a 0.00 62.00 0.00 0.00
a
  If LBj > 150,000, then TRF = 87+0.0016*LBj ,  else TRF=87.00.
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APPENDIX B
TAXATION SCHEDULES
This Appendix outlines taxation schedules used to calculate the average tax rate applied
on taxable income in a given period and were sourced from Pitcher Partners (1997 and
various issues).  Schedules of marginal tax rates applied at different taxable income tiers
used in the historical and projection models are shown in the Table B.1.  The taxable
income tiers are expressed in dollar terms.
Table B.1   Marginal taxation rates and taxable income tiers schedule
Tier Historical model Projection model
Tiers Marginal tax rate Tiers Marginal tax rate
1 5,100 0.24 5,400 0.20
2 12,600 0.29 20,700 0.34
3 19,500 0.40 38,000 0.43
4 35,000 0.48 50,000 0.47
Given taxable income after income splitting with p number of partners and tax
averaging (TTFI ) , the average tax rate (atr) depends on the tiers set for taxable income
and the different marginal tax rates which apply at these tiers.  Using Table B.1 and
defining the taxable income tiers as Ti  where i = 1 4, ....,  with marginal tax rates, mtri ,
the structure of the income taxation system gives the following equations for calculating
the average tax rate:
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and subscripts are denoted by
i = credit policy set;
j = region-industry segment;
q = initial default risk grade;
h = initial security risk grade;
a = years since entrance into portfolio; and
t = simulation year.
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APPENDIX C
DISCOUNT RATE AND LOAN PRICING MODEL
C.1 Introduction
The aim of this Appendix is to present a long-run loan pricing model that gives
internally consistent relationships between the expected rates of interest charged to
borrowers and the discount rate.  In calculating the discount rate, the weighted average
cost of capital approach implies a certain target rate of return on equity and therefore a
particular profit margin.  In turn, this profit margin must be added to the cost of funds
used to finance loan securities to ensure that the target rate of return on equity is
achieved.  In the next section, long run structural relationships for the bank balance
sheet are defined.  In Section C.3, linkages between the expected rates of interest
charged on the overdraft and term lending facilities for prime rate borrowers and the
target rate of return on equity are developed.  In the final section, the model is used to
derive the cost of funds for use in determining the discount rate.
C.2 Bank asset-liability model
Bank assets in the case of rural lending, denote these as  A, may be split into three components: net
lending balances BLN , reserve deposits, RD  and other asset support, OAS.
(C.1) A BLN RD OAS= + +
Reserve deposits are held for prudential purposes (RBA 1994).  In 1993-94, reserve
deposits included non-callable deposits, NCD and prime assets, PA .
(C.2) RD NCD PA= +
The required holdings of reserve deposits are determined by the size of risk weighted assets, which
are defined as net lending balances multiplied by a risk weighting factor plus other asset support.  In
the case of rural loans, net lending balances are 100% weighted (RBA 1994).  Accordingly, risk
weighted assets, RWA, are given by the following:
(C.3) RWA BLN OAS= +
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Aggregate non-lending asset balances may be defined by the following structural
relationships:
(C.4) NCD ncdrRWA= .
(C.5) PA parRWA= .
(C.6) OAS oasrA= .
where ncdr= non-callable deposits ratio;
par = prime assets ratio; and
oasr= other asset support ratio.
The bank asset model may be used to find the amount of bank assets, A, required to be
held for a unit of net lending balances, BLN .  Substituting equations (C.2) to (C.6) into
equation (C.1) and collecting like terms gives
(C.7) A BLN ncdr par RWA oasrA= + + +( ). .
  = + + + +BLN ncdr par BLN OAS oasrA( ).( ) .
  = + + + +BLN ncdr par BLN oasrA oasrA( ).( . ) .
  = + + + + +BLN ncdr par BLN oasr ncdr par A( ). .( ).1
Taking oasr ncdr par A.( ).+ +1  to the left side gives
(C.8) [ ]1 1 1-oasr ncdr par A ncdr par BLN( ) . ( ).+ + = + +
Equation (C.8) may be used to define a net lending balances multiplier, nblm, by taking
BLN  to the left side and [ ]1 1-oasr ncdr par( )+ +  to the right side
(C.9) nlbm
A
BLN
ncdr par
oasr ncdr par
=
+ +
+ +
=
-
1
1 1.( )
Against bank assets, banks hold debt, D , and equity, E .
(C.10) A D E= +
where equity and debt may be determined by the long run equity-asset ratio, er, used to
calculate the discount rate.
(C.11) E er A= .
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(C.12) D er A= -( ).1
Since lending assets of differing maturities are held, short term debt, DST ,  and long
term debt, DLT ,  are assumed to be held in the equivalent proportions to the overdraft
and term loan balances relative to total net lending balances respectively.
(C.13) D D DST LT= +
(C.14) D bodrDST = .
(C.15) D btlrDLT = .
where bodr= share of overdraft lending balances of total net lending balances and
btlr = share of term lending balances of total net lending balances.
Capital adequacy regulations define minimum capital ratios, called Tier One and Tier
Two capital ratios, within which banking institutions must operate (RBA 1994).  In
particular, if equity is solely used as Tier Two capital, a side constraint on the size of
equity required may be defined by the minimum Tier Two capital ratio requirement as
follows:
(C.16)
E
RWA
³ 8%
Given the bank asset-liability model above, the relationship defined in equation (C.16)
may be expressed solely in terms of the asset multipliers as follows
(C.17)
E
RWA
E
BLN OAS
er A
nlbm A oasrA
er nlbm
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=
+
=
+
= +æ
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1
1
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C.3 Loan pricing model
The loan pricing model is used to link the target return on equity, rE , to the expected
rates of interest charged to borrowers, denoted by E ro( )  for the overdraft facility and
E rb( )  for the term lending facility.  The aim is to determine the size of profit margin
that must be added to cost of funds so as to ensure that target profitability on lending
balances is achieved.
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Lets define the expected return on assets, rA ,  as the product of the target return on
equity and the long run equity-asset ratio.
(C.18) r r erA E=  . 
The expected return on assets may be broken up into its components as follows:
(C.19) r ctr iir ier niir nierA = - - + -( ).( )1
where iir = interest income ratio;
ier = interest expense ratio;
niir = non-interest income ratio;
nier = non-interest expense ratio; and
ctr = company tax rate.
If the net interest margin, nim, is given by
(C.20) nim iir ier= -
then substituting equation (C.20) into equation (C.19), and setting equation (C.19) equal
to equation (C.18) gives:
(C.21) r er ctr nim niir nierE  . = - + -( ).( )1
If a target return on equity is substituted into equation (C.21), then this equation may be
rearranged to give a target net lending margin that is required on lending assets, denote
this as nim' 
(C.22) nim
r er
ctr
nier niirE'
( )
=
-
+ -
 . 
1
The profit margin required on net lending balances may be found by using nim'  and
the net lending balances multiplier as follows:
(C.23) pm nim nlbm= ' . .
The components of the profit margin may be defined as follows
(C.24) pm
II IE
BLN
=
-
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where
(C.25) II II IIOD TL= +
(C.26) IE IE IEOD TL= +
(C.27)
II
BLN
E ro BOD
BLN
E ro bodrOD = =
( ).
( ).
(C.28)
II
BLN
E ro BTL
BLN
E ro btlrTL = =
( ).
( ).
(C.29)
IE
BLN
c bodrD
BLN
c bodr er nlbmOD ST TL= = -
. .
. .( ).1
(C.30)
IE
BLN
c btlrD
BLN
c btlr er nlbmTL TL TL= = -
. .
. .( ).1
Substituting equations (C.25) to (C.30) into (C.24) gives
(C.31) pm E ro bodr E rb btlr
c bodr er nlbm c btlr er nlbmST LT
= +
- - - -
( ). ( ).
. .( ). . .( ).       1 1
Collecting like terms results in the following
(C.32) ( ) ( )pm E ro c er nlbmbodr E rb c er nlbmbtlrST LT= - - + - -( ) .( ). . ( ) .( ). .1 1
Lets define the following profit margins required on net lending balances differentiated
by loan product as follows
(C.33) pm E ro c er nlbmOD ST= - -( ) .( ).1
(C.34) pm E rb c er nlbmTL LT= - -( ) .( ).1 .
If profit margins on each lending facility are equalised (ie, p pm mOD TL= ), equations
(C.33) and (C.34) may be rearranged to give unique values for E ro( )  and E rb( )
(C.35) E ro c er nlbm mST( ) .( ).= - +1 p
(C.36) E rb c er nlbm mLT( ) .( ).= - +1 p
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where p p pm m bodr m btlrST LT= +. .  and therefore p pm m bodr btlr= +.( )  with
(bodr btlr+ )=1.  Importantly, the target profit margin, pm, is given by equation (C.23).
C.4 Cost of funds model
The long run cost of funds for use in the discount rate formula may be defined as the ratio of interest
expenses to total assets.
(C.37) r
IE
AD
=
This ratio is simply the weighed average cost of short and long term cost of funds.  Using equation
(C.26) and components of equations (C.29) and C.30) and substituting these into equation (C.37)
gives the costs of funds in terms of unit cost of funds and the equity-asset ratio as follows
(C.38) rD =
+c D c D
A
ST ST LT LT. .
=
+c bodrD c btlrD
A
ST LT. . . .
( )= +c bodr c btlr D AST LT. . . /
( )= + -c bodr c btlr erST LT. . .( )1 .
This gives the cost of funds for use in the discount rate module.
299
APPENDIX D
ACCOUNTING LINKAGES BETWEEN THE FARM MODEL AND THE
BANK MODEL
D.1 Introduction
In this Appendix, the accounting relationships for measuring bank returns and bank
loan assets at the farm level are described for different problem-loan resolution policy
options.  These accounting measures are defined in accordance to central bank
guidelines regarding recognition and measurement of performing and impaired assets
outlined in RBA (1993, 1995b).  In Section D.2, outcomes for bank returns and bank
loan assets at the farm level are canvassed in the case where no loan restructuring policy
is offered to defaulting exposures.  In Section, D.3, these outcomes are outlined in the
case where loan-restructuring policy is offered to fully secured defaulting exposures.  In
Section D.4, the analysis is extended to include the policy option where loan
restructuring is also offered to defaulting exposures when they are not fully secured.
D.2 No restructuring
D.2.1 Scenarios for measurement
If credit policy does not permit restructuring of defaulting exposures, three possible
scenarios may result in terms of the measurement of bank revenue, provisionings and
net lending balances.  In Figure D.1, a flow chart maps these scenarios.  Each scenario
depends on whether the farm model performs or defaults in the current period and
whether the bank realises a capital loss in event of default.
Figure D.1 Scenarios for calculation of bank returns and bank loan assets if no
restructuring option offered to defaulting exposures
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D.2.2 Loan revenue
Loan revenue is equal to income from interest and bank fees and charges, and the
amount of revenue received depends on whether the farm model defaults and the stage
of maturity of the term loan with each scenario defined in Figure D.1.
(D.1) RL
II BFC
ijqhat
ijqhat ijqhat
=
+
- -
é
ë
ê
ê
ê
          Scenario P
                              Scenarios FD  and FD0 1 2
where
(D.2) II IO ITijqhat ijqhat ijqhat= +
(D.3) BFC
BF BC a
BF a
ijqhat
ijqhat
ijqhat
=
+é
ë
ê
ê
ê
          if =
                  if >
1
1
and RLijqhat = average revenue from loans in ijqha portfolio segment in time
period t;
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II ijqhat = average interest income from loans in ijqha portfolio segment in
time period t;
BFCijqhat = average bank fees and charges income from loans in ijqha
portfolio segment in time period t;
CSRijqhat = cash surplus including credit reserves for the farm model in ijqha
portfolio segment in time period t;
IOijqhat = overdraft interest paid by the farm model in ijqha portfolio
segment in time period t;
ITijqhat = term loan interest paid by the farm model in the ijqha portfolio
segment in time period t;
BFijqhat = bank fees paid by the farm model in ijqha portfolio segment in
time period t; and
BC = bank charges paid by the farm model
where subscripts are denoted by
i = credit policy set;
j = region-industry segment;
q = initial default risk grade;
h = initial security risk grade;
a = years since entrance into portfolio; and
t = simulation year.
D.2.3 Provisionings
If in the event of default, a capital loss unexpectedly occurs, provisionings are equal to
the writeoff not specifically provided for.  Under a policy of no restructuring, specific
new provisionings, writebacks and writeoffs of bad and doubtful debts specifically
provided for are not relevant.
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(D.4) PB
S P FD
WNSP S FD
ijqhat
ijqhat
=
-
-
é
ë
ê
ê
ê
0                        cenarios and 
          cenario 
1
2
and
(D.5) WNSP L s Cijqhat ijqhat
m
jt jt= - .
where PBijqhat = average provisionings for loans in ijqha portfolio segment in time
period t;
WNSPijqhat= average writeoff not specifically provided for from loans in ijqha
portfolio segment in time period t;
sjt = salvage value of collateral for the farm model in j portfolio
segment in time period t;
C jt = value of collateral for the farm model in j portfolio segment in
time period t; and
Lijqhat
m = maximum value of liabilities held by the farm model in ijqha
portfolio segment in time period t.
D.2.4 Net lending balances
At the start of the first year of loan drawings, net lending balances are set equal to the
once-off term loan drawing by the farm model, since the opening balance on the
overdraft facility of the farm model is assumed to be equal to zero.  The measure of net
lending balances is equivalent to loan drawings made at the beginning of a simulation
year.
(D.6) BLN LTijqha t ijqha t= - = -=0 1 0 1
where BLNijqha t= -0 1 = average opening net lending balances for loans in ijqh
portfolio segment for portfolio entrants in time period t and
LTijqha t= -0 1 =initial term loan drawing for the farm model in ijqh portfolio
segment for portfolio entrants in time period t.
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The closing value of average net lending balances is found by adding the change in
average net lending balances during time period t to the opening value of average net
lending balances:
(D.7) BLN BLN BLNijqhat ijqha t ijqhat= +- -1 1 D
where DBLNijqhat = change in average closing net lending balances for loans in
ijqha portfolio segment in time period t.
The change in the average value of net lending balances in given by the following
identity:
(D.8) DBLN IC LD RPT WNSPijqhat ijqhat ijqhat ijqhat ijqhat= + - -
where IC ijqhat =average interest capitalisation for loans in ijqha portfolio segment
in time period t;
LDijqhat =average loan drawings for loans in ijqha portfolio segment in time
period t; and
RPTijqhat =average loan repayments for loans in ijqha portfolio segment in
time period t.
Interest capitalisation is equivalent to interest income and depends on the performance
of the farm model in a particular time period.
(D.9) IC
II S P
S FD FD
ijqhat
ijqhat
=
- -
é
ë
ê
ê
ê
                  cenario 
                       
                         cenarios  and  0 1 2
Loan repayments and drawings depend on the current and prior history of negative
balances on the overdraft facility and the performance of the farm model.  Since interest
is only earned on negative balances, the bank model considers only negative overdraft
balances.  In Figure D.2, a flow chart illustrates how loan repayments and drawings on
the overdraft facility of the farm model are measured for the bank model.  The variable
LO represents the actual overdraft balance of the farm model and may contain either
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positive or negative values.  The variable LOB represents the overdraft balance used for
calculating the change in the overdraft balance in a particular period for bank accounting
purposes.
Figure D.2 Calculation of loan repayments and loan drawings on the overdraft
facility for the bank model
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Given Figures D.1 and D.2, average loan drawings from the portfolio segment for the
bank model depends on the performance of the farm model and whether the change in
LOB was negative during the period.
(D.10) LD
LOB S P
LOB LOB S P
FD FD
ijqhat
ijqhat
ijqhat ijqhat=
³
<
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ê
0
0 1 2
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                      Scenarios  and 
D
D D
Loan repayments for the bank model depends on the default status of the farm model.
If the farm model does not default, term loan principal repayments are made and a
repayment on the overdraft facility may occur.  If the farm model defaults and the loan
is fully secured, the repayment incorporates the maximum farm liabilities outstanding,
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Lm.  If however, the loan is not fully secured, then the bank only salvages the sale value
of the collateral pledged against the loan.
(D.11) RPT
P LOB P
P LOB LOB P
L FD
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D.3 Restructuring fully secured
D.3.1 Scenarios for measurement
If credit policy permits restructuring of defaulting exposures on the proviso that loan
balances are fully secured, several circumstances result in terms of the measurement of
bank revenue, provisionings and net lending balances.  In Figure D.3, a flowchart maps
several scenarios with each scenario depending on whether the farm model performs or
defaults in the current period, whether the farm model is successfully restructured in
event of default, whether the farm model performed or was successfully restructured in
the previous period, whether the farm model had been previously restructured and
whether the farm model is fully secured or not fully secured.
In outlining the measures of bank returns and bank loan assets, the following
prerequisites are assumed to be required to be satisfied if restructuring is to proceed:
· restructuring is offered only once during the maturity term;
· restructuring is only offered to fully secured exposures with secured status based on
the expected value of the collateral (in other words E s C Lm( ). ³ ); and
· restructuring is not offered to exposures in their first or final years of maturities.
If the above prerequisites are satisfied, then restructuring comprises one of the two
following options: first, term loan interest only with principal repayment forgiven or
second, forgiveness of term loan interest for one year with interest capitalised into term
loan principal.
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The two options are assessed under the following restructuring conditions.
· the maximum credit limit is fixed; no extension is offered, though the measurement
of returns and loan balances for the bank model outlined below are equally applicable
in the case when credit limit extension is granted: and
· overdraft interest and bank fees and charges are paid regardless of whether or not
restructuring occurs; and
· restructuring is successful if following restructuring, forgiveness of term loan principal
or interest provides the farm model with adequate liquidity, and the loan is fully
secured.
D.3.2 Loan revenue
Loan revenue received from income from interest and bank fees and charges depend on
the default and secured status of the farm model and whether restructuring of defaulting
exposures was successful.  If the farm model enters partial default (that is, restructuring
is successful), term loan interest is credited to loan revenue regardless of the
restructuring option since loan balances are fully secured.  Under ‘interest only’, term
loan interest payment are made.  Under ‘interest forgiveness’, term loan interest
payments are in arrears and the proportion of the fair value of security as measured by
E sjt( ) is sufficient to cover payment of total loan principal and accrued interest.
(D.12) RL
IO IT BFC
ijqhat
ijqhat ijqhat ijqhat
=
é
ë
ê
ê
ê
+ +                 Scenario P-1, P-2 and PD
                                                 Scenarios FD-1 to FD-60
Figure D.3 Scenarios for calculation of bank returns and bank loan assets if
restructuring occurs when defaulting exposures are fully secured
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D.3.3 Provisionings
Under a policy of restructuring fully secured borrowers, specific provisionings for bad
and doubtful debts are not incurred with writeoffs not specifically provided for loan
assets being made in event of default if a capital loss is made.
(D.13) PB
WNSP
ijqhat
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=
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ê
ê
ê
0                    Scenarios P-1, P-2, PD, FD-1, FD-3 and FD-5
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(D.14) WNSP L s Cijqhat ijqhat
m
jt jt=  -  .
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D.3.4 Net lending balances
The change in the average value of net lending balances is found by using equation (D.8)
with interest held in reserve being an additional variable included.  Interest capitalisation
is equivalent to interest income and depends on the performance of the farm model and
the restructuring option utilised in a particular time period.
Interest only option
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Interest forgiveness option
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Loan drawings depend on the current and prior history of negative balances on the
overdraft facility and the default status of the farm model.
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Loan repayments depend on the restructuring option utilised and the default status of
the farm model.  If partial default occurs, under the interest only option, term loan
principal payment is forgiven.  In contrast, a principal repayment is made under the
‘interest forgiveness’ option if partial default occurs.
Interest only option
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Interest forgiveness option
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D.4 Restructuring not fully secured
D.4.1 Scenarios for measurement
If credit policy permits restructuring of defaulting exposures on both fully secured and
not fully secured loan balances, several circumstances result in terms of the way bank
revenue, provisionings and net lending balances are measured.  In Figure D.4, several
scenarios are mapped depending on whether the farm model performs or defaults in the
current period, whether the farm model performed or defaulted in the previous period,
whether the farm model had been restructured previously, whether the farm model is
fully secured or not fully secured and whether provisionings in the previous period were
adequate or inadequate.
D.4.2 Loan revenue
If default of the farm model occurred in the previous year, and if restructuring was
successful, term loan interest held in reserve is counted to interest income in the current
period.  For the purpose of the analysis, if a loan is restructured, it is defined as an
impaired asset, and therefore regarded as a non-accrual regardless of whether ‘interest
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only’ or ‘interest forgiveness’ options are utilised.  While non-accrual status may also
apply to fee income, it is assumed that fees must be paid and are thus counted to the
profit and loss statement.
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+                               Scenarios PD-2
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where
(D.21) IR ITijqhat ijqha t= - -1 1
and IRijqhat = average interest held in reserve from loans in ijqha portfolio
segment in time period t.
Figure D.4 Scenarios for calculation of bank returns and bank loan assets
under restructuring option that includes defaulting exposures not
fully secured
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D.4.3 Provisionings
Under a policy where no restructuring is permitted on under-secured exposures, specific
provisionings for bad and doubtful debts are incurred if restructuring is successful but a
capital loss may be expected.  In the event that a specific provisioning was made in the
previous period, and the farm model resumes performance, a writeback of the specific
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provisioning is required.  On the other hand, writeoffs not specifically provided for loan
assets are required in event of default if a capital loss is eventuates.  The size of the
writeoff depends on the whether the farm model was restructured in the previous
period and, if restructured, whether the specific provisioning was adequate to cover the
actual capital loss.
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D.4.4 Net lending balances
The change in the average value of net lending balances is found by using equation (D.8)
combined with interest held in reserve and provisionings.
(D.26) DBLN IC LD RPT SPN WBS WNSPijqhat ijqhat ijqhat ijqhat ijqhat ijqhat ijqhat= + - - + -
where interest capitalisation, loan drawings and loan repayments are equal to equations
(D.27), (D.28) and D.29) respectively as follows.
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APPENDIX E
DATA AND PARAMETER ASSUMPTIONS
E.1 Gross farm income module
Table E.1  Gross farm income data (expressed in 1995-96 dollar terms) a
Region-
industry   1978-79    1979-80     1980-81      1981-82   1982-83   1983-84     1984-85
1   246,695      233,063      194,975      207,660   176,590   203,030      237,602
2   333,697      423,681      291,511      402,927   229,850   339,361      368,684
3   154,725      311,627      172,233      221,939   134,320   283,961      195,587
4   208,424      277,457      342,734      286,598   172,574   220,843      226,723
5   144,679      180,031      231,596      255,489   235,548   255,315      201,913
6   169,720      285,821      178,073      154,989   132,228   137,847      157,153
7     88,272        83,974      103,919        72,485     65,969     79,108        49,983
8   134,053      168,505      187,720      191,538   178,891   166,896      167,486
9   211,840      261,055      285,692      326,815   112,047   422,397      159,714
10   214,935      149,447      255,388      186,206     70,537   200,108      176,872
11   163,686      161,340      223,116      187,064     93,370   168,108      173,877
12   116,320      124,918      143,398      133,718   154,814   142,817      134,765
13   117,239        92,158      176,700      118,902   176,627     97,533      119,090
14   125,168      150,864      187,979      163,027   115,921     51,856        82,254
15   171,688      181,825      163,304      160,832   104,166   173,293      154,303
16   118,535      114,412      123,579      122,999   129,604   131,953      111,997
17   392,258      580,800      489,645      749,671   379,581   707,911      345,177
18   539,632      441,005      475,417      443,254   295,554   585,317      700,555
19   267,266      573,201      315,523      224,016   369,996   337,153      411,681
20   324,702      440,343      257,190      273,809   280,480   237,359      437,447
21   125,800      189,213      106,888      193,283   174,275   199,565      117,032
22   105,670      112,969      127,392      139,566   120,919   122,333      114,793
23   243,452      222,839      202,324      315,206   169,657   374,060      393,957
24   311,087      296,094      241,408      376,920   187,982   257,503      252,683
25   131,940      134,186      150,866      158,616   140,650   127,186      181,965
26   329,715      405,228      403,123      378,330   254,407   262,395      258,009
27   478,742      583,421      533,321      622,567   228,880   180,102      205,462
28   219,732      291,965      290,416      301,833   127,780   355,074      209,413
29   127,939      206,697      196,697      203,239   133,957   157,319      179,018
30   195,302      220,406      209,288      180,636   171,522   180,760      152,280
31   142,461      135,744      155,286      149,673   172,098   153,499      136,467
32   264,399      229,428      186,607      197,140   235,538   238,871      262,076
33   287,531      344,054      360,363      373,259   355,424   347,151      340,013
34   269,481      283,539      400,468      420,082   391,542   351,412      482,156
35   211,820      136,018        91,405      116,076   121,265     62,746        93,634
36   205,612      201,409      241,858      186,352   159,626   131,730      124,954
37   236,118      242,092      208,901      202,501   222,154   214,966      216,716
38   199,826      267,806      161,787      172,745   224,153   178,830      212,973
39   227,683      218,929      158,074      167,509   245,052   170,124      114,765
40   139,171      124,951      120,614      138,466   133,427   108,343      109,028
41   898,656   1,019,160   1,185,890   1,077,281   625,585   696,108      765,912
42   821,055   1,261,750      901,133      658,070   823,013   993,408   1,308,762
Column
average
248,017 294,367 272,233 276,507 214,942 257,277 258,213
Source: ABARE (1997a and various issues).
a    Nominal times series data deflated by the Australian consumer price index.
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Table E.1  Gross farm income data (continued)
Region-
industry   1985-86  1986-87  1987-88  1988-89   1989-90  1990-91  1991-92  1992-93 1993-94
1   211,817   254,662   301,319   335,599   384,061   243,057   173,880   140,036   184,328
2   275,290   256,977   284,495   354,395   374,463   355,224   407,077   403,546   393,417
3   215,295   182,325   237,337   321,962   196,640   194,142   162,122   180,268   199,389
4   202,163   205,398   238,100   228,646   213,822   194,489   231,727   259,557   307,784
5   208,987   192,662   172,728   223,981   203,191   177,445   203,015   232,492   249,157
6   184,828   151,551   196,382   204,009   203,441   147,094   124,286   113,718   134,937
7     89,892     73,123     87,452     94,684     79,051     60,448     63,596     65,568     84,938
8   167,893   161,625   155,350   171,885   156,245   165,366   177,170   211,196   210,521
9   141,077   277,193   254,153   238,350   225,953   141,233   136,017   256,009   198,098
10   168,006   158,795   167,019   193,618   234,047   118,960   139,595   212,809   237,060
11   163,030   138,394   154,794   127,524   154,778     94,428   138,416   155,939   121,390
12   130,073   147,252   155,476   185,232   194,715   164,010   162,229   190,838   203,172
13   150,091   166,770   191,225   185,473   151,606   129,940   103,051     77,661     72,765
14     96,123   100,120     72,832     79,682     72,398     61,046     56,353     77,261   111,110
15   134,302   161,575   199,169   173,008     93,642     78,203     58,278     87,331   103,010
16   119,957   144,543   147,737   186,445   170,762   151,697   174,814   185,120   188,225
17   485,963   684,952   467,239   438,604   310,265   474,659   253,696   338,362   480,420
18   416,239   692,282   695,613   587,025   697,638   503,694   412,820   386,443   464,860
19   301,007   317,458   408,620   324,140   250,528   264,038   220,373   241,706   267,655
20   297,931   315,579   386,839   369,732   314,889   297,189   238,457   220,992   216,569
21   179,892   136,610   146,096   184,735   153,513   140,336   152,530   154,758   132,220
22   110,754   114,370   111,822   132,111   120,923   158,667   152,089   161,199   171,360
23   297,101   203,050   312,758   391,252   304,311   303,421   242,510   233,526   218,713
24   230,867   263,841   194,973   263,168   250,909   195,867   216,612   248,505   248,919
25   163,758   209,071   140,366   136,032   120,737   149,268   100,929   162,420   214,849
26   226,845   332,641   152,266   136,491   205,428   158,276   142,377   226,754   214,563
27   261,799   387,524   329,024   372,743   396,002   354,856   254,521   261,048   300,633
28   227,982   202,540   215,330   150,336   250,507   152,215   223,998   189,816   206,146
29   175,223   162,844   164,573   150,951   203,061   137,600   168,150   184,516   195,803
30   167,210   187,331   204,606   197,803   173,583   125,304   120,535   152,314   141,853
31   134,433   158,478   146,710   160,349   159,662   150,982   166,832   187,579   193,302
32   237,318   251,405   314,050   320,429   210,122   262,561   163,132   180,266   226,235
33   284,998   306,530   367,619   395,881   406,443   263,988   275,253   323,178   357,786
34   308,357   365,653   324,670   370,498   383,325   292,895   286,288   376,955   469,181
35   111,674     93,981     83,835     80,976   143,827   100,878     88,643     98,650   113,177
36   136,751   176,560   234,056   225,168   180,377   136,312     96,199   142,454   134,180
37   213,867   216,801   206,656   247,349   245,733   254,325   273,182   279,768   288,482
38   190,131   223,592   211,683   219,833   210,301   190,069   143,835   153,687   143,298
39   150,270   183,800   173,738   169,820   145,057   131,629   118,570   148,557   175,623
40   123,571   141,151   144,530   175,786   182,562   165,584   158,630   188,494   196,295
41   608,148   523,383   409,370   637,134   535,420   498,011   332,370   334,022   487,847
42   853,415   745,386   847,184   860,515   888,288   837,283   820,991   820,310   817,288
Column
average
227,484 246,899 247,852 261,985 251,244 218,493 198,456 220,134 239,918
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Table E.1  Gross farm income data (continued)
Region-
industry     1994-95     1995-96 E(GIB)a DW b
1      211,333   181,527 228,957 0.676
2      248,761   390,133 340,749 2.224
3      140,838   160,754 203,637 2.486
4      268,356   286,949 242,908 1.087
5      263,875   279,918 217,334 0.766
6      139,815     81,268 160,953 1.554
7        94,368     62,647 77,749 1.981
8      238,637   241,537 180,695 0.504
9      152,687   303,785 228,006 2.726
10      142,819   258,018 182,458 2.349
11      147,797   162,862 151,662 2.186
12      222,264   241,514 163,751 0.969
13      110,054     81,150 128,780 1.222
14        75,998     76,559 97,586 0.959
15      174,833   109,264 137,890 1.327
16      215,402   226,694 153,582 1.116
17      394,223   400,663 465,227 2.718
18      493,178   475,701 517,012 1.498
19      234,092   198,502 307,053 2.406
20      224,897   189,812 295,790 1.771
21      135,067   142,810 153,590 2.894
22      165,475   167,435 133,880 0.883
23      274,912   257,327 275,576 1.733
24      252,864   138,013 246,012 2.73
25      104,860   110,026 146,540 1.928
26      100,227   250,295 246,520 1.786
27      324,747   258,230 351,868 1.044
28      209,682   260,347 226,951 2.846
29      201,251   302,180 180,612 1.365
30      178,181   153,228 172,897 1.161
31      205,248   212,229 162,280 0.843
32      233,710   225,855 235,508 1.298
33      369,580   425,936 343,610 1.136
34      474,867   545,433 377,600 1.174
35        92,777   115,831 108,734 1.292
36      188,666   122,110 168,021 1.055
37      314,381   332,808 245,378 0.485
38      186,384   100,851 188,432 2.009
39      170,906   163,018 168,507 1.495
40      194,341   246,247 155,066 0.895
41      408,198   355,542 633,224 1.394
42   1,060,244   799,691 895,433 2.001
Column
average
239,067 240,350 245,191 1.570
a Exponential of the simple average of the logarithm of gross farm
income in real terms for the 18 year period to 1995-96.
b Durbin-Watson statistic for the regression GIt = ß0+ ß1.t
(see Section 13.5.2, p 224).
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Table E.2  Gross farm income covariance matrix data  (expressed in
log-transformed 1995-96 dollar terms) a
Region-
industry
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 0.0579 0 0 0 0 0.0414 0 -0.0207 0 0
2 0.0347 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 0.0595 0 0 0.0383 0 0 0 0
4 0.0303 0 0 0 0.0151 0 0.0329
5 0.0284 -0.0245 0 0.0207 0 0
6 0.0707 0.0249 -0.0239 0 0
7 0.0351 0 0 0
8 0.0217 0 0
9 0.1226 0.0704
10 0.0938
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
a Covariances estimated from log-transformed historical series on gross farm income data given in Table E.1.
Covariance measures with correlation coefficients between -0.5 and +0.5 are set to zero.
Table E.2  Gross farm income covariance matrix data (continued)
Region-
industry
11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
1 0 0 0.0428 0 0 0 0 0.0411 0 0.0376
318
2 0 0 -0.0358 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0324 0
4 0.0213 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
5 0 0.0197 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -0.0273
6 0 -0.0288 0 0 0 -0.0312 0 0 0.0470 0.0506
7 0 0 0 0 0.0335 0 0 0 0 0
8 0 0.0215 -0.0226 0 0 0.0212 0 0 0 -0.0248
9 0.0435 0 0 0 0 0 0.0575 0 0 0
10 0.0438 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
11 0.0440 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
12 0.0404 0 0 0 0.0421 0 0 -0.0285 -0.0283
13 0.0917 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0360
14 0.1254 0 0 0 0 0 0
15 0.1167 0 0.0575 0 0.0459 0
16 0.0481 0 0 -0.0351 -0.0314
17 0.0792 0 0 0
18 0.0527 0 0
19 0.0675 0.0473
20 0.0563
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
Table E.2  Gross farm income covariance matrix data (continued)
Region-
industry
21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 0.0240 0 0.0312 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0235 0.0240 0 0
5 0 0.0162 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0186 0 0.0151
6 0 -0.0281 0 0.0296 0 0 0.0505 0 0 0.0272 -0.0258
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7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0204 0
8 0 0.0193 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0197 0 0.0163
9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0604 0 0 0
10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0449 0.0311 0 0
11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0429 0 0 0
12 0 0.0251 0 -0.0222 0 -0.0462 0 0 0 0 0.0240
13 0 -0.0281 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
14 0 0 0 0 0 0.0979 0.0850 0 0 0.0311 0
15 0 -0.0298 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0482 0
16 0 0.0275 0 0 0 -0.0559 0 0 0 0 0.0257
17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
18 0 0 0.0306 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
19 0 -0.0279 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0228 -0.0212
20 0 -0.0284 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -0.0252
21 0.0305 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
22 0.0260 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -0.0165 0.0174
23 0.0542 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
24 0.0450 0 0 0.0393 0 0 0 0
25 0.0422 0 0 0 0 0 0
26 0.1509 0 0 0 0 0
27 0.1192 0 0 0.0292 0
28 0.0637 0.0256 0 0
29 0.0382 0 0
30 0.0270 0
31 0.0180
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
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Table E.2  Gross farm income covariance matrix data (continued)
Region-
industry
32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42
1 0.0255 0 0 0 0.0312 0 0.0302 0 0 0 0
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
5 0 0.0127 0.0257 0 0 0 -0.0204 0 0 0 0
6 0 0 -0.0266 0 0.0425 -0.0208 0.0468 0 0 0.0591 0
7 0 0 0 0 0.0329 0 0 0 0 0 0
8 0 0 0.0213 0 0 0.0145 -0.0210 0 0.0193 0 0
9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
12 0 0 0.0242 0 0 0.0236 -0.0241 0 0.0393 -0.0556 0
13 0 0 0 0 0.0428 -0.0278 0.0363 0 0 0 0
14 0 0 0 0 0.0483 0 0 0.0351 0 0.0999 0
15 0.0322 0 0 0 0.0602 0 0 0 0 0.0743 0
16 0 0 0 0 0 0.0270 -0.0271 0 0.0445 -0.0664 0
17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0551 0
18 0.0198 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
19 0 0 0 0 0 -0.0204 0.0421 0 -0.0376 0 0.0263
20 0.0229 0 0 0 0 -0.0200 0.0433 0 -0.0281 0 0
21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
22 0 0 0 0 0 0.0184 -0.0250 0 0.0266 -0.0346 0
23 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
24 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0503 0
25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
26 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.1061 0
27 0 0 0 0 0.0609 0 0 0 0 0.0736 0
28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
29 0 0.0152 0.0241 0 0 0 -0.0237 0 0 0 0
30 0 0 0 0 0.0358 0 0.0188 0.0202 0 0.0375 0
31 0 0 0.0166 0 0 0.0158 -0.0192 0 0.0240 -0.0328 0
32 0.0291 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
33 0.0176 0.0184 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
34 0.0395 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
35 0.0659 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
36 0.0635 0 0.0281 0.0259 0 0 0
37 0.0211 -0.0183 0 0.0273 -0.0365 0
38 0.0475 0 -0.0269 0 0
39 0.0384 0 0 0
40 0.0483 -0.0580 0
41 0.1499 0
42 0.0271
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E.2 Farm cost module
Table E.3  Farm costs data (expressed in 1995-96 dollar terms) a
Region-
industry 1978-79 1979-80 1980-81 1981-82 1982-83 1983-84 1984-85 1985-86 1986-87
1 161,490 151,473 182,481 177,162 160,332 166,192 177,786 178,694 184,592
2 215,113 325,653 229,950 310,740 210,233 292,213 339,422 253,550 244,757
3 103,293 202,805 138,934 176,802 157,762 230,675 172,673 177,825 148,221
4 138,345 200,067 244,110 194,615 138,596 160,199 186,737 162,323 168,711
5 97,324 115,186 142,519 157,867 157,167 152,005 133,484 136,074 116,965
6 126,566 180,954 140,229 147,214 121,227 122,143 128,250 144,331 123,087
7 69,119 74,231 104,092 69,958 56,122 72,756 49,172 84,265 71,173
8 89,759 124,683 142,797 125,079 126,890 105,532 112,017 115,544 109,909
9 149,906 166,911 183,766 216,481 139,240 341,741 165,374 143,315 218,570
10 129,798 94,304 153,143 105,652 83,959 169,077 133,839 140,765 117,615
11 112,316 112,780 147,521 132,934 96,393 153,402 146,017 142,710 114,044
12 80,667 78,422 94,852 87,585 107,348 103,396 94,372 94,725 98,312
13 75,118 54,665 123,849 84,820 112,912 75,375 89,264 106,347 116,446
14 78,104 103,088 133,228 110,543 97,903 36,321 70,785 75,856 76,896
15 127,713 132,263 124,432 125,231 97,052 141,870 117,986 103,652 120,776
16 72,759 82,286 79,322 84,608 93,752 97,645 81,431 80,355 96,891
17 227,182 343,865 402,412 463,040 300,880 439,103 233,729 389,382 391,417
18 359,105 313,280 287,737 366,792 330,531 454,519 590,025 291,248 550,384
19 135,680 281,201 235,755 194,398 302,337 325,239 283,850 284,275 276,955
20 219,801 328,906 213,316 203,723 209,749 211,818 282,836 237,915 255,845
21 86,598 134,232 82,612 131,202 130,197 129,307 91,505 146,445 130,803
22 65,942 78,176 89,740 93,212 87,330 89,614 83,208 81,190 86,425
23 152,037 162,716 158,828 239,614 176,782 264,506 382,533 246,370 199,455
24 170,101 188,867 180,900 268,654 156,744 238,364 199,555 231,038 189,411
25 86,707 86,315 107,881 121,632 110,084 87,617 155,512 152,382 122,349
26 252,936 279,424 262,349 341,333 213,959 204,094 189,842 206,681 209,340
27 289,746 366,181 355,187 363,132 230,342 175,783 266,993 224,938 251,807
28 168,295 182,739 216,321 218,573 138,073 227,846 175,964 205,543 173,006
29 92,956 115,987 131,556 134,681 113,536 112,318 136,699 129,761 130,151
30 120,378 165,324 151,168 136,008 144,334 151,938 149,150 154,332 140,922
31 94,649 92,692 106,568 110,947 139,673 101,729 104,754 99,442 115,790
32 238,280 208,514 223,151 204,995 198,969 235,593 243,691 219,469 216,148
33 228,048 266,867 272,624 311,109 273,703 290,756 251,143 231,351 245,893
34 226,095 233,381 299,517 301,330 298,750 320,376 367,573 262,253 283,054
35 144,382 96,125 78,231 98,834 96,451 64,872 78,105 95,288 91,902
36 149,702 158,056 174,376 152,200 135,130 118,091 105,258 112,292 128,182
37 166,464 156,562 146,409 144,279 161,189 155,236 146,932 146,486 145,651
38 142,883 204,015 121,179 130,545 187,247 148,779 155,164 154,520 159,213
39 177,227 174,244 119,922 138,752 196,758 145,150 99,594 125,405 148,309
40 95,475 84,000 85,661 102,777 90,607 73,414 78,252 83,286 94,478
41 967,577 703,046 823,659 750,722 700,619 767,614 694,637 533,154 471,240
42 462,353 776,778 742,726 696,361 797,591 1,258,512 1,239,072 1,269,765 1,125,454
Column
average
174,952 199,554 200,834 207,765 187,582 219,351 213,909 201,299 201,442
Source: ABARE (1997a and various issues).
a    Nominal times series data deflated by the Australian consumer price index.
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Table E.3  Farm costs data (continued)
Region-
industry 1987-88 1988-89 1989-90 1990-91 1991-92 1992-93 1993-94 1994-95 1995-96
1 180,270 224,621 291,182 211,869 149,405 145,784 150,066 158,008 173,356
2 219,563 258,272 256,914 299,546 315,647 318,450 296,275 197,386 244,237
3 167,925 210,828 143,290 155,580 124,932 138,177 164,045 118,063 116,091
4 158,747 170,156 159,547 168,182 185,934 199,185 228,494 194,867 205,917
5 90,386 146,779 144,987 125,807 145,899 167,659 168,355 201,465 195,725
6 128,322 132,819 143,567 119,379 107,613 104,550 104,153 114,295 84,072
7 84,364 87,023 82,896 54,026 62,084 59,441 51,723 81,024 72,499
8 103,418 127,419 120,328 129,337 133,272 145,070 146,331 187,995 181,968
9 192,050 191,096 164,026 131,628 112,095 184,759 161,742 125,962 204,507
10 114,456 137,990 146,916 106,952 113,249 159,418 181,504 116,996 158,499
11 100,430 85,997 122,922 93,574 112,907 120,064 92,329 120,286 107,954
12 114,388 125,550 131,585 121,002 116,659 138,921 144,936 166,031 169,338
13 107,192 110,750 98,691 120,396 98,887 72,539 68,023 89,208 77,393
14 56,900 66,619 54,037 54,004 49,465 78,821 74,009 67,412 68,500
15 145,796 136,683 68,208 67,650 55,671 72,476 92,636 120,168 92,157
16 104,041 112,444 110,495 100,760 119,853 124,172 135,409 167,771 163,076
17 403,011 281,605 171,836 278,663 192,364 285,060 281,384 288,745 331,687
18 430,894 368,047 482,280 380,899 328,961 298,725 284,048 380,603 452,704
19 261,363 242,069 201,137 206,754 172,350 197,237 217,765 188,716 161,816
20 252,772 302,447 229,651 237,672 212,084 194,727 185,116 190,397 160,887
21 120,101 140,322 119,106 121,179 118,789 111,650 112,053 106,155 98,346
22 79,559 96,843 84,759 113,813 115,595 127,993 124,771 130,649 130,964
23 267,264 264,577 240,506 259,770 185,893 185,141 196,188 209,702 217,529
24 172,499 192,153 202,312 139,991 168,714 197,157 227,641 197,797 121,266
25 123,106 116,301 93,828 100,912 83,640 115,197 142,697 88,058 92,650
26 105,036 123,714 131,503 155,887 130,569 178,467 146,473 115,658 222,122
27 256,510 307,396 271,092 265,120 193,353 208,546 214,089 224,175 198,624
28 170,819 134,499 157,737 145,672 171,125 155,988 178,526 180,566 180,902
29 114,967 117,219 134,112 125,207 132,825 139,300 153,517 142,720 185,188
30 148,235 137,198 136,144 110,344 101,962 113,072 121,153 129,028 124,989
31 114,359 117,984 122,939 116,740 129,938 132,236 150,584 166,676 163,524
32 240,995 249,406 203,639 262,215 184,377 204,830 233,227 244,295 272,329
33 272,521 275,521 302,764 229,864 217,591 265,143 289,702 286,545 300,157
34 259,608 254,927 282,663 244,594 238,209 302,816 377,575 347,629 389,220
35 80,107 74,003 133,646 82,834 73,468 85,727 84,340 94,388 100,820
36 153,159 159,215 127,239 115,097 97,788 135,807 114,504 132,763 100,646
37 139,239 168,824 165,987 165,635 181,540 191,999 203,662 236,353 236,459
38 137,990 136,760 150,794 173,027 131,618 135,974 131,388 163,699 101,420
39 130,255 128,003 108,681 120,560 106,048 129,062 147,280 133,140 136,052
40 103,241 104,774 118,482 119,344 118,190 128,273 139,375 148,820 184,436
41 489,929 490,526 416,033 353,417 373,677 297,704 394,367 364,306 289,092
42 867,380 820,977 825,227 911,787 750,282 904,591 836,701 758,612 718,474
Column average 189,599 193,580 186,993 180,873 164,631 182,188 189,242 187,551 190,181
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Table E.3  Farm costs data (continued)
Region-
industry E(FC)  a efc  b fvc  c ffc  d    r2  e
1 179,153 0.39 0.28 0.20 71%
2 268,218 0.36 0.46 0.11 62%
3 158,218 0.38 0.39 0.16 76%
4 181,374 0.40 0.46 0.13 85%
5 144,203 0.45 0.55 0.19 83%
6 126,265 0.34 0.34 0.09 83%
7 71,443 0.38 0.69 0.11 63%
8 129,297 0.35 0.71 0.13 89%
9 177,398 0.36 0.45 0.13 83%
10 131,341 0.39 0.36 0.09 68%
11 117,477 0.40 0.33 0.17 59%
12 114,894 0.43 0.57 0.19 97%
13 93,437 0.39 0.27 0.16 69%
14 75,138 0.37 0.39 0.19 90%
15 107,912 0.37 0.48 0.16 95%
16 105,948 0.38 0.57 0.17 93%
17 316,965 0.34 0.37 0.14 71%
18 386,154 0.30 0.52 0.08 64%
19 231,605 0.37 0.30 0.11 48%
20 229,426 0.37 0.34 0.19 85%
21 117,256 0.43 0.33 0.22 69%
22 97,766 0.35 0.78 0.10 95%
23 222,745 0.38 0.54 0.18 73%
24 191,287 0.40 0.35 0.14 52%
25 110,382 0.40 0.39 0.16 60%
26 192,744 0.35 0.35 0.28 83%
27 259,056 0.36 0.31 0.10 81%
28 176,789 0.41 0.32 0.08 75%
29 130,150 0.42 0.34 0.08 72%
30 135,315 0.35 0.34 0.10 52%
31 121,179 0.40 0.79 0.11 91%
32 226,895 0.39 0.11 0.24 37%
33 267,295 0.35 0.37 0.18 80%
34 293,865 0.36 0.48 0.13 89%
35 91,862 0.36 0.41 0.15 84%
36 131,639 0.35 0.37 0.11 87%
37 169,939 0.40 0.56 0.19 95%
38 148,123 0.35 0.41 0.09 65%
39 136,913 0.31 0.53 0.18 93%
40 108,494 0.37 0.61 0.14 94%
41 548,962 0.41 0.46 0.20 73%
42 875,702 0.31 0.32 0.07 9%
Column
average
192,862 0.37 0.44 0.15 41%
 a  Simple average of farm costs in real terms over the 18 year period to 1995-96.
 b  Simple average of fixed costs to total costs ratio as surveyed by ABARE over the 10 year period to 1995-96.
 c  Regression coefficient for the equation  FVC-E(FVC)=fvc.(GIB-E(GIB)) estimated for the region-industry
     segment over the 18 year period to 1995-96, where GIB and E(GIB) are given in Table E.1.
 d  Regression coefficient for the equation  FFC-E(FFC)=ffc.(GIB-E(GIB)) estimated for the region-industry
      segment over the 18 year period to 1995-96,  where GIB and E(GIB) are given in Table E.1.
 e  The r2 statistic measures the proportion of the variations in the total sum of squares of the actual series, FC,
     explained by the predicted series generated by FC=(1-efc).E(FC)+fvc.(GIB-E(GIB))+efc.E(FC)+ffc.(GIB-
E(GIB)) for the region-industry segment (see Johnston 1984, p 25).
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E.3 Personal expenses module
Table E.4  Personal expenses data (expressed in 1995-96 dollar terms) a
Region-
industry 1978-79 1979-80 1980-81 1981-82 1982-83 1983-84 1984-85 1985-86 1986-87
1 44,226 39,696 40,299 44,995 38,784 36,512 42,691 45,357 42,951
2 29,065 33,511 36,556 32,096 32,295 28,130 34,623 33,661 32,166
3 26,760 30,767 36,334 37,212 36,415 37,577 31,730 41,402 36,870
4 33,830 29,761 41,862 33,320 31,271 25,633 30,037 31,858 33,272
5 42,234 45,280 45,453 45,681 46,877 45,713 49,226 45,989 48,823
6 32,963 34,677 28,350 28,433 24,971 33,311 35,240 32,154 29,070
7 26,017 28,805 23,546 22,995 21,978 20,804 21,241 25,420 28,183
8 37,775 35,810 35,401 39,773 39,035 42,634 42,519 41,941 38,600
9 38,854 32,808 36,618 31,932 33,937 38,385 36,048 30,292 31,833
10 41,678 30,832 46,233 35,612 31,922 30,964 34,504 31,369 31,462
11 29,318 32,684 38,934 38,541 39,888 35,459 41,125 37,338 26,820
12 37,512 35,243 36,455 37,208 38,443 41,172 40,443 38,836 34,028
13 28,368 24,153 24,035 25,205 29,756 23,067 21,398 26,827 24,647
14 27,806 31,233 33,899 32,332 33,439 21,382 25,742 26,321 25,317
15 26,113 29,656 27,782 28,793 28,141 28,205 33,571 22,494 29,400
16 35,650 30,746 34,992 38,307 33,951 33,066 35,984 32,972 32,222
17 30,745 42,282 32,155 44,718 39,503 41,716 45,453 49,247 48,155
18 38,336 32,470 29,590 41,323 23,438 36,903 37,549 41,072 40,504
19 30,246 33,978 29,342 31,439 33,704 36,903 39,840 40,701 38,455
20 32,351 27,828 26,208 32,513 36,141 40,846 40,635 36,825 37,090
21 28,159 35,523 29,117 32,433 32,803 36,748 32,744 36,515 32,659
22 41,982 37,288 41,451 42,259 41,599 41,802 42,838 42,034 39,357
23 35,787 36,445 34,196 33,647 33,607 35,611 32,905 32,873 33,688
24 44,094 34,043 33,895 32,052 31,564 26,758 37,879 31,502 32,420
25 29,644 34,116 28,461 29,571 24,564 30,472 29,600 25,163 24,756
26 46,050 41,963 36,773 48,199 36,366 28,250 41,753 46,105 34,031
27 43,240 39,073 33,822 36,228 45,768 42,073 45,977 44,495 43,190
28 36,133 30,978 32,663 31,712 36,001 36,591 34,241 36,097 34,759
29 34,576 31,327 29,233 29,182 27,457 28,035 33,773 31,122 30,920
30 33,489 30,971 31,730 29,374 30,202 29,763 27,813 31,555 33,023
31 30,599 34,365 35,567 38,504 40,193 38,424 35,903 37,697 36,782
32 30,242 41,303 35,049 37,008 37,662 37,603 36,404 42,094 37,825
33 37,769 35,535 36,463 38,532 37,577 35,586 35,056 32,142 33,901
34 37,566 41,777 42,796 38,459 43,094 39,605 39,117 34,293 37,126
35 33,664 38,799 26,482 28,305 31,704 25,776 21,602 21,122 18,642
36 38,474 36,742 41,199 32,800 35,643 35,822 32,258 32,053 31,382
37 49,225 38,303 42,031 41,531 41,630 39,423 40,276 40,578 39,058
38 37,097 29,753 33,115 34,999 33,618 31,898 29,823 24,169 24,850
39 28,499 27,814 29,915 36,305 33,970 33,664 29,335 28,293 26,114
40 30,455 37,089 36,093 36,254 36,737 36,505 38,581 37,145 34,597
41 33,878 66,306 39,551 35,953 44,839 39,992 47,014 43,578 36,072
42 32,854 32,836 31,348 35,779 37,149 33,015 37,473 36,535 31,022
Column
average
34,841 35,109 34,405 35,274 34,944 34,329 35,761 35,220 33,715
Source: ABARE (1997a and various issues).
 a  Personal expenses are proxied by ABARE’s operators’ estimate of the labour input of operator’s, partners and their
      families imputed at the relevant Federal Pastoral Award rates.  Nominal times series data deflated by the Australian
      consumer price index.
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Table E.4  Personal expenses data (continued)
Region-
industry 1987-88 1988-89 1989-90 1990-91 1991-92 1992-93 1993-94 1994-95 1995-96 PE  a
1 36,221 13,836 23,730 23,553 21,440 17,012 10,525 13,471 14,852 17,302
2 31,646 16,419 22,354 23,651 25,706 23,246 17,620 17,958 17,595 20,568
3 33,142 22,349 17,174 19,759 17,400 12,404 9,842 7,019 9,730 14,460
4 31,870 14,830 14,470 19,545 21,465 16,250 15,958 14,746 19,240 17,063
5 46,099 30,108 27,594 22,738 15,948 21,866 28,393 26,717 29,701 25,383
6 25,329 12,844 13,730 13,746 15,706 11,048 10,158 11,086 13,918 12,779
7 27,844 7,108 7,986 9,881 5,781 8,669 7,121 11,198 11,734 8,685
8 36,898 18,484 19,101 21,288 21,448 22,744 21,660 20,610 21,577 20,864
9 29,579 19,340 13,847 16,049 15,868 14,556 14,999 17,047 18,553 16,282
10 30,191 16,212 18,428 20,444 16,779 18,961 15,788 13,974 14,072 16,832
11 25,511 12,229 18,488 13,020 17,797 15,546 11,376 14,601 17,783 15,105
12 30,357 12,947 18,649 16,951 23,026 18,684 17,727 20,022 18,422 18,303
13 27,227 13,620 12,518 14,793 13,144 10,511 9,604 8,516 10,688 11,674
14 24,456 7,325 10,302 11,687 7,322 8,218 7,901 5,600 7,354 8,214
15 26,043 12,201 13,880 12,060 11,907 11,777 14,464 8,853 11,227 12,046
16 28,412 15,830 16,325 17,181 15,879 19,043 16,287 21,374 20,693 17,826
17 39,020 24,988 38,141 21,353 21,326 16,707 12,893 17,774 19,452 21,579
18 40,805 17,743 20,016 24,516 24,567 19,475 15,451 13,932 14,575 18,784
19 35,519 16,881 16,419 27,603 23,113 21,014 18,828 14,211 14,203 19,034
20 39,884 12,093 25,778 30,062 23,354 13,785 17,592 24,212 19,371 20,781
21 30,921 15,277 16,836 17,159 19,167 15,828 17,114 14,250 11,968 15,950
22 39,328 22,402 26,213 30,439 28,328 25,296 24,807 24,344 23,648 25,685
23 37,113 18,266 18,041 18,783 23,049 17,302 19,427 17,193 18,724 18,848
24 28,561 14,997 20,510 16,859 14,072 16,231 14,113 15,985 16,911 16,210
25 28,443 12,336 11,570 13,505 13,639 18,124 14,595 11,047 16,017 13,854
26 36,092 12,751 9,865 11,486 10,510 17,072 10,462 12,394 12,243 12,098
27 31,864 18,053 21,680 18,614 16,305 15,210 19,072 12,843 14,318 17,012
28 32,714 15,355 17,569 16,297 14,874 14,898 17,501 18,661 14,134 16,161
29 27,760 13,545 18,765 23,517 24,021 21,503 14,436 11,810 18,142 18,217
30 33,902 13,937 17,860 12,643 14,760 9,300 9,218 13,143 14,389 13,156
31 36,900 16,848 14,490 20,348 16,053 17,137 14,448 16,789 22,819 17,367
32 29,452 14,377 11,936 22,170 19,792 17,671 14,044 17,084 12,800 16,234
33 35,417 19,259 24,129 24,035 20,542 21,046 18,265 19,834 19,842 20,869
34 35,138 18,135 20,308 21,074 20,476 18,954 25,382 18,875 20,982 20,523
35 18,780 10,355 10,289 11,300 11,713 12,676 13,177 13,530 9,527 11,571
36 34,824 15,081 12,024 12,696 14,548 15,502 12,336 12,106 10,761 13,132
37 36,030 17,863 18,198 18,498 18,616 18,671 18,517 21,413 24,996 19,596
38 23,463 7,352 11,855 13,061 14,767 11,146 4,750 8,834 9,127 10,111
39 25,470 12,539 12,411 14,958 11,610 9,278 9,363 10,668 14,247 11,884
40 32,107 15,463 17,736 17,528 19,178 22,421 17,670 15,512 16,404 17,739
41 35,160 21,412 24,613 27,526 23,038 20,382 25,164 31,586 30,928 25,581
42 38,357 18,874 19,709 24,416 15,518 17,018 15,456 15,850 16,888 17,966
Column
average
32,234 15,759 17,751 18,733 17,704 16,528 15,321 15,635 16,537 16,746
 a  Simple average of personal expenses in real terms for the 8 year period to 1995-96.
326
E.4 Land and buildings and salvage value of farm assets module
Table E.5  Land and buildings and salvage value of farm assets data (expressed in
1995-96 dollar terms)  a
Region-
industry 1978-79 1979-80 1980-81 1981-82 1982-83 1983-84 1984-85
1      444,616      476,956      527,533      553,686      539,326      757,386      886,123
2      957,720   1,056,938   1,009,977   1,251,109   1,131,862   1,028,205   1,219,293
3      541,660      990,903      913,250      866,594      839,471   1,046,371      871,851
4      763,043      973,655   1,427,979   1,165,520   1,182,426   1,093,226   1,297,663
5      390,180      451,262      561,517      691,314      773,566      956,699      800,094
6      688,811   1,160,340   1,044,280   1,012,218      875,035      933,324   1,013,576
7      581,776      383,746      610,419      477,143      636,886      627,266      566,339
8      438,115      546,326      779,576      665,879      766,954      765,618      771,234
9      902,441      825,219   1,001,479      957,254   1,115,125   1,391,136   1,007,234
10      934,845      624,484      870,702      825,697   1,006,655      993,190   1,049,044
11      762,085      771,196      854,508      924,501   1,117,251   1,191,413   1,066,147
12      351,919      409,237      422,849      398,928      541,693      501,478      434,008
13      533,480      525,484      868,054      813,164   1,026,970      716,632      753,437
14      485,444      752,509      528,308      596,631      630,340      555,106      710,126
15      786,122      809,195      830,837      852,211      808,693   1,173,868      877,813
16      499,907      599,102      598,150      572,467      625,374      542,617      531,173
17      381,412      506,315      468,668      490,953      412,011      604,580      515,133
18      560,071      618,463      569,086      688,958      857,792      998,694   1,167,661
19      436,881      581,138      674,772      612,923      893,587   1,071,689   1,107,281
20      619,560      628,938      583,465      604,717      669,402      658,133   1,025,074
21      698,457      919,479      633,835      891,612   1,032,104   1,328,339      869,275
22      364,723      469,982      658,602      779,323      755,771      661,122      641,301
23      442,824      581,319      615,117      875,082   1,039,243   1,198,816   1,498,486
24      610,282      691,788      951,599   1,333,229   1,180,593   1,181,960   1,038,636
25      463,671   1,470,674      813,886   1,108,731   1,112,735      847,644   1,410,846
26      787,321   1,505,484   1,201,696   1,427,661   1,010,697      893,654   1,026,855
27      944,803      919,491      979,842   1,064,659      970,758      892,891      995,862
28      812,793   1,073,539   1,223,824   1,228,116   1,177,519   1,266,892   1,164,156
29      620,362      701,438      779,982      881,686      904,440      902,505   1,014,053
30      765,031   1,236,257   1,075,490   1,106,057   1,060,226   1,322,392   1,138,641
31      657,717      620,078      719,144      825,748      817,779      751,751      729,564
32      190,129      271,551      364,407      466,361      430,404      368,616      373,474
33   1,016,586   1,109,145   1,369,726   1,756,358   1,503,158   1,603,501   1,198,583
34      918,848      949,303   1,149,049   1,519,355   1,434,773   1,418,242   1,158,468
35   1,013,666      661,649      650,146      820,698      748,416      574,904      499,558
36      787,669      871,000   1,098,503      871,583      835,063      816,590      651,416
37      674,554   1,085,184   1,301,788   1,288,206   1,313,338   1,202,146   1,192,782
38      727,293      803,075      710,059   1,040,056   1,417,243   1,178,480   1,264,040
39      561,652      834,563      658,997      775,062      930,470      972,756      765,072
40      350,778      482,199      501,761      556,688      543,982      479,247      512,581
41      603,366   1,164,167      879,343      480,872      366,199      438,348      671,789
42      819,082   1,035,929      961,482      719,689      691,679      843,669   1,376,960
Column
average
640,278 789,255 820,088 877,112 898,262 922,645 925,302
Source: ABARE (1997a and various issues).
a    Nominal times series data deflated by the Australian consumer price index.
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Table E.5  Land and buildings and salvage value of farm assets data (continued)
Region-
industry 1985-86 1986-87 1987-88 1988-89 1989-90 1990-91 1991-92
1      856,207      722,410      801,712   1,227,804   1,270,214      608,523      678,785
2   1,011,048   1,017,048      948,991   1,219,487   1,297,357   1,142,341   1,368,700
3      944,358      643,013      678,377   1,198,422      709,484      687,401      646,672
4   1,090,886      824,267      886,609      922,440      693,595      733,119      849,301
5      687,033      503,380      521,276      912,714      764,578      665,868      692,826
6   1,007,331      730,531      863,396   1,385,869   1,254,365   1,037,672   1,186,767
7      653,681      596,591      804,460      915,607      739,101      855,519      821,034
8      785,176      640,677      817,186   1,383,066   1,185,750   1,277,710   1,238,149
9      777,249      814,447      807,373      920,195      634,815      451,461      420,333
10      862,444      579,758      671,959      742,121      682,129      567,949      683,591
11      922,488      729,473      759,766   1,155,971   1,482,436      666,023      888,227
12      419,189      336,467      339,473      544,548      526,329      552,994      479,435
13      923,114      846,817      784,018   1,085,188   1,012,179      752,379      820,900
14      637,022      585,886      557,659      849,495      923,505      768,566      662,107
15      742,908      897,417      911,721   1,333,518      730,626      668,876      700,140
16      519,843      604,841      613,679      867,993      852,600      802,974      865,679
17      980,245   1,095,777      905,319      894,938      691,459      741,502      839,851
18   1,017,385   1,084,742   1,193,662   1,630,403   1,695,011   1,308,322   1,271,219
19   1,253,967   1,118,285   1,189,701   1,668,575   1,250,301   1,161,475   1,136,012
20      953,150   1,126,047   1,050,311   1,988,391   1,433,462   1,054,937      994,617
21      582,783      642,315      629,799      889,274      823,228      789,241      873,584
22      636,629      539,961      452,480      748,214      536,295      559,501      568,961
23   1,033,153      733,816      965,612   1,245,053   1,067,768   1,044,881   1,063,261
24      895,490   1,001,148      840,625   1,552,816   1,511,181   1,214,425   1,231,957
25   1,089,423      951,826      985,576   2,092,066   1,588,431   1,357,256   1,321,136
26      789,096   1,116,199      967,097   1,516,986   1,239,545   1,158,440   1,054,754
27   1,105,076   1,359,334   1,412,625   1,138,605      958,762      955,723      870,693
28   1,098,240      652,136      660,858      639,671      523,163      441,611      410,344
29      996,108      811,264      797,570      854,789      853,563      667,192      713,784
30   1,020,749      904,038      948,958   1,053,764      950,008      875,715      916,315
31      665,897      628,190      592,463      738,580      620,342      626,277      603,152
32      429,044      486,233      461,113      515,329      321,590      247,505      188,207
33      878,131      833,011   1,006,808   1,281,804   1,100,859      686,248      773,894
34      702,541      651,179      782,297      816,458      637,190      569,607      613,263
35      598,054      419,722      429,201      812,192      761,231      742,441      834,774
36      546,509      733,747      862,611   1,240,329   1,098,296      792,793      837,768
37      877,127      913,945      982,358   1,751,170   1,351,538   1,301,208   1,591,697
38   1,237,517   1,006,119   1,009,738   1,687,388   1,595,972   1,359,568   1,477,793
39      826,215      906,603      859,943   1,143,573      794,841      813,872      835,215
40      563,583      464,247      489,827      596,096      564,382      609,623      572,886
41      994,377      756,064      748,878   1,429,537   1,216,305      796,165      673,588
42   2,288,370   2,033,857   1,730,763   1,683,718   2,548,261   1,633,522   1,495,291
Column
average
878,544 810,543 826,758 1,149,385 1,011,715 851,153 875,397
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Table E.5  Land and buildings and salvage value of farm assets data (continued)
Region-
industry 1992-93 1993-94 1994-95 1995-96     LB a  svf b      r2   c
1      777,782      852,909      979,375      814,692 873,421 0.66 32.9%
2   1,357,082   1,285,700   1,571,228   1,301,111 1,250,904 0.23 8.4%
3      642,017      650,228      639,337      591,897 708,685 0.65 56.5%
4      961,138      941,520      976,106   1,026,231 881,432 0.45 17.5%
5      887,249      795,329      841,509      897,465 748,219 1.08 57.6%
6   1,274,430   1,050,486      966,124      928,901 1,067,854 0.15 5.7%
7      799,701      759,446   1,456,213   1,359,112 910,679 0.00 0.1%
8   1,698,712   1,239,702   1,308,827   1,243,503 1,203,328 1.28 32.2%
9      552,655      511,383      585,538      634,383 633,258 0.43 22.7%
10      737,543      729,014      699,622      698,488 679,217 0.02 0.1%
11      754,369      633,147      798,451      665,987 853,385 0.07 0.4%
12      546,789      545,011      589,047      624,444 508,454 0.70 65.7%
13      577,794      593,483      729,311   1,015,727 821,780 0.42 35.7%
14      861,835   1,000,821      734,794      776,730 772,140 0.00 8.7%
15      735,540   1,046,356   1,279,354      821,856 912,540 0.38 28.7%
16      809,811      863,391   1,043,822   1,045,908 837,070 1.03 91.9%
17      953,341      952,310      945,234   1,318,737 933,847 0.00 1.1%
18   1,331,249   1,286,524   1,279,176   1,305,617 1,338,593 0.44 11.2%
19   1,080,117   1,079,352   1,106,917   1,065,527 1,185,626 0.00 3.0%
20      982,999   1,037,743   1,020,745   1,063,220 1,175,247 0.22 2.4%
21      788,288      806,020      729,861      623,308 759,492 0.73 34.5%
22      644,781      687,122      726,702      705,793 616,981 0.52 22.7%
23   1,017,688      974,711   1,046,864      911,216 1,007,087 0.72 44.6%
24   1,097,268      981,568   1,202,495   1,066,879 1,170,036 0.00 0.1%
25   1,355,508   1,828,385   1,217,047      997,324 1,369,456 0.21 2.2%
26   1,965,473   1,222,497   1,224,868   1,439,454 1,290,531 0.03 0.2%
27      992,703   1,163,195   1,298,117   1,032,580 1,118,234 0.00 0.0%
28      447,305      539,803      490,349      443,794 524,903 0.73 19.7%
29      764,082      849,321      838,026      957,029 810,662 0.22 13.2%
30      827,863      976,934      850,037      930,291 923,392 0.29 10.7%
31      662,423      657,357      681,894      720,645 653,132 0.07 0.9%
32      202,082      345,410      302,073      307,072 337,661 0.81 23.2%
33   1,026,267   1,064,253   1,199,079   1,339,186 1,031,141 1.20 41.3%
34      746,103      816,089      829,087      911,217 737,249 0.43 7.8%
35      923,893      923,076   1,571,151   1,400,379 881,806 0.29 5.4%
36   1,050,581   1,179,436   1,166,633   1,229,825 1,019,202 0.22 6.2%
37   1,797,952   2,047,956   2,352,121   2,401,712 1,649,166 1.91 74.6%
38   1,461,277   1,507,911   1,589,615      814,249 1,350,963 0.00 0.0%
39      878,883      976,786      874,288      959,970 904,397 0.00 0.0%
40      592,060      584,891      695,855      824,361 599,423 0.60 62.3%
41      869,509   1,386,802   1,517,140   1,675,965 1,106,995 0.00 9.9%
42   1,440,620   1,474,037   1,836,994   1,691,679 1,756,874 0.00 0.4%
Column
average
949,399 972,557 1,042,643 1,013,892 950,344 0.41 0.8%
 a The simple average of the value of land and fixed improvements in real terms for the 10 year period to 1995-96.
 b Regression coefficient for the equation  LB / E(LB)-1 =svf.((GIB-E(GIB))-1) estimated for the region-industry
over the 18 year period to 1995-96 where GIB and E(GIB) are given in Table E.1.
 c The r2 statistic measures the proportion of the variation in the total sum of squares of the actual series,
(LB / E(LB)-1) for the region-i dustry, explained by the predicted series generated by
(LB / E(LB)-1) =svf.((GIB-E(GIB))-1) for the region-industry (see Johnston 1984, p 25).
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E.5 Farm population numbers module
Table E.6  Farm population data (number of farms)
Region-
industry 1978-79 1979-80 1980-81 1981-82 1982-83 1983-84 1984-85
1 1152 937 989 922 994 914 887
2 3270 3879 3827 3464 2825 3566 2915
3 4507 4212 3874 3429 2698 3178 3253
4 5194 5763 3917 3900 5643 5918 3894
5 217 245 251 207 454 272 259
6 5215 4717 5187 4514 5600 5094 5638
7 3078 6276 4910 4381 4638 3246 3295
8 3142 2848 2901 2850 2567 2841 2728
9 2088 2250 1890 1914 1986 1988 2087
10 2366 2841 2436 2626 828 2779 2590
11 2180 2271 1795 1872 3106 2325 2724
12 3282 3296 3527 3090 2496 3064 2993
13 3330 3067 2494 2937 2825 4403 4902
14 3390 2235 3288 2558 2572 3330 4102
15 3534 4730 3893 3688 3091 2166 2294
16 8251 8022 7737 5971 7458 7096 6844
17 125 108 88 84 148 107 270
18 480 696 691 694 675 665 659
19 795 423 411 761 505 724 692
20 848 737 815 806 801 792 788
21 2612 2206 2466 2048 1625 1991 2282
22 2888 2624 2751 2575 2660 2634 2502
23 2684 2444 2945 3333 2958 2695 2476
24 1665 2057 1592 1135 1257 1860 2030
25 4676 2546 3675 1611 2863 3668 2518
26 1100 794 909 867 623 498 416
27 321 303 260 261 228 265 211
28 1878 1871 2166 2063 1736 1750 1703
29 5772 5419 4644 5329 5044 4864 4856
30 3026 2868 3080 2782 2862 2820 2912
31 1271 1413 1248 1149 1315 1304 1234
32 419 376 321 399 391 380 384
33 5743 5372 5136 5384 5216 5258 5072
34 2684 2734 2208 2618 2470 2419 2443
35 1108 1424 1287 1018 1094 1061 1124
36 1611 1201 1613 1976 2278 1516 1614
37 483 547 562 531 613 605 601
38 749 1078 906 878 907 884 1040
39 1583 1669 1800 1577 747 870 1037
40 1419 1153 1190 1201 1201 1189 1065
41 35 22 51 78 36 46 55
42 213 186 186 136 135 147 141
Total 100,383 99,856 95,915 89,613 90,171 93,190 91,530
Source: ABARE (1997a and various issues).
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Table E.6  Farm population data (continued)
Region-
industry 1985-86 1986-87 1987-88 1988-89 1989-90 1990-91 1991-92
1 882 893 926 855 854 799 860
2 3081 2751 2550 2188 1970 1571 1503
3 3696 3353 3354 2946 2095 1857 2257
4 4006 3693 4098 3628 3558 3497 3445
5 229 226 231 221 217 232 229
6 4708 4491 4968 4994 5195 5237 5008
7 1894 1654 1996 1973 2775 2356 2313
8 2524 2403 2386 2131 2063 1832 1781
9 1750 1350 1592 1704 1648 1678 1585
10 2547 2453 2111 1573 1768 1801 1832
11 2287 2433 1977 1477 1112 1276 1027
12 2879 2792 2756 2609 2483 2483 2610
13 3994 3944 4503 4520 4833 5365 3732
14 2708 2681 2869 2752 3464 3620 3715
15 1982 1963 1887 1922 2368 1665 2266
16 6215 5872 5723 5472 5506 5286 5029
17 106 145 113 113 120 117 116
18 654 531 491 612 619 605 598
19 602 541 537 487 495 576 484
20 768 838 923 732 742 729 731
21 2033 1801 1632 1728 1603 1545 1338
22 2240 2078 2172 1872 1884 1686 1590
23 2479 1889 1623 1639 1758 1735 1241
24 1733 2186 2211 2093 2152 2298 2737
25 1882 1900 2454 2071 2398 2554 2508
26 335 314 365 472 748 388 513
27 211 208 282 296 291 296 296
28 1440 1603 1543 1458 1531 1334 1470
29 4537 4380 4303 4132 4118 4009 3997
30 2168 2225 2433 2457 2622 2676 2343
31 1103 1041 1083 959 905 863 842
32 383 353 321 380 336 327 341
33 4496 4212 3761 3520 3494 3612 3894
34 2173 2312 2083 1978 1957 2110 2007
35 639 626 857 830 993 874 812
36 1504 1511 1556 1644 1657 1457 1485
37 584 558 555 517 496 493 497
38 766 715 914 886 981 688 641
39 709 753 859 787 868 951 959
40 908 872 832 779 761 761 760
41 58 57 81 99 77 105 78
42 134 136 111 90 112 95 122
Total 80,026 76,736 78,022 73,598 75,623 73,439 71,592
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Table E.6  Farm population data (continued)
Region-
industry 1992-93 1993-94 1994-95 1995-96 D POPN  a shq(q=1) bc shq(q=2) bd shq(q=3) be
1 814 760 775 852 -124 24% 33% 43%
2 1604 1719 1363 2061 0 18% 24% 58%
3 2634 1855 1904 3351 0 12% 33% 56%
4 3964 3911 3804 4903 -695 17% 29% 53%
5 229 255 241 250 -9 23% 37% 40%
6 4291 3884 3784 3495 -448 15% 31% 54%
7 1421 1483 1952 1981 -50 25% 26% 49%
8 1736 1831 1845 1737 0 16% 32% 51%
9 1224 1692 1280 1334 0 19% 36% 45%
10 1334 1762 1769 2130 -398 24% 29% 47%
11 894 1398 1181 1703 0 19% 28% 53%
12 2583 2669 2599 2570 -406 19% 32% 49%
13 3065 3873 3034 2436 367 17% 33% 50%
14 4109 2659 3956 4119 400 17% 31% 53%
15 2271 2386 1448 1843 -286 16% 30% 53%
16 5089 5289 5222 5246 -777 21% 33% 46%
17 118 126 121 113 3 31% 21% 48%
18 605 593 591 580 -20 9% 15% 76%
19 628 567 656 652 -18 18% 29% 52%
20 724 725 709 721 -43 20% 32% 48%
21 1282 1055 926 1237 -161 20% 31% 49%
22 1597 1634 1666 1713 -163 17% 31% 52%
23 1256 1490 1105 1440 -216 16% 27% 57%
24 2831 2300 2521 2671 528 9% 24% 68%
25 2273 1837 2842 2554 -625 15% 26% 58%
26 502 532 530 443 -63 16% 47% 37%
27 298 272 276 268 -3 16% 38% 46%
28 1464 1295 1058 1286 -94 23% 27% 50%
29 3815 3812 3298 3303 -250 21% 30% 48%
30 2171 2081 1852 1756 -124 15% 31% 54%
31 849 838 831 831 -68 16% 32% 52%
32 324 302 316 318 -38 30% 30% 40%
33 3951 4164 3954 4084 -994 19% 31% 50%
34 2081 1701 1992 1992 -380 22% 34% 44%
35 1074 797 698 945 -215 9% 31% 60%
36 1029 842 1107 939 -64 22% 26% 53%
37 514 515 505 460 -22 20% 32% 49%
38 516 431 452 474 -47 21% 29% 50%
39 996 969 988 902 -96 15% 28% 58%
40 767 783 759 759 -78 23% 32% 45%
41 76 74 71 76 6 25% 36% 39%
42 134 131 128 133 -10 16% 28% 55%
Total 69,135 67,294 66,108 70,658
  a  DPOPN  is given by the parameter estimate, b, in the regression POPNt=a+b.log(t) where t=1,...,18, using the data in this
table.  Some parameter estimates have been qualitatively adjusted to ensure a well behaved projection scenario.
  b The values for shq across the three default risk classes may not sum to one due to rounding.
  c Share of portfolio entrants into default risk class q=1.  For derivation, see Section 11.4.1.4, p 181.
  d Share of portfolio entrants into default risk class q=2.  For derivation, see Section 11.4.1.4, p 181.
  e Share of portfolio entrants into default risk class q=3.  For derivation, see Section 11.4.1.4, p 181.
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Table E.7  Number of new entrants in a credit risk class for XS < 10 a
Credit risk class XS values
q h 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 2 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 3 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
2 2 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1
2 3 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
3 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Total 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Source: Estimates made by author.
  a  XS represents the number of portfolio entrants by region-industry segment.  These rules apply when
XSjt = 0.02*POPNjt result in less than 10 farms in a region-industry segment.
E.6 Interest rate module
Table E.8  Interest rates data for historical model
Year rb  a ro  b
1977-78 11.75% 10.25%
1978-79 11.25% 9.75%
1979-80 11.75% 10.25%
1980-81 13.50% 12.00%
1980-82 16.50% 14.50%
1982-83 15.00% 13.75%
1983-84 15.25% 13.25%
1984-85 16.13% 15.25%
1985-86 17.50% 18.13%
1986-87 16.75% 18.38%
1987-88 15.50% 16.75%
1988-89 19.25% 20.88%
1989-90 18.50% 20.13%
1990-91 15.75% 15.38%
1991-92 12.75% 11.00%
1992-93 12.25% 9.85%
1993-94 11.50% 9.35%
1994-95 13.00% 11.08%
1995-96 12.13% 11.25%
Source: ABARE (1997b).
  a  Term loan  interest rate series refers to nominal variable rates charged by the Commonwealth
  Development Bank.
  b  Overdraft interest rate series refers to nominal rates charged on overdrafts less than $100,000
  applying to the lowest risk borrowers for the major banks in Australia.
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E.7 Overdraft transactions drawings and deposit numbers module
Table E.9  Overdraft transactions drawings and deposit numbers assumptions
Region- Region-
industry btnd  a btnc  b industry btnd  a btnc  b
1 19.8 100 22 22 75
2 37 190 23 37 190
3 34.5 190 24 29 165
4 41 215 25 20.8 145
5 22 75 26 5.5 45
6 19 65 27 21.8 65
7 9.5 65 28 28.5 165
8 22 75 29 30 165
9 31.5 190 30 31 165
10 31.5 165 31 23.7 75
11 32 165 32 15.7 65
12 21.5 75 33 31.5 165
13 25.6 100 34 28.5 165
14 16 65 35 16.9 65
15 24 100 36 29.2 140
16 22 75 37 22 75
17 5.2 45 38 30.1 165
18 20.6 165 39 25.2 140
19 13.3 165 40 22 75
20 22 65 41 8.5 145
21 37 190 42 9 145
Source: Estimates made by author (for derivation, see Section 12.8, p 193).
  a  Number of drawings on the overdraft facility.
  b  Number of withdrawals on the overdraft facility.
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APPENDIX F
PRODUCTIVITY RELATIVE RATIO AND THE CREDIT SCREENING MODEL
F.1 Introduction
This Appendix outlines an algebraic solution to the farm model that gives particular values for the
productivity relative ratio by security risk class without prior knowledge of the variability of net cash
flows.  These values are used to reduce the sampling time in credit screening simulation experiments
to estimate productivity relative ratios applying to different credit risk classes.  In Section F.2, a credit
screening farm model is outlined to identify the relationship between components of net farm cash
flows and the credit risk classification system in the circumstance when the expected probability of
default is equal to 50%.  In Section F.3, this model is used to identify critical values for the
productivity relative ratio that satisfies the solution for expected values for the cash surplus including
credit reserves equal to zero.  Since the income taxation system involves multiple marginal tax rates,
the relationship between the productivity relative ratio and tax paid is examined in Section F.4.  In the
final section, a unique solution for the productivity relative ratio for a security risk class is presented
for application in credit screening simulations.
F.2 Credit screening farm model
When the expected value of cash surplus including credit reserves, E CSR( ) , is equal to zero, the
expected probability of default is equal to 50%.
(F.1) ( )P E CSRijqhat( ) .£ =0 05
where E CSRijqhat( )  for a = 1 is given by
(F.2) E CSR E CS CRijqhat ijqhat ijqhat( ) ( )= +
and
(F.3) E CS E GI E FC LFC E PI
PE E TAX
ijqhat ijqhat jt ijqhat ijqhat
jt ijqhat
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
= - - -
- -                  
where CSR = cash surplus including credit reserves;
CS = cash surplus;
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CR = credit reserves;
GI = gross income;
FC = farm costs;
LFC = loan fees and charges;
PI = amortised principal and interest repayments;
PE = personal expenses; and
TAX = taxation payments
and subscripts
i = credit policy set;
j = region-industry segment;
q = default risk class;
h = security risk class;
a = loan account time; and
t = time period.
In outlining the components of the model below, the relationship between variables and
subscripts are important.  The aim of model presentation is to delineate variables that
are affected by their default risk class, and variables which are not.  Accordingly, the
subscripts i, j and t are dropped for ease of exposition since they are common to all
equations.  Further, default risk class q is defined as comprising borrowers with an
expected probability of default equal to 50%.
Gross income
The expected value of gross income is determined by an unknown value for the
productivity relative ratio, prr qha* , and the expected value of gross farm income for the
base average farm, E GIB( ) , in the region-industry segment.
(F.4) E GI prr E GIBqha qha( ) * . ( )=
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Farm costs
From equation (11.4), expected farm cost is equal to
(F.5) E FC E FC( ) ( )=
Loan fees and charges
From equation (11.10) and Appendix A, loan fees and charges are a function of the size
of initial term loan drawings, LT, and the expected value of collateral, E(C),  given bank
charges, BC, and the expected number of deposits and cheques, BTND and BTNC
respectively, in the period.
(F.6) ( )LFC f LT E C BC BTND BTNCha ha= =0, ( ); , ,
The initial term loan drawing is determined by the minimum credit reserve limit, crm,
the security cover ratio for security risk class, scrh, and the expected value of collateral
(see equations (4.16) and (6.5)) as follows
(F.7) LT crm scrn E Cha h= = -0 1 1( ).( / ). ( )
and hence LFCha is purely a function of h in the subscripts for new farms.
Term loan principal and interest
The expected value of the amortised term loan repayments is function of the expected
interest rate E rtqh( ) , the maturity term nt, and the initial term loan drawing LTha=0
(see equations (6.1) and (6.2)).
(F.8) ( )E PI f E rtqha qh ha( ) ( ),= = nt, LT 0 .
Since the default risk premium is limited on the upside by the risk pricing limit for large
default probabilities, then for dha = 50%, the risk premium calculated for the term loan
interest rate is independent of the q subscript.  Accordingly, the default risk grade is not
relevant and the subscript q is redundant in equation (F.8).  Dropping the q subscript in
equation (F.8) gives:
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(F.9) E PI E PIha qha( ) ( )= .
Personal expenses
Personal expenses are assumed in Section 12.3 to be purely a function of the j  subscript
(F.10) PE PE= .
Credit reserve
The initial size of the credit reserve is given by the minimum credit reserve limit crm,
the maximum credit limit clh , and the expected value of collateral as presented in
equations (4.16) and (6.3).  The value of cl  is a function of the h subscript since it is
the inverse of the expected security cover ratio limit defined for the security risk class
segment.
(F.11) CR crmcl E Cha h= . . ( ) .
Taxation payments
Taxation payments are a function of the average tax rate atr, and taxable income,
E TTFI( ) , given income splitting between p number of  partners and tn year averaging
provisions (see equation (11.14)
(F.12) E TAX p atr E TTFIqha qha qha( ) . . ( )=
where the expected value of taxable income is given by
(F.13) ( )E TTFI tn E TFI E TFITNqha qha t( ) / . ( ) ( )= +1
with the expected value of current year taxable income determined by
(F.14) ( )E TFI p E GI E FC LFC E ITqha qha ha ha( ) / . ( ) ( ) ( )= - - -1
and the sum of the expected value of total taxable income earned in the previous
tn-1 years for new farms given by
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(F.15) E TFITN E TFIt t
t t tn
t
( ) ( )=
= - +
-
å
1
1
Taxable income used in equation (F.15) assumes no debt is utilised by the farm in the
previous tn-1 years
(F.16) E TFI E GIB E FCt t t( ) ( ) ( )= -      for t = t-tn+1, ..., t-1.
Interest payments
To calculate current taxable income, expected interest payments are given by the
product of the expected rate of term loan interest and the initial term loan drawing.
Since the term loan interest rate is independent of the q subscript in relation to the
amortised term loan principal and interest repayment, the expected interest payment on
the term lending facility is given by
(F.17) E IT E rt LTha ha ha( ) ( ).= =0
where the default risk premium in E(rt) is evaluated at the risk pricing limit.  The
expected value of the overdraft interest payment is zero since initial overdraft balances
of new farms entering the portfolio are assumed to be zero
(F.18) E IOqha( ) = 0.
F.3 Critical value for productivity relative ratio
The objective is to find the critical value for the productivity relative ratio for a particular
security risk class defined in the h-dimension which gives an expected probability of
default of 50%.  This is achieved by identifying variables that are a function of the
productivity relative ratio, and solving for the condition E CSR( ) = 0.
In the model outlined in the previous section, expected gross income (equation (F.4))
and expected tax payments (equation (F.12)) are a function of both q and h while the
remaining equations are a function of h but independent of q.  Substituting equations
(F.3) to (F.6) and equations (F.8) to (F.11) into equation (F.2), taking variables which are
affected by both the q and h dimensions to the left side, and rearranging to give the
remaining variables to the right side gives:
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(F.19) E GI E TAX INDqha qha ha( ) ( )- =
where INDha includes all variables independent of q and therefore prr
(F.20) IND E FC LFC E PI PE CRha ha ha ha= + + -( ) ) ( )+ .
If equation (F.4) is substituted into equation (F.19) then
(F.21) prr E GIB E TAX INDqha qha ha. ( ) ( )- = .
The critical value for the productivity relative ratio, prrqha
c , for E CSRqha( )= =1 0 may be
found by using equation (F.21) by adding E TAXqha( )  to both sides and dividing both
sides by E GIB( )
(F.22) prr
IND E TAX
E GIBqha
c ha qha
= =
+
1
( )
( )
This equation shows that the critical value of the productivity relative ratio is simply the
ratio of expected net cash outflows including the permissible credit reserve inflow to the
value of expected gross income for the average base farm in the region-industry segment
in time period t.  However, E(TAXqha ) is also a function of prr and this relationship is
explored in the next section.
F.4 Relationship between the productivity relative ratio and the taxation
module
The critical value for the productivity relative ratio is affected by the amount of expected
taxes paid due to the influence of the productivity relative ratio on gross income and
therefore taxable income in the current year.  From equation (F.12), E TAXqha( )
depends on both E atrqha( )  and E TTFIqha( ) .  E atrqha( )  is also dependent on
E TTFIqha( )  due to cut-off levels for TTFI  for application of different marginal
income tax rates as outlined in Appendix B.  Substituting equation (F.4) into equation
(F.14) gives
(F.23) ( )E TFI p prr E GIB E FC LFC E ITqha qha ha ha( ) / . * . ( ) ( ) ( )= - - -1  
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If prrqha
p  is defined as permissible values of the productivity relative ratio, then
substitution of equation (F.23) into equation (F.13), with collection of like terms
independent of prr gives the following
(F.24) E TTFI TAXIND p tn E GIB prrqha ha qha
p( ) / ( . ). ( ).= + 1 .
Equation (F.24) describes a linear relationship between permissible values of the
productivity relative ratio and the expected value of taxable income where
(F.25) [ ]{ }TAXIND tn TFITN p E FC LFC E ITha ha ha= - + +1 1/ . / . ( ) ( ) .
A family of prr E TTFIp - ( )  curves may be defined across different security risk
classes.  In Figure F.1, these relationships are illustrated for a security risk classification
system containing three classes.  The value of the slope parameter, ( / . ). ( )1 p tn E GIB , is
known to be positive.  The placement of the three curves in Figure F.1 with respect to
each other depends on the impact of actual leverage on LFC and E(IT), and in turn the
constant TAXIND, when a farm model is placed into different security risk classes.
Figure F.1   Relationship between permissible values of the productivity
                    relative ratio and expected taxable income
prr
E TTFI( )
h= 3
h= 2
h= 1
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Finally, permissible values of prr may be found in terms of values for E(TTFI) by rearranging
equation (F.24), as follows:
(F.26) prr
E TTFI TAXIND
p tn E GIBqha
p qha ha=
-( )
( / . ). ( )1
The taxable income tiers determine switching points at which different marginal tax rates are applied.
Accordingly, a matrix of values for both prrc  and prrp  may be determined at each taxable income
tier, denoted by Ti , at which the amounts of tax paid are known.  A vector of prrp  values may be
derived by the substitution of Ti for E TTFIqha( )  in equation (F.26).
(F.27) prr
T TAXIND
p tn E GIBTi h
p i h
  =
-
( / . ). ( )1
In addition, a vector of prrc values may be developed by the substitution of the amount of tax payable
at Ti , denoted by TAXTi for E(TAX) in equation (F.22) to give prrT h
c
i  
(F.28) prr
IND TAX
E GIBT h
c ha T h
i
i
 
 =
-
( )
where
(F.29) TAX mtr T TT h i i i
i
k
i  
 = - -
=
å .( )1
1
   for i=1, ...., k.
F.5 Solution to critical values of the productivity relative ratio
The aim of this section is to find critical values for prr given by equation (F.22) in terms of
permissible values for prr given by equation (F.26).  This is achieved by, first, solving for a
simultaneous solution to equations (F.22) and F.26) to find prrc in terms of prrp , and second,
determining where these values lie with respect to  prr values found at the taxable income tiers to
give a final solution for prr p .  To simplify the analysis, the focus of model presentation is for one
security risk class only.
342
In order to determine the critical value of prr for a security risk class, the value of E(TAX)
associated with a particular value of E(TTFI) is required.  From Appendix B, E(TAX) in terms of
E(TTFI) is given by:
(F.30) E TAX
m
p mtr TTFI T m
p mtr TTFI T
p mtr T T m
qha
m m
m m
i i i
i
m
( )
. .( )
. .( )
. .( )
=
- =
-
+ - ³
é
ë
ê
ê
ê
ê
ê
ê
ê
ê
ê
- -
- -
+
=
-
å
0 1
2
3
1 1
1 1
1
1
2
                                          for =
              for 
                for 
where m=1   if E(TTFI)<T1
m=2   if T E TTFI T1 2£ <( )
m=3   if T E TTFI T2 3£ <( )
m=4   if T E TTFI T3 4£ <( )
m=5   if E TTFI T( ) ³ 4 .
and Ti = taxable income tiers with i=1,....,4.
The substitution of equation (F.24) into equation (F.30) gives E(TAX) alues corresponding to
permissible values of prr.
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(F.31)
[ ]{ }
[ ]{ }
E TAX
m
pmtr TAXIND ptn E GIB prr T
m
pmtr TAXIND ptn E GIB prr T
p mtr T T m
qha
m ha qha
p
m
m ha qha
p
m
i i i
i
m
( )
. . ( / . ). ( ).
. . ( / . ). ( ).
. .( )
=
+ -
=
+ -
+ - ³
é
ë
ê
ê
ê
ê
ê
ê
ê
ê
ê
ê
ê
ê
ê
- -
- -
+
=
-
å
0 1
1
2
1
3
1 1
1 1
1
1
2
                                                                  for =
                                                                  for 
                                      for 
Finally, the substitution of equation (F.31) into equation (F.22) gives critical values of prr
in terms of permissible values of prr.
(F.32)
[ ]{ }
[ ]{ }
prr
IND
E GIB
m
IND p mtr TAXIND p tn E GIB prr T
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A unique solution to equation (F.32) is given by the condition
prr prr prrqha qha
c
qha
p* = = .  The solution for the unique value of prr* within credit risk classes q
and h and E(CSR)=0 for an unknown value of mis given by:
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Since equations (F.34) to (F.36) depend on an unknown m, the following rules are used
to find the value of m and therefore a unique value for prr*.
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Equation (F.30) gives a single value for prr* for a security risk class where the default
risk class q relates to a default probability of 50%.  In Figure F.2, the relationship
between productivity relative ratio and expected taxable income for a particular
security risk class is illustrated.
Figure F.2   Relationship between productivity relative ratio and expected
taxable income for a particular security risk class
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Given three security classes, three unique values for the productivity relative ratio
relating to d=50% may be calculated to commence efficient credit screening simulations.
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APPENDIX G
CREDIT POLICY SIMULATION RESULTS BY REGION-INDUSTRY
SEGMENT
Table G.1 Summary statistics of distributions for net present value of bank returns
by region-industry segment (A$million in 1995-96 dollar terms)
Credit policy identifier  1 2 3 4 5 6
Restructuring option no yes no yes no yes
Region-
industry
Risk pricing limit 5% 5% 2.5% 2.5% 7.5% 7.5%
1 Mean 19.63 21.06 18.01 19.46 20.67 21.79
Minimum 18.50 20.05 17.34 18.53 19.29 20.76
Maximum 21.05 22.47 19.00 20.54 22.46 23.89
Standard deviation 0.4033 0.3772 0.2951 0.3180 0.5615 0.5573
2 Mean 49.31 89.98 116.75 159.14 42.30 84.59
Minimum 42.12 82.80 86.92 138.45 39.76 82.53
Maximum 56.11 96.15 140.95 172.49 46.24 87.90
Standard deviation 2.8793 2.7261 9.2559 6.4249 1.1555 0.9754
3 Mean 98.31 104.12 82.17 86.49 102.98 111.27
Minimum 92.96 97.89 78.97 83.03 93.55 100.91
Maximum 104.84 110.95 85.29 89.81 109.95 119.98
Standard deviation 2.0878 2.3414 1.2911 1.3850 2.6917 3.2662
4 Mean 36.72 82.56 55.62 113.48 37.38 82.39
Minimum 35.14 80.62 43.55 99.05 35.89 80.21
Maximum 38.66 85.22 72.51 128.92 39.02 84.93
Standard deviation 0.6789 0.9907 5.8767 5.2419 0.6349 0.9853
5 Mean 2.44 4.40 3.54 6.18 2.32 4.12
Minimum 2.27 4.16 2.65 5.67 2.21 4.03
Maximum 2.65 4.70 4.78 6.41 6.23 4.25
Standard deviation 0.0695 0.0963 0.3557 0.1461 0.2804 0.0424
6 Mean 118.78 139.54 138.86 147.01 119.56 140.61
Minimum 113.36 133.73 131.53 139.56 109.63 133.81
Maximum 126.62 148.53 146.03 156.23 126.48 146.01
Standard deviation 1.9972 2.6665 2.7928 2.7617 3.2990 2.1234
7 Mean 40.77 64.17 41.88 66.63 37.56 60.09
Minimum 38.86 61.60 40.00 64.07 34.43 55.77
Maximum 41.94 65.68 44.12 69.42 40.37 64.03
Standard deviation 0.5681 0.7372 0.7487 0.9339 1.0498 1.4390
8 Mean 15.50 25.35 28.01 48.88 13.86 22.94
Minimum 13.92 22.19 27.07 47.21 12.91 21.19
Maximum 17.50 28.93 28.47 50.30 14.72 24.71
Standard deviation 0.7954 1.3890 0.1904 0.6329 0.3113 0.6593
9 Mean 22.87 23.78 19.59 20.32 23.96 24.89
Minimum 21.57 22.45 18.27 18.99 22.58 23.47
Maximum 24.34 25.24 21.03 21.78 25.43 26.44
Standard deviation 0.5541 0.5682 0.5309 0.5506 0.5684 0.5923
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Table G.1 Summary statistics of distributions for net present value of bank returns
by region-industry segment (continued)
Credit policy identifier 1 2 3 4 5 6
Restructuring option no yes no yes no yes
Region-
industry
Risk pricing limit 5% 5% 2.5% 2.5% 7.5% 7.5%
10 Mean 12.41 13.53 9.68 10.67 12.78 13.92
Minimum 10.62 11.70 7.97 8.89 10.97 12.03
Maximum 14.50 15.65 11.72 12.75 14.87 16.06
Standard deviation 0.7274 0.7592 0.6932 0.7336 0.7324 0.7709
11 Mean 27.25 41.40 37.87 49.21 26.57 41.70
Minimum 26.30 40.37 34.33 47.51 25.80 40.94
Maximum 28.23 42.50 40.46 50.81 27.69 42.89
Standard deviation 0.3666 0.3963 1.2036 0.6103 0.3258 0.3586
12 Mean -1.89 8.89 -0.14 14.28 -2.89 5.75
Minimum -3.71 4.51 -0.51 13.16 -4.22 2.88
Maximum -0.05 13.49 0.22 15.44 -1.45 9.32
Standard deviation 0.6408 1.4165 0.1631 0.3655 0.5132 1.1378
13 Mean 191.51 196.37 175.69 179.70 196.39 202.07
Minimum 185.39 190.07 171.92 175.66 188.91 193.78
Maximum 197.62 203.44 179.89 184.10 205.34 212.84
Standard deviation 2.5375 2.6413 1.6236 1.6887 3.2727 3.8353
14 Mean 306.90 361.72 326.96 338.84 237.57 286.49
Minimum 263.23 325.90 312.76 323.70 219.24 272.19
Maximum 351.41 386.19 346.33 360.14 254.09 301.48
Standard deviation 15.1394 10.3123 5.0103 5.5447 5.6802 4.8436
15 Mean 50.54 61.34 61.89 66.57 43.84 57.41
Minimum 46.97 58.18 56.08 63.60 36.63 50.55
Maximum 55.21 65.79 66.06 70.30 52.26 63.17
Standard deviation 1.6373 1.5281 1.4366 1.3144 3.2461 2.6193
16 Mean 25.35 63.81 27.44 75.01 19.51 55.10
Minimum 22.34 57.04 24.88 66.23 16.35 49.97
Maximum 29.12 73.62 32.40 84.26 22.97 63.78
Standard deviation 1.3176 2.9615 1.2822 3.0788 1.2183 2.4251
17 Mean 1.74 1.74 1.74 1.74 1.74 1.75
Minimum 1.63 1.63 1.62 1.62 1.62 1.63
Maximum 1.89 1.89 1.88 1.88 1.89 1.89
Standard deviation 0.0501 0.0497 0.0495 0.0498 0.0501 0.0499
18 Mean 24.28 30.24 24.30 33.10 24.98 30.61
Minimum 23.57 29.43 22.53 30.90 24.37 29.85
Maximum 24.80 31.51 26.35 35.12 25.63 31.35
Standard deviation 0.2503 0.3665 0.8238 0.8129 0.2459 0.2792
19 Mean 40.16 41.39 38.52 39.82 40.15 41.31
Minimum 39.22 40.32 37.43 38.34 39.24 40.35
Maximum 41.13 42.56 40.13 40.96 41.11 42.30
Standard deviation 0.3622 0.3870 0.4862 0.4193 0.3521 0.3635
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Table G.1 Summary statistics of distributions for net present value of bank returns
by region-industry segment (continued)
Credit policy identifier 1 2 3 4 5 6
Restructuring option no yes no yes no yes
Region-
industry
Risk pricing limit 5% 5% 2.5% 2.5% 7.5% 7.5%
20 Mean 32.94 37.86 38.39 41.63 31.55 36.42
Minimum 30.42 35.50 34.54 38.83 29.78 34.95
Maximum 35.85 40.49 40.64 43.29 33.27 37.95
Standard deviation 1.0626 0.8895 1.0145 0.6809 0.7033 0.6248
21 Mean 26.11 31.84 25.70 31.01 25.99 33.21
Minimum 25.17 30.87 24.54 29.58 24.01 31.78
Maximum 27.33 33.34 27.34 32.82 27.52 34.17
Standard deviation 0.3320 0.3968 0.5438 0.6607 0.5872 0.4438
22 Mean 7.20 12.53 12.18 22.10 6.02 10.70
Minimum 5.93 10.43 11.72 21.42 5.44 9.47
Maximum 8.63 14.73 12.45 22.61 6.73 11.82
Standard deviation 0.4599 0.7913 0.1106 0.2537 0.2416 0.4766
23 Mean 18.24 31.46 48.47 56.38 15.64 27.83
Minimum 12.76 24.77 34.71 49.11 12.50 24.61
Maximum 24.91 39.65 55.01 59.76 19.47 32.09
Standard deviation 2.4380 3.0536 3.5273 1.7623 1.5135 1.5311
24 Mean 273.87 333.80 284.40 320.46 215.41 283.88
Minimum 238.12 309.29 276.52 310.85 196.96 263.80
Maximum 300.49 349.14 295.08 332.36 243.13 308.13
Standard deviation 12.1892 7.9665 2.8365 3.4555 7.8278 8.0723
25 Mean 35.38 52.43 33.59 50.01 35.93 52.15
Minimum 34.42 51.48 32.59 48.75 34.98 51.07
Maximum 36.41 53.39 35.07 51.10 36.97 53.19
Standard deviation 0.3811 0.4052 0.4279 0.4512 0.3811 0.4136
26 Mean 22.13 23.11 21.29 21.99 22.05 23.35
Minimum 21.02 22.07 20.64 21.27 21.23 22.25
Maximum 23.15 24.15 22.12 22.93 23.11 24.87
Standard deviation 0.4072 0.4114 0.2975 0.3159 0.3618 0.4632
27 Mean 8.54 9.30 7.70 8.36 8.42 9.19
Minimum 7.59 8.37 6.65 7.44 7.49 8.45
Maximum 9.67 10.24 8.60 9.27 9.29 10.13
Standard deviation 0.3486 0.3375 0.3501 0.3522 0.2987 0.2989
28 Mean 13.76 14.13 11.81 12.11 14.02 14.40
Minimum 12.82 13.13 10.91 11.11 13.03 13.39
Maximum 14.91 15.29 12.86 13.19 15.24 15.70
Standard deviation 0.3763 0.3954 0.3702 0.3821 0.3872 0.4086
29 Mean 129.84 151.52 129.72 137.16 99.18 125.43
Minimum 108.42 135.47 124.65 130.38 84.46 110.40
Maximum 144.25 160.82 135.24 144.40 114.64 141.23
Standard deviation 6.7217 4.4575 2.2857 2.8775 5.3509 5.4086
350
Table G.1 Summary statistics of distributions for net present value of bank returns
by region-industry segment (continued)
Credit policy identifier 1 2 3 4 5 6
Restructuring option no yes no yes no yes
Region-
industry
Risk pricing limit 5% 5% 2.5% 2.5% 7.5% 7.5%
30 Mean 44.21 63.73 43.38 56.10 31.20 51.56
Minimum 36.42 57.79 42.21 54.81 27.19 47.27
Maximum 51.80 68.19 44.57 57.53 37.33 57.82
Standard deviation 3.2313 2.2538 0.4709 0.5400 1.7789 1.8044
31 Mean 2.01 3.36 4.73 8.44 1.82 3.09
Minimum 1.67 2.78 4.56 8.17 1.57 2.64
Maximum 2.42 4.03 4.85 8.60 1.98 3.42
Standard deviation 0.1483 0.2470 0.0534 0.1025 0.0765 0.1454
32 Mean 2.39 2.39 2.31 2.31 2.42 2.42
Minimum 2.25 2.24 2.17 2.17 2.27 2.27
Maximum 2.56 2.56 2.47 2.47 2.58 2.58
Standard deviation 0.0576 0.0581 0.0571 0.0572 0.0585 0.0583
33 Mean -6.02 22.95 10.64 32.31 -7.15 18.92
Minimum -10.90 15.28 3.40 28.71 -11.24 13.53
Maximum 1.08 34.70 14.40 36.23 -3.13 23.48
Standard deviation 1.9483 3.2879 1.7572 1.4038 1.2579 1.8590
34 Mean 1.51 6.32 5.51 11.34 2.42 8.81
Minimum 0.11 4.82 2.04 8.88 0.40 6.60
Maximum 3.44 8.59 8.27 13.80 4.99 11.45
Standard deviation 0.6247 0.7028 1.1012 0.8193 0.9427 0.8631
35 Mean 17.53 21.30 19.60 21.68 14.40 18.10
Minimum 14.64 18.49 18.79 20.92 12.81 16.75
Maximum 19.86 22.73 21.27 22.80 15.98 19.53
Standard deviation 1.0948 0.8352 0.3983 0.3513 0.5794 0.4780
36 Mean 27.96 32.76 30.43 35.40 28.12 33.15
Minimum 26.88 31.60 28.32 32.90 26.98 31.91
Maximum 28.91 33.72 34.04 38.50 29.30 34.71
Standard deviation 0.4171 0.4433 1.1380 1.0854 0.4473 0.5232
37 Mean 7.33 13.81 8.25 15.73 7.31 13.80
Minimum 6.68 12.76 7.71 14.99 6.68 12.73
Maximum 7.82 14.88 8.61 16.41 7.82 14.90
Standard deviation 0.2000 0.4038 0.1647 0.2963 0.1982 0.3981
38 Mean 31.72 35.33 34.82 37.10 30.05 33.66
Minimum 28.64 33.13 32.48 35.81 27.09 31.82
Maximum 33.95 36.86 36.04 38.32 32.31 35.02
Standard deviation 1.0399 0.6890 0.6606 0.4924 0.9985 0.6697
39 Mean 11.16 18.59 11.31 18.52 11.36 18.81
Minimum 10.91 18.25 10.87 18.07 11.12 18.54
Maximum 11.37 18.91 11.93 18.98 11.64 19.09
Standard deviation 0.0833 0.1013 0.2211 0.1835 0.0886 0.0984
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Table G.1 Summary statistics of distributions for net present value of bank returns
by region-industry segment (continued)
Credit policy identifier 1 2 3 4 5 6
Restructuring option no yes no yes no yes
Region-
industry
Risk pricing limit 5% 5% 2.5% 2.5% 7.5% 7.5%
40 Mean 2.56 7.28 3.74 8.38 2.45 7.09
Minimum 2.03 6.57 2.73 7.36 1.93 6.42
Maximum 3.21 7.94 5.56 9.93 3.09 7.78
Standard deviation 0.2541 0.2639 0.5660 0.5594 0.2379 0.2764
41 Mean 0.43 0.43 0.34 0.34 0.46 0.46
Minimum 0.38 0.38 0.30 0.30 0.41 0.41
Maximum 0.48 0.48 0.39 0.38 0.50 0.51
Standard deviation 0.0171 0.0166 0.0160 0.0157 0.0193 0.0184
42 Mean 3.14 3.15 3.09 3.11 3.16 3.17
Minimum 2.92 2.94 2.88 2.89 2.95 2.97
Maximum 3.39 3.40 3.34 3.36 3.41 3.41
Standard deviation 0.0902 0.0893 0.0907 0.0898 0.0907 0.0890
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APPENDIX H
PRODUCTIVITY RELATIVE RATIO ESTIMATION RESULTS
Table H.1 Estimated values for the productivity relative ratio in the historical model a
       Credit risk class       (q given by next row with h the following row)
Region- 1 1 1 2 2 2 3 3 3 Row
industry 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 Average
1 1.224 1.154 1.142 1.124 1.154 1.142 1.124 1.174 1.142 1.153
2 1.014 1.060 1.045 1.014 1.060 1.045 1.014 1.020 1.045 1.035
3 1.273 1.122 1.110 1.173 1.122 1.110 1.093 1.122 1.110 1.137
4 1.047 0.973 0.979 1.047 0.973 0.979 0.987 0.993 0.979 0.995
5 0.938 0.945 0.929 0.938 0.945 0.929 0.938 0.945 0.949 0.940
6 1.310 1.328 1.265 1.310 1.328 1.265 1.230 1.248 1.265 1.283
7 1.335 1.244 1.310 1.235 1.244 1.310 1.175 1.224 1.310 1.265
8 1.025 0.958 0.952 0.925 0.958 0.952 0.945 0.958 0.972 0.960
9 1.315 1.323 1.249 1.315 1.323 1.249 1.235 1.243 1.249 1.278
10 1.297 1.227 1.215 1.197 1.227 1.215 1.197 1.227 1.215 1.224
11 1.212 1.127 1.121 1.212 1.127 1.121 1.112 1.147 1.141 1.147
12 0.948 0.956 0.963 0.948 0.956 0.963 0.948 0.956 0.963 0.956
13 1.356 1.195 1.231 1.256 1.195 1.231 1.276 1.215 1.231 1.243
14 1.317 1.306 1.319 1.317 1.306 1.319 1.237 1.326 1.339 1.310
15 1.328 1.207 1.189 1.228 1.207 1.189 1.148 1.227 1.189 1.212
16 1.047 0.960 0.972 0.947 0.960 0.972 0.967 0.980 0.992 0.978
17 1.214 1.036 1.058 1.114 1.036 1.058 1.034 1.036 1.058 1.072
18 1.039 1.001 0.984 1.039 1.001 0.984 0.979 1.021 0.984 1.004
19 1.262 1.108 1.114 1.262 1.108 1.114 1.202 1.108 1.114 1.155
20 1.281 1.127 1.114 1.181 1.127 1.114 1.101 1.127 1.114 1.143
21 1.023 1.076 1.068 1.023 1.076 1.068 1.023 1.036 1.088 1.054
22 1.027 1.019 1.029 1.027 1.019 1.029 1.027 1.039 1.049 1.029
23 1.197 1.026 1.054 1.097 1.026 1.054 1.037 1.026 1.054 1.063
24 1.188 1.078 1.088 1.188 1.078 1.088 1.088 1.078 1.088 1.107
25 1.074 1.097 1.121 1.074 1.097 1.121 1.074 1.097 1.121 1.098
26 1.386 1.239 1.253 1.286 1.239 1.253 1.226 1.139 1.253 1.253
27 1.571 1.196 1.200 1.371 1.196 1.200 1.291 1.196 1.200 1.269
28 1.276 1.122 1.127 1.276 1.122 1.127 1.216 1.122 1.127 1.168
29 1.175 1.085 1.074 1.175 1.085 1.074 1.075 1.105 1.094 1.105
30 1.070 1.124 1.157 1.070 1.124 1.157 1.070 1.064 1.157 1.110
31 0.930 0.940 0.929 0.930 0.940 0.929 0.930 0.940 0.949 0.935
32 1.431 1.297 1.284 1.331 1.297 1.284 1.251 1.317 1.284 1.308
33 1.083 0.988 1.012 0.983 0.988 1.012 1.003 0.988 1.012 1.008
34 1.064 1.048 0.990 1.064 1.048 0.990 1.004 1.048 1.010 1.030
35 1.385 1.279 1.271 1.285 1.279 1.271 1.205 1.299 1.271 1.283
36 1.225 1.221 1.197 1.125 1.221 1.197 1.125 1.161 1.197 1.186
37 0.903 0.912 0.922 0.903 0.912 0.922 0.903 0.912 0.922 0.912
38 1.179 1.077 1.094 1.179 1.077 1.094 1.079 1.077 1.114 1.108
39 1.112 1.026 1.039 1.012 1.026 1.039 1.032 1.026 1.059 1.041
40 0.971 0.961 0.969 0.971 0.961 0.969 0.971 0.961 0.969 0.967
41 1.394 1.338 1.303 1.294 1.338 1.303 1.294 1.298 1.303 1.318
42 1.277 1.284 1.212 1.277 1.284 1.212 1.197 1.224 1.212 1.242
a  Productivity relative ratio for the average farm in a region-industry segment is equal to one.
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Table H.2 Estimated values for the productivity relative ratio in the projection model a
           Credit risk class    (q given by next row with h the following row)
Region- 1 1 1 2 2 2 3 3 3 Row
industry 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 average
1 1.310 1.412 1.356 1.210 1.312 1.356 1.170 1.212 1.376 1.301
2 1.099 1.096 1.250 1.099 1.096 1.250 1.059 1.096 1.250 1.144
3 1.238 1.375 1.313 1.138 1.175 1.313 1.138 1.195 1.313 1.244
4 1.117 1.173 1.129 1.017 1.073 1.129 1.017 1.073 1.109 1.093
5 1.016 1.047 1.120 0.916 0.947 1.120 0.936 0.967 1.120 1.021
6 1.378 1.689 1.693 1.278 1.589 1.693 1.278 1.389 1.593 1.509
7 1.259 1.564 1.900 1.259 1.564 1.600 1.259 1.564 1.600 1.508
8 1.038 1.060 1.160 0.938 1.060 1.160 0.958 1.060 1.160 1.066
9 1.395 1.382 1.549 1.395 1.382 1.349 1.295 1.402 1.349 1.389
10 1.229 1.548 1.549 1.229 1.548 1.449 1.229 1.368 1.429 1.398
11 1.154 1.327 1.359 1.154 1.327 1.359 1.174 1.247 1.359 1.273
12 1.041 1.108 1.036 0.941 1.008 1.036 0.941 0.988 1.036 1.015
13 1.349 1.475 1.723 1.349 1.475 1.623 1.249 1.435 1.663 1.482
14 1.301 1.738 1.784 1.301 1.538 1.784 1.301 1.438 1.804 1.554
15 1.438 1.410 1.818 1.238 1.410 1.618 1.238 1.410 1.618 1.467
16 1.075 1.079 1.128 0.975 1.079 1.128 0.975 1.079 1.128 1.072
17 1.171 1.201 1.189 1.071 1.201 1.189 1.091 1.121 1.149 1.153
18 1.010 1.088 1.204 1.010 1.088 1.104 1.010 1.088 1.084 1.076
19 1.237 1.498 1.396 1.237 1.298 1.396 1.237 1.298 1.456 1.339
20 1.234 1.297 1.416 1.134 1.297 1.316 1.134 1.217 1.296 1.260
21 1.067 1.348 1.329 1.067 1.248 1.329 1.067 1.248 1.329 1.226
22 1.048 1.102 1.177 1.048 1.102 1.177 1.048 1.102 1.177 1.109
23 1.065 1.245 1.282 1.065 1.145 1.282 1.065 1.145 1.282 1.175
24 1.229 1.304 1.498 1.129 1.304 1.398 1.149 1.204 1.298 1.279
25 1.256 1.530 1.436 1.156 1.330 1.436 1.176 1.350 1.436 1.345
26 1.256 1.530 1.436 1.156 1.330 1.436 1.176 1.350 1.436 1.345
27 1.471 1.561 1.548 1.271 1.461 1.548 1.271 1.361 1.548 1.449
28 1.292 1.428 1.426 1.192 1.328 1.326 1.212 1.328 1.326 1.318
29 1.133 1.261 1.371 1.133 1.261 1.371 1.133 1.161 1.371 1.244
30 1.148 1.234 1.376 1.148 1.234 1.276 1.148 1.234 1.296 1.233
31 0.940 1.003 1.068 0.940 1.003 1.068 0.940 1.003 1.068 1.004
32 1.443 1.428 1.473 1.343 1.428 1.373 1.363 1.328 1.373 1.395
33 1.006 1.131 1.175 1.006 1.031 1.075 1.006 1.071 1.055 1.062
34 1.139 1.069 1.219 1.039 1.069 1.119 0.999 1.089 1.079 1.091
35 1.464 1.509 1.954 1.364 1.509 1.854 1.364 1.509 1.754 1.587
36 1.389 1.470 1.665 1.189 1.370 1.665 1.189 1.370 1.465 1.419
37 0.920 1.018 1.220 0.920 1.018 1.220 0.920 1.018 1.220 1.053
38 1.229 1.326 1.577 1.129 1.326 1.577 1.149 1.246 1.477 1.337
39 1.089 1.216 1.259 1.089 1.216 1.259 1.069 1.136 1.259 1.177
40 1.067 1.085 1.146 0.967 1.085 1.146 0.967 1.085 1.146 1.077
41 1.377 1.526 1.556 1.377 1.326 1.556 1.297 1.326 1.356 1.411
42 1.369 1.460 1.372 1.269 1.360 1.372 1.229 1.260 1.272 1.329
a  Productivity relative ratio for the average farm in a region-industry segment is equal to one.
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APPENDIX I
GLOSSARY OF PARAMETERS AND VARIABLES IN SIMULATION
MODEL
Mnemonic            Variable or parameter name
A Total asset value
am Amortisation factor for farm model
atr Average tax rate for farm model
BC Bank charges
BF Bank fees
BFC Bank fees and charges paid by farm model
BFC Average bank fees and charges income from portfolio segment for bank model
BLN Net lending balances for bank model
BLN Average net lending balances from portfolio segment for bank model
bodr Ratio of net term lending balances to total net lending balances for bank model
BR Returns (or cash flow) for bank model
BR Average bank returns (or cash flow) from portfolio segment for bank model
bs Share of farm population that obtain finance from the bank in a region-i dustry segment
BTNC Number of deposits made on the overdraft facility in a year by farm model
BTND Number of cheques drawn on the overdraft facility in a year by farm model
C Value of collateral pledged for farm model
c Proportion of assets pledged as collateral by farm model
cl Maximum credit limit for farm model
CL Average capital loss from loans in portfolio segment for bank model
c
LT
Cost of funds on long term liabilities for bank model
CR Credit reserve for farm model
crm Minimum credit reserve limit for farm model
CS Cash surplus for farm model
CSR Cash surplus including credit reserves for the farm model
CSRpr Cash surplus including credit reserves prior to restructuring for farm model
CSRfr Cash surplus including credit reserves following restructuring for farm model
c
ST
Cost of funds on short term liabilities for bank model
ctr Company tax rate
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Mnemonic            Variable or parameter name
BLND Change in net lending balances during a simulation year for bank model
BLND Average value of change in net lending balances in a simulation year from a portfolio segment
for bank model
dq Critical cut-off score for probability of default in default risk class q
dn Default risk quality limit expressed in terms of the maximum acceptable probability of default
for loan applicants
dr Discount rate for bank model
drpce Certainty-equivalent default risk premium
efc Expected fixed cost factor where expected fixed costs are expressed as a proportion of
expected total farm costs for farm model
er Equity-asset ratio for bank model
FC Farm costs for farm model
FDR Fixed debt servicing requirement for farm model
FFC Farm fixed costs for farm model
ffc Fixed cost factor which gives the contribution to farm fixed costs for a unit deviation of gross
income from the expected value of gross income
FVC Farm variable costs for farm model
fvc Variable cost factor which gives the contribution to farm variable costs for a unit deviation of
gross income from the expected value of gross income
GI Gross income for farm model
GIB Gross income for the base farm model in a region-industry segment
I Total interest payments by farm model
IC Interest capitalisation for bank model
IC Average interest capitalisation from a portfolio segment for bank model
II Interest income for bank model
II Average interest income from a portfolio segment for bank model
IO Interest payment on the overdraft facility by farm model
IR Interest held in reserve for bank model
IR Average interest held in reserve from a portfolio segment for bank model
hn Security risk class with the minimum acceptable security cover ratio as a cut-off limit
LB Value of farm land and buildings
LD Loan drawings for bank model
LD Average loan drawings from a portfolio segment for bank model
LFC Loan fees and charges payment by farm model
lfr Average rate of loan fees and charges paid by farm model
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Mnemonic            Variable or parameter name
LO Balance on the overdraft facility for farm model
L
m Maximum permissible liabilities for farm model
LT Balance on the term loan facility for farm model
mrp Market risk premium
NBFC Non-bank fees and charges payment for the farm model
NC Net cash flows not including farm costs and the gross farm income of the base farm
model in a region-industry segment
ncdr Non-callable deposits ratio for bank model
nier Non-interest expense ratio for bank model expressed as a ratio of non-interest expenses to bank assets
niir Non-interest income ratio for bank model expressed as a ratio of non-interest income to bank assets
nim Net interest margin for bank model expressed as a ratio of interest income less interest expenses to bank
assets
nlbm Net lending balances multiplier for bank model expressed as a ratio of net lending balances and bank assets
nt Maturity term of loan for farm model
oasr Other asset support ratio for bank model
p Number of partners for taxable income splitting purposes for farm model
P Principal payment by farm model
par Prime assets ratio for bank model
PB Provisionings for bad and doubtful debts for bank model
PB Average provisionings from a portfolio segment for bank model
PE Minimum personal consumption expenditure for farm model
PI Principal and interest payment by farm model
pm Profit margin for bank model
POPN Population of farms in a region-industry segment
prp Portfolio risk premium
prr Productivity relative ratio for farm model.  The productivity relative ratio gives the ratio of
gross income for a farm model to the gross income for the average farm in the region-industry
segment consistent with a particular level of the expected probability of default.
qn Default risk grade that has the maximum default probability as a cut-off limit
r’ Promised rate of interest
rt Term loan rate of interest
R Bank returns for bank model
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Mnemonic            Variable or parameter name
rA
bt Target return on assets before tax for bank model
rb Benchmark rate of interest on the term loan facility for prime rate borrowers (prime rate borrowers are
associated with zero expected losses)
rce Certainty-equivalent promised rate of interest
rE Target return on equity for bank model expressed as a ratio of net profit after tax to bank equity
RL Loan revenue for bank model
RL Average revenue from portfolio segment for bank model
ro Rate of interest on the overdraft facility
rpl Risk pricing limit beyond which the risk premium is fixed regardless of default risk and
security risk
rpce Certainty-equivalent risk premium
RPT Loan repayments for bank model
RPT Average value of loan repayments from portfolio segment for bank model
s Salvage value of farm assets
shq Proportion of farms in a region-industry which fall into particular default risk class
scr Expected security cover ratio which equals the ratio of expected value of collateral assets
pledged to loan value
scrh Critical cut-off score for security cover ratio in security risk class h
scrn Security risk quality limit expressed in terms of the minimum permissible security cover ratio
SPN New specific provisions for bad and doubtful debts for bank model
SPN Average value of new specific provisionings from portfolio segment for bank model
srpce Certainty-equivalent security risk premium
svf Salvage value factor which gives the contribution of a unit deviation in the ratio of  actual gross income to
the expected value of gross income
TAX Tax payments for farm model
TFI Taxable income after income splitting for farm model
TTFI Taxable farm income after income splitting and tn years tax averaging
tn Number of years over which taxable income is averaged for tax payment calculations
wacc Weighted average cost of capital for bank model
WBS Writeback of specific provisions for bad and doubtful debts for bank model
WBS Average value of writeback of specific provisionings from portfolio segment for bank
model
WNSP Write-off of provisions for bad and doubtful debts not previously provided for bank model
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Mnemonic            Variable or parameter name
WNSP Average value of write-off of provisions for bad and doubtful debts not previously provided
for from portfolio segment for bank model
X Number of borrowers in a portfolio segment for bank model
XS Number of portfolio entrants for bank model
